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ABSTRACT  
The thesis aims to understand: what constitutes urban collaboration and its relationship with policy 
outcomes?  The research develops a conceptual understanding of the public value (PV)1 (Bardach, 1998; 
Moore, 1995, Smith, 2004)2 of Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC)3 as economic development 
policy, relative to three theoretical domains in the literature: economic collaboration (i.e. new/old 
institutional economics: Ostrom 1990, 2016; Williamson, 2000); spatial collaboration (i.e. institutional 
economic geography: Ostrom, 2010; Gerber, 2015; Tarko and Aligica, 2012), and governance collaboration 
(i.e. collective action theory: Hulst and van Monfort, 2012; Feiock, 2008, 2013).  Theoretically, the 
‘institution’ (Amin, 2001; Jessop, 2001; Williamson, 2000; Aligica and Boettke, 2009; Gertler, 2010) is a 
distinct conceptual dimension connecting the theoretical literature, bridging scholarly boundaries across 
compatible ontological insights (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003; and Hay, 2011).   
A conceptual framework is developed to help understand: a) what ULAC looks like; b) how ULAC creates 
PV and, c) why institutions explain the PV of ULAC.  A purposeful single case study of ULAC (i.e. the 
Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA): a formalised institutional policy network involving seven Urban Local 
Authorities (ULAs) and the Scottish Government) involved collecting data using semi-structured interviews, 
secondary data, policy documentation and non-participant observation.  The emergence of the SCA as 
economic development policy in Scotland – conducive to an institutionally sensitive theoretical approach – 
presents a valuable opportunity to contribute towards an empirical and theoretical understanding of ULAC. 
Using template analysis, findings emerged through process-tracing, sense-making and thick narrative 
descriptions to reveal aggregate dimensions and second-order themes and first-order concepts.  
The thesis responds to calls for in-depth case study research of the way local government collaboration 
operates and performs (Hulst and Montfort, 2012), engaging with the ‘fuzzy’(Markhusen, 2003) concepts 
and processes of ‘urban collaboration’, ‘policy outcomes’ and ‘institutions’ to reveal a lack of empirical and 
conceptual understanding of how ULAC operates: particularly the role of ‘urban’ institutional context as a 
‘key actor attribute’ (Hulst and van Monfort, 2012: 139).  Using a critical realist ontology (Jessop, 2005), the 
research is best suited to Stake’s (2005) interpretive methodological approach to contextualised theorising, 
using the SCA in Scotland to investigate the ‘contextualised’ Institutional context, to help inductively 
conceptualise the PV of ULAC as economic development policy.  
Whilst conscious of the risks of methodological and conceptual ‘stretching’ (Stubbs, 2005: 71)4, the research 
uses Scotland as a case study to conceptualise the more generic, abstract features of ULAC as a ‘theoretically 
vague’ term that may ‘travel’ (Stubbs, 2005: 71).  The results validate a realist perspective of the theoretical 
role of formal and informal institutions shaping the contextual path dependant nature of the PV of 
ULAC.   The methodological contribution of the thesis highlights how a new evolving model of economic 
and spatial governance in Scotland, presents potential challenges for the future delivery of urban policy and 
practice in Scotland, before closing with a discussion of research limitations and recommendations for areas 
of future academic research. 
                                                 
1 PV is the acronym used throughout the rest if the thesis to refer to Public Value. 
2 The Public Value (PV) in the context of this thesis is defined as: an assessment of normative consensus concerning an increase (or 
decrease) in the value to the public from initiating and reshaping public sector enterprise in both the short and long run.   
3 Urban Local Authority collaboration (ULAC) in the context of this thesis relates to: inter-urban governmental networks representing 
multiple linkages of dynamic interaction between individuals, organisations, places and nodes, in pursuit of economic development 
outcomes for their territory.  ULAC is the acronym used throughout the rest if the thesis. 
4 See Stubbs (2005) for a useful discussion of the risks of methodological and epistemological overstretching within governance related 
research. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Focus of the research 
 
‘We cannot adopt the smug presumption of earlier group theorists who thought groups would 
always form whenever a joint benefit would be obtained…we need to recognize that political 
systems are complexly organized and that we will rarely be able to state that one variable is 
always positively or negatively related to a dependent variable.’ 
 Ostrom (1998: 16) 
 
The research philosophy of the thesis strongly resonates with Ostrom’s view of joint working.  
Having worked in the public sector in Scotland over many years, I found that collaborative 
working was commonplace, failure frequently observed and measures of success largely anecdotal.  
Recent policy shifts in Scotland have shown a renewed focus on collaboration in the area of 
economic development (a responsibility of local government in Scotland), through the ‘Agenda for 
Cities’ (Scottish Government, 2011), introducing a formal urban collaboration partnership of 
governmental working between the seven urban local authorities (ULAs) of Scotland and the 
Scottish Government (i.e. the Scottish Cities Alliance – SCA).   
 
Given the renewed policy emphasis on urban collaboration between Scotland’s cities as economic 
development policy, the implied assumption is that collaborative relationships in a networked 
policy environment is advantageous for achieving policy outcomes.  A question as to whether 
discernible positive policy outcomes can be identified, and the causal mechanisms thereof, raises 
an important research question: 
What constitutes urban collaboration and its relationship with policy outcomes? 
If ‘one purpose of research on collaboration is to inform practice, then measurement becomes 
important because policy makers rely on research findings to make substantive changes in policy’ 
(Thomson et al. 2009: 24).  
This introductory chapter situates the research within the broad complex field of collaboration as 
economic development policy, first outlining the theoretical background and second, outlining the 
research rationale and proposed approach, highlighting the research questions, aims, and 
objectives, before finally, providing an outline of the structure of the thesis.  The conclusions and 
empirical findings are discussed in later empirical chapters (i.e. Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
 
1.1.1 The theoretical rationale of public sector collaboration for economic development  
 
Prior to the industrial revolution, economic growth theory largely recognised cities as monocentric 
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clusters of people and business.  In recent years, networks among cities have been increasingly 
recognised as an alternative, or compliment to traditional models of urban competitiveness (see for 
example, Stoker and Young, 1993; Malecki, 2002; Turok, 2004; Meijers, 2005) - a complex and 
often controversial term in itself (see Boddy, 1999).  The concept of ‘collaboration’ in its various 
forms, has underpinned the development of new urban policies emphasising ‘joined-up’ policy-
making (Docherty et al. 2004: 449) and a growing reflection of intergovernmental working (see for 
example, Davies, 2002).  
 
‘Collaboration’ as a generic theoretical and policy term is controversial, often ill-defined within a 
dense multi-disciplinary literature, lacking clarity from a variety of meanings and terms, including: 
‘networks’; ‘cooperation’; ‘joint-working’; ‘coordination’; ‘collective action’, ‘partnerships’.  Of 
particular interest to this research is the growing interest in collaboration and its relationship with 
the competitive position of cities (see for example, Stewart, 1996; Oinas, 2002; Graham, 1995; 
Crosby and Bryson, 2006).  As a result, there exists a wide range of literatures and research 
interests relating to collaboration as policy from varying theoretical foundations and relationships 
(e.g. between individuals, firms or geographies), across varying structures and forms (e.g. between 
or within public/private agencies).  
 
There are a variety of concepts, typologies and models aimed at capturing the structures, 
interactions, and outcomes of collaboration, where the meaning and outcome changes according to 
the perspective from which it is being assessed.  The overall result is conceptual ambiguity relating 
to collaboration theory and policy (see for example, Gray 1989, 1996, 2000; Huxham 1996; 
Huxham and Vangen 2005).  To emphasize the point, ‘some 101 definitions of collaboration are 
thought to exist’ (O’Leary and Vij, 2012: 508), leading to misconceptions of the term.  
 
Such theoretical diversity highlights the underlying complexity and ‘fuzzy’ (Markusen, 2003: 702) 
nature of research relating to collaboration policy, highlighting the need for more ‘systematic 
approaches’ to understanding collaboration by taking into account multiple ‘theoretical 
perspectives’ in a ‘consistent non-subjective way’ (Thomson et al. 2009: 52).  
 
The focus of this thesis relates to the different and sometimes overlapping theories, that seek to 
explain the nature and rationale of collaboration policies, bridging insights from across three main 
groups of literature: economic, spatial and public management fields.  The aim is to use theoretical 
insights to help understand the public value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) for 
economic development.  Building on Moore (1995) – who originally coined the phrase –the Public 
Value (PV) of joint public sector activity involving collaboration can be defined as: 
‘normative assessment concerning an increase (or decrease) in the value to the public from 
initiating and reshaping public sector enterprise in both the short and long run’  
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Bardach (1998: 8)   
Economic development can be broadly understood as policy aimed at developing the capacity of 
economic agents (i.e. individuals, firms, industry, public agencies) (Feldman et al. 2016).  The unit 
of analysis of the research is ULAC as an economic development policy network, defined broadly 
as a collaborative arrangement between Urban Local Authorities (ULAs) working across spatial 
and institutional boundaries.   
Recognising that networks are the primary organizational setting for designing and executing much 
of policy, geography and economics research recognises the role of social and institutional 
structures for understanding networks of different size and scale, across different nodes and reach – 
although often criticized as vague conceptualization (Williamson, 1994).  The public management 
literature recognizes the number and type of networks that exist ‘within the policy-making realm of 
a single city’ and their empirical importance for contemporary public management (Agranoff and 
McGuire, 1998: 68), although similarly lacking conceptual clarity.  
 
Through the coordination of institutional perspectives of urban collaboration (as broadly defined 
and understood) across three theoretical literature domains, the research provides a multi-
disciplinary approach to conceptualising the PV of ULAC (as a form of urban collaboration) as 
economic development policy.  The methodological challenge therefore, is to conceptualise ULAC 
through the coordination of different theoretical perspectives of institutions as networked social 
behavior, regardless of differing methodological positions. 
The economic rationale of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) 
 
The ‘new urbanism’ in urban and regional growth literature, recognises urban areas as critical 
forces for economic and national growth (Stanley, 2005).  Recognizing the economic role of cities 
within their wider context of interconnectedness across different scales (i.e. between cities; within 
cities; between organisations within cities; between organisations across cities), an economic 
perspective of ULAC policy relates to an understanding of network activity shaped and transferred 
within and between cities. 
Whilst cities at the global scale generally seek to compete for economic growth (i.e. for investment, 
population, tourism, labour, for example), small cities are thought to be more successful if they 
compete and collaborate with nearby cities to achieve complementarity5 (Gordon 2011, Feiock and 
Turnbull, 2012).  The economic role of networks and networked cities is premised on the view that 
‘effective urban systems ought to have benefits for the economy as a whole…and improve overall 
                                                 
5 Complementarity is when two collaborating cities have similar economic structures, but possibly specialise and compete in the 
production of different sectors.  
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economic performance’ (Begg, 1999: 807). 
The (new and old) institutional turn in economics’ for understanding ULAC, relates to the social, 
unbounded nature of urban networks.  Indeed, cities can be viewed as fragmented economically, 
socially and institutionally and no longer bounded, and ‘metropolitanisation’ and city networks 
thought to have made traditional urban territorial boundaries obsolete (Parkinson, et al. 2004).  
Therefore, the institutional economic perspective of ULAC recognizes the broader nature and 
‘levels of the institutional environment and the institutions of governance’ (Williamson, 2000: 
608), separating the institutions and the environment to highlight how different institutional 
arrangements facilitate economic development.    
New Institutional Economics (NIE) considers the importance of informal and formal rules and how 
they interact to affect economic stability (Furbotn and Richter, 2000), as well as how structures 
affect economic networks and the importance of interaction between individuals and institutions 
(Lowndes, 2001).  Urban policy is thought intensely local, political and territorial, requiring 
recognition of wider governance frameworks and policy networks (McCann and Ward, 2011).  The 
NIE perspective (Williamson, 2000) highlights the conditions that facilitate or impede 
collaboration for economic efficiency, using social analysis to understand the role and development 
of institutions, representing a conceptual shift from earlier, more rational explanations of 
networked economic activity.  
 
Different institutional arrangements will be used for different means in the context of networked 
policy, for example: taking a broad strategic view across areas of economic significance or of 
functional coherence (i.e. spatial planning, service delivery or infrastructure improvement) (Turok, 
2009); providing a ‘potential mechanism through which cities can share resources, physical assets 
and policy skills’ (Docherty et al. 2004, p448); help achieve information exchange and mutual 
commitment to shared goals across spatial boundaries (Dawson, 1992); maximizing collaborative 
advantage (Huxman, 1996). 
 
However, although NIE may help explain the economic role of ULAC from a broad institutional 
perspective, it is largely understood as a ‘cauldron of ideas’ (Williamson, 2000: 610) that on its 
own lacks clarity and in need of further research to help establish a ‘fully formal theory’ (p610). 
 
The spatial rationale of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC)  
 
From a spatial perspective, ULAC can be seen as both a structural (i.e. a nodal, city level 
connection) and social relationship, in terms of: the city network; the nodal (city) level connection; 
and secondary nodal connections (i.e. various organizations within cities), resulting mainly from 
collaborative urban relationships (i.e. that can be both competitive and collaborative in nature) 
(Taylor, 2004).   
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The New Economic Geography (NEG) in the early 1990s introduced the importance of the spatial 
economy for understanding economic activity in terms of ‘a variety of economic agglomerations’ 
(Fujita, 2007:484).  Collaboration across administrative boundaries is thought to enhance economic 
activity through a critical mass of networked advantages (Meijers 2008) within and between places, 
to facilitate urban success (Amin and Thrift, 1992; Bennett and McCoshan, 1993; Kanter, 1995; 
Ohmae, 1995; Simmie, 1997).  The economies of scale and spatial concentration of people and 
firms, clustering and urbanization are recognised as key spatial contexts to understanding 
networked activity (see Fujita et al. 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002).   
Harrison and Growe (2012) suggest increasing urbanization means ‘functional economies of most 
large cities extend far beyond their traditional boundaries to capture physically separate, yet 
functionally networked cities and towns in the surrounding hinterland’ (p25).  Indeed, spatial 
change within the urban system means connections between cities can be both horizontal and 
vertical (Camagni and Salone, 1993), resulting in the ‘city network paradigm’ that recognises cities 
are not merely static, ‘centrally-place’ based territorial systems (Camagni, 1992).  Brenner (2001) 
provides a relevant discussion of scale as it relates to a relational view of the social construction of 
places, based on scale as a ‘tangled hierarchy’ of networks across various scales (Brenner 2001, 
605).  Thus, the city, traditionally conceived, is an increasingly out-dated and redundant concept, 
no longer adequately reflecting the underlying structure of how socio-economic activity is 
organized at the urban scale. 
Economic geography also highlights the importance of the relationship between structure and 
agency (Giddens, 1984), and the path dependant, contextual nature of ULAC networks. The 
institutional turn in economic geography highlights the important role of agents and organizations, 
networked relationships and resultant social dynamics across spatial and non-spatial scales, by 
‘conceive[ing] institutions as stabilizations of mutual expectations and correlated interaction’ 
(Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 341), where ‘rules and regulations are required only for socio-
economic institutions in a spatial perspective’ (p357).  Hence, the institutional-logic of the 
networked city-system from a relational spatial perspective, views ULAC as a process 
encompassing a range of network synergies of both functional and complimentary nature, 
regardless of city size and distance (Camagni and Salone, 1993). 
An understanding of ULAC in institutional economic geography is thought ambiguous and 
methodologically challenging, including ‘institutions’ being ‘hidden behind spatial patterns or 
assumed spatial laws’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 341), resulting in a ‘duality of structure and 
agency’ that implies ‘institutions cannot be measured by obvious or easily identifiable indicators’, 
and empirical research thought ‘still in its infancy’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 357).  
The governance rationale of urban local government collaboration (ULAC) 
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The governance perspective of ULAC largely within the public management literature is 
recognised through ‘policy network’ research (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), based on early theories of 
organisational sociology, inter-organisational relations (Provan and Millward, 1995) and political 
science (Klinj, 1996).  Policy networks are theorized at different geographical scales (i.e. global; 
national; local) (Arku and Oosterbaan, 2014; O’Toole, 1997; Healey, 2004; Meijers, 2005), and 
rarely questioned in practice (Sullivan et al.  2013).  
 
Policy networks involving government collaboration have proliferated in recent years, in line with 
the shifting focus of the new urban governance literature towards partnerships, particularly in 
Britain, where partnerships developed rapidly in the 1990s (Davies, 2002).  The collaborative 
working focus on ‘partnerships’ in public policy increased at a time when hierarchical policy-
making was being questioned (see Sørensen and and Torfing, 2007), with a general shift in 
emphasis from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014).  The result has been a 
growth in policy networks as a form of ‘collaborative governance’ (see, for example, Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2000; Rhodes 1998; Kickert et al. 1997; and Scharpf 1978).  
 
The ‘associational model’ (developed by Cooke and Morgan in 1998) describes policy network 
governance as a ‘third way’ between state-led and market-led development, involving a more 
social/collaborative mode of achieving economic success.   Social and economic success is based 
largely on regional capability in trust-based relationships, learning and network competence and 
the ability to create the right conditions for competitiveness, including: administrative 
organisations, strategic public–private networks, leadership, vision and strategy, political support, 
societal support and a set of spatial economic conditions that induces and supports collaboration 
(i.e. the social capital of cities) (van den Berg and Braun, 1999). 
 
The governance perspective provides insights on the institutional and social contexts of policy 
networks and their specific contents (Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2003), in terms of an apparent ‘gap 
between the actual needs of spatial and economic transformation, and newly introduced 
mechanisms, units and scales of governmental activity’ (Eraydin et al. 2008: 2316).  Indeed, the 
governance perspective considers the ‘politics of scale…seen not as fixed but, rather, as contingent, 
complex, and socially constructed’ from increased recognition of complex and overlapping 
networks, as opposed to being discrete at the territorial level (Stubbs, 2005, p67).  
 
However, regardless of the governance literature for understanding ULAC, the policy network 
approach is vulnerable to criticism due to a lack of general theory and conceptual ambiguity (see 
Dowding 1995), with calls for a conceptually and theoretically more rigorous approach to policy 
networks (Bressers, OʹToole, and Richardson, 1994; Dowding, 1995; Peters, 1998). 
 
Having considered the main theoretical dimensions to understanding ULAC and its diversity, it is 
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important to consider why the renewed focus on ULAC and its importance, relative to the 
difference it can make to society and the economy if it is successful. 
 
The success of ULAC: public value (PV) 
 
An important theoretical strand connecting the diverse literature and rationale underpinning urban 
collaboration is that both internal and external network properties across different scales are 
thought important for economic competitiveness (see Figure 2 in section 2.3).  As a result, there 
has been increasing policy recognition of networks and collaboration as economic development 
policy in recent years.  However, measuring the ‘outcome’ from collaboration policy in practice, is 
not well understood (O’Leary and Vij, 2012), largely a result of varying theoretical dimensions and 
the conceptual challenges in assessing policy outcomes (Thomson and Perry, 2006).   
 
There are different ontological views of how to assess and understand ‘outcomes’ and often 
entangled in ‘vague definitions and conceptualizations’ (Crosby et al. 2014: 453).  Policy outcomes 
can be understood within a linear policy development process: the intermediate stage in the policy 
development process can be understood once a policy is developed and implemented, the delivery 
of policy outcomes, outputs and gains/impacts can be assessed (e.g. strategic policy [intangible] or 
physical project [tangible]).  Policy outcomes at a wider, macro economy level would relate to 
strategic policy changes that result from any given policy programme (see Figure 1 for an 
illustration of the linear policy process), and not wider medium-longer term policy outputs and 
economic impacts (e.g. intermediate (shorter term) outcomes produced by the policy process in 
terms of new/improved physical transport infrastructure; reduced traffic congestion outcomes). 
 
Figure 1:  Policy Development Process
 
 
Given the different ontological perspectives of outcomes, the attribution of policy networks 
towards achieving policy outcomes is thought methodologically challenging and difficult to fully 
evidence how benefits actually happen (Loftman and Nevin, 1996), resulting in a general lack of 
data (Provan and Milward 1995) to help ‘capture the adaptive behaviours of organizations’ 
(Thomson et al. 2009: 49).  Policy outcomes do not occur automatically and causality within 
networks are thought related to differences in history, local institutions, and differently structured 
environments where people live, work and invest. Thus, measuring outcomes of collaboration 
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policy is far from straight forward, due largely to a multiplicity of structures and dynamic 
complexity of the network process having a non-linear effect, such that the combination of factors 
may not result in the same situation or outcome a second time (Theitart and Forgues, 1995).   
 
Much of the policy network literature on collaboration distinguishes between ‘process’, 
‘management’ and ‘policy outcomes’ (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 549), highlighting ‘the analytical 
difficulty prevalent in the literature’ (Thomson et al. 2009: 49). Organizing and realizing the 
benefits and costs of collaboration are rarely identified and understood, except anecdotally 
(Malecki 2002), with ‘a lack of empirically validated tools’ (Marek et al. 2014: 68). There are 
various studies that attempts to identify the large number of variables for assessing collaboration 
(see O’Toole 1997; Axelrod, 1984, Huxham 1996, for example) ‘but these variables either go 
unanalyzed or are not systematically modelled’ and thought too often represent ‘process 
dimensions as opposed to actual outcomes’ (Miller et al. 2008: 97).   For example, a recent attempt 
to develop a multi-dimensional model of the collaboration policy-process-outcome relationship by 
Miller at al (2008), uses structural equation modelling in their conceptualisation, identifying five 
main dimensions of collaboration involving numerous process-related activities that are tested via 
seventeen indicators (and primary data generated from a questionnaire), used to empirically test 
their model.  Although the empirical testing of the model is thought to demonstrate support for the 
conceptualisation of collaboration, it is however, thought limited in its ability to make 
‘generalisations’ without being tested in various settings.  Indeed, such models are dependant on 
which theoretical perspective is taken to the conceptualisation and thought best to avoid labelling 
collaboration outcomes in terms of ‘success or failure’, unless it is possible to demonstrate 
consistency in outcomes over time, and across different settings and contexts (Miller et al. 2008: 
103).     
 
Therefore, given the diversity of perspectives for assessing and understanding the outcomes of the 
policy process, in order to understand whether ULAC is effective as urban policy there is the need 
to clarify the ontological position of what is meant by ‘policy outcomes’ in the context of this 
thesis.  Bardach (1998) and Smith (2004) ontological view is that that policy success should be best 
thought of in terms of the ‘public value (PV)’ created from the policy process in a non-linear way, 
to produce sustainable collaboration as a key indicator of its value.  An original line of inquiry into 
the relationship between urban collaboration policy and outcomes is apparent: it is not only any set 
of contributing ‘factors’ that enable policy outcomes, nor how they flow (or ‘sort’) into a location, 
but how the factors interact within the policy process in a transformational way (Pawson, 2006).  
These ways differ across polices and across space and time due to complexity: human interactions 
and institutional settings vary within a policy network and the territory with which it is placed.  
Thus, institutional context matters for conceptualisation. 
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For the focus of this thesis, there is an opportunity to contribute towards the understanding of urban 
collaboration from a diverse theoretical coherent perspective, by bringing together both existing 
and new empirical and theoretical insights to help conceptualise the PV of ULAC within a distinct 
institutional context.  Bringing together the fuzzy (Markusen, 2003) concepts of ‘urban 
collaboration’, ‘policy network’ and ‘institutions, the unique contribution of this research is to 
conceptualise the PV of ULAC within a particular institutional setting.   
 
Consistent with the PV perspective of policy outcomes, collaboration should be assessed for it’s 
ability to create ‘social value… based on the principle of comparative advantage’ (Bardach, 
1998:9) to distinguish it from its counterparts (i.e. to specialize or diversify, as opposed to 
collaborate).  In other words, the PV of collaboration relates to the benefits derived from changing 
work practices, until the most effective combination of activities are produced.   
 
Assessing PV criteria of collaboration policy thus requires: 
 
‘telling a story…to bring together debates about values, institutions, systems, processes, 
and people….Public value is defined and redefined through social and political interaction’ 
(emphasis added)  
Smith, (2004: 68 -69)  
 
Consistent with Moore (1995: 71), producing PV from policy requires that the policy must be: 
 
‘substantively valuable, that is, they must produce things of value to overseers and 
beneficiaries; be legitimate and politically sustainable; be operationally and 
administratively feasible’ (emphasis added) 
 
Smith, (2004: 79)  
In line with the above theoretical understanding of PV criteria, a normative assessment of the PV of 
ULAC in the context of this thesis is conceptualized through the establishment of the combined 
understanding of:  
 
a) the network process (what does ULAC look like) - an interpretation of network members’ (i.e. 
as the overseer and beneficiary) perception of the purpose and value of ULAC; 
b) the network context (how it takes place) – an explanation of network members’ perceptions of 
the role of institutions on the operational and administrative feasibility of ULAC; and  
c) network value (why it is perceived the way it is) – a theoretical explanation of the impact of 
institutions on the legitimacy and political sustainability of ULAC.   
 
1.1.2 Urban collaboration and intergovernmental working  
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Aside from the diverse theoretical nature underpinning the fuzziness of urban collaboration, there 
exists a range of policy areas and collaborative arrangements from which an empirical assessment 
would permit. The focus on local government as the ‘collaborator’ within a ULAC setting is of 
particular importance and relevance for several reasons.  
 
First, the rationale and emphasis on urban collaboration largely inspired by the growth in ‘neo-
liberal’ approaches to public policy, represents a key shift in UK policy delivery from the 1990s 
onwards, stressing ‘the need to move away from understanding cities as discrete, self-enclosed, 
analytically separate objects’ (Ward, 2008: 407).  The result is a renewed interest in functional 
collaboration at both an intra-urban scale and inter-urban scale (i.e. SCA) between public agencies 
focused on policy delivery outcomes.  Policy networks characteristically refer to multi-actor 
arrangements, where public sector networks are typically led or managed by government 
representatives (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001).  Research focused on understanding the factors 
affecting intergovernmental collaboration is thought ‘fairly rudimentary’, with ‘limited models 
taking account of political, economic, and demographic factors’ (Carr et al. 2007: 2).  Research on 
urban collaboration policy involving government institutions in the UK is thus timely.  
 
Second, cities are thought to play a crucial role in shaping and delivering economic development 
across various scales (local, urban, regional, national), with the role of local government taking a 
key role within that (see for example: Feiock, 2002 and Konvitz, 2016).  Cities often use 
collaboration as a resolution approach for dealing with similar or interconnected challenges (i.e. 
transport issues), or simply, to strengthen collaborative relationships between different agencies, or 
to support ‘mandated’ joined-up service delivery.  UK government policy focus in recent years has 
seen a gradual restructuring of urban local government, underpinned by an unfolding debate 
concerning different models of territorial governance, power constellations and balance of urban 
policy responsibility between central and local government.  For example, traditionally, economic 
development services have been ‘commonly associated with vertical forms of collaboration’ 
(Kaye-Essien, 2016: vi), whereas recent, more horizontal models for delivering economic 
development across urban local government in the UK are evolving, including: the creation of the 
‘English Core Cities Group’ and ‘region deals’ for England’s largest local authorities, and 
similarly, the Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) and ‘City Deals’ in Scotland.  Therefore, a fuller 
understanding of the changing role and structure of ULG for new models of urban collaboration is 
required. 
 
Case study selection: The Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) 
 
Growing pressure for greater autonomy and control of urban policy across local government in 
Scotland has coincided with government policy encouraging Scotland’s largest city local 
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authorities to work together in a formalised partnership for the first time.  The Scottish Cities 
Alliance (SCA), characterised by governmental working, represents a collective identity of the 
Scottish Government and seven ULAs: Glasgow, Edinburgh, Inverness, Dundee, Aberdeen, 
Stirling, and Perth, linked within a wider economic system.  The SCA was originally established by 
the Scottish Government in 2011, to encourage urban collaboration that supports national economic 
growth.   Scotland’s establishment of the SCA as a nationally instituted policy, provides a unique 
empirical opportunity for greater insight into the functioning of urban collaboration within a 
distinct country setting.  The research reveals the evolving nature of SCA policy over the study 
period (2010 – 2016), and the SCAs important  role in supporting cities pursuit for radical changes 
to urban policy in Scotland, mainly: the development of new infrastructure delivery models in 
Scotland, and calls for a new relationship between central and local government in Scotland.   
 
The SCA was selected as a case study for three main reasons.  First, from a governance 
perspective, it is the first time all of Scotland’s ULAs have come together in a formalised ULAC 
network, providing a unique opportunity to examine economic development policy of particular 
relevance to urban local government.  Second, from a spatial economic perspective, Scotland’s 
ULA areas all vary in size and economic diversity (see Table 9 in section 4.3.1) – indeed, some 
would question whether some of ‘Scotland’s cities are small towns’ (MacLennan, Waite and 
Muscatelli (2017: 100) - resulting in institutional diversity.  Scotland’s cities do however boast 
relatively skilled and well-educated populations common to all cities.   
 
Edinburgh and Glasgow are the two largest ULA areas and the only two cities having previously 
worked in formalised ULAC policy setting (i.e. The Glasgow-Edinburgh Initiative).  Glasgow is 
the most populated Scottish city and after almost four decades of profound and protracted decline, 
Glasgow has re-emerged as a locus of strong growth in jobs and incomes, underpinned by an 
expanding service sector.  Edinburgh, Scotland’s capital city is the second largest of Scotland’s 
cities, covering a broad base of economic activities.  Aberdeen has a long reputation as a high 
quality place for services and environmental opportunities, with a prominent oil and gas service 
sector, although a less diversified economic base.  Dundee has a relatively large public sector base, 
although some commercial successes in life sciences and digital technologies.  Stirling enjoys a 
relatively healthy economic environment and high quality life factors, holding a middle league 
position among the Scottish cites in terms of employment and salaries.  Inverness as one of the 
smallest Scottish cities has robust tourism, renewable energy, life sciences and food and drink 
sectors, and a key gateway to the northern reaches of Scotland.  Perth is the newest city having 
regained its ancient city status in March 2012 and an important strategic location between the urban 
lowlands and rural highlands, and the fastest growing area in Scotland with significant business 
services, retail, tourism and culture sectors (see MacLennan et al. 2017, for a comprehensive 
discussion on the role of Scotland’s cites in the Scottish Economy). 
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The economic diversity across Scotland’s cities, and variation of competitive sectors, implies that 
resource allocation, investment decisions and motivations for collaboration will differ across the 
cities.  Until recently, the varying size, structure and economic performance of Scotland’s urban 
areas has to a large extent, reduced the incentive for city local authorities to work together in a 
formalised ULAC setting.  The SCA, with small catalytic funding, is focused on improving the 
connections and commonalities between the major urban areas in Scotland, as well as supporting 
the effective practices for shaping and delivering city infrastructure development strategies.  The 
SCA has also notably supported the development of metropolitan, city-region level infrastructure 
‘City Deals’, representing major infrastructure strategies comprised of substantial innovative 
funding mechanisms.  As a result, the SCA involves inter-urban collaboration, but also, through 
‘City Deals’, involves the development of policy between urban areas and their wider metropolitan 
economic systems.  The notion of the ‘city’ and ‘city-region’ spatial focus of policy in the UK has 
been largely missing (see for example, Deas and Hinks, 2017 and Hambleton, 2017), although 
being increasingly reformed in recent years. For example, Scotland’s third National Planning 
Framework: ‘Ambition, Opportunity and Place’ (Scottish Government, 2014), emphasizes a 
renewed focus on the spatial scale of city regions, and similarly, the ‘Agenda for Cities’ (Scottish 
Government, 2011) highlighting the importance of both cities and their regions in Scotland.  
 
A distinct feature of the SCA case study therefore, is the potential insight into the spatial and 
economic rationale for ULAC as being representative of a policy mechanism for cities to work as a 
regional/national system, in line with suggestions that ‘the emergence of a distinctly new ‘regional 
world’ is evolving ‘underpinned by a relational ontology of flow, network and connectivity’ 
(Harrison and Growe, 2012: 37).  
 
Finally, whilst seeking to conceptualise the relationship between ULAC and policy outcomes, the 
SCA case study was deemed unsuitable for assessing or evaluating policy outputs/impacts at this 
stage.  Most of the SCA’s policies and projects identified over the study period (2010 – 2016) were 
not significantly advanced to facilitate an assessment of ‘policy outputs’ (i.e. where long lead-times 
are required between project planning, development and delivery).  Therefore, the thesis focus on 
policy outcomes from a PV perspective (Bardach, 1998), uses the SCA as a valuable contextualised 
collaboration policy opportunity for in-depth investigation of ULAC in practice, taking into 
account: 
 
‘The assessment of program interventions on the basis of policy makers’ goals to an 
engagement with and among all stakeholders about the value and meaning of their practice’ 
Abma (2006: 31)  
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
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The previous sections outlined how an understanding of urban collaboration requires insight from a 
number of theoretical perspectives, with a lack of conceptual clarity and multi-dimensional 
perspectives for understanding urban collaboration between urban local government and its 
relationship with policy outcomes.  The thesis research incorporates theories relating to economic 
collaboration (i.e. new/old institutional economics; Ostrom 1990, 2016; Williamson, 2000); spatial 
collaboration (i.e. institutional economic geography: Ostrom, 2010; Gerber, 2015; Tarko and 
Aligica, 2012), and governing collaboration (i.e. collective action theory: Hulst and van Monfort, 
2012; Feiock, 2008, 2013), through an interpretive approach (Stake’s, 2005) to understanding the 
relationship between ULAC and policy outcomes, acknowledging the importance of context using 
Scotland as a single case study.  A conceptual framework was developed (Figure 1) from the 
literature review to guide the in-depth case study of the policy-outcome relationship with insights 
from a particular Scottish context.  
 
The thesis’ research question, identified from the synthesis of knowledge gaps, was described as:  
 
What is the Public Value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) as economic 
development policy, relative to institutions?  
 
In order to fully investigate the research question and knowledge gaps on ULAC, the following 
research objectives were identified:  
 
• An understanding of the mutli-dimensional nature of urban local authority collaboration 
(ULAC) across three functional domains: purpose, configuration and management; 
 
• An explanation of perceived public value (PV) of ULAC relative to functional and 
institutional context; 
 
• A multi-disciplinary interpretive conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC as economic 
development policy relative to the role of institutions. 
 
1.3 Research Approach 
 
The methodology uses qualitative case-study research (Stake, 2005) to undertake an interpretive 
(Stake, 2005; Yanow, 2007; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) critical realist approach (Sayer, 2004,  Hood, 
2012; Pawson, 2006), deemed most appropriate for investigating the apparent lack of 
understanding of PV of ULAC and the importance of institutional context.  The conceptualisation 
of the PV of ULAC uses process-tracing (see George and Bennett, 2005; Checkel, 2008; Hay, 
2016;) as a the most appropriate qualitative research tool for understanding causal mechanisms that 
take particular account of the role of both structure (how) and agency (what) within the networked 
policy process.  
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The role of the different network members and the process of collaboration between them, are 
analysed to reveal the aggregate policy network process. Institutional distance is characterised by 
differences between member’s own individual institutional contexts within the policy network.  
Scotland was selected as the appropriate network context for the research, based on the uniqueness 
of the case study as the first time ULAC has been implemented as policy involving all of 
Scotland’s cities. 
 
An inductive approach to establishing a conceptualisation of the ULAC and PV relationship is used 
to reveal the network development process between the members embedded within the policy 
network.  An in-depth single case study was used in order to reveal to contextual importance of the 
urban context and novel conceptualization of ULAC, including policy lessons outwith Scotland, 
notwithstanding the particular geographical and political characteristics of the context under 
consideration here.  The within-case analysis was undertaken by comparing the findings with 
documentary and academic evidence, to reveal an interpretive causal explanation of: 
 
The Public Value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) as economic 
development policy: the role of institutions 
  
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis is concerned with conceptualising the PV of ULAC bringing together key concepts of 
‘urban collaboration’; ‘policy outcomes’ and ‘institutions’ across a diverse multi-disciplinary 
literature (i.e. economic, spatial and governance rationales), using an interpretive inductive-theory 
building in-depth case study (Stake, 2005). 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research philosophy and methodology and background context to 
researching the PV of ULAC, highlighting three theoretical themes underpinning the relevant 
literature, leading to a more detailed literature review in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
The literature review chapters build on the preliminary introduction of ULAC, by providing a 
comprehensive statement of the theoretical background and academic premise underpinning the 
subsequent case study analysis for conceptualising ULAC, through an in-depth examination of the 
Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) in Scotland as the main study area.  Chapter 2 is directly concerned 
with urban collaboration and economic development as concepts per se, leading to the focus on the 
role of networks and collaboration across ULG in terms of ULAC.  Chapter 3 provides an 
explanation of the conceptual dimensions of ULAC according to three main theoretical domains in 
the literature: economic, spatial and governance networks, and how they can be defined and 
understood relative to networks involving government institutions.  Chapter 3 concludes that 
knowledge of ULAC as an economic development policy is limited, particularly an understanding 
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of the role of the urban context in the network development process.   
 
The final Chapter of the literature review Chapter 4, highlights the complex nature of measuring 
and understanding policy outcomes from a PV perspective, and the role of institutional theory for 
bridging scholarly insights.  Chapter 4 also provides background context to the ULAC case study 
in Scotland, highlighting the nature of institutions situating Scotland’s local government sector, 
towards the development of the SCA between 2011 and 2016.  The literature review chapters are 
concluded with an outline of the integrative conceptual framework for achieving the research aim:  
 
To conceptualise the Public Value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) 
as economic development policy, relative to the role of institutions 
 
Chapter 5 outlines the research approach and methodology, including the justification for the single 
case study selection in Scotland, highlighting the epistemological issues in relation to the critical 
realist ontological position of the research and the need to be clear about the contribution the 
conceptual framework aims to provide.  In particular, substantial focus is given to interpretive 
sense making (Stake 2005) methodology, thought suitable for unpacking complex policy systems 
in particular institutional contexts. Clarity is also given to the interpretations adopted in the 
research through extensive qualitative coding and template analysis, predicting patterns in the data 
and establishing conceptual categories for analytical consideration, as well as outlining the validity 
and reliability of the research approach.   
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide detailed within-case study evidence of the Scottish Cities Alliance 
(SCA), analysing its perceived PV in terms of its purpose, configuration and management.  Chapter 
6 compares the published strategic policy position of the SCA with network members’ personal 
perceptions and understanding of the process. The context-rich data identifies three distinct stages 
in the network development process, summarised through  ‘process tracing’ (George and Bennett, 
2005: 147) to highlight ‘what’ the network looks like relative to its functional domains (i.e. 
purpose, structure and management).  Chapter 6 therefore provides an indicative conceptual model 
of what ULAC looked like over the study period. 
 
The second stage of the data analysis is presented in Chapter 7, identifying the relative strength of 
different institutions to help explain how ULAC and its functional domains create PV.  The ULAC 
conceptualisation identified in Chapter 6 is enhanced, analysing network members’ perceptions to 
understand the role of different institutional mechanisms.  The man mechanisms through which 
value from the network is created, is revealed, providing a detailed ‘sense making’ model of the 
how institutions can explain the PV of the SCA.  The extent to which formal and informal 
institutional mechanisms explain how network members interact within the SCA is revealed, 
highlighting important power constellations and institutional dynamics between Scotland’s ULAs 
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and Scottish Government. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the research findings to explain ‘why’ the PV of ULAC can be perceived 
according to the findings in chapter six and seven, gaining insight from institutional theory (i.e. 
spatial, economic and governance networks) to understand the PV of the SCA for urban local 
government and evolving city-regional infrastructure models across Scotland.  Institutional theory 
is used as a means for understanding the economic, spatial and governance rationales of ULAC, 
compared to the contextual findings relating to Scotland’s ULAC context, helping to finalise the 
conceptualization. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with an outline of the conceptual model of the role of 
institutions for understanding the PV of ULAC in Scotland, to reveal wider implications for 
Scotland’s local government. The important role of different institutional mechanisms across key 
phases of the network process over time, are shown to significantly influence the value of the 
policy-making process.  The research reveals key implications for the conceptualisation of ULAC 
and assumptions of urban regime theory, particularly those relating to city-region models of urban 
local governance. The research limitations are also discussed, suggesting avenues for future 
research.  
 
1.5 Contribution to knowledge: 
 
The research makes a theoretical contribution from the coordination of a number of complex 
concepts across a diverse theoretical literature, previously not well integrated for understanding 
how city local authorities collaborate, and its PV as an economic development policy.  
 
The research develops a multi-disciplinary conceptualisation of the dynamic networking processes 
between Scotland’s ULAs and national government, and its perceived value as public policy.  The 
findings underline some of the complexities and contradictions within the literature, important for 
understanding the further development of urban regime policy in Scotland. The Scottish case study 
is also theoretically valuable and empirically relevant for many other UK cities, as new spatial 
systems of urban governance have evolved across the UK in recent years.  The research provides 
an in-depth understanding of the importance of institutions and the roles played by public sector 
agencies representing the city system.   
 
Importantly, the research identifies the importance of both formal and informal institutions across 
different stages of the network process, highlighting the cumulative effect of institutional 
mechanism, conditioned by institutions in earlier network stages, to reveal an on-going dynamic 
network policy process over time.  The research findings are also empirically valuable as they 
relate to the Scottish case, helping to understand the role of collaboration policy in the development 
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of a new city and city-region spatial models of governance in Scotland. Finally, the research also 
has the potential to provide a unique contribution to the evolving work programme of the Scottish 
Cities Alliance (SCA) and inform the future development of urban policy in Scotland. 
 
Having briefly introduced the purpose, methodology and contribution of the thesis, the following 
chapter (Chapter Two) will proceed with a review of the collaboration literature relevant to the 
urban context.  
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Chapter Two: Economic Development and Local Government: it’s all 
about cities 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the thesis is to contribute towards knowledge on the PV (i.e. the social, non-scientific, 
non-economic goals…often the core public rationale for an endeavour: Bozeman and Sarewitz, 
2011: 1) of ULAC as economic development policy, by identifying the main theoretical insights 
and existing understandings.  Accordingly, a review of the academic literature concerning urban 
economic development was undertaken from a multidisciplinary perspective, identifying relevant 
knowledge about public sector collaboration as policy and the role of institutions of its public 
value.  Key gaps in understanding were identified, resulting in the narrow focus on economic 
development collaboration as policy between urban local government institutions. 
 
Accordingly, Chapter two in sections 2.2 and 2.3, discuss what is known about urban economic 
development policy in its broad context, framing the evolving economic policy debates relevant to 
Scotland.  Chapter three of the Literature Review follows with a more focussed discussion of 
collaboration networks, and specifically, collaboration as economic development policy of urban 
local government.  
 
2.2 Local Economic Development  
 
The thesis is primarily focused on the economic development role of urban local government, 
which requires both an understanding and definition of ‘local economic development’ and ‘urban 
local government’. It is necessary to first discuss economic development in its broad public sector 
context and the role of local government within that, before discussing the economic development 
context of urban local government in section 2.3.  
 
In its widest context, the term ‘local economic development’ is highly contested with limited 
consensus as to its meaning, ‘characterized as a hodgepodge of conflicting perspectives that do not 
speak to or with each other’ (Feiock, 2002: 123), although historically dominated by economic 
concerns relating to both the welfare of the individual and business growth. Indeed, economic 
development policies of local government are thought explained largely by ‘economic need’ 
(Feiock, 1990: 539); the pursuit of economic growth as an ‘ideological symbol’, or, the result of 
‘institutional arrangements’ within cities (p54).   
 
It is largely regarded as a ‘development’ process, where the inclusion of the ‘economic’ is thought 
to ‘consist of much else besides economic growth’ (Seers, 1969: 1) including: poverty, 
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unemployment, inequality, education and rights of citizenship.  In this sense, the economic 
objective of economic development is regarded a means for which economic welfare can be 
achieved according to ‘the social, economic, cultural and political conditions of particular 
populations in specific places’ and thought ‘inescapably context-dependent’ (Pike et al. 2016: 4).  
The recognition of a broader range of non-economic factors affecting economic development in 
recent years is thought reflected by the inclusion of ‘softer, less tangible and immeasurable 
dimensions’ of economic development (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013: 258).   
 
In relation to the ‘local’ context of economic development, it can be broadly understood as relating 
to ‘bottom-up, territorial, decentralized and participatory approaches to stimulate the local 
economy using locally available resources’ (Walo, 2016: 1).  Accordingly therefore, ‘local’ 
economic development is understood as relating to the policy domain of local government.      
 
Given the broad nature of local economic development, what follows is an overview of the relevant 
insights for understanding the theoretical basis of economic development policy in the context of 
local government, in order to make a clear distinction of the focus of interest from the outset.  
Economic development is a ‘dynamic field of activity with theories and methodologies often 
contested’ (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013: 258).  Economic development priorities and policies are not 
static and regularly reevaluated and changed as a consequence of surrounding local economic and 
political contexts, influencing both institutional mechanisms and modes of practice (Bentley and 
Pugalis, 2013).  Economic development is also thought embedded in particular social and 
institutional arrangements, and influenced by a wide range of forces (Turok and Bailey, 2004: 138).  
As such, local economic development theory is thought lacking a clearly defined model, as people 
and agencies have their own local understanding of the concept. 
 
The key concepts that structure our understanding of local economic development have been 
examined by ‘different scientific and ideological prisms’ (Pike et al. 2016: 2), reflected by a 
multiplicity of forms and structures of government and governance shaping diverse policy 
interventions within different historical, economic and geographical contexts.  
 
Clarifying the broad context of local economic development is necessary in setting boundaries for 
the scope of understanding the range of policy activity within which urban economic development 
(and collaboration as policy) has evolved as an important focus of urban local government policy.   
 
2.2.1 Theories of Local Economic Development  
Both the structures and regulatory frameworks of economic development have been a focus of 
much diverse academic interest in recent years, rooted mainly within economic and political 
geography traditions, as well as sociological and political science (see Jones, 2001, for a useful 
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summary).  Economic development theories include ‘hard, bounded and soft, unbounded 
conceptualization and theorization, inductive and/or deductive reasoning…varied geographies and 
conceptions of the ‘local’ (Pike et al. 2016: 5), making if difficult to isolate singular theoretical 
domains. The theoretical literature relevant to local economic development in the context of this 
thesis is summarized below, followed with a more in-depth discussion of the collaboration and 
network relevant theories in section 3. 
 
• Economic theories: Largely based on ideas of endogenous growth theory for economic 
development, assuming: economic rationality; perfect mobility of information; 
competition; diminishing returns; efficient markets/allocation of resources.  
 
• Spatial theories: The New Economic Geography (NEG) emphasizes the role of increasing 
returns, agglomeration economies, multiplier effects and knowledge spillovers in shaping 
the distribution of economic development, focusing on the benefits of spatial organization 
and concentration of activities for economic activity.  
 
• Governance theories:  The theories of the New Public Management (NPM) relate mainly 
to the role of institutions (i.e. government and governance; informal institutions; public and 
private partnerships) and cultural frameworks (i.e. customs, norms, and social routines; 
formal/informal structures of regulations) across all spatial scales, shaping policy 
formulation and development. 
 
The second half of the 20th century saw both the study of local economic development and the 
range and scale of government interventions expand significantly in the UK (Pike et al. 2016).   
 
Economic development has traditionally been delivered through the activities of local government, 
through a ‘redistributive approach to economic development, historically relying on subsidies’, 
although increasingly replaced in recent year by ‘neoliberal investment approaches’ to incentivize 
growth development through increasing involvement of the private sector (Bentley and Pugalis, 
2013: 258). The private sector has taken an increasing role in how economic development is 
delivered through increasing recognition of asset-based approaches to incentivizing growth in the 
UK (Brenner et al. 2010).  
 
2.2.2 Dimensions of Economic Development 
The World Bank6 view of local economic development is based on the idea that economic 
development relates mainly to strategies of individual communities and areas within a local 
                                                 
6 See: http://go.worldbank.org/EA784ZB3F0 
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government's influence.  It typically involves a wide range of agencies and partnerships at the local 
level, aimed at ‘continually improving the investment climate and business enabling environment 
to enhance their competitiveness, retain jobs and improve incomes’.  As previously mentioned, 
economic development policies are often inherently area dependant involving a diverse range of 
activities.  The World Bank provides a concise list helpfully suggesting a common range of local 
economic development activities, including: 
• Local investment development for local businesses; 
• Small and medium sized enterprise development; 
• Investment in new industries; 
• Attracting external investment (nationally and internationally); 
• Investing in physical (hard) infrastructure; 
• Investing in soft infrastructure (educational and workforce development, institutional 
support systems and regulatory issues); 
• Supporting the growth of particular clusters of businesses; 
• Targeting particular parts of the city for regeneration or growth (areas based initiatives); 
• Supporting informal and newly emerging businesses; 
• Targeting certain disadvantaged groups. 
Local economic development strategies are thus designed to either attract new business or to 
maintain, expand, or generate business within the local community. 
 
The key concepts that structure our understanding of local economic development are thought 
highly context dependant and local.  Economic development ‘does not take place in a political–
institutional vacuum’, shaped by the form, operation and spatial organization of the ‘nation’s core 
institutions, governance structures, political arrangements and policy-making machinery’ (Ron 
Martin et al. 2015: 348).  It is important to summarise relevant policy context shaping our 
understanding of economic development in the UK in recent years. 
 
UK ‘Local’ economic development context: 
 
Local economic development is not a statutory responsibility of local government in the UK and as 
such, requires a multi-sectoral approach to public intervention.  The UK is a good atypical example 
of asymmetrical spatial configuration from an increasing ‘localism’ agenda in recent year, thought 
distinct from every other major European country (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013).  As a result, the 
English regions have delegated authority without elected assemblies providing regional democratic 
control.  The other countries of the UK - Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales - have all been 
provided varying devolved powers since the late 1990s.  Thus, it is important to consider any 
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implications of the UKs changing constitutional arrangements for a new spatially devolved model 
of local economic development across the UK.   
 
In more recent years, the UK Government can be seen to shift its focus towards a model of local 
government that promotes greater sub-regional autonomy, through Local Employment Partnerships 
and City Region Deals.  In England, local authorities have been invited to ‘come forward with joint 
proposals to form combined authorities…and bid to take over powers currently held by Whitehall’ 
(Loudes and Garner, 2016: 2).  Sub-regional devolution across England’s core cities can be seen 
through the establishment of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) in 2011, and 
thereafter, a further four combined authorities in Sheffield, West Yorkshire, Liverpool and the 
North East.  However, increasing devolution of economic development functions to city-regions 
are thought to lack a supporting institutionalized governance framework to coordinate policy: 
‘power structures that drive and manage economic development in England are thought to remain 
largely centralised’ at the UK Government level (Ron Martin et al. 2015: 348). 
 
A single tier of local government in Scotland means local economic development policy is 
delivered via 32 unitary local authorities as a product of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1994.  Historically, local government has been restricted in its powers largely functioning on behalf 
of central government, acting in accordance and ‘within the powers’ of the Local Government Act 
2003, providing services largely in relation to: infrastructure; environmental and amenities; and 
social welfare, although being gradually reduced (Kelly, 2007: 198).  Partnership working in 
Scotland is reflected largely by the Community Planning role of local government, to ensure the 
coordination of local policy in line with locally inflected national priorities.  However, the 2014 
Scottish referendum is thought to have provided a ‘fresh momentum to a formerly moribund 
debate’ (Loudes and Garner, 2016: 6), about the powers available to Scottish local authorities.   
 
Within a historically centralized fiscal and governance structure in Scotland, constitutional change 
since the 2014 Scottish independence referendum has brought increasing devolution of fiscal and 
policy powers through the Smith Commission.  New tax powers for Scotland are thought to have 
resulted in an increasing range of ‘largely uncoordinated local and city-based economic 
development policies’ (Martin et al. 2015: 348), for example: the Single Outcome Agreements 
(SOA); local infrastructure funds; City Region Deals (or City Deals in Scotland), contributing 
towards an increasing complexity of delivery mechanisms and structures for delivering economic 
development functions across Scotland. Scottish local government is though to ‘operate in a 
fragmented, complex and interconnected policy and service delivery environment characterised by 
associational and joint arrangements’ (Pugh and Connolly, 2016: 321). 
 
Given the England and Scottish contexts to local government policy, recent changes are thought to 
be contributing towards a new spatially devolved model of political–economic governance, albeit 
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‘relatively ad hoc and piece-meal reform’ (Martin et al. 2015: 348).  As such, new devolved powers 
for English cities and Scotland are thought to be ‘highly uneven, unequal and potentially 
destabilising for promoting further spatial imbalance’ across the UK (Martin et al. 2015: 348). 
 
2.3 Urban Economic Development  
 
‘Cities can be thought of as unitary actors seeking to maximize economic and status 
interests. Policymakers pursue the economic interests of a city through policies that alter the 
rate of economic growth in the community.’  
Feiock (2002: 124) 
 
Historically, cities were thought of as areas suffering from social disadvantage, congestion, 
pollution, and examined via traditional economic explanations, such as: technological change, 
industrial decline; and poor investment (see for example, Ihlanfeldt, 1995).  Urban policy in recent 
years has shifted focus on the importance of urban competiveness, through the increasing 
recognition of their role for wider regional economic growth and the importance of more 
productive, innovative, knowledge-driven cities.  Glaeser (2011) and Storper (2013) highlight how 
cities contribution to overall regional economic performance relates mainly to their role in 
connecting small nations and large regions, when individual city performance varies with size, 
density, visibility and connectivity. 
 
Urban Growth (economic considerations): 
 
Urban areas are increasingly recognized as critical forces for economic growth (although 
questioned by some7), with evidence to suggest that cities are more adept at dealing with economic 
development than nation states (Konvitz, J 2016).  The main premise of the importance of cities is 
based largely on the idea that ‘effective urban systems ought to have benefits for the economy as a 
whole…and improve overall economic performance’ (Begg, 1999: 807). 
 
Albeit urban competitiveness a highly contested term (see for example, Porter, 1998; Krugman, 
1996; Begg, 2002; Martin, 2006)8, Martin and Simme (2008) provide a working definition useful 
for emphasising the contribution of cities: 
 
 ‘Urban competiveness relates to the ability of cities to continually upgrade their business 
environment, skill base, and physical, social and cultural infrastructures, so as to attract and 
                                                 
7This is based mainly on the views that: cities are now fragmented economically, socially and institutionally and no longer united, 
metropolitanisation has made cities obsolete, city networks have made traditional urban territorial boundaries obsolete, global capitalism 
has made European cities insignificant, the increased mobility of labour, capital and ideas and the space of flows have made place and 
community less important in a globalised world (see Parkinson, M., Hutchins, M., Simmie, J., Clark, G., and Verdonk, H. (2004) 
Competitive  European Cities: Where do the Core Cities Stand). 
8 See for example, Michael Porter’s study On Competition (1998) finds ‘no one accepted definition’ of competitiveness (Porter, 1998: xii). 
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retain high-growth, innovative and profitable firms, and an educated, creative and 
entrepreneurial workforce, to thereby enable it to achieve a high rate of productivity, high 
employment rate, high wages, high GDP per capita, and low levels of income inequality and 
social exclusion’  
Martin and Simme (2008: 4). 
 
Martin and Simme (2008) explain the different networks within cities (both internal and external), 
in terms of five overlapping theoretical processes (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Drivers of Urban Competitiveness  
  
 
Traditional views of urban competitiveness (albeit a contested term) are based largely on 
endogenous growth theory9, which focus on the competitive relationship between cities, although 
thought limited by an apparent ‘lack of attention for the importance of external relations of cities 
and city networks’, or recognition of ‘the importance of relational factors’ (in terms of external, 
exogenous factors) of inter-city relationships (Yuhong, and Lijing, 2012: 272).  
 
There followed influential research based upon Porter’s (1990) ‘diamond’ model of 
competitiveness, which recognized the role of urban networks for economic competitiveness, and 
the importance of competition among places (Begg, 1999).  More recent growth theory focuses on 
the dynamic (networked) view of cities, where the agglomeration and clustering of people, industry 
                                                 
9 See for example: Andersson and Karlsson, 2007; Capello and Nijkamp, 2009; Stimson et al. (2011). 
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and employment in close proximity allows for the easy flow of information, ideas and innovation 
(see for example: Jacobs, 1969; Bairoch, 1988).  The new urbanism recognises the important role 
of city networks for urban competitiveness (Stanley, 2005), where city networks can be defined as: 
the city network; the nodal (city) level connection; and secondary nodal connections (i.e. various 
organizations within cities), resulting mainly from cooperative urban relationships, as opposed to 
purely competitive hierarchical urban relationships (Taylor, 2004). Urban policy from the 1990s 
thus shifted focus onto the spatial (networked) view of cities and economic growth more generally 
defined by scale and agglomeration economies.  
 
The shifting focus towards alternative models of traditional urban policy in the UK (see for 
example, Amin and Thrift, 1994; Stoker and Young, 1993), is thought to underpin policies 
involving horizontal coordination and collaboration between different cities (Begg, 1999), resulting 
in networking or ‘joined up’ government policy for public service provision between central and 
local governments across the UK (Huxman and Vangen 2000).   
 
‘local authorities previously antipathetic to market- and partnership-based activities adopted 
an approach of so-called ‘new realism’, within which concepts such as partnership with the 
private sector were embraced as the only realistic way of addressing how to meet their 
regeneration objectives within a climate of dwindling resources and capacity to effect 
change’            
 McCarthy (2007: 29) 
 
British urban policy has been characterized by partnership working for: bidding, funding and 
delivery of regeneration policy in recent years (Bailey, 2003).  For example, the 1990s saw a 
growth in the number of collaborative working initiatives and partnerships, often in very localized 
areas under a series of ‘piecemeal and unfocused policy initiatives’ (Bailey, 2003: 443).  
Government-appointed local governance agencies (e.g. Urban Development Corporations in 
England) and early public-private partnerships (e.g. The City Challenge programme) were created 
across England, where for the next decade, almost every local funding regime required the 
involvement of partnerships for the delivery of regeneration programmes, although largely replaced 
in recent years through a more strategic approaches to urban development (Bailey, 2003).  
 
Urban local government and cities (spatial considerations): 
 
Recognising the importance of urban competitiveness, understanding how cities are defined, 
managed, organised and structured, are key economic development policy considerations.  Local 
government has a central role in policy and governance of cities. The size and geographical, spatial 
structure and governance modes of cities are key elements to understanding how urban growth 
benefits are maximised and managed.  The ‘administrative urban boundary’ and Functional Urban 
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Area (FUA) managed by urban local government do not always coincide, resulting in complexities 
for understanding the delivery of urban economic policy.  
 
Typically, cities represent built-up areas of historically well-established functions and are 
essentially the agglomeration of people, firms, and economic activity within defined political 
boundaries (Glaeser, 1998).  The term ‘city’ can be understood at more than one spatial level 
(Cheshire, 1999).  Up until the reorganisation of UK local government in the mid 1970s, the 
common statistical way of defining an urban area was in line with that defined by the 
‘administrative urban boundary’ or population area (i.e. defined by the census), in terms of the area 
administered by local government authorities10.  Often referred to as the ‘municipal’ area of the city 
defined by the area administered by the city local authority (e.g. Glasgow City Council). The 
‘metropolitan area’ relates to the built-up area of neighbouring towns/suburbs and spread of 
development beyond the core.   
 
Boddy and Parkinson (2004) suggest the process of metropolitanisation through city networks 
means that traditional urban territorial boundaries are obsolete, as city-regions describe the 
continuous networks of urban communities and economic activity (Jacobs, 1984), which 
‘increasingly function as essential spatial nodes of the global economy and as distinctive political 
actors on the world stage’ Scott et al. (2001:11).  The Functional Urban Area (FUA) is an urban 
definition proposed by OECD based on urban economic functions rather than administrative 
boundaries.  The ‘city-region’ or ‘functional economic city’ relates to the economic footprint or 
travel to work area (TTWA) of a city in terms of the location of key economic markets, including: 
labour, retail and housing.11  Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill (1999: 131) define city-regions as ‘a 
strategic level of administration and policymaking that extends beyond the administrative 
boundaries of single urban government authorities to include urban and/or semi-urban hinterlands’.  
 
It is apparent therefore, that the structure and size of the defined geographical urban area 
administered by urban local government varies according to the above definitions.  Local and 
central government policy traditionally view the city-region area as the most important for place-
based policy, emphasising the potential contribution of wider city connections for regional growth. 
The gradual process of increasing territorial decentralisation across the UK is also thought to have 
contributed to the city-region scale emerging as a significant focus of sub-national economic 
analyses and development planning (Coombes and Champion 2011). 
 
Indeed, the organisation and structure of urban local government in recent years has been subject of 
much debate, where research argues that increasing fragmentation of local government is 
counterproductive for economic development and ‘accountability’ (Lowry, 2010), thus requiring 
                                                 
10 See for example, GRO(s), 1991. Census Key Statistics for Localities in Scotland.  HMSO, 1995. 
11See Box 2.1 ‘City Concepts’ of ODMP (2006) for a more in-depth discussion on the role and definition of cities. 
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‘good regional government and governance’ mechanisms to ‘eliminate development subsidy 
competition among jurisdictions’ (Feiock, 2005: 5).   
 
However, the planning and implementation of economic interventions at the city-region scale is 
thought to require the co-ordination of a wide range of varied institutional actors (Brenner, 2004), 
and the alignment of local institutional arrangements within functional economic areas challenging 
(Crouch, 2011).  The mismatch between administrative and functionally defined city boundaries 
may result in a failure on the behalf of administering local authorities, to implement economic 
development policies that deliver positive spillovers for the region in practice, as these may not 
always be fully internalized within the administered area (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996). 
 
Academics and policy-makers have long been concerned that ‘metropolitan regions are chaotic and 
ungovernable places’ (Storper, 2013: 1).  Regional urbanisation (Soja, 2000) recognises the 
apparent linkages between city-region governance systems and economic performance (Ahrend et 
al. 2014), shaped by the strong interdependencies across urban areas, comprised of fragmented 
geography and a variation of differing agencies that govern them (Storper 2013). Hence in a multi-
level policy context, city-region governance arrangements are thought limited by their capacity to 
perform as legitimate, functional and enduring policy players (Nelles, 2013, p1350). 
 
The definitions of the geographical areas for delivering economic development at the sub-national 
level is therefore often implicit or contested, leading to confusion in terms of spatial analysis and 
policy prescription.  The spatial definition and local authority understanding of the city is important 
for determining the city local authority boundary: where the legal boundary is thought closely 
equivalent with its physical size, and the city local authority boundary frequently failing to 
correspond to the initial built-up area of the city (Hall and Pain, 2006; Parr, 2007).  Given this 
complexity there is an important difference between both the functional and geographical areas of 
Scotland’s main city local authorities.  
 
The functional economic region/area is thought to be of more economic importance and focus for 
local government: the Travel-To-Work-Area (TTWA) of Scotland’s largest urban areas (i.e. 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen) is thought to largely correspond to an area beyond 
their original/legal geographical boundary, due to a large degree of in-commuter workforce and 
corresponding to the area where the majority of resident population work.  By implication, the view 
of larger local authorities is often that their effective economic and functional area under much of 
the control (i.e. funded) by adjacent/neighbouring local authorities: the functional and legal 
geographical boundaries of the remaining smaller cities of Scotland (i.e. Inverness, Stirling and 
Perth) are largely thought to be equivalent and including their TTWA.  Figure 3 demonstrates how 
Glasgow and Edinburgh’s TTWA include a number of other Local Authorities.  For example, 
Glasgow’s TTWA includes Glasgow City Council, but also: East Dumbartonshire Council, 
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Renfrewshire and East Renfrewshire Council, and parts of North and South Lanarkshire Councils, 
Falkirk, Stirling, West Dumbartonshire and East Ayrshire Council.  
 
Figure 3: Glasgow and Edinburgh Travel to Work Areas (TTWA), and Local Authority 
Boundaries 
 
Source: Scotland’s Economic Powerhouses (Fraser of Allander Institute, 28 October 2015) 
 
The result of such boundary complexities and discrepancies across Scotland’s cities have been a 
focus of much academic debate over the years, particularly given that local authority equalisation 
funding12 is based largely on a city’s population base and TTWA.  Some key definitional anomalies 
exist regarding Scotland’s cities, for example, Falkirk is regarded a large town, yet in population 
terms is only slightly smaller than Perth and Inverness as cities, highlighting the issue of key 
differences constituting small cities or large towns in Scotland. 
 
There is therefore a tendency for city local authorities to compete for funding, rather than 
collaborate with neighbouring local authorities, due mainly to discrepancies in functional and legal 
boundary responsibilities and funding.  Recent infrastructure funding models being pursued by 
Scotland’s cities in recent years (i.e. City Deals – see Figure 4), are focussed on wider metropolitan 
areas of cities and reflective of wider TTWAs.  
 
  
                                                 
12 See ‘Scotland’s Fiscal Framework: Assessing the Agreement Scotland’ for a recent discussion of the equalisation formula in Scotland 
– the Barnett Formula: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201605.pdf 
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Figure 4: City Region Deals in Scotland 
 
Source: City Region Deals in Scotland, (SPICe, March 2017) 
 
Scotland’s City Region Deals largely reflect Scottish Government’s increasing recognition of the 
strategic and economic importance of wider city-regions, including a renewed heavy focus in the 
refreshed Third National Planning Framework (2014). 
 
2.3.1 Economic Development Policies of Urban Local Government  
There are a number of challenges facing urban local government in delivering economic 
development policy, including: lack of resources; falling urban population (Arku and Oosterbann, 
2014); increasingly complex political systems of governance; contributing towards a growing 
recognition of the importance of being able to manage and maximise urban networks for delivering 
economic development.  Cities are thought to be ‘increasingly dependent on the ability to cope 
with a complex web of both horizontal and vertical economic and social interactions, both within 
and between cities’ (Cheng et al. 2013) within an evolving globalised economy, putting cities 
under increasing pressure to become more economically competitive. For example, Crosby and 
Bryson (2006) suggest collaboration occurs ‘simply [in] that we live in a shared-power world in 
which many groups and organizations are involved in, affected by, or have some partial 
responsibility to act on public challenges (44). 
 
The increasing interest in how local government is organised with a renewed interest on the role of 
institutions is largely associated with the ‘new regionalism’  (Wheeler, 2002), recognising urban 
economic development based on a network-like mode of operation, where collaboration policies 
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are thought to provide flexible ways for delivering urban policy that creates ‘real competitive 
advantage for the urban region’ (Sotarauta, 2010: 294).  
 
Competition and collaboration are traditionally based on separate theoretical concepts: competition 
based on traditional growth theories explaining economic success, and urban collaboration 
promoting the idea of spatial integration.  Urban collaboration policy has been presented as ‘an 
alternative approach to traditional models of urban competiveness’ (see for example Amin and 
Thrift, 1993; Stoker and Young, 1993: 180), building on the early ideas of Michael Porter, who 
argued that cities (and regions) collaborate, as well as compete, due to benefits of the micro-
economic factors and networks within cities.  Porter (1990, 1995) debates competitiveness by 
assuming inter-firm competition as equivalent to inter-place competition (although challenged by 
Krugman).  Whilst cities at the global scale generally seek to compete for economic growth (i.e. for 
investment, population, tourism, labour, for example), the rationale is that small cities may be more 
successful if they collaborate with nearby cities to achieve complimentary13 (Gordon, 2011).  
 
In an economic development context, a city’s economic policy actions (i.e. through market 
interventions) (Bowman, 1988: 512) can be seen to shift focus from competition towards 
cooperation (Bowman, 1988; Bradshaw, 2000; Goetz and Kayser, 1993; Gordon, 2007, 2009; 
Grady, 1987; Wells, 1990; Wolfson and Frisken, 2000).  Collaboration across administrative 
boundaries is a way to enhance competitiveness for those places that share networks, by potentially 
providing a critical mass for network members (Meijers 2008).  Stoker (1995) suggests that cities 
can work together to generate a coalition of private and public interests in the form of an urban 
regime, where local decision makers are assembled to help govern policy to the benefit of the 
region as a whole. Successful cities are thus thought to maintain and promote connections with 
other places. 
 
From a governance perspective, theories of Institutional Collective Action (ICA) argue that local 
government can work together to produce both benefits from competition and collaboration, by 
helping institutions to work together to achieve benefits that would not otherwise be gained if 
working alone (Olson, 1965).  As highlighted previously, examples of institutional collaboration 
differ widely in both policy focus and organisation, with collaborative working between cities long 
recognized across Europe, including: Øresund (Copenhagen and Malmo); Lithuania (Vilnius and 
Kaunas); The Dutch Deltametropolis (formerly the Randstad) with a long-standing initiative aimed 
at strengthening global competitiveness and the profile of the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Utrecht.    
 
                                                 
13 Complementarity is when two collaborating cities have similar economic structures, but possibly specialise in the production of 
different sectors.  
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Urban collaboration policies can be aimed at improving both physical and institutional capacity, by 
encouraging the development of working relationships between urban government, public agencies 
and societal actors.  For example, cities often use collaboration as a resolution approach when 
cooperation of two or more local governments is required (e.g. to progress physical connectivity), 
or by collaborating on similar or interconnected challenges (i.e. strategic economic development 
issues), or simply, to strengthen collaborative relationships between different agencies (i.e. to 
support joined-up service delivery and avoid duplication).  Cities can also collaborate to ‘pool 
resources’ beyond traditional city boundaries, to create a ‘critical mass of assets’ across city 
services, aimed at avoiding duplication and hamper any ‘potential negative effects from 
competition between local authorities’ (Eurocities, 2011: 2).   
 
The general shifting focus on city-city (inter-urban) collaboration in the UK has been historically 
concerned with a range of strategic activity including: transportation, infrastructure development, 
planning, grant applications, and marketing strategies (Gordon, 2007).  Indeed, government policy 
in the UK has promoted partnership working as key criterion for regeneration funding, for 
example: the English City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget initiatives; and Social 
Inclusion Partnership (SIP) initiative in Scotland, and ‘continues to be important within 
regeneration funding’.  Thus, collaboration and partnerships are thought a ‘principle underpinning 
all aspects of urban regeneration policy in the UK’ (McCarthy, 2007: 29).  
 
However, recent evidence of more locally driven IMC in the UK is thought a reflection of a 
growing ‘rationale for political leaders to negotiate purposefully and pragmatically with 
surrounding local authorities’ (OECD, 2015: 31), reflective of changing constitutional 
arrangements across the UK.  For example, recent policy shifts in England include the 
establishment of ‘English Core Cities’ - representing the eight largest cities in England outside 
London (i.e. Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and 
Sheffield) – thought having evolved to represent the shifting political focus on greater collaboration 
across England’s main local authority areas, with a remit to lobby for greater autonomy for local 
authorities and a redistribution of power within regions, initiating the first ‘City Deals’ in 2011 
following the advent of the UK Coalition.  Political collaboration of local government is thought 
historically atypical in the UK and often the result of mandate Government policy.  Thus, recent 
evidence of IMC in the UK is thought to reflect local government’s changing constitutional 
position, given that council’s have been historically without powers of competence (Kelly, 2007).  
 
Greater UK policy recognition of cities and their increasing role within economic development 
through policies of collaborative working, alongside shifts in urban regime theory and increasing 
local government policy fragmentation, provide the context for which collaboration has emerged as 
economic development policy across urban local government. The result has been an increase in 
the development of new urban-based policies, which emphasise the importance of collaborative 
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working through ‘joined-up’ policy making (Docherty et al. 2004: 449).  
 
2.3.2 Recognition of Networks for Urban Economic Development  
 
There is a vast academic interest and empirical evidence in economic development literature 
concerning the role of networks for the economic development of urban areas, viewed positively by 
many policy makers as important for economic competitiveness and rarely questioned in practice 
(Sullivan et al. 2013).  
 
Drawing from a review of the urban economic development literature, Table 1 summarises the key 
benefits of urban networks as enablers of economic development:  
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Table 1: Collaborative Advantage for Urban Economic Development:  
 BENEFITS FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
(non-exhaustive) 
LITERATURE 
ECONOMIC 
NETWORKS 
• Knowledge and innovation network externalities (endogenous 
growth); 
• Reduced Transaction Costs; 
• Diffusion of ideas, new collaborative solutions/ innovation; 
• Share educational/cultural backgrounds; 
• Knowledge accumulation and knowledge spillovers;  
• Increasing returns in ‘total factor productivity’. 
Martin and Simme (2008); Porter, M (1990) The Competitive Advantage Of Nations; 
Porter, M. (1998) On Competition; Begg, (1999) Cities And Competitiveness; Blakely 
And Leigh (2010) Planning Local Economic Development; Amin and Thrift (1995) 
Globalisation, Institutional Thickness and The Local Economy, in Healey et al. (Eds) 
Managing Cities: The New Urban Context, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. 
SPATIAL 
NETWORKS 
• Agglomeration networks: external economies of scale/scope that 
flow from firms locating in the same area;  
• Localised knowledge spillovers; innovation in close 
geographical/spatial proximity;  
• Increasing returns from spatial concentration/external economies of 
localisation; 
• Spatial and functional development of cities and urban systems, via 
spatial integration, functional integration and economic 
complementarities; 
• Clusters: specialist industries and services.  
Meijers (2005) Polycentric Urban Regions and The Quest For Synergy; Marshall (1920) 
Principles Of Economics; Van Oort, F., Burger, M., and Raspe, O. (2010). On The 
Economic Foundation Of The Urban Network Paradigm; Camagni (2002) On The 
Concept Of Territorial Competitiveness; Gordon (2009). Perceptions Of Regional 
Economic Development; Gordon (2007) Partners Or Competitors; Blakely and Leigh 
(2010) Planning Local Economic Development. 
GOVERNANCE 
NETWORKS 
• Internal and external soft networks; 
• Socio-cultural networks: (embeddedness’; values, institutional 
culture);  
• Governance networks; 
- avoid bureaucratic processes; 
- problems/opportunities better conceptualized and tackled; 
- helpful in politically challenged and divided situations;  
- create connectedness;  
- social cohesion, network steering, public administrative 
reform; 
- resilience and adaptability to change. 
Scharpf (1978). Interorganizational Policy Studies; Kenis (1991) The Preconditions for 
Policy Networks; Kenis and Schneider (1991). Policy Networks and Policy Analysis; 
Dowding (1992): Model or Metaphor; Rhodes (1997) Understanding Governance; 
O’Toole (1997) Treating networks seriously; Porter (1998) On competition; Stoker (1998) 
Governance as theory; Jessop (1998) The rise of governance and the risks of failure; Klijn 
and Koppenjan, (2000). Public Management and Policy Networks; McGuire (2000). 
Collaborative policy making and administration; Wolfson and Frisken (2000) Local 
response to the global challenge; Healey (2004) Creativity and urban governance; 
Newman (2005) Remaking governance, peoples, politics and the public sphere; Gordon 
(2007) Partners or competitors 
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It is apparent from Table 1 that the benefits of collaboration for urban economic development, 
relates to a diverse range of literature.  A key complexity across the literature relates to the fact that 
organizing and realizing the benefits from urban networks, and just how and where those 
connections are made, and by whom, are thought ‘rarely identified except anecdotally’ and 
‘difficult to fully evidence’ (Malecki 2002: 934).  Therefore, before discussing the complexities of 
networks and economic development of urban local authorities in more detail in Chapter Three, the 
following subsection (2.3.3) concludes Chapter Two by clarifying the urban local authority context 
of collaboration for economic development as understood in this thesis. 
 
2.3.3 Summary: Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) for Economic Development  
 
Chapter two demonstrates how economic development is a diverse concept, relating largely to the 
delivery domain of local government.  In the context of this thesis, the terms ‘local government’ 
and ‘local authority’ will be used interchangeably, and the definition of the ‘urban’ and ‘city’ 
context will vary according to the size and spatial contexts of individual local authorities in line 
with that discussed at the start of section 2.3.  The size and definition of the ‘urban local authority’ 
in the context of this thesis, will relate to the surrounding population base (i.e. the administrative 
urban boundary) for which the local authority is responsible, unless otherwise stated.  The 
administrative urban boundary definition is thought most relevant to the consideration of 
collaboration processes between urban local authorities, given that the behaviour and intention to 
participate in collaboration with other local authorities often relates to city size.   
 
The research’ focus on collaboration as economic development policy of urban local government 
will therefore draw upon three main bodies of literature: economic, spatial, and governance 
perspectives, acknowledging that no ‘universal model or framework’ of economic development 
will ‘guarantee success for economic development’ (Stimson and Stough, 2008: 188).  An 
understanding of economic development according to this thesis recognizes the need to ‘move 
beyond narrow concerns of the economy’ (Bosworth, 2011:7), recognizing ‘a new set of arguments 
for local economic development policies and/or more strategic forms of territorial competition’ 
(Gordon, 2011: 34) in line with the below: 
 
‘at the micro-level: effective mobilisation by potential beneficiaries with the capacity to 
organise themselves into a successful promotional coalition within a suitably defined 
territory; and at the macro-level: tolerance and/or active support by higher levels of 
government for local agencies to take on independent/competitive roles in pursuit of 
economic development for their territories’  
(Gordon, 2011: 34) 
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The thesis research is in line with Gordon’s (2011) above broad understanding of local economic 
development as a ‘more strategic form of territorial competition’ (p40), appropriate to the study of 
collaboration in the context of urban local government, in that it emphasizes: a) the territorial, 
spatially dependent nature of economic development activity; b) the broader scope of activity 
beyond only economic competitiveness, recognizing both ‘coalition’ and ‘competition’ for 
territorial competitiveness, and c) recognition of the role of higher tiers of government and 
‘territory’ in shaping local government economic development policy responses via ‘contextual 
influences’ that ‘shape (and bias) the choice of policies and the way they are implemented’ 
(Gordon, 2011: 41).  
 
There is some research to help explain the rationale and factors determining the success of inter-
governmental collaboration (Carr et al. 2009), suggesting horizontal collaboration (i.e. between 
government agencies at the same level of government) is more likely between ‘geographically 
proximate units collaborating around processes or service delivery (Gerber, 2015: 3), due to the 
strength of relationships, trust and formal and informal connections between individuals within 
these administrations.  However, how such collaborative processes function in practice in the UK is 
still largely unknown. 
 
Chapter three follows with a more detailed discussion of the role of collaboration as policy 
networks in urban local government economic development, drawing on three main bodies of 
network-related literature: economic networks; spatial networks; governance networks.  More 
specifically, the effect of network dimensions on local government economic development 
collaboration is examined, including closer consideration of their nature and what is meant by 
‘network’ in the context of collaboration as understood in this thesis. 
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Chapter Three: Economic Development and Urban Local Government: 
It’s all about networks  
 
3.1 Introduction: Collaboration Policy Terminology 
 
Section 2.3 in Chapter 2 on urban local government economic development, introduced the idea of 
‘collaboration’ as economic development policy.  Fuller understanding of what is meant by 
‘collaboration’ across organizational, political and spatial boundaries for urban local government is 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Collaboration as local government policy is widely associated with economic development within a 
dense and complex multidisciplinary literature, where conceptual complexity means collaboration 
is understood in multiple ways, deriving from often, conflicting theoretical assumptions.  For 
example: some studies look at collaboration as some form of social structure in a structured and 
quantitative way (Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011); and others, consider metaphorical 
descriptions of collaboration as some type of social interaction across organizational and spatial 
boundaries.   
 
Section 3.1 provides a summary of the terminological challenges relating to collaboration as 
‘networks’, before briefly synthesizing the main theoretical domains of the literature in section 3.2, 
highlighting underlying assumptions and implications of collaboration-related theories that apply to 
an understanding of urban local government economic development, mainly: policy network 
theory; economic network theory; and spatial network theory.  The thesis focus on collaboration 
policy between urban local government for the purposes of economic development will then be 
explained and justified.  Section 3.3 defines collaboration policy in the context of urban local 
government according to this thesis (i.e. Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC)), bringing 
the relevant theoretical concepts together.  Thereafter, section 3.4 argues that a multi-disciplinary 
understanding of ULAC is limited, requiring cognizance of three clusters of theoretical literature 
(i.e. termed ‘theoretical domains’). The section proposes a two-dimensional analytical framework 
for the study of ULAC, requiring an understanding of functional domains, relevant to the 
theoretical domains, in terms of network: purpose; structure; and management.  Section 3.5 
highlights the complex nature of collaboration policy through closer consideration of its functional 
dimensions, emphasizing the lack of understanding of their impact on policy outcomes for the 
economic development of urban local government, and identification of the key knowledge gaps in 
section 3.6. 
 
Subsection 3.7 concludes the chapter by suggesting that an understanding of ULAC requires 
appreciation of a networks’ multi-level dimensions in terms of the structure of networks, their 
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purpose, and management/governance aspects, presenting a multi-dimensional conceptual 
framework to help conceptualise the PV of ULAC, discussed on more detail in Chapter four. 
 
It is necessary to first briefly outline some of the terminological challenges underpinning 
collaboration research in the context of studying public policy. 
 
3.1.1 Terminological and conceptual challenges:   
 
The difficulty defining and conceptualizing collaboration for urban local government economic 
development relates mainly to the large number of varying terminology and range of meanings 
relating to collaboration and network research, spanning a diverse multi-disciplinary literature and 
wide number of research fields applying network research.  
 
The multitude of network-related terms in a public policy context, include: ‘collaboration’; 
‘network’; ‘coordination’, all in themselves controversial terms, often lacking individual clarity. To 
emphasise this point, some ‘101 definitions of collaboration’ (O’Leary and Vij, 2012: 508) are 
thought to exist, giving rise to potential misconceptions of the term.  The existence of multiple 
terms brings with it conceptual challenges and an apparent confusion within the literature relating 
to the interchangeable nature of the commonly used terms ‘collaboration’ and ‘network’.  O’Leary 
and Vij (2012: 508) suggest an ‘apparent lack of consensus and agreed-upon definition and 
commonly used term, with a need for more precise models of measuring the relevant factors which 
impact upon collaborative behaviour and policy in practice’ (O’Leary and Vij, 2012: 518).  Indeed, 
within the public management literature, Provan and Lemaire (2012) suggests the confusion 
between ‘collaboration’ or ‘collaborative arrangements’ are often used when they really mean 
‘networks’.  
 
Isett et al. (2011: 160) suggest: ‘the word ‘network’ is used too loosely throughout the literature’ 
when it can refer to many different things: different types of collaboration; different scales of 
collaboration (i.e. individuals, organizations, etc.); different collaboration 
conceptualizations/functions (i.e. a metaphor for spatial organizing; a governance method; an 
economic policy); a static, dynamic or agency-based process.  Networks tend to be thought more of 
as being ‘organically developed by organizations independently of, or within collaborative 
partnerships’ (Scott and Thomas, 2013: 1).  However, there is thought general agreement that the 
term ‘network’ is typically used when referring to multi-actor collective action arrangements for 
solving joint problems (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001), specifically, in terms of public management 
networks that are led or managed by government representatives, albeit in varying forms/structures.  
Within the public sector management literature, a concept of ‘network’ found to have ‘the most 
support and agreement is policy network’ (Klinj, 1996), relating mainly to early theories of 
organisational sociology and inter-organisational relations in political science literature, and 
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discussed more fully in section 3.2.1.  
 
Given that ‘collaboration’ and ‘network’ are often used interchangeably, the incorrect impression is 
that ‘all networks are collaborative and all collaborations happen in networks’ (O’Leary and Vij, 
2012: 517).  Therefore, when using the terms ‘collaboration’ or ‘network’, there is a need to be 
clear what is meant to make sure there is a shared definition (O’Leary and Vij, 2012). 
 
The understanding of collaboration according to Himmelman’s ‘continuum of complexity and 
commitment’ (Himmelman, 1996), provides a typology of collaboration according to varying 
levels of complexity and integration, that build up along a continuum ‘depending on the degree to 
which three limitations to working together – time, trust and turf – are overcome’ (p7) (see Figure 
5 below). 
 
Figure 5: Himmelman’s Continuum of Complexity and Commitment (the three C’s) 
Source: Himmelman (1996) 
 
According to Himmelman (1996), collaboration is achieved at the end of the collaboration 
continuum.  However, the continuum uses the terms ‘coordination, collaboration and cooperation’ 
interchangeably, when it is thought they are best thought of as ‘analytically distinct at different 
points on the continuum’ (Farnsworth, Irving and Fenger, 2014: 261).  Therefore, the existence of 
various conceptualisations of collaboration and use of different terminology, underlines the 
difficulties of sourcing a coherent conceptualisation.  The theoretical rationale for achieving 
successful collaboration is thus requires a multi-disciplinary approach, discussed more fully 
throughout the rest of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Collaboration as economic development policy of urban local government 
 
In order to better understand the role of collaboration in the economic development of urban local 
government, what is meant by ‘network’ in the context of this thesis must be clarified and defined, 
Networking is 
exchanging infromation 
for mutual benefit: 
informal/easy to use
Coordination is 
exchanging information 
and altering activities for 
mutual benefit and a 
common purpose: 
formal/complex decision 
making  
Cooperation: Exchanging 
information, altering 
activities and sharing 
resources for mutual 
benefit and to achieve a 
common purpose: 
common/prioritised 
decisionmaking
Collaboration: Exchanging 
information, altering activities, 
sharing resources and enhancing the 
capacity of another for mutual benefit 
and to achieve a common purpose: 
formal/complex decision-making, 
characterised by control and 
ownership
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reviewing the key theoretical perspectives underpinning the role of networks in extant economic 
development research.  
 
ULAC for economic development can be conceptualized as ‘network’ policy reflecting the 
evolving inter-disciplinary insights from several theoretical perspectives over time, including: 
economic geography (i.e. spatial networks); economic competitiveness (i.e. institutional networks); 
and public management (i.e. policy and governance networks).  The overlapping nature of the 
differing theoretical perspectives relates mainly to their conceptual relatedness for providing a 
theoretical perspective on the role of ‘networks’ (in the broadest sense), for economic development, 
which is thought ‘place dependent’ both ‘within and outwith a place’ and in terms of ‘larger social 
and geographical scales’ (Leitner et al. 2002: 278).   
 
Therefore, there lacks one commonly accepted theory of ULAC due to theoretical plurality and that 
clearly articulates its relationship with policy outcomes.  The following subsections discuss how 
ULAC can be defined and understood as an economic development policy of urban local 
government, as context to researching ULAC between Scottish local authorities.  What follows is 
an overview of key insights of network processes from a multi-disciplinary perspective, drawing 
from three main bodies of literature relevant to understanding ULAC across urban boundaries. 
 
3.2.1 Policy Network Theory:  
 
A fundamental starting point for understanding the theoretical premise of network policies within 
economic development relates to the ‘policy network’, ‘network governance’ and collaborative 
governance’ concepts, which view networks and collaboration as ‘alternative modes of governance 
to markets and hierarchies’ (Morgan et al. 1999: 181).  Albeit often disputed concepts within the 
public management literature, they are fundamental to understanding ‘collaboration policy’ 
activities (O’Leary and Vij, 2012: 516).  
 
Isett et al. (2011) helpfully defines the range of network literature for public administration as 
falling into three main sub-themes: decision making policy networks concerned with decisions 
about public resource allocation; collaborative networks concerned with the provision and 
production of goods and services; governance networks concerned with public goods/service 
provision, policymaking and the coordination of interests toward a common goal. 
 
From a public administration perspective, urban regime theory (see Mossberger and Stoker, 2001) 
is thought traditionally concerned with economic development (Davies, 2003: 257), through 
‘policy networks’ in the UK context (Dowding, 1995: 140).  ‘Policy networks’ are referred to as a 
form of ‘intermediation between state and society since the 1950s…as an analytical tool for 
examining the exchange relations between public and private actors and outcomes of the policy 
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processes’ (Eraydin et al. 2008: 2292).  Policy networks are used to emphasise the importance of 
structural relationships between political institutions (Marsh, 1998). Early conceptualisations of 
policy networks by Rhodes (1988) marked a key development in the field in the UK, by 
characterizing collaboration between public and private actors in terms of policy communities 
along a continuum from policy communities at the one end, through to professional networks, 
intergovernmental networks and producer networks to issue networks, at the other.   
 
Policy networks in UK public policy proliferated in the 1990s and 2000s, through the promotion of 
the public-private, collaborative partnerships and the ways in which public/private actors are 
involved in policy.  However, existing policy network research is characterised by varying 
ontological perspectives, posing significant problems for understanding the conceptual relationship 
between different policies and outcomes (discussed more fully in section 4).  In this sense, Blom-
Hansen (1997) suggests the need for explicit recognition of the policy network actor ‘if the concept 
is to enable the analyst to move beyond mere description into… policy explanation’ (p669). 
 
The ‘collaborative governance’ increased at a time when hierarchical policy-making was being 
questioned (see Sørensen and and Torfing, 2007), with a general shift from government to 
governance (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014), as society became more interdependent and public 
resources more limited, resulting in the growth of policy networks as a form of collaborative 
governance (see also, Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Rhodes 1997; Kickert et al. 1997; and Scharpf, 
1978).  The governance focus in the literature is thought to reflect the move away from hierarchical 
systems of government to one of governance (Rhodes, 1997).  
 
Keast, Madell, Agranoff, (2013) refer to ‘network governance theory’ of common structures of 
interdependence between all sectors of government, community and private sector, resulting in a 
wealth of government policy promoting the benefits of joint ventures, partnerships and 
collaborations, and an increase in local strategic partnerships (LSPs) in the 1990s and 2000s.  
‘Governance networks’ are thought focussed on to providing a coordination function of network 
members towards a common goal, rather than being focused on the service or policy goals. (Isett et 
al. 2011). Inter-governmental and/or public-private sector working relates mainly to the new urban 
governance literature (Davies, 2002: Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Stewart, 2005) as an 
institutional and organizational concept. 
 
Indeed, partnership working was promoted as a model for urban regeneration following the 
fragmentation of urban policy in the 1980s, as policy makers attempted to follow this by 
integrating public and private agencies to help better coordinate projects and programmes (Davies, 
2002). In this context, policy networks evolved as a means for describing the governance of 
collective actions at a time of increasing government deregulation, with key themes in the literature 
relating to neo-liberalism (see Jessop, 2002 for example) and co-governance (Newman, 2005). 
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Regardless of a general consensus on the role of policy networks for understanding policy 
processes of joint action, many researchers argue (see for example Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; 
O’Toole, 1997) that the ability to harness the benefits of collaboration has been and continues to be 
limited due to the absence of a coherent theoretical framework informing their design, 
management, evaluation and governance (Keast, Madell, Agranoff, 2013: 18).  
 
Collaboration policy is often unquestioned in practice, with a lack of recognition of the 
complexities associated with urban network governance.  Although urban collaboration has 
become increasingly important in economic development policy terms, its full policy impact in 
terms of economic outcomes in practice is not fully understood, due mainly to limited empirical 
evidence.  For example, Dowding (1995: 137) argues that the policy network perspective does help 
understand the policy process by categorizing different types of network.  In this sense the role of 
collaboration in the public sector is thought largely inconclusive (O’Toole, 1997).  
 
Policy networks relate to a diverse range of institutional forms ‘shaped and constrained by 
institutional rules as well as regulatory procedures and norms specific to the policy arena’ (Isett et 
al. 2011: 164).  There are also limitations in the explanatory value of policy networks highlighted 
by Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 260), suggesting ‘policy networks will never provide an adequate 
account of policy change, because such networks are but one component of any such explanation’, 
given that the policy network concept is regarded as ‘a meso-level concept, it must be combined 
with macro-level and micro-level theories in order to produce explanations’. Therefore, ‘they 
[policy network explanations] fail to explain policy outcomes because the driving force of 
explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but rather 
characteristics of components within the networks’ (Dowding 1995: 137).   
3.2.2 Economic Network Literature  
 
Whilst the existence of government is a key starting point for most policy related research, the 
economic gains from different institutional forms of government have historically received limited 
focus within economic research.  Collaborative working between local government institutions as 
an institutional form of government is best recognised in relation to more recent institutional 
economic theories of urban growth, recognising the importance of external urban networks.  
Institutional economics recognises the economy as a collection of social and cultural relationships 
shaping individual action, rather than merely a collection of individual firms driven by rational 
self-interest (Amin, 1999).  
 
Traditional urban growth theory paid little attention to the important role of networks for economic 
competitiveness, generally seeking to prove inter-city relations through certain attributes of cities 
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and lacking a relational perspective, making it difficult to reveal the nature of inter-city relations 
(Taylor, 2004).  Early economic literature focuses on the competition between places with some 
welfare economists arguing that competition among local governments creates economic benefits 
(Kotler, Haider, and Rein, 1993).  Critics reject such arguments criticising competition because of 
the costs imposed on communities and their residents (Turner, 1990), offering alternative 
conceptual frameworks.  
 
Early conceptualisations of urban competitiveness are thought unconvincing and ignorant to the 
importance of external city relationships, followed by the ‘the new urbanism’, focussed on the 
nature and importance of inter-city relations.  The 1990s marked a significant shift in focus on the 
important role of the city and the micro-economic, coordinated networked activities within and 
between cities for competitiveness (Healey and Dunham, 1994; Kresl, 1995; Begg, 1999; Maleki 
2002; Gordon, 1999;).  A shifting focus from the hierarchy perspective of traditional central place 
theory (i.e. where hierarchies within city networks are thought mainly the result of urban 
competition, and inter-city relations are vertical and one-way), the focus shifts towards the 
recognition of relational factors of city networks and inter-city relations (i.e. city to city), both 
internal and external relations of cities for urban competitiveness (Stanley, 2005).  
 
A key influence in this research is the shifting recognition that cities can compete in the way that 
firms and nations compete, through the proactive implementation of strategies to improve networks 
(Porter, 1998).  The growing interest in the role of urban networks within the new urbanism 
perspective of competitiveness recognises the role of ‘collaborative regional governance’ as an 
important compliment to competition, followed by a gradual decentralised approach to regionalism 
known as the ‘new localism’ (Feiock, 2012:1).   
 
The purely competitive urban strategies characterising the 1980s ‘were being complemented by the 
emergence of collaborative interurban networks’ (Graham, 1995: 503) (see for example, Dawson, 
1992; Parkinson, 1992; Robson, 1992), based on ‘alternative models of urban policy’ (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994; Stoker and Young, 1993:180).  The shifting focus of the literature is thought to 
represent a ‘reorientation of urban politics towards a more balanced mixture of competition with 
collaboration’ (Graham, 1995: 503).   
 
The economic rationale underpinning networks can be seen to shift was from traditional views of 
exogenous development (i.e. the Solow-Growth model: Solow, 1956), towards asset-based 
endogenous development, recognising the economy as an instituted process and socially embedded 
activity comprised of local skills, knowledge, natural resources, relationships, social capital, and 
governance (Amin, 1999).  In this context, the new urbanism (and institutional) turn in economics, 
introduces the importance of scale through the advantages of spatial clustering (Porter, 1994), 
discussed more fully in the following section. 
 54 
 
3.2.3 Spatial Network Literature 
 
The shifting economic recognition of city networks for economic gain as highlighted above, 
recognizes the relative importance of spatial ‘networks, territory, place, scale’ (Jessop et al. 2008: 
391) marking a key shift in the spatial network literature.  A large theoretical literature on 
agglomeration economies/externalities exists, with useful reviews by Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; 
Duranton and Puga, 2004; and Puga, 2010, confirming that agglomeration benefits result from: 
learning, knowledge sharing, specialization, and labour markets.  
 
The institutional turn in geography literature is thought to offer a ‘richer understanding of territorial 
proximity’ including, ‘the institutional and social sources of economic action…than that offered by 
endogenous growth theory, which continues to stress well-known but rather tired agglomeration 
factors’ (Amin, 1999: 370).  The institutionalist perspective of spatial networks is based on an 
understanding that ‘successful’ regions flourish as a consequence of institutional embeddedness or 
thickness, creating powerful local nodes of economic activity within an increasingly competitive 
global economy (Amin and Thrift, 1992).  
 
There is an expansive literature that considers how networks play an important synergetic role on 
the spatial configuration of cities, in terms of polycentric networks between cities (Meijers, 2005; 
Governa and Salone, 2005; Salet, 2006; Camagni and Salone, 1993; Malecki, 2002; Polenske, 
2004).  The synergy effects relate mainly to the benefits of ‘increasing returns linked to the 
cumulative development of agglomeration processes and activities’, thought to create positive 
advantages and externalities through the ‘artificial advantage of proactive collaboration and 
increased cooperation capability between public administrations’ (Camagni, 2002: 2405).   
 
Given the above network methodologies relevant to the research of ULAC, section 3.2.4 highlights 
the importance of interaction between the theoretical positions underpinning the research.   
 
3.2.4 Network Methodologies: Theoretical Interaction, Scale and Function 
Researching economic development networks relating to ULAC requires further clarification of 
their theoretical basis, further discussed in the methodology chapter, and introduced here.  It is 
evident from the evolving literature that ‘part of the intellectual challenge … is blending multiple 
theoretical and research perspectives’ (Bryson et al. 2006: 52).  The related literature is 
schematically summarized in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 55 
Figure 6: Collaboration Networks and Economic Development  
 
 
 
The various theoretical perspectives relating to collaboration and networks reflect a shifting 
recognition of the role of institutions for shaping internal and external network properties across 
different scales (geographical and organisational) for economic development, according to three 
distinct theorising domains: networks for public administration; networks for spatial synergy; 
networks for economic competitiveness. 
 
A consequence of the plurality of perspectives is conceptual ambiguity and complexity, due mainly 
to: varying spatial scales; differing strategic focus; differing organisational levels; and 
fundamentally, differing ontological dimensions underpinning the varying theoretical perspectives, 
contributing towards some fundamental research concerns: 
 
• the urban regime literature is thought ‘rich in insights from numerous disciplines’ but 
limited due to a ‘piece-meal approach’, general lack of research focused on ‘whole 
network’ effects and outcomes (Provan and Milward, 2005), requiring a definition ‘that 
excludes irrelevant issues’ (Wood and Gray, 1991: 143); 
 
• the urban growth literature promotes the idea of collaboration and networks between firms 
and places for economic efficiency, innovation and growth, although disputed for lacking 
empirical evidence of the economic gains;  
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• the urban spatial literature is largely recognised as a strategic planning concept 
emphasising the complex nature of urban networks and polycentric structure of urban 
systems (Davoudi, 2003), thought rather unconsolidated as a theory (Bailey and Turok, 
2001).  
 
The implications of theoretical complexity across the literature relevant to understanding ULAC 
for economic development is realising that networks are studied at multiple levels.  Researching 
networks must therefore clarify both the scale and type of network analysis from the outset: first, in 
terms of scale, collaboration can take place in various forms, within different settings and across 
different geographical and organizational scales.  For example: at the intra-organisational scale (i.e. 
between different individuals within an organization); inter-organizational scale (i.e. between 
different organisations in terms of public-private partnerships; strategic alliances; joint ventures; 
across different organisations); intra-urban collaboration (i.e. collaborative networks and working 
within the city); and inter-urban collaboration (i.e. working between different cities).  
 
Second, network analysis can refer to a range of functions, where the ‘composition and size of 
networks are thought related to the purpose of collaboration’ (Bryson and Crosby, 2006: 49).  For 
example, Rhodes and Marsh (1992) point out, ‘networks differ according to the interest that 
dominates them…and may be dominated by professional interests, economic or government 
interests’ (p184). Therefore, it is crucial when studying network literature that the area of interest 
and primary role of the network is clarified from the outset (i.e. in terms of its ‘function’). 
 
Finally, the main difference between the conceptualizations of organisational networks is thought 
dependant on whether the network is considered a ‘metaphor for some kind of interaction across an 
organizational boundary, using multiplex, value relational data that draws in overall network 
structures’, or whether the term refers to ‘the specific social structure between organizations and 
analysed via social network analysis relying on uniplex, dichotomous relational data that is 
constrained to ego-networks’ (Bergenholtz, C., and Waldstrøm, 2011: 54).   Thus, the type of 
network analysis must be clarified in terms of collaboration as a whole network or analysis of the 
sub-structures of the network, where methodologically, a number of approaches are possible (i.e. 
ego-network, dyadic, triadic or whole network perspectives) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
 
All types of network analysis are thought important, although an apparent lack of research on 
whole networks means it is difficult to fully understand how networks function separately from 
network sub-structures (Isett et al. 2011).   Empirically, there is a lack of evidence demonstrating a 
comparison between ‘whole network’ policy outcomes and counterfactual policy outcomes (i.e. the 
policy outcomes of individual network sub-actors).  The result of differing ontologies and 
conceptualisations of collaboration policy relating to ULAC make it difficult to compare findings 
across the research.  There is the need for a more systematic, multi-dimensional approach to 
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researching and understanding collaboration as a policy process that recognises the following 
network dimensions from the outset: 
 
• Clarify the collaborating ‘actor’ (i.e. Node of analysis); 
• Identify relevant theoretical issues from differing perspectives, according to the policy 
area/function of interest (i.e. The ‘function’ that the network will serve);  
• Clarify the ontological perspective underpinning the network analysis. 
Based on the above network research considerations, the remainder of part two of the chapter will 
define the network ‘actor’ according urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) for economic 
development, before discussing its multi-dimensional characteristics, towards the development of a 
conceptual framework. 
 
3.3 The Network: ULAC for economic development  
 
Conceptually, given the general confusion regarding collaboration policy terminology according to 
the network perspective (see for example, Bingham, O’Leary, and Carlson, 2008), understanding 
collaboration as an economic development policy of urban local government requires clarification 
of the terminology in the context of this thesis.  
 
As discussed throughout section 3.2, this thesis follows a multidisciplinary approach by drawing on 
theoretical insights from three main literature domains relevant to inter-urban collaboration (i.e. 
urban scale) between urban local authorities (i.e. the network ‘actor’) working together across 
organizational and spatial boundaries for economic development (i.e. the ‘function’ of network 
analysis).  
 
A definition of collaboration networks relevant to this thesis will focus on economic development, 
as outlined in subsection 2.3.3, based on collaboration between urban government organisations.  
An understanding of collaboration networks relationship with outcomes should make explicit 
reference to the ‘actor’ and ‘node’ of interest, as well as the network ‘function’.  First, given that 
economic development networks can be understood at various levels, the network actor can be 
understood at the organisational level, according to the public administration literature:  
 
‘Intergovernmental networks based on representative organisations of local authorities, their 
distinctive characteristics are: topocratic14 membership (and the explicit exclusion of all 
                                                 
14 A system can be viewed as ‘topocratic’ if the compensation and power available to an individual is determined primarily by their 
position in a network (See: Borondo, J., Borondo, F., Rodriguez-Sickert, C., and Hidalgo, C. A. (2014). To Each According to its 
Degree: The Meritocracy and Topocracy of Embedded Markets. Scientific Reports, 4, 3784. ) 
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public sector unions); an extensive constellation of interests encompassing all the services 
(and associated expertise) and clients of local authorities; limited vertical interdependence 
because they have no service delivery responsibilities; but extensive horizontal articulation 
or ability to penetrate a range of other networks.’ 
 Rhodes and Marsh, (1992: 183) 
 
The Rhodes and Marsh (1992) definition of intergovernmental networks is useful for the study of 
ULAC networks given the recognised important role of the actor in terms of their relative position 
within the network, as acting on behalf of their organization, shaped and influenced by context, 
which is ‘likely to be strategic, maximizing their own jurisdiction or organization’s interests (Ha et 
al. 2016: 15).  However, the Rhodes and Marsh (1992) description of intergovernmental networks 
provides little by way of explanation of the intended outcome of organisational network linkages, 
where the role of structure and flow of network linkages ‘as a processes of interaction, in terms of 
an exchange of goods, services, information and contacts among places and nodes’ (Camagni and 
Capello, 2004: 496) is thought an important influence on network outcomes.   
 
The scale of network analysis according to this research represents an aggregation of individual 
network relationships as ‘a structure involving multiple nodes—agencies and organizations—with 
multiple linkages...taking many forms, including simple individual interactions to multiple 
networks, flows, and patterns of information within and between groups’ (Ha et al. 2016: 16). 
 
Therefore, ULAC according to this thesis builds on the above understanding of networks as: 
 
Inter-urban governmental networks representing multiple linkages of dynamic interaction 
between individuals, organisations, places and nodes, in pursuit of economic development 
outcomes for their territory. 
 
According to the above definition offered by this thesis, an understanding of the relationship 
between ULAC and economic development policy outcomes in Scotland is provided, through an 
aggregation of individual urban local authority behavior and linkages within the ULAC network.  
In other words, the collaboration-outcome relationship of urban local government in Scotland is 
focused on whole network outcomes from which the individual (as representing the local authority 
organisation) is embedded, rather than the network individual/organisation being the focus of 
analysis. 
 
Having clarified the theoretical definition underpinning ULAC for economic development 
applicable to this thesis, it is recognised that network outcomes are affected by a multitude of 
contexts and factors relating to the functioning of the network, including: i) the node of interest: 
(i.e. individual, organization, city, region); conceptual clarity in terms of ii) the function of 
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collaboration (i.e. a service delivery function; a strategic function; a local economic development 
function).  Such conceptual issues relating to network theory requires fuller understanding of what 
constitutes such functional characteristics of economic development collaboration according to 
different theoretical perspectives.  Therefore, a conceptualisation of ULAC must first clarify the 
theoretical dimensions according to Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Concetpualising Matrix: Theoretical dimensions of ULAC:  
 
THEORETICAL 
DOMAINS 
NODE: URBAN LOCAL AUTHORITY 
FUNCTION: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Functional Characteristics 
Spatial Network Theory 
Economic Network Theory 
Governance Network Theory 
 
Accordingly, in an attempt to identify a common understanding of the functional characteristics 
relevant to ULAC across the literature, section 3.4 provides a review of the economic development 
and urban local government literature according to the various theoretical perspectives.  Chapter 
three concludes with a proposed integrative conceptual framework for the study of ULAC for 
economic development, taking into consideration both the theoretical and the functional 
dimensions of ULAC. 
 
3.4 Functional Characteristics of Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) for 
Economic Development. 
  
In order for academic research on economic development collaboration to become more integrated, 
an understanding of its functional characteristics is required. Only through the unravelling of the 
different functional dimensions of collaboration, can its relationship with policy outcomes for 
economic development be better understood. In this context, research is overlapping and dense 
across the multidisciplinary literature.  Section 3.4 defines the characteristics to propose an 
integrative framework that includes network functional characteristics.  
 
As demonstrated in section 2.3.2 a key aim and purpose of ULAC for economic development 
depends on the theoretical perspective from which it is being discussed. Each of the functional 
dimensions of purpose; configuration and management are discussed throughout the following 
section according to the multi-disciplinary literature, clarifying the area of interest from the outset: 
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• The node of interest: Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC)15; 
• Functional area of interest: serve economic development priorities; 
• Identification of the ontological perspective underpinning the network characteristics. 
 
3.4.1 The economic rationale of ULAC: 
Economics’ early focus on the competiveness of firms historically focused on the ability of 
organisations to ‘consistently and profitably produce products that meet the requirements of an 
open market in terms of price, quality, design, relative to rivals’ (Martin and Simmie, 2008: 2).  
Through a gradual shifting institutional focus of endogenous growth theory, there is recent 
recognition of the positive economic externalities and increasing returns to scale associated with 
spatial clustering and specialization of institutional activities between urban organisations (Porter, 
1994; Krugman, 1995).   
 
Traditional views of urban competitiveness are based largely on endogenous growth theory16, 
which focus mainly on the competitive relationship between cities, and thought limited by the 
apparent ‘lack of attention for the importance of external relations of cities and city networks, and 
lack of recognition of the importance of relational factors’ (in terms of external, exogenous factors) 
of inter-city relationships for competitiveness (Yuhong, and Lijing, 2012: 272).   
 
The increased interest in collaboration policy is viewed the result of thinking that economic 
development results cannot be achieved without it (Hudson et al. 1999).  Collaboration policy is 
typically viewed as a positive policy solution, even when there is little evidence to suggest it will 
work in practice (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).  The policy rationale relates to the potential 
advantages for creating ‘more resources and more ideas….multi-sector partnerships having the 
potential to leverage additional resources (financial and social capital); pool existing resources 
(buildings, staff and information); reduce duplication in resource use; and share risk’ (Lowndes and 
Squires, 2012: 401). 
 
Purely competitive urban strategies of the past are therefore being gradually replaced by more 
collaborative network based policies (see for example, Dawson, 1992; Parkinson, 1992; Robson, 
1992), where city governments often explore policies which emphasise ‘horizontal coordination 
and collaboration between cities’ (Graham, 1995: 503).  However, the reality of delivering urban 
policy within a network of collaboration is complex and must be understood within an environment 
of multi-layered governance arrangements. 
                                                 
15 The acronym Urban Local Government Collaboration (ULAC) will be referred to throughout the rest of the thesis as the node of interest 
for network analysis. 
16
 See for example: Andersson and Karlsson, 2007; Capello and Nijkamp, 2009; Stimson et al. 2011. 
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Martin and Simmie (2008) usefully identify four overlapping urban economic competiveness 
theories, which emphasise the role of urban networks in various forms: increasing returns theories; 
knowledge and innovation theories; cluster theory; and cultural economy theories.  Each theory 
emphasises certain institutional (and geographical) networks and processes as key ‘drivers’ of 
urban success. In this context, there is an important overlap between economic theory and spatial 
theory relating to agglomeration economies, endogenous growth theory and cluster theory, through 
a theoretical recognition of spatially localized externalities and knowledge spillovers, (albeit in 
different ways), from geographically local, rather than distanced interactive types of proximity.   
 
It is important to distinguish between geographic and interactive (organizational) networks across 
the different theoretical explanations of urban competitiveness, through the economic recognition 
and importance of ‘proximity’.  Taylor (2004) defines urban connections in terms of: the city 
network; the nodal (city) level connection; and secondary nodal connections (i.e. various 
organizations within cities), resulting mainly from cooperative urban relationships, as opposed to 
purely competitive hierarchical urban relationships.  Proximity in economic geography ‘introduces 
space and interactions between spaces into economic theory’, whereas neo-classical economics 
assumed economic activities took place in ‘placeless realms in which location does not play a 
significant part’ (Martin and Simmie, 2008: 4).  Thus, neoclassical economics was dismissive of 
the importance of institutions and their complexity, much recognised in organizational theory. 
 
The institutional turn in the economic literature highlights the transactions cost and resource 
constraints factor affecting firm behaviour (see for example, Williamson, 1985 and Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), underpinning economic rationale for collaborative forms of organization to help 
reduce transaction costs (i.e. the costs of running the economic system) through recognition of ‘the 
role of more qualitative aspects of institutions…through discrete structural analysis’ (Williamson, 
1991:269).  The distinction of the institutional turn in economics from earlier conceptualisations of 
the firm, recognise that economic activity is shaped by ‘economizing issues, and issues posed 
within firm’ (p270) motivating collaborative forms of working. 
 
Organizational proximity is suggested a key factor affecting long-distance working and limiting 
socio-economic interaction between organisations across large areas, suggesting knowledge 
exchanges and interactions need not be confined within a given locality.  For example, institutional 
network clusters are useful for promoting innovation and creativity of institutions, and the 
improved functionality of common projects (Kunzmann, 2004; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004).  Due 
to the micro-economic, networked activities of cities, collaboration between city administrations is 
viewed crucially important to city competitiveness by enhancing the interaction of positive 
externalities (Porter, 2001).  
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Furthermore, strategic learning from other institutional actors involved in a network is believed to 
be crucial for cities in sustaining competitiveness under rapidly changing external conditions, 
including their ability to transfer best practices through learning and to enable cities to form 
relations on a flexible basis (Leibovitz, 2003; Provan and Milward, 2001). As Storper (1996) 
indicates, untraded interdependencies, which include formal and informal collaboration and 
information networks among cities, make possible rapid responses to changing circumstances. 
 
Another key network factor relates to social embeddedness, where norms, customs, culture, 
structural and political factors (i.e. informal constraints) located and networked in an area can 
provide advantages in terms of ‘social embededdness’ (Granovetter, 1985).  The informal factors 
recognised in the ‘New Institutional’ turn in economic thinking, mark a significant change and 
recognition of networks and informal institutions impacting on urban performance.   
 
The above ‘networked’ advantages are believed to lie in the character of local social, cultural and 
institutional arrangements. More specifically, insight drawn from institutional and evolutionary 
economics highlights the importance of network ties of proximity and association, as a key source 
of knowledge and learning (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Martin and Sunley, 1996; Storper, 1997).  
Martin and Simme (2008) suggest that location (in terms of proximity) and interaction between 
locations (i.e. between organisations and geographies) can help to explain how economic forces 
play out differently in different cities. 
 
Having considered the main economic context understanding ULAC, Table 3 provides a summary 
of the key ‘network’ characteristics relative to the networks functional domains: purpose, 
configuration and management. 
 
Table 3: Economic Network Characteristics According to Functional Dimensions: 
Economic Network:  Purpose Configuration  
• Institutional inter-
city networks; 
• Strategic Learning 
Networks; 
• Innovation clusters. 
 
• Institutional innovation and creativity; 
• Improved functionality of common 
projects; 
• Improve knowledge and innovation;  
• Provide flexible learning 
arrangements; 
• Enhance cultural economies (social 
embeddedness); 
• Reduce organisation transaction costs; 
• Share resources; 
• Secondary-level nodal 
networks (i.e. between city 
organizations) 
• Network ties of proximity 
(closeness); 
• Network ties of 
association (specialisation) 
 
 
It is clear that economic competiveness is important and depends on the configuration of both 
internal and external networks of collaboration within and outwith cities.  However, organizing and 
realizing the benefits of collaboration is rarely identified empirically in economic literature, except 
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anecdotally (Malecki 2002), and difficult to fully evidence how economic network benefits happen 
in practice (Loftman and Nevin, 1996).   
 
3.4.2 The spatial role of ULAC: 
Collaboration is viewed as ‘inherently spatial’ (Gerber and Loh (2015: 1), in that ‘urban systems 
both shape, and are shaped by, locational networks and network behaviours’ (Bryson and Crosby, 
2006: 49).  Urban systems are thought structured according to different network flows: the 
interurban scale corresponds to flows between core and peripheral districts in different urban 
regions and intra-urban relations refer to relations in the ‘own’ core and periphery districts 
involved (van Oort, et al.  2010: 729).  The focus here is on the inter-urban level of spatial 
networks: ‘urban institutions have received significant attention within political geography (see 
Warf, 1991, for a review). Influenced by both regulation theory and urban regime theory.  Van 
Oort (2010) identified key policy conceptualisations relating to urban networks including :  
• spatial integration: when network interaction between different geographies within an urban 
network provides opportunities for transport and communication, facilitating information flows 
and relationships between individual urban agglomerations; 
• functional integration: when spatial integration helps to ensure urban economic functions 
delivered by local authorities are differentiated or specialized in different sectors. 
 
Hence, networks between similar types of cities can be useful for place competitiveness, where 
networks enhance benefits of specialisation, whilst networks between cities of different character 
can introduce benefits of diversity (Eraydin et al.  2008). 
 
Spatial networks can also provide a synergetic role through the spatial configuration of cities in 
terms of ‘polycentricity’ (Meijers, 2005; Governa and Salone, 2005; Salet, 2006; Camagni and 
Salone, 1993; Malecki, 2002; Polenske, 2004).  In this context, joint policies and strategic 
decisions among and within different cities can help to solve the problem of size, as an important 
determinant of competitiveness (Scott, 1998; Buck et al. 2005; Turok, 2004). Maximising urban 
size is believed to be a key source of advantage and can be attained by cities of different size by 
promoting efficient networking and competent governance (Eraydin et al.  2008).  Such networks 
may be particularly critical for smaller areas that lack resources (Arku and Oosterbaan, 2014).   
 
Provide networked externalities (agglomerations): 
 
The geographical (spatial) perspective of networks and collaboration is commonly known as the 
new economic geography (NEG), which recognises the significance of the structure of networks in 
terms of agglomerations for economic performance via clustering and the importance of proximity 
for economic interaction (Oinas, 2002).  NEG insights on spatial economics has largely helped to 
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theorise and measure agglomeration, as well as provide key insights into the structural 
determinants of urbanisation in terms of the interaction between market structures and the 
importance of spatial factors.   
 
At the scale of the organization within a city, Huggins and Thomson (2013) suggest that: 
 
‘inter-organizational networks underpinning the flow of knowledge within and across 
regions are a key capital input within regional growth processes...in that economic growth is 
partly a function of the value created through inter-organizational flows of knowledge (i.e. 
network capital)’ 
Huggins and Thomson (2013: 2) 
 
 The recognition of inter-organizational networks (i.e. collaborations principally between firms) for 
knowledge flows has been widely recognised by economics, geography and management studies 
(see for example, Maggioni and Uberti, 2009; Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011).    
 
Industrial agglomeration theory has increasingly recognised the importance of geographic scale for 
positive external economies across regions and localities in recent years (Phelps and Ozawa, 2003; 
Phelps, 2004; Malmberg and Maskell, 2006).  In other words, economic collaboration requires 
proximity to ‘help make collaboration better, faster, easier and smoother’ (Maskell, 1999: 50). 
 
At the scale of the city, the structure and ‘intensity of networks’ are important (Docherty et al.  
2004: 449) characteristics of ULACs, and likely to be dynamic due to the ambiguity and 
complexity that is inherent in collaboration (Huxham and Vangen 2005).  For example, inter-urban 
collaboration can be viewed as more than simple networking, due to the potential for the exchange 
of information, knowledge and resources, all having the capacity to create mutual benefit and 
achieve common purpose.   
 
Pred and Hagerstrand (1967) and Storper, (2010) suggest that increasing returns are realised 
through both the geographic and organizational processes relating to: localisation, spatial and 
economic diffusion of knowledge.  Krugman (1994) highlights the importance of the geographic 
perspective through the recognition of agglomeration advantages between industries, suggesting 
that ‘the most striking feature of the geography of economic activity….is concentration’ (Krugman, 
1991: 5). 
 
The importance of spatial collaboration has also been increasingly recognised through the concept 
of the polycentric urban region (PUR), in terms of a set of historically and spatially separate 
metropolitan areas comprising a larger, functionally interrelated urban region (Kloosterman and 
Musterd, 2001).  In this context, collaboration is known as ‘polycentrism’, where regions with 
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multiple urban centres are functionally interrelated, either through competition or collaboration 
(Cowell, 2010: 945)17. 
 
PUR policies have been used as spatial planning tools to support economic competitiveness, 
through the analysis of patterns of interaction between different geographical nodes, and mainly 
introduced to encourage a more balanced spatial distribution of economic activity between 
geographic nodes (Burger et al.  2013).  The PUR concept is still largely contested as an accepted 
definition viewed as being largely focused on conceptual and analytical issues (Maly, 2016).  PUR 
policies promote the idea of policy to support city clusters and city networks, by promoting 
integrated spatial development strategies for city clusters (i.e. by enlarging particular functional 
regions) (see for example, Baily and Turok, 2001; Meijers, 2005; Burger et al.  2013).  The 
Randstad region in the Netherlands is a good example of a PUR  in reality (see Lambregts, 2009). 
 
However, the PUR concept is potentially limited in its examination of only functional linkages 
between cities, and lacks a fuller appreciation of the multiplicity of networks, such as existing 
hierarchical and power relationships within the PUR (Burger et al. 2013).  NEG spatial insights 
alone are thus limited in their ability to establish the causality of spatial dynamics (Storper, 2010), 
by examining only one type of functional linkage between cities and with the need for a ‘general 
framework in geographical economics’ (p315).  In other words, there is a need to better understand 
the driving causal forces behind the processes of collaboration and interaction (beyond functional 
proximity), and the resultant impact on urban economic development policy outcomes and benefits 
from ULACs. 
 
The ‘network city’ or ‘urban network’ has been a key focus of regional and urban development 
policy in recent years and commonly used in urban geography, urban economics, and planning to 
help analyse the social, economic, and/or environmentally sustainable context of polycentric (i.e. 
several centres) urban regions (PURs) (Cheng et al. 2013). The term polycentric in relation to 
urban network theory relates to collaborative working between cities and long recognized as a 
crucial economic development approach in Europe.  For example: Øresund (Copenhagen and 
Malmo); Lithuania (Vilnius and Kaunas); The Dutch Deltametropolis (formerly the Randstad) 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) are all examples of well-established European 
inter-urban collaboration models.  Kansai in Japan (Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe) is another example.   
 
Ostrom et al. (1961) first observed polycentricity as a situation comprised of: 
 
‘many centres of decision-making, formally independent of each other, although functioning 
in a coherent way, with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behaviour’  
                                                 
17 Cowell, M. (2010). Polycentric regions: comparing complementarity and institutional governance in the San Francisco Bay Area, the 
Randstad and Emilia-Romagna, Urban Studies, 47, 945-966. 
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Ostrom et al. (1961: 831).  
 
The New Economic Geography (NEG) perspective of polycentricity can be understood at different 
scales in terms of: the individual, institution, city, or region.  Collaborative networks are defined in 
terms of: inter-regional; intra-regional (e.g. networked cities like the Ruhr-Rhine Region); or intra-
urban (e.g. within the city), where both the intra-urban (regional) and inter-urban (metropolitan) 
scales are believed important for the governance of fragmented political systems. 
 
Meijers (2006) describes the Polycentric Urban Regions (PUR) as a commonly used term for 
‘describing a collection of historically distinct and both administratively and politically 
independent cities located in close proximity and well connected through infrastructure’ (p1).  In 
other words, polycentricity is a geographical and descriptive concept of the configuration of space 
and flows of interactions between and within cities (Pompeli, 2006). 
 
From an urban planning perspective, the flows between cities are encouraged via strategic spatial 
planning policies promoting the idea of polycentricity and used to explain urban structure and 
growth.  In particular, polycenticity has become a popular spatial development tool in Europe since 
the publication of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP, 1999).   
 
Around the same time, much of the academic literature from the 1990s onwards tends to analyse 
urban systems from the networked perspective, in terms of ‘flows between cities and the 
importance of external relations of cities’ (i.e. urban network theory), with earlier urban systems 
research concentrating mainly on the ‘characteristics within cities’ (Liu and Derudder, 2013: 1).   
 
The networked view of cities is predominantly that cities (and regions) compete, as well as 
collaborate, due mainly to the micro-economic factors and networks within cities, building upon 
Porter’s (1990) ‘diamond model’ of competitiveness of places (Healey and Dunham, 1994).  Such 
institutional milieu (e.g. governance, policy and networks) are increasingly regarded as the most 
important factors of competitiveness, in terms of their contribution towards developing social 
capital (i.e. the features of social organization, including: trust, norms, and networks) (Putnam, 
1993), albeit assumed the hardest elements to measure in practice (Webster and Muller, 2000). 
 
Alongside the increased recognition of networks for competitiveness, increasing globalization is a 
further reason why cities collaborate, mainly to ‘avoid the fiscal and social problems that can 
inhibit cities’.  In other words, cities work together ‘to provide amenities and infrastructure that can 
make a region more attractive’ and competitive as a whole (Wolfson and Frisken, 2000: 365).  In 
an increasingly globalized world, cities have the opportunity to develop their own competitiveness 
through the opportunity (and threat) of increased access to world markets, global labour and 
capital. 
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Ultimately however, cities only have the capacity to control some of the factors, which determine 
competitiveness.  Indeed, there is research to suggest that competition between different areas can 
lead to inefficiency and inequality (Goetz and Kayser, 1993), as a key influence of recent policy 
shifts towards collaborative economic development policy, as opposed to competitive working 
(Wolfson and Frisken, 2000).  Within the field of economic development, there is increasing 
emphasis on collaboration from policymakers, who believe local governments should cooperate 
(Arku, 2014), instead of competing, as an essential part of ‘win-win’ policy for regional prosperity 
(Gordon, 2009: 327). 
 
According to Capello (2013: 331): 
 
‘Cities need efficient urban policies with the aim to upgrade the economic functions within 
the city, as well as the development of linkages outside the city, such as alliances, co-
operation agreements, advanced international transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure.’  
 
Aside from the urban growth perspective of collaboration, Foray and Lundvall (1996) argue that 
human competence is at the core of contemporary forms of economic development.  A key 
component of what are called third-wave strategies of economic development by Amercian 
academics (Osgood et al. 2012), relate mainly to: ‘finding new institutional and organizational 
arrangements with sufficient scope, responsiveness, and flexibility to provide the foundation for 
economic development’ (Clarke and Saiz, 1996: 543). 
 
Castells (1996: 324) refers to this as the: 
 
‘city network paradigm’, in terms of a successful theoretical framework to overcome the 
limiting interpretative power of the traditional central-place model by departing from the 
abstract Christallerian pattern of a nested hierarchy of centres and markets, by breaking the 
link between urban size and urban function.’   
 
Bertolini and Dijst (2003) describe three main types of urban network configurations: 
morphologic–descriptive, normative–strategic, and analytic, defined in Table 4 below.  The key 
point here is that by ‘integrating accessibility and proximity features of locations’ a city can be 
regarded as ‘an open system of connected open sub-systems in which human interaction can take 
place’ (Bertolini and Dijst, 2003: 40).  Thus, the networked view of the city offers a wider 
perspective than more traditional urban theory by highlighting the importance of spatial 
configuration within the network theory logic, where ‘size is not the only determinant of factor 
productivity and economies of agglomeration of large centres’ (Castells, 1996: 325).   
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In other words, increasing relationships and networks among cities follow a network-logic, where 
cities collaborate regardless of physical distance, in order to establish economic relationships and 
thus, influence the spatial organization and resultant urban efficiency, growth, and specialization 
(i.e. due to economies of vertical and horizontal integration, and network externalities). 
 
Table 4: The Urban Network Paradigm and Network Configurations  
Urban 
Networks 
Urban Form Functionality Research 
morphologic–
descriptive 
• mostly mid-sized 
cities;  
• polycentric/multi-
nodal urban 
regions; 
• sub centres next to 
historic urban 
centres in 
metropolitan areas; 
 
 
• functional 
integration; 
• competing and 
complementary 
based view of 
spatial patterns of 
social and 
economic activity 
around nodes.  
 
Batten, D. F. (1995). Network cities: 
Creative agglomerations for the 21st 
century. Urban Studies, 32(2), 313–
327. 
Ascher, F. (1995). Metapolis, ou 
l’Avenir des Villes. Paris: Editions 
Odile Jaco 
Dieleman, F. M., and Faludi, A. 
(1998). Polynucleated metropolitan 
regions in Northwest Europe: Theme 
of the special issue. European 
Planning Studies, 6(4), 365–377. 
normative–
strategic 
• polycentric urban 
region (PUR) 
• explicit focus on 
the horizontal 
linkages between 
adjacent cities;  
• a larger urban area 
with a wide 
(competitive) 
space. 
 
• economically 
and/or 
environmentally 
sustainable  
• functional 
interaction; 
linking different 
systems; 
• favoured by 
planners and 
designers 
 
Albrechts, L., and Lievois, G. (2004). 
The Flemish diamond: Urban 
network in the making? European 
Planning Studies, 12(3), 351–370. 
Albrechts, L., and Mandelbaum, S. 
(2005). The network society – The 
new context for planning. London: 
Routledge.  
Hall, P., and Ward, C. (1998). 
Sociable cities: The legacy of 
Ebenezer Howard. Chichester: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Rogers, R. (1997). Cities for a small 
planet. London: Faber and Faber.  
Meijers, (2005). Polycentric urban 
regions and the quest for synergy: Is a 
network of cities more than the sum 
of the parts? Urban Studies.vol: 
42 (4) pp: 765-781 
 
Source: Adapted from Bertolini and Dijst (2003: 30) (see Table 1: Perspective on Network Cities) 
 
Much of the empirical research on polycentricism between the 1990s and 2000s, focused mainly on 
the governance role of local institutions, originating mainly from the United States and 
Netherlands, and with few studies within the UK.  
 
Indeed, Davoudi (2003) suggests polycentric and networked regional structures ‘appear to be 
cropping up everywhere as an ideal type of regional spatial structure’ (p72), despite a lack of 
common definition and empirical evidence about its desirability and effectiveness.   Accordingly, 
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there is a need for insights from urban systems theory to support spatial planning. 
 
The following section provides a fuller assessment of the importance of spatial network theory for 
understanding the role of ULAC for economic development. 
 
Assessing ULAC according to configuration:  
 
Recognizing the growing importance of the urban network perspective within the NEG literature, 
most theoretical and empirical studies are largely concerned with understanding the dynamics of 
urban connectivity (Hamme et al. 2013). The purpose of this section is to assess the role of 
ULACs within economic development according to network configuration in relation to: city size, 
scale and scope.  
 
NEG insights on spatial economics has largely helped to theorise and measure agglomeration, as 
well as provide key insights into the structural determinants of urbanization, in terms of the 
interaction between market structures and the importance of spatial networks.  Spatial networks 
have been increasingly recognised through the concept of the polycentric urban region (PUR), in 
terms of a set of historically and spatially separate metropolitan areas comprising a larger, 
functionally interrelated urban region, of both inter and intra-urban patterns of economic activity 
(Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001).    
 
The term ‘polycenticity’ can be interpreted as either a planning tool or as a socio-economic policy 
tool, with PUR policies mainly used as spatial planning tools to support economic competitiveness, 
by analysing and promoting patterns of interaction between different geographical nodes to 
encourage a more balanced spatial distribution of economic activity (Burger et al.  2013).  
 
The PUR concept promotes city clusters and city networks via integrated spatial development 
strategies (i.e. by enlarging particular functional regions) (see for example, Baily and Turok, 2001; 
Meijers, 2005; Burger et al.  2013).  Polycentric characteristics of ULACs therefore relates to the 
configuration and concentration of networked activity between different geographical nodes ‘or 
concentrations of physical (i.e. transport) and/or functional (i.e. institutional, social, human 
networks) connections between nodes in a geographical area’ (Cheng et al. 2013: 165).  
 
For example, Meijers (2005) suggests that horizontal-networked relationships between urban areas 
can be seen as a new form of spatial organisation supporting economic synergy, in terms of a: 
 
‘situation in which the effect of two or more co-operating or combined bodies or functions is 
larger than the sum of the effects each body or function alone can achieve’ 
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Meijers (2005: 766). 
 
Hence, the polycentric nature of ULACs for economic development relates to the potential for 
increased competitiveness, cohesion and regional balance, through the promotion of functional 
network relationships been nodes (i.e. cities).  
 
Complementarity and synergy effect of PURs: 
 
The Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent issued by 
CEMAT suggests the development of urban systems and functions within a network can help to 
increase their complementarity, and facilitate access to information and knowledge by encouraging 
national and regional prosperity.   
 
Meijers, (2006a) suggests that the enhancement of complementarity is a main objective of co-
operation and policymaking for PURs, in that it is not one city that provides a complete array of 
economic functions, but rather, the whole system (and network) of cities within a region.  Taylor 
(2004: 88) further explains such complementarity in that ‘power within a network of cities is more 
diffuse as every node has a particular niche that contributes towards the overall production of the 
whole region’.  Therefore, ULACs aimed at enhancing complementarity can be advantageous for 
regional development because ‘it improves the range of services offered and the economic 
conditions of a region and thereby increasing its competitiveness’ (CEC, 1999: 65). 
 
The key point is that the network theory perspective suggests that complementarity within a PUR 
can act as a synergy-generating mechanism (Meijers, 2005), and the ability to avoid duplication of 
urban services across different areas.  Meijers (2006b), suggests that duplication of facilities in 
PURs should be minimized to ensure the range of assets on offer across networked cities are 
complementary, as opposed to competing for economic activity, and as a result, will help increase 
agglomeration economies. 
 
Albeit that urbanisation is often combined with agglomeration, they are not synonymous, 
especially if the fastest-growing areas are small cities and towns rather than major cities.  For 
example, Turok, 2013 suggest that it is not urbanisation that stimulates and sustains growth, but 
rather the form that urbanisation takes and whether it provides an efficient enabling environment 
(i.e. the distribution of growth across cities of different sizes).  The complementarity, distribution 
and configuration of urban activities are crucially important. 
 
Capello (2013) explains that the spatial network perspective can also be used to help understand the 
role of city size (i.e. in terms of an efficient size, as opposed to an optimal size), and the 
relationships among centres.  For example, patterns of specialization are a main reason that cities 
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establish economic relationships, where spatial organization is believed to be fundamental to 
understanding their efficiency, growth and specialization. Hence, it is not optimal city size that is 
important in an economic context, rather the efficient size in terms of what a city produces and how 
it co-operates within the urban system.  
 
Agglomeration economies and industrial networks/clusters: 
 
Collaboration between cities to promote complementarity is also viewed more important than 
competition in terms of supporting positive agglomeration economies.  Importantly, the 
geographical (spatial) perspective of urban networks recognises the significant role of network 
capital in terms of agglomerations for economic performance via clustering and the importance of 
proximity for economic interaction (Oiins, 2002), in the form of polycenticity.   
 
Agglomeration theory in its different forms can help define urban concentration in terms of both 
the division of labour (i.e. productivity gains from industrial clustering/specialisation of city 
functions) and economies of scale (i.e. both internal efficiencies to the firm, and external 
agglomeration economies in terms of locational benefits).  
 
The role of spatial distance and regional agglomerations are important concepts for understanding 
innovation-based, hierarchical, economies in that these reflect the inter-dependencies between 
firms, that generate region-specific agglomeration benefits (Storper, 1995), and hence, of particular 
importance for developing industrial clusters (Porter, 1990).  
 
The concept of agglomeration economies is important for the analysis of industrial location in the 
NEG literature, where spatial models are used to help explain differences in the distribution of 
economic growth and productivity across cities (Sedgley and Elmslie, 2004) and the way in which 
economic agents interact and live (Ioannides and Rossi-Hansberg, 2005).   
 
Specifically, agglomeration in terms of industrial clusters, contain spatial complexities and 
different types of cluster activity (both within and across a range of activities).  As a result, there is 
a significant literature, which considers city size and shape for maximising the benefits of 
agglomeration economies.  The value of spatial agglomeration (in terms of economies of scope, 
scale and complexity) (see Parr, 2002 for example), relates to knowledge and information exchange 
(both informal and formal), in terms of the traditional (neo-classical) ideas of competitive 
advantage inherent in large urban areas (Doherty et al. 2004).  Thus, agglomeration economies 
suggest that cities are dynamic economic territories and important determinants of national 
competitive advantage (Kresl, 1995, p.49).   
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Important theoretical considerations of industrial clusters include Michael Porter’s study ‘The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990)’, which suggests that internationally successful 
industries often concentrate in a city (or region) to take advantage of local scale and agglomeration 
economies.  In other words, knowledge economy factors relating to: knowledge exchange between 
individuals and organisations, sectoral innovation and creativity, scale, density and socio-economic 
diversity of cities (Gordon and McCann, 2000).   
 
Furthermore, some of the more recent work of Richard Florida and ‘creative class’ theory, (see for 
example,  , 2002, 2003, 2005), suggests that diverse, tolerant and ‘cool cities’ will outperform other 
places.  Such ideas relate to the increasing importance of a knowledge-driven economy, and the 
role of the skilled workforce in facilitating the flow of ideas and in enabling adoption of new 
technology and adaptation to change, means that cities offer benefits through the clustering of 
people and their ideas. This is a direct result of the agglomeration of economic activity in cities and 
the economic benefits that this can bring (ODPM, 2006).  
 
A prominent characteristic of economic development is therefore the recognition and reliance on 
the role of knowledge via the knowledge economy (Abramovitz and David, 1996), and the 
importance of the spatial distribution and dissemination of information (Raco, 1999: 952).   
 
The traditional view of the role of innovation and knowledge within economic theory is that the 
location and diffusion of knowledge is distributed in a hierarchical, polarised manner, whereas, the 
knowledge-economy perspective is based on a wider understanding of the role of ‘different 
socioeconomic relationships creating different geographies through hierarchical territorial 
relationships of localised networks of knowledge sharing, generation and innovation’ (Raco, 1999: 
953). 
 
Knowledge networks potentially play an important role in the long run, due mainly to: the 
increasing pace of innovation; the potential for technological improvements; and the increased use 
of electronic networks (see Foray and Lundvall, 1996).  Thus, Raco, 1999 suggests that knowledge 
distribution is important for the ‘competitive advantage of smaller producers working in flexible, 
market-responsive, information-rich collaborative relationships’ (p953). 
 
Yuhong, and Lijing (2012) construct a conceptual model of urban competitiveness (i.e. co-
opitition) to suggest that the shift towards the city network perspective largely reflects the changing 
nature of capital and information flows in recent years, due to information and communication 
technology (i.e. the knowledge and innovation economy) making city cooperation easier.   
 
Huggins and Thompson (2013) takes this concept a stage further, arguing that regional growth is 
partly a function of the value created through inter-organizational flows of knowledge within and 
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across regions, and suggest that ‘investment in calculative networks to access knowledge is a form 
of capital (i.e. network capital), which should be incorporated into future regional growth models in 
a more formalised way’ (p2). 
 
Therefore, the institutional focus on networks is a form of selective co-operation between locally 
based producers, acting collaboratively towards long-term growth, based on a view that successful 
regions flourish as a consequence of institutional embeddedness or thickness (i.e. through the 
continual improvements in standards of working), by creating ‘local nodes of economic activity’ 
(Raco 1999: 951).  Hence, institutions are understood to provide the basis for localised social and 
economic networks where strong local institutional relations may act to support regional economic 
success (see Amin and Thrift, 1995). 
 
Table 5: Spatial Network Characteristics According to Functional Dimensions: 
Spatial Network 
Characteristic:  
Purpose Configuration  
• Functional 
Networks 
• Complementary 
Networks 
 
• Spatial integration/ 
improved transport and 
communication networks; 
• Network Synergy 
 
• spatial integration: when network interaction 
between different geographies within an 
urban network provides opportunities for 
transport and communication, facilitating 
information flows and relationships between 
individual urban agglomerations; 
• functional integration: when spatial 
integration helps to ensure urban economic 
functions delivered by local authorities are 
differentiated or specialized in different 
sectors. 
• networks between similar types of cities are 
thought useful for place competitiveness, 
where networks enhance benefits of 
specialisation, whilst networks between 
cities of different character can introduce 
benefits of diversity (Eraydin et al.  2008). 
 
The social networks ‘remain something of ‘a black-box’ as to how clusters relate to and impact on 
the rest of a city’s economy (Martin and Simmie, 2008: 10).  Although the ‘new economic 
geography provides economic reasons for local agglomeration, it is believed to fail to properly 
investigate the sources of these local advantages (Martin and Sunley, 1996).  Thus, consideration of 
the public administration perspective provides an understanding of the role of networks and how 
they are organised in order to understand their role for economic success. 
3.4.3 Governance role of ULAC: 
 
Agranoff and McGuire (1998) make a distinction between the strategic purpose of networks, 
delineating ‘policy-making and strategy-making networks from resource-exchange and project-
based networks’ (Bryson and Crosby, 2006: 49) affecting their configuration.   
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The focus here is on strategy-making governance networks of inter-organisational working.  In this 
context, inter-governmental networks refer to semi-institutional and relatively stable network 
formations that promote collective (or parallel) action in common areas of policy interest. Inter-
municipal partnerships represent the main context of partnerships between local authorities, 
described as ‘the ability to enlist all actors involved [to] generate new ideas and develop and 
implement a policy designed to respond to fundamental developments and create conditions for 
sustainable development’ (van den Berg and Braun, 1999: 995).   
 
‘cooperative alliances are a way to enhancing competitiveness and effectiveness that would 
not be possible through the traditional governance mechanisms of market or hierarchy ’  
Provan and Milward, (1995:1).   
 
The above description of collaboration highlights the governance associated with public sector 
collaboration ‘crucial to understanding collaboration in the urban setting’ (Docherty et al.  2004: 
449).  The focus here is on the characteristics defining governmental networks between urban local 
authorities for economic development as an extension of the ‘collective action problem’ in the 
context of collaboration between local goverments (Feiock et al. 2009: 256). 
 
The organisation and structure of urban local government in recent years has been subject of much 
governance debate, arguing that increasing fragmentation of local government is counterproductive 
for economic development and ‘accountability’ (Lowry, 2010), requiring ‘good regional 
government and governance’ mechanism to ‘eliminate development subsidy competition among 
jurisdictions’ (Feiock, 2005: 5).  There has been a significant change in the traditional mechanisms 
of local governance of cities in recent years: authority is being ‘diffused vertically, upwards 
towards global institutions and networks, downwards to local communities, and horizontally to a 
larger and broader range of non-governmental actors’ (Graham, 1995: 143).  Formal institutions of 
urban government are believed to have shifted ‘towards a more diffuse concept of multi-actor 
governance’ meaning urban collaboration between cities can be viewed as ‘an extension to the 
process of regime formation and support that has long existed inside cities with complex 
fragmented systems of governance’ (Docherty et al. 2004: 449).  
 
Network governance theory definitions are important for highlighting how governance is managed 
and the forms of control of public service delivery, where governance can be assumed to be a ‘a set 
of coordinating and monitoring activities that must occur in order for collaborations to survive’ 
(Bryson and Crosby, 2006: 49).  Himmelman (1992) offers a ranking of varying levels of 
commitment and complexity within governance networks, that goes beyond mere collaboration by 
including government actors as a key component, especially as a means for creating control of 
collective actions. 
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Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) describes the collaborative working between two or more local 
authorities with some degree of institutionalisation (Hulst and van Montfort, 2012).  IMC is 
assumed to ‘supplement national administrative systems and not replace existing public 
administration systems’ to ‘make it possible to incorporate mutual interdependencies’ (Hulst and 
van Montfort, 2012:122) between local government institutions and overcome policy complexities 
across the boundaries of individual local authority areas.  
 
Network governance between local authorities offers a ‘potential mechanism through which cities 
can share their resources, physical assets and policy skills’ (Docherty et al. 2004: 448), where 
positive economic forces are potentially a major factor behind the recognition of collaborative 
working in the public sector in recognition of ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham, 1996), for 
delivering positive outcomes as opposed to working alone. 
 
At the regional scale, Feiock (2004) suggests ‘the second path to regional development’ recognised 
by the ‘new regionalism’ stresses the importance of governance for not only efficiency of local 
government, but importantly, its role in ‘democratic governance and economic growth’ (p5), 
emphasising the self-governance role of local government, through horizontally and vertically 
linked organisations. 
 
There are different types of governance structures of collaboration which distinguish the different 
roles they can play, where different types of network governance coordination are associated with 
performance (Herranz, 2008), including: self-governing structures; lead organization of decision-
making and coordinating activities; and network administrative organization, which are all viewed 
important influencers of a networks effectiveness (Provan and Kenis 2005).   
 
The importance of collaborative governance structures relate to how the ‘actors relate to each other 
within the network’  (Eraydin et al. 2007: 2296) and how this impacts upon policy outcomes, in 
terms of non-hierarchical relationships (Morcol, 2005; Rhodes, 1997; Sotarauta and Linnamaa, 
1998), and hierarchical relationships (Le Gales, 2001).  Huxham and Vangen (2005) refers to 
‘power imbalances’ that can take place within the network and between partners of the network, in 
that dynamics can impact upon trust relationships and affect policy outcomes.  Therefore, 
governance networks are seen as being crucial in an ever inter-connected world, in that they allow 
for ‘flexible and dynamic modes of decision-making’ (Leitner et al. 2002: 280), and their non-
hierarchical, self-coordinated nature means they are superior for supporting economic growth 
(Martin and Mayntz, 1991).  Hence, self-regulating collaborative arrangements provide ‘intrinsic 
benefits and advantages over a traditional hierarchically controlled government bureaucracy’ 
(Heranz, J, 2010: 311) 
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Referred to as the ‘associational model’ (developed by Cooke and Morgan in 1998), trust-based 
relationships, learning and network competence, relate to ‘local organising capacity conditions’ 
(i.e. social capital) for competitiveness, including: administrative organisations, strategic public–
private networks, leadership, vision and strategy, political support, societal support and spatial 
economic conditions that induce and support collaboration (van den Berg and Braun, 1999).   The 
management and structure of governance is important for power relations (Bryson, 2004; Gray, 
1996; Le Gales, 2001; Camagni and Salone, 1993), trust, conflict (Bolland and Wilson 1994) and 
the rules (Kickert et al.  1997; Klijn and Teisman, 1997) by which collaboration is managed, and 
key characteristic that will impact on policy outcomes.   
 
The context of collaboration is an important influence on the structure of networks, in that changes 
in government policy are understood to ‘often destabilize systems or alter resources in the policy 
fields in which networks are embedded’ (Bryson and Crosby, 2006: 49) and potentially rearrange 
the structure of ties among members (Sharfman, Gray, and Yan 1991; Stone 2004).  For example, 
‘contextual factors such as physical/financial resources, stakeholders’ incentives and intervention, 
and institutional constraints need to be regarded as essential in determining local governments’ 
network activities for economic development’ (Ha et al. 2016:17).  Structural configurations are 
therefore important for the overall effectiveness of networks (Provan and Milward, 1995; Provan 
and Sebastian, 1998). 
 
Networks are also not free of problems, with the following causes of failure: the lack of incentives 
to co-operate; objectives may be vague or not provocative; important actors may be absent; while 
the presence of other actors may discourage the participation of necessary actors; crucial 
information about goals, means and actors may be lacking; discretionary power may be absent; 
lack of commitment of actors to the common purpose (Kickert et al. 1997.) However, existing 
network governance research is understood to underemphasize the complex variety of coordination 
processes that may operate in public networks over time, and the potential for variable outcomes.  
 
There is a lack of evidence on outcomes, assumed largely due to empirical weaknesses and 
network gains rarely identified ‘except anecdotally’ (Malecki 2002: 940).  Furthermore, most 
research considering outcomes have been case studies within the collaborative governance 
literature and tended to look at ‘process outcomes’, as opposed to ‘policy outcomes' (Ansell and 
Gash, 2007: 549).  Collaboration is thus viewed as mainly intangible, representing a ‘non-price 
factor of competitiveness that cannot be measured’ (Malecki, 2004: 1103).     
Hulst and Van Montfort (2007) have developed a framework for explaining the performance of 
IMC across Europe according to how it is configured from a public administration perspective, in 
terms of: administrative forms, governance structures and political organisation.   Hulst and Van 
Montfort present a conceptual framework of IMC in the UK (see Table 6 below), defining various 
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dimensions for describing and understanding the main factors affecting the overall performance of 
IMC, as including: Composition (i.e. who is involved); tasks (i.e. policy or service); Scope (i.e. 
Single-purpose or multi-purpose arrangements); Institutionalisation (i.e. networks, formal 
agreements and standing organisations); Decision-making powers (i.e. Regional authority or 
regional agent); Democratic legitimisation (i.e. Political representation and accountability).  
Alongside national context (i.e. nature of national administration and local government), these 
factors are understood to influence the establishment of IMC as either: semi-regional government; 
service delivery organisation: service delivery agreement: or a planning forum.  The Table 6 below 
summarises the findings from Hulst and Van Montfort on the characteristics of IMC specific to the 
UK. 
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Table 6: Conceptualizing Inter-Municipal Collaboration (IMC) in the UK: Functional dimensions 
Types of Inter-municipal Cooperation Composition: Types of tasks:  Scope: Institutionalisatio
n:  
Decision-
making 
powers:  
Democratic 
legitimisation:  
Semi-regional governments:  managed by local 
councils; 
Service delivery organisation: almost absent in 
the UK due to limited autonomy of local 
government; 
Service delivery agreement: Vertical agreements 
between local authority and (semi) autonomous 
public or private agencies; 
Planning forum: especially active in the fields of 
spatial planning, social-economic development, 
public housing and environmental planning. 
Strong presence of 
mixed public-private 
arrangements in service 
delivery 
(predominantly central-
local); regional public-
private networks for 
social-economic and 
spatial planning. Pure 
IMC is promoted by 
central government. 
Public service 
delivery 
dominates. 
Some planning 
and 
coordination for 
social-economic 
development on 
a regional level. 
Arrangements 
are 
predominantly 
multi-purpose. 
Predominance of 
agreements for 
service delivery. 
Networks for 
social-economic 
and spatial 
planning. 
Standing 
organisations 
are scarce: 
predominantl
y regional 
agents. 
Standing 
organisations are 
scarce. No 
legislation with 
regard to 
representation 
and 
accountability. 
Adapted from Hulst and Van Montfort (2007). 
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The Hulst and Van Montfort (2007) find that IMC in the UK is distinctly different in character to 
the rest of Europe, largely regarded as a non-mandated process to be established by municipalities 
themselves as circumstances require.  Furthermore, a major limitation of the Hulst and Van 
Montfort’s framework is potentially the lack of systematic demonstration of the success of IMC, 
due largely to fragmented and anecdotal research to date.   
 
The characteristics identified by Hulst and Van Montfort (2007) can be condensed into purpose: 
configuration and management summarised in Table 7 below.  It is also important to note, that the 
factors listed are not exhaustive. 
 
Table 7: Governance Network Characteristics of ULAC According to Functional 
Dimensions: 
Governance 
Characteristic 
of ULAC:  
Purpose Configuration  Management 
Governance 
networks: 
inter-
governmental 
networks for 
strategy and 
policy 
coordination 
• public resource allocation; 
• provision and production 
of goods and services; 
• Strategic 
policymaking/coordination 
• Flexible/dynamic modes of 
decision-making 
• Non-hierarchical, self-
coordinated self-regulating 
collaborative arrangements  
• Degree of 
formalization/standardization 
• Trust 
• Reputation 
• Influence 
• Conflict 
• Rules 
• Power 
relations 
• Network 
competence 
 
 
3.5 Summary: Conceptualization of Economic Development Network:  
 
The literature review in Chapter three in reveals the growing policy interest in urban collaboration 
networks, mainly the result of thinking that economic development results cannot be achieved 
without collaborating (Hudson et al. 1999), and typically regarded as a positive policy solution, 
regardless of mixed evidence to demonstrate that it works (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).  
 
As a result, there are many studies discussing the obstacles to collaboration between cities in 
practice (e.g. Lackey et al. 2002; Cigler, 1999; Baker, 1992; Bradshaw, 2000; Cox and Wood, 
1994), raising important questions about its methodological and theoretical premise.  In particular, 
the impact and role of complex urban networks on policy outcomes, raises interesting questions 
such as: the impact of the multi-scale nature of governance arrangements; the impact of different 
structures on decision-making outcomes; the impact of varying incentives and behaviour of 
network actors; the nature and configuration of networked interactions at the urban level.  In all, 
this raises further questions about the nature, scope, and complexity of urban collaboration 
underpinning skepticism of its role (Marsh, 1998). 
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Although there is general consensus that networks have become important elements of governance 
practices, difficulties are still understood to be associated with policy networks due to problematic 
relations between politicians and other actors.  Furthermore, although policy makers have 
articulated their willingness to collaborate in policy making, relatively little is known about how 
these partnerships act to support regional economic development (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).  
Therefore, a key question relates to: how urban local authorities collaborate (ULAC) in order to 
achieve economic development outcomes?  
 
The above question is a key gap in extant literature given the multi-disciplinary dimensions of 
network policy and that requires an understanding of ULAC from the main theoretical and function 
domains, focused on the relationship with outcomes for economic development achieved. The 
following section will Chapter three with an outline of the conceptual framework structuring the 
thesis research of the PV of ULAC for economic development. 
 
Little information is available on how ULAC functions and what activities are key to supporting it 
as economic development policy, and limited evidence regarding the outcomes and challenges 
involved (Arku and Oosterbaan, 2014), especially in Scotland, where all of the cities are being 
encouraged to collaborate as national policy for the first time.  
 
In order for academic research on collaboration policy to become more integrated, an in-depth 
understanding of the theoretical and functional characteristics is required, in terms: the networks 
role and purpose, the networks management and the network structure. 
 
3.5.1 Conceptual Framework of Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC)  
 
The findings from the review of the economic development literature, highlights a complexity and 
diversity of theoretical discussion relating to the role of networks for economic development.  The 
main functional characteristics of collaboration across the multi-disciplinary literature, relates to 
three areas: purpose (i.e. role/remit/type of networks); configuration (i.e. how collaboration and 
networks are structured); management (i.e. how collaboration networks and network actors are 
managed, interact and function), see Figure 7.  
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Figure 7:  The Functional Network Characteristics Connecting the Literature  
 
A research framework can be developed in line with the three main functional dimensions 
identified across the network literature.  In this context, the research is fragmented and often 
confusing due to the multiplicity of terminology and variation in perspectives. Only through the 
disentangling of the different dimensions of networks, can an understanding of how ULAC 
functions be achieved, towards an appreciation of their relative value for economic development.  
 
Integrating findings from both a review of the economic development literature and urban network 
literature, a framework for conceptualizing the functional nature of network characteristics relevant 
to the ULAC context can be achieved (see Table 8 below).  
 
Table 8: Conceptualising Matrix (PART A): Functional Dimensions 
THEORETICAL 
DOMAINS 
NODE:  
FUNCTION: 
Purpose Configuration Management 
Spatial  The 
role/remit/type of 
network 
How collaboration 
and networks are 
structured 
How collaboration networks and 
network actors are managed, interact 
and function 
Economic  
Governance  
 
The conceptual framework is appropriate for researching ULAC in order to provide a dynamic, 
multi-dimensional approach from the outset, and that clarifies the scale, function and relevant 
theoretical characteristics relevant to the network process.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the type of network analysis is of core importance to 
understanding their relationship with outcomes.  A conceptual link across all of the literature 
relates to the shifting recognition of the new institutional approach to growth and wider role of 
networks for economic development, away from earlier ideas of innovation-driven endogenous 
growth theory.  Institutional theory recognises that economic and social activity is both ‘an 
instituted process and a socially embedded activity and therefore context-specific and path-
URABN LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
COLLABORATION 
(ULAC)
GOVERNANCE 
NETWORKS
ECONOMIC 
NETWORKS
SPATIAL NETWORKS
THEME 1: NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT
THEME 2  NETWORK 
DENSITY/STRUCTURE
THEME 3:NETWORK 
ROLE/REMIT
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dependent’ where economic outcomes are known to be influenced by network properties, 
including: mutuality, trust and cooperation (Amin, 1999: 366).  
 
Chaoter four will discuss institutional theory as a means for understanding the role and impact of 
the differences in institutional environment for the policy outcomes of ULAC.  The aim is to 
provide a rigorous approach to the conceptualization of collaboration for economic development 
across urban local government in the form of ULAC. An integrative analytical framework is 
outlined, incorporating both theoretical and functional dimensions from an institutional 
perspective, promoting theoretical relevance without compromising methodological rigor and 
theoretical depth (Nesbit et al. 2010).  To avoid conceptual ambiguity, throughout the rest of the 
thesis the overarching network term ‘urban local authority collaboration’ (ULAC) will be used. 
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Chapter Four: The Public Value (PV) of Urban Local Authority 
Collaboration (ULAC): It’s all about institutions   
 
4.1 Introduction:  
 
The literature review in Chapters Two and Three demonstrate that a dense range of collaboration-
related research exists across a complex multi-disciplinary literature.  Chapter four of the review 
considers the literature on the role of ‘institutions’ (Bathelt and Glucker, 2013) for understanding 
the relationship between ULAC and its Public Value (PV).  
 
Lindblom (1993) suggests government has to be able to formulate policy that is intelligent and 
democratic, with knowledge and ideas said to be the main sources of governmental legitimacy.  As 
such, collaboration policy must be seen to produce a policy solution subject to societal and political 
scrutiny.   
‘Collaboration should create social or public value in the same way as its organizational 
counterparts, differentiation and specialization, do. Collaboration results need to be assessed 
because any loss of efficiency due to political, institutional, and technical pressures 
decreases its public value’: 
Bardach (1998: 17) 
 
Assessing public policy and identifying ‘what works’ is complex and largely recognized as a 
‘wicked problem’ unlikely to produce a clear answer (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 160).  A key 
consideration of this research is therefore:   
How can ULAC achieve greater public value (PV) for economic development, than 
would otherwise be achieved if urban local authorities (ULAs) acted individually? 
 
First, an understanding of the perceived outcomes of public policy should take into account an 
‘understanding of the processes that produce and sustain positive outcomes in society’ (Bryson et 
al. 2014: 455), in terms of what is meant by Public Value (PV) and the scope of ‘values’ in the 
context of ULAC in this thesis.   
 
Second, given that the thesis focus is primarily concerned with collaboration policy between 
government agencies, it arguably, cannot be decoupled from an appreciation of the wider role of 
institutional context. However, the potential epistemological and methodological fragmentation 
underpinning the diverse range of theoretical literature relating to collaboration policy-outcome 
processes prevents an adequate appreciation of existing research. The important point here is that, 
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concepts are best understood with clarity when they can be understood in more or less the same 
way across multiple disciplines.   
 
An important theoretical consideration for bridging the range of scholarly boundaries across the 
network policy-outcome related literature relevant to this thesis is the role of ‘institutions’ for 
understanding the perceived PV of ULAC. Consistent with Bathelt and Glucker’s, (2013) 
conceptualization of institutions, the research focus of this thesis is to investigate an economic 
development policy involving interaction between policy members from both urban and regional 
contexts.   
 
The relationship between institutions and economic development ‘had been fundamentally 
overlooked by mainstream economic theory, in general, and growth theory, in particular’, and 
indeed, viewed as ‘more subjective, less clear, more controversial…and much more difficult to 
operationalize’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013: 1035).  Economic development from an institutional 
perspective, can be defined as an on-going economic process of change that is influenced and 
facilitated by individuals ‘choices, entrepreneurs and firms made of different forms of institutional 
organisation (North, 1993).  Society in this context is believed to undergo a process of economic 
change by playing a game involving decision making, rule adherence and contracting (between 
individuals and organisations), within a structure of property rights and political rules.  The process 
of institutional development from a NIE perspective, takes place between formal and informal 
rules, modifying economic and institutional behavior over time (Williamson, 2000). 
 
Institutions in the context of this thesis are viewed as: 
 
‘neither organizations nor as rules or simple regularities, but rather…as stabilizations of 
mutual expectations and correlated interaction…as [non] spatial constructions’ 
 
Bathelt and Glucker, (2013: 341) 
The above view of institutions is based on the idea that they can be conceived without ‘a priori 
spatial constructions’ (Bathelt and Glucker, 2013: 341), useful for understanding urban 
collaboration by recognizing the role of agents and organizations, collaboration relationships and 
the dynamics of social institutions at both spatial and non-spatial scales.  Importantly, Bathelt and 
Glucker’s (2013) relational view of institutions provides a basis for understanding how institutions 
shape economic interaction by drawing together a range of different views of institutions in a 
‘contextual, path-dependent, yet contingent way’ (p342), consistent with the view of this thesis.   
Therefore, this final section of the literature review considers the path dependant, contextual nature 
of institutions for understanding the PV of ULAC as an economic development policy. Network 
actors are guided by the institutions in which they are embedded, thus institutional characteristics 
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will differ between network members, requiring an understanding of how institutions affect 
different network clusters, raising the question as to how different institutional contexts impact the 
ULAC process.  Consistent with Miller et al. (2008), the thesis supports the view that policy 
outcomes should not be labelled in terms of success or failure (unless they are consistent over time 
and across different contexts) and instead viewed in terms of public value (PV).  
Subsection 4.1 first provides an outline of what is meant by PV for understanding the causal 
relationship between public policy and outcomes in the context of this research.  Section 4.2 
follows with a discussion of ULAC as a ‘fuzzy concept’, characterised by a lack of conceptual 
clarity, deeming it: ‘difficult to operationalize…due to two or more alternative meanings…thus not 
reliably identified’ (Markusen, 2003: 702).  The theory of ‘institutions’ (Bathelt and Glucker, 
2013) is used to help overcome the challenge of a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the 
thesis focus: the PV of ULAC, clarifying what is meant by ‘institutions’ in the context of this 
thesis.  Section 4.3 continues a discussion of institutional context, providing background to the case 
study context and Scotland’s ULAC institutional context and nature of different institutional 
dimensions (i.e. institutional environment and institutional arrangement: Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), 
later found to play a key role in the main findings of the thesis in Chapter 6 and 7. Finally, section 
4.4 of the chapter closes with a summary of the key findings and main research gaps identified in 
the literature review as a whole, to reveal the required research direction of the thesis:  
 
An understanding of the PV of ULAC is not clearly understood, requiring a multi-
disciplinary approach to understanding the role of institutions on the ULAC policy 
process.   
 
4.1.1 The Public Value (PV) of Public Policy 
 
A clear understanding of what is meant by the PV of networked policy as understood in this thesis 
is important to clarify from the outset, and the difficulties in defining and measuring PV in relation 
to inter-organisational arrangements between government institutions. 
 
Local government is largely regarded as the central public sector actor in delivering economic 
development policy, by providing instructions to formulate policy programmes (i.e. the policy 
process).  Much of the existing policy literature considers policy performance as relating to both 
agency and system level factors, via three main policy coordination mechanisms: ‘market, 
hierarchy and network’ (Thompson et al. 1991:1).  At its simplest level, Figure 8 below provides an 
adaptation of Coats and Passmore (2008:9) schematic representation of the dynamics underpinning 
an understanding of the PV of public policy, comprised of three main components: Authorise; 
Measure and Create.    
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Figure 8: The Public Value (PV) of Public Policy: Authorise, Measure and Create    
 
 
Source: Coats and Passmore (2008)  
 
Therefore, taking into account the above three components of PV according to Coats and 
Passmore, (2008) and consistent with Smith’s (2004) definition of PV (defined near the end of 
section 1.1.1), a conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC according to this thesis relates to three main 
questions: 
 
1. Authorisation (the network process) - what purpose does ULAC serve? 
2. Create (the network context) - how does ULAC take place?   
3. Measurement (network value) - why it is perceived the way it is?   
 
The available literature relating to the first two questions concerning authorisation and creation 
relate is considered in Chapters Two (Authorisation - WHAT) and Three (Create – HOW) through 
discussion of the functional domains of ULAC in terms of its: purpose, configuration and 
management across a multi-disciplinary literature. 
 
The final question (3) in terms of the measurement of ULAC (WHY) is considered in Chapter Four 
in the following sections, highlighting the different ways of conceptualising the measurement of 
outcomes from varying ontological perspectives, to reveal disagreement about how different 
‘value’ criteria are conceptualized and measured.  Taking into account the importance of both the 
‘social’ and the ‘institutional’ context of policy, the measurement of a networks value according to 
this thesis is therefore consistent with a PV perspective (Smith, 2004). 
 
4.1.2 Measuring Public Policy 
PUBLIC 
VALUE
AUTHORISE: 
how PV is 
legitimised
MEASURE: how 
PV is quantified
CREATE: how PV 
is produced.
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Economic literature provides insights mainly into the rationale for network involvement.  
Economic organisational theory views organizations as being comprised of networks (and 
constitute a type of institution at the whole network level), where organizational benefits are found 
to relate to efficiency outcomes, in terms of reduced transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) resource 
efficiencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and scale and scope economies associated with networks. 
In this sense, early economic research focus on the organizational experience of being involved in 
networks has resulted in little attention on outcomes from the network.  An economic 
understanding of non-structural outcomes from networks as a whole, are therefore, thought missing 
(Provan and Milward, 1995). 
 
Sadioglu and Dede (2016) suggest much of existing empirical research on the effectiveness of 
inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) - similar to the ULAC – is premised on rational choice-based 
theory, concluding its ‘weak ability to delve into regional problems’ (p148-9) and inefficient 
process over the longer-term.  Feiock and Turnbull (2012) also suggest rational economic 
approaches to explaining technical efficiency as a preference between competition or collaboration, 
based on ‘rationalized logic that competition induced spending reductions making government 
more efficient’ (p3).  The economists thus traditionally view the policy process as a rational 
political-administrative activity, viewing interaction as taking place through hierarchical 
relationships and bureaucratic institutional frameworks, with focus on factors that shape the actions 
of individual decision-makers. Game theory has been used for understanding networked settings 
(Stoker, 1991), by taking into account the full constellation of network structures and 
interdependencies, as well as individual preferences (O’Toole, 1997). However, the tradition of 
viewing policy as the outcome of rational decision-making is not without criticism, and believed to 
fail to take into account multi-actor and multi-level approaches in policy formulation. 
 
From a spatial perspective, network policy research of outcomes are said to lack recognition of the 
importance of city context shaping outcomes, in terms of regulatory systems, traditions and norms, 
historical context, location and evolving political and economic systems (Sheppard, 2002; Leitner 
and Sheppard, 1999). 
 
The public administration literature takes a different view of outcomes, by recognising the need to 
take into account wider institutions and processes in policy practice (Jacobs, 2014).  Performance 
measurement of network policy from a public administration perspective, considers wider policy 
context in addition to efficiency and effectiveness criteria, directly related to policy objectives.  In 
this sense, the public administration literature refers to policy outcomes as PV.  Stoker (2006) 
proposes ‘public value management as a new paradigm…suited to networked governance’, due to 
its focus on networked inter-organizational and cross-sector relations and governance, to provide a 
means for assessing performance measurement and management (Kalambokidis, 2014).   
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The ‘institutions and processes that produce and sustain policy’ are important for PV, particularly 
in collaborative, networked governance processes, where an understanding of ‘managerial 
behaviour’ as well as ‘democratic and collaborative governance’, are key elements for 
understanding PV creation (Crosby et al. 2014: 453).   Provan and Milward (2001) suggest that 
collaboration policy should therefore best be assessed by the communities they are trying to serve 
and in meeting partner expectations through the broader value that accrues to participant 
organizations.  Moreover, along with any of the benefits or values accrued by collaborative inter-
governmental working, their costs and barriers will also impact on performance (Agranoff, 2007).  
Therefore, policy network analysis is believed valuable for helping to ‘directly confront the 
administrative and political complexity’ (Rhodes 1990: 313) that can be associated with ULAC.  
 
A key difficulty in understanding and measuring policy network performance relates to the 
generalizability of network findings, given their embeddedness within specific policy contexts.  
Policy networks relate to a diverse range of institutional forms ‘shaped and constrained by 
institutional rules as well as regulatory procedures and norms specific to the policy arena’ (Isett et 
al. 2011: 164).  For example,  ‘trust’ is a potential criterion for success in formal networks, 
although the policy context can shape and impact on success, as member commitment may vary. 
Much of the network policy research emphasises the benefits of networks by presuming ‘often 
uncritically, that collaborative horizontal arrangements yield advantages, but no disadvantages, 
when compared to hierarchical arrangements’ (Heranz, 2010: 313).  
 
There are also limitations in the explanatory value of policy networks highlighted by Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992), suggesting ‘policy networks will never provide an adequate account of policy 
change, because such networks are but one component of any such explanation’ (p260), given that 
the policy network concept is regarded as ‘a meso-level concept, it must be combined with macro-
level and micro-level theories in order to produce explanations’. Therefore, ‘they [policy network 
explanations] fail to explain policy outcomes because the driving force of explanation, the 
independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of 
components within the networks’ (Dowding, 1995: 137).   
 
Policy outcomes are said not to occur automatically and differ as products of history, local 
institutions, and differently structured environments where people live, work and invest.  For 
example, networks are ‘likely to produce other outcomes that may be critical to overall network 
function’ that may not always be easy to capture or identify: ‘since networks are, essentially, social 
systems…likely to generate social outcomes related to network participation’ (Provan et al. 2009: 
874).  The policy network approach is found to produce output content, which is fed back into a 
hierarchical decision-making process.  The explanatory power of the policy network concept is a 
key limitation of current administration research, with general academic agreement that the 
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strength of existing conceptions of collaboration relate merely to their descriptive value.  In this 
context, the explanatory power of the policy network concept is limited. 
 
Given all the above, it is clear the policy-outcome relationship is ‘neither straightforward nor easily 
conceptualized’ as ‘outcomes of collaboration vary significantly, depending on which theoretical 
perspective a researcher takes’ (Miller et al. 2008: 102).  Assessing collaboration policy-outcome 
processes are complex, such that the dynamic nature of social behaviour in collaborative settings 
means it is difficult to fully understand their true value.   
 
The apparent lack of evidence to support a causal connection between collaboration policy and 
outcomes can be said to relate to the existence of multiple theoretical perspectives across the 
different strands of related literature, making it conceptually challenging to connect various 
empirical studies to policy outcomes.  The problem is compounded by the complexities of 
measuring policy performance.  The direction of causality within networks and their impact on the 
economy is still largely unclear, raising important questions about the fundamental causes of 
change and how city agents influence policy outcomes in practice (see Storper, 2010, for example).  
 
Therefore, different methodological approaches to measuring performance add complexity due to: 
networks of various form/structure: from an ego-network, dyadic, triadic or whole network 
perspective (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  Networks can also be formal or informal, where local 
government tend to rely on formal networks for managing economic development, comprised of 
informal networks characterising the relationships between network actors (Agranoff and McGuire, 
2003).  A key methodological difficulty understanding intergovernmental network structures also 
relates to the ‘lack of a clear network boundary’ concerning the nature of the network structure 
(Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011: 540).  The issue of boundary is resolved by applying either a 
realist approach (actors themselves defining social boundaries) or the nominal approach (imposing 
the boundary conceptually based on the analytic purpose). There is also some academic debate 
about the appropriate unit of network analysis and whether examination of the ‘whole network’ 
should be considered more important, or whether the component substructures are as important for 
consideration (Isett et, 2011).  There is a general lack of empirical research focused at the whole 
network level hindering the ability to understand ‘how the whole functions separately from its 
parts’ (Isett et, 2011:162), and as such, both units of analysis are assumed important.  These 
complexities are discussed more fully in section 4.2. 
 
The apparent shift in the regionalist literature towards an appreciation of the autonomous 
interdependent nature of networked actors in horizontal relationships of interactive and reciprocal 
nature (Thompson et al. 1991) highlights the importance of analysing the impact of institutional 
context on the value of collaboration.  By considering the forms and politics of urban partnerships 
and broader governance arrangements across different city-region environments, this wider 
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conceptualisation views collaboration ‘in an increasingly networked society’, and its ‘unique 
potential to create public value’ (Miller et al. 2008: 103).  Bardach (1998) argues that collaboration 
policy outcomes and success should be best viewed in terms of Public Value (PV) as a ‘value-
creating’ process that is ‘partly descriptive … and partly normative’ (Crosby et al. 2014:448).  
According to Smith (2004), the PV of policy requires ‘telling a story…to bring together debates 
about values, institutions, systems, processes, and people…allowing one to link insights from 
different analytical perspectives…to aggregate issues for scholarly analysis’ (p68).  Creating PV in 
this sense, relates to ‘the extent to which PV criteria are met as some combination of input, process, 
output, and outcome measures’ (Crosby et al. 2014: 449).   
 
Overall, in view of the various ontological and theoretical approaches across the literature and its 
inherently complex nature, it is believed ‘unlikely we will ever arrive at a single approach to 
evaluate collaboration outcomes’ (Miller et al. 2008: 104), requiring ‘a pragmatic and non-
ideological approach’ (Coats and Passmore, 2008: 5), from a coherent multidisciplinary, multi-
dimensional perspective.  Any conceptualisation of the policy-outcome relationship must also 
make clear ‘the analytical perspective’ from the outset (Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011: 540).   
 
The institutional perspective of the PV of ULAC suited to the analytical approach of this thesis 
relates to two main points.  First, the ability to bridge insights across a range of ‘scholarly 
boundaries’ (Smith, 2004: 69) from different analytical fields (i.e. economic, spatial and 
governance literature), allows for the aggregation of discussions on ideas from an institutional 
perspective.  Second, it is difficult to utilize policy network theory ‘to move beyond mere 
description and into policy explanation’ on ‘matters of substance’ (Rhodes, 1990: 311), requiring a 
‘model of the actor…as key to better policy explanation’ (Blom-Hansen, 1997: 669).  By ‘telling a 
story’ (Smith, 2004: 68) of the three main functional areas of the ULAC policy process (i.e. the 
context; the process and value), the approach in the thesis is to take into account the role of the 
‘urban’ and ‘national’ institutional context of the network actor involved in the ULAC process.   
 
From an institutional perspective, PV relates to not only any set of contributing factors that enable 
policy outcomes, nor how they flow (or sort) into a location, but how the factors interact within the 
particular policy process in a convoluted way.  In this sense, PV differs across polices due to 
complexity: human interactions and institutional settings varying across policy, meaning assessing 
the PV of policy network outcomes is complex (see figure 2.1 in Pawson, 2006: 22).  The 
assessment of ULAC and its PV appropriate to this thesis is therefore not focused on the evaluation 
of outcomes, rather, it is aimed at understanding the PV according to network dimensions, in terms 
of: their purpose (what); management and configuration (how), as an explanation of its public 
value (why), by drawing from a range of relevant disciplines, including economic, political and 
geographical perspectives.  Thereafter, the PV of ULAC policy can be comprehensively 
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understood from an institutionally sensitive conceptualisation.  The following section provides a 
fuller discussion of the institutional perspective of the PV of ULAC as understood in this thesis.  
 
4.2 Institutional Perspective of Economic Development Networks between Government 
Agencies 
 
Institutional theory makes a distinction between sociological (i.e. cultural, normative and cognitive 
behaviour) and economic (i.e. rational, self-interested, logical) explanations of human behaviour, 
including the role of power, its distribution and how it affects relationships, via ‘a set of related 
analytical ideas that help to bring theoretical dimensions together to explain the relationship of 
networks with outcomes’ (Blom-Hansen, 1997: 674).  In particular, institutional insights consider 
issue of both agency (the behaviour of individuals) and structure (the role of organisations) for 
shaping policy. 
Recognising there are different types of institutionalism (see Jessop, 2001), ontologically, the focus 
of the research interest here is to bridge economic, spatial and governance insights of institutions as 
‘the basic unit of social organisation’ (Amin, 2001: 1237), by drawing on institutionalist 
perspectives relevant to the study of economic development, emphasizing ‘the importance of social 
and cultural conditions’ of economic activity (Cumbers et al. 2003: 325).  
To ensure ‘the role of institutions [is] considered in an explicit and systematic way’ (Blom-Hansen, 
1997: 674), iinstitutional theory for understanding economic development policy in the context of 
this thesis draws mainly upon: Bathelt and Gluckler (2013) and Evenhuis, (2017) multi-scalar 
economic geography perspectives of institutions; Rodríguez-Pose (2013) conceptualization of 
informal and formal network rules, ties and structures; and Lowndes (2001) for understanding 
urban political processes.  The view of institutions in this research is thus suited to the ontological 
view of institutions as shaping, but also being shaped by the environment, contrasted with more 
rationalistic perspectives (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).  
This section provides an overview of the institutional insights relative to: Rodríguez-Pose (2013), 
Bathelt and Gluckler (2013), Evenhuis (2017) and Lowndes (2001), in order to clarify and 
synthesis an extent understanding of institutions for economic development. 
4.2.1 Defining Institutions:  
 
Institutional analysis from a social science perspective, is regarded one of the ‘most widely used 
frameworks’ (Araral and Amri, 2016) for understanding networked processes, in particular, its use 
for understanding the influence of the recent ‘place-based approaches to territorial development’ 
(Tomaney, 2014: 231).   
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Public sector institutions and individuals involved in networks are viewed as predominately shaped 
and embedded in institutional context, resulting in network policy outcomes that are ‘influenced by 
a set of contextual factors (i.e. exogenous)’ (Araral and Amri, 2016: 74).  Given the research focus 
on understanding ULAC as an economic development policy involving government agencies 
representing both national and urban scales, Bathelt and Glückler (2013) and Evenhuis (2017) 
multi-scalar conceptualisations are relevant in the context of this thesis.  The ontological 
perspective of institutions for economic development across various levels of scale, are viewed as: 
 
‘structures that shape social interactions [and] the interplay of sets of social structures at 
various levels of scale’ 
Evenhuis (2017: 2-3) 
‘…from a relational perspective [of] how institutions emerge in a contextual, path-
dependent, yet contingent way…[through] the roles of agents and organizations, the 
economic practices and relationships in which they engage, and the resulting social 
institutions and their dynamics at different spatial and non-spatial scales’ 
Bathelt and Glückler (2013: 341-342) 
Evenhuis (2017) perspective of institutions for economic development makes a key distinction 
between various types of institutions and their somewhat diverse roles, recognizing that ‘structures 
can shape and constrain individual choices’ Gertler (2010: 4). Bathelt and Glückler (2013) provide 
a relational economic geography perspective by integrating approaches from different fields of the 
social sciences, whereas Evenhuis (2017) relational perspective is slightly wider as it focuses 
attention on the subnational scale of various types of institutions.  Institutions can refer to both the 
institutional arrangement (i.e. organisations, regulatory agencies, procedures, agreements, routine 
processes, rituals) and the institutional environment (i.e. macro-environment context, norms, 
regulations) relative to both formal (i.e. rules, procedures, contracts) or informal structures (i.e. 
norms, conventions, traditions, routines) (Evenhuis, 2017: 3), where the dynamics of institutional 
change vary relative to the different types of institutions (Evenhuis, 2017) (refer to Figure 9). 
Therefore, understanding ULAC networks in economic development involving government 
agencies from differing institutional contexts, views institutions as: economic development 
networks for economic gain (Bathelt and Glückler, 2013) involving interaction between 
government actors embedded within different institutional contexts (Evenhuis, 2017). 
 
4.2.2 Formal and Informal Institutions in Economic Development Networks:  
 
A key theme in academic literature is recognition of the important role of institutions ‘in shaping 
processes of economic development’ (Cumbers et al. 2003: 328).  Institutional analysis in 
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economic research broadly focuses on how activities are organised in different contexts and their 
importance for economic processes, highlighting the significance of ‘path dependency of collective 
practices, which circumscribe economic potential’ (Amin, 2001: 1239), recognising that economic 
activity of agents is conditioned and constrained by institutional structures.  Institutional context is 
believed to impact economic activity and outcomes (Storper and Rodriguez-pose, 2006).  
Williamson (2000) provides a comprehensive review of the New Institutional economics (NIE), its 
diverse nature, dimensions and complexity.  
Traditional institutional geography insights view collaboration between local government agencies 
as being ‘inherently spatial’ (Gerber, 2015: 1), for information sharing, policy development, or land 
use planning, for example, from a ‘meso-level understanding of economic life of cities and regions’ 
(Amin, 2001: 1237).  The economic geography literature suggests that ‘spatial context matters in 
different settings’ (p1238) for the features of ‘embededness’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994) and ‘path 
dependency’ (Storper, 1997) relative to the historical, political, cultural, and policy content shaping 
a places overall institutional context.  
 
Regardless of a range of economic, spatial and governance institutional perspectives, 
institutionalisms largely perceive the economy through a broad set of social rules and norms 
(Amin, 1999), in terms of: the role of informal conventions as well as formal rules and structures; 
the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships; and the impact of institutions 
upon behaviour, and interaction between individuals and institutions (Lowndes, 2001).   
Institutional theory considers the role of institutional structures and activities (i.e. formal and 
informal) for economic, social, cultural, or political ends, that can: act both as a constraint (North, 
1990), and enabler of networked behavior (Bathelt and Glückler, 2013); as well as define and shape 
actor behaviour according to organisational position, authority, and rules (Ostrom, 2005).   
However, ‘how institutions matter’ (Rodriquez-Pose, 2013: 1035) is a key concern of this research, 
where economic development policy is understood as being largely embedded in national policy 
approaches that negate the importance of local institutional context (Pike et al. 2006).  The view in 
this thesis is that ‘institutions matter’ (Rodriquez-pose: 2013: 1036) for economic development at 
the national level (Jackson and Deeg, 2008), but also, at the subnational level, across various 
scales, by taking into consideration the role of different types of institutions.   
Evenhues (2017) conceptualises institutions for economic development by paying particular 
attention to the importance of a ‘differentiated and multi-scalar understanding of institutional 
change in regions and cities…provide[ing] scope for agency’ making a clear distinction between 
the different types and functions of institutions in economic development.   
Therefore, the approach to the thesis research is sympathetic to the institutional approach in 
Evenhues (2017) and Bathelt and Glückler (2013), sharing their ontological positions on the role of 
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institutions in economic development at the subnational level. The research analyses the role and 
impact of different dimensions of formal and informal institutions on the PV of ULAC, according 
to: functional, contextual and relationship dimensions, relative to the institutional environment, 
function and social embeddedness (see Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9: Path Dependent Institutional Dimensions in Economic Development  
 
 
The figure provides a framework for understanding institutional impacts in economic development, 
and the different dimensions within a complex set of networked activity.  ‘operational institutions’ 
relate to the working of the network itself in terms of constituted processes either formal or 
informal.  The ‘environmental institutions’ relate more to the external scale of the network (i.e. 
national or international level), which largely condition and impact the lower level institutions 
within the network, that affects the culture, beliefs, traditions, experiences, historical context, and 
political views (i.e. socio-cultural influences of the whole network context).  Therefore, the 
operational and environmental institutions can be both internal and external to the network process.  
The background of larger political, economic and social structures at a certain point in time will 
NETWORK INSTITUTIONS (ENVIRONMENTAL)
macro-environment context; culture; history; economics
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Standards, routines, work practices
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ultimately ‘influence the nature and success of networked processes in practice, as well as their 
historical context influencing the causes, as well as consequences of networks’ (O’Toole, 1997: 
47).  Institutions can also be further grouped into ‘structures’ (e.g. chambers of commerce, business 
associations, labour unions) and ‘governance’ (e.g. multiple actors, across multiple levels of 
society) (Evenhuis, 2017).    
All of the institutions, both internal and external, are either formal or informal institutions, with the 
overall effect on the networks outcomes dependant on the underlying nature and dimensions that 
the institutions take.  Formal institutions are believed more relevant and important ‘for the steering 
and coordination of initiatives pertaining to economic development in particular regions and cities’ 
(Evenhuis, 2017: 2), given their ease of visibility and relevance in economic development.  
 
Importantly, the role of institutions for understanding the PV of ULAC relates to their ‘institutional 
thickness’ (Rodriguez-pose, 2013:1037), as network capital, resulting from the combination 
different types of institutions.  There is an overall view that formal institutions are more important, 
although the role of informal institutions is also important, but unclear exactly how due the 
difficulties with isolating the complex combination of both formal and informal. 
 
Therefore, the institutional nature of the framework is important for understanding the relationship 
with policy outcomes, relative to three main dimensions: functional, contextual and behavioural, 
dependent on different levels subject to self-reinforcing mechanisms.  Path dependency ‘can be 
used to focus critical attention on the importance of agency and structure’ (McCarthy, 2007: 33): 
‘agency’ to explain local governance, strategic stakeholder behaviour, and ‘structure’ to explain 
social relations and how contextual factors affect decision-making. 
This thesis will demonstrate how both formal and informal institutions (Lowndes, 2001) matter for 
understanding the PV of ULAC.  The notion of path dependence can help to bring the framework 
together, viewing the network as an ongoing dynamic process, rather than inevitably ending in a 
stable state.  Figure 9 demonstrates how an institutionalise approach to understanding economic 
development is multi-dimensional, complex and path dependent in nature for understanding the 
policy-outcome relationship, dependant on the networked institutional processes, properties and 
characteristics (i.e. network capital defined by Huggins and Thomson, 2013).  The institutional 
context both within and outwith the formal instituted network will impact the direction and nature 
of whole network effects and flows, where the aggregation of effects across different levels (i.e. the 
community; the network as a whole; and the networks individual components) and scales (i.e. 
supranational, national, subnational) determine the overall causal relationship between the whole 
policy network and its PV (see section 4.1). 
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The institutional view of the economic development policy in the context of this thesis, is akin to 
‘something more than a collection of atomised firms and markets driven by rational preferences 
and a standard set of rules’, instead, it is viewed as: 
 
‘a composition of networks and collective influences which shape individual action; a highly 
diversified set of activities owing to the salient influence of culture and context’  
Amin (1998:4)   
 
The formal and informal institutions of local government and governance are viewed as being 
important for the overall economic performance of the city and the region.  Rodrıguez-Pose (2013) 
notes, the view of institutions as both ‘cause and consequence of economic development’ making 
them especially difficult to assess given the apparent endogeneity of different institutional 
dimensions within and outwith the process. 
 
In order to make clear boundary limits to an institutional approach to network analysis in the 
context of this thesis, clear specification of the networks policy function (i.e. economic 
development) and the scale of network analysis (i.e. analysis of the PV of the whole network effect 
resulting from collaboration between local and national government agencies within the formal 
network) is clarified from the outset.  
 
The context chosen to study the process of ULAC from an institutional perspective involves 
national and urban local government in Scotland.  In line with that suggested by Feiock and 
Steinacker’s (2005) in terms of the importance of actor attributes, the following section considers 
the institutional attributes of ULA’s and national government as the main collaborating actors in 
the context of this thesis.  In line with an institutional perspective, the institutional features of 
ULA’s (as the collaborating actor) are key to understanding the relationship between ULAC and its 
PV at the subnational level.   
 
The importance of institutions in the context of this thesis relates to the context of economic 
development policy in Scotland and the ‘growing importance of multi-actor networks’ (Lowndes, 
2001:1956), requiring institutional insights of emerging arrangements for understanding the role of 
both formal and informal institutions at the subnational level. 
 
4.3 Institutions and Economic Development Networks: Local and National Government (see 
also section 2.2 of the Thesis) 
The role of institutions and their relevance for understanding context relative to ULAC concerns 
the literature pertaining to government agencies involved in economic development.   The 
fragmentation of elected local government and prevalence of multi-actor policy networks in recent 
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years, suggests that ‘institutions’ are not the same as ‘organisations’, given that informal coalitions 
and partnership working is commonplace in policy (Lowndes, 2001).  
The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) Framework (Ostrom, 1990) has been used for analysing 
collective action between institutional actors, such as cities, and government agencies (Feiock, 
2009), where Feiock and Steinacker (2005), highlighting how the heterogeneity across different 
local government institutions can impact on collaboration outcomes and economic divisions.  
Specifically, contextual factors relating to network structures matter to help formalise policy 
networks, as key to their performance. The ‘contextual factors promoting or constraining local 
economic development institutions’, are believed to shape the behaviour of network actor 
interaction (Ha et al. 2016: 17).   
 
Therefore, insights concerning the institutional dimensions of ULAC suggest the political nature of 
LA institutions are defined by rules, in turn, constraining the actions of the participating actors.  
Formal structures characterizing intergovernmental networks often involve some form of 
contractual process (e.g. a manager, network broker/ administrative organization) that plays a key 
role in coordinating the network without top-down authority unlike hierarchies.  Provan and 
Milward (1995) suggest network effectiveness is based on network structural characteristics (i.e. 
degree of centralisation) and network stability (i.e. contextual factors).  Structural attributes 
familiar with governmental settings include: formalization, standardized procedures, and report 
monitoring (Christensen, 1999).  Provan et al. (2009) also identify ‘task-oriented indicators’ for the 
achievement of network embeddedness as an indicator of network value, based on three social 
outcomes: organizational trustworthiness, reputation, and influence.  
 
Differences across political institutions shape actor incentives, in turn, influencing network 
behaviour and outcomes as a whole; where the whole network outcome is potentially inefficient 
when institutional actors’ incentives differ significantly.  Mitigating institutions are believed to be 
one solution for dealing with different institutional actors within network settings: the 
establishment of regional governments is one such mechanism for solving horizontal collective 
action problems across metropolitan regions, although depends on ‘the degree of autonomy the 
mechanism affords local actors’ (Feiock, 2009: 359).   
 
Feiock and Steinacker’s (2005) study of institutional collective action (ICA) amongst local 
governments suggests that much of the network research has focused on ‘the relationships between 
actors, to the neglect of actor attributes’ (p267).  Research derived from sociological perspectives, 
based on the structure of ties, are supposed to direct attention away from the attributes of actors 
that shape their interest in cooperation, forming a key research gap in the literature.   
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The aim of the research thesis focus will thus consider institutional context in terms of actor 
attributes and their PV for economic development.  It is worth considering whether ULAC in 
Scotland has been used as a means for reconciling economic development challenges resulting 
from institutional content and differences between Scotland’s ULAs.  In order to understand the 
relationship between ULAC and economic development policy by Scottish ULAs with varying 
institutional contexts, fuller understanding of the institutional dimensions are considered important, 
and to what extent differences across urban local government may impact on the PV of policy are 
considered in the following sections, leading to the conclusion of the chapter, highlighting the key 
knowledge gaps and related research questions. 
 
Local Government Context: 
 
Given the theoretical context to institutional perspectives of economic development policy, the 
changing management and structure of local government in the UK in recent years is an area in 
which new institutionalise insights have been ‘self-consciously applied, although often more in 
passing than as a systematic structuring device’ (Lowndes, 2001: 1964)’.  While there exists a 
range of policy network studies of local government collaboration from an institutional perspective 
(Ha et al. 2016; Hulst and Montfort, 2012), few provide a multi-disciplinary focus on the role of 
scale (e.g. urban scale of local government) as a key institutional characteristic affecting 
collaboration outcomes.   
 
The academic research highlights the importance of ‘contextual factors…for encouraging local 
governments to engage in collaborative economic development activities’ (Ha et al. 2016: 16).  The 
extent to which institutional context of local government matters and is defined (i.e. urban, city-
region, metropolitan definitions), the literature points to ‘the need to map the structure of networks 
among local governments’, to ‘enhance our understanding of the potential and limitations of policy 
cooperation’ (Feiock and Steinacker, 2005: 267).  In this context, an institutional perspective can 
provide ‘powerful tools for understanding change inside local government bureaucracies’ 
(Lowndes, 2001:1953). 
 
However, Nelles (2013) suggests that ‘determining what constitutes the ‘actor’, without reference 
to policy and institutional context, is problematic’, in that an institutional understanding of the city 
actor (as the urban local authority) requires ‘reference to a specific pattern of relations at a specific 
point in time’ Nelles (2013: 1353).  Thus, a ‘systematic study of how variations in political and 
economic institutions affect…the performance of policy subsystems’, is required, in that ‘policy 
subsystems cannot be divorced from their institutional context’ (Araral and Amri, 2016: 81).  
 
Institutional Ties: 
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From an institutional perspective, there is wide discussion in the literature of the role of formal and 
informal institutions, and a lack of knowledge on the effect that network context may have on a 
networks ability to solve complex problems (Jacobsen, 2013).  Research also suggests that 
institutional differences between network members is not what is most important to network 
effectiveness, rather, the nature and strength of ties between network members: ‘weak ties’ link 
members of different social groups, while ‘strong ties’ are concentrated within particular groups. 
Weak ties are less time-consuming, less intense and less intimate than strong ties but serve to create 
‘bridges’ between actors with different interests and identities, generating a potential for collective 
action. It is the institutionalisation of weak ties that constitutes the challenge for governance within 
the disaggregated urban polity. Institutions do not always take an organisational form; rather, they 
are comprised of rules that are both created by, and constraining of, political actors.  
Clarke (1995: 514) argues for the importance of local context in shaping urban regimes, where a 
narrow focus on composition and structure of formal institutions obscures the important ways in 
which the overall structure of the local institutions affect the ability of groups to influence policy.  
Institutional differences can also affect the choice, behaviour and functionality of collaboration 
networks, where institutional differences among local government stakeholders as key influencing 
factors, include: financial/economic conditions; the development environment of communities; 
political institutions; policies; regulations; urban growth regime/regulations (Ha et al. 2016: 16); 
level of autonomy; functional scope; strategic consensus (Nelles, 2013: 1351).  LAs and the 
individuals working on behalf of their city have specified authority to commit their local authority 
into contractual agreements.  The ICA framework suggests an actors’ strategic action in a 
collaborative context depends on the extent of ‘preference integration among actors in the 
composite network, with capacity for conflict when preferences diverge’ (i.e. principal-agent 
problem) (Feiock, 2009: 358).  
 
Much of the existing economic development network research on institutional differences has 
focussed on the differences between ‘a variety of organizations from different sectors’, or 
‘distinguish between public and private sector network linkages’ (Ha et al. 2016: 16), (see for 
example, Herranz, 2010; Isett and Provan, 2005).  There is understood to be a need for ‘a 
reformulated theory of the (diverse) institutional constraints within which urban political processes 
operate’ (Lowndes, 2001: 1967). 
 
A recent OECD study draws attention to the importance of local and regional institutions in the 
process of economic development, identifying a ‘new paradigm’ of regional policy via the role of 
softer and informal institutions: tapping under-utilized economic potential, creating integrated 
development programs, and developing soft infrastructures organized in relation to functional 
economic areas rather than administrative boundaries, supporting the importance of institutions for 
the effectiveness of ‘place-based’ development policies (Tomaney, 2014). 
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Drawing on the institutional characteristics highlighted by Hulst and van Monfort (2012) a clear 
distinction of the importance of institutional characteristics between local government actors 
working on the same issue area (i.e. economic development) relate to three main factors: formal 
structures of the state; administrative culture; and legislation, incentives and policies of 
cooperation.  The extent to which institutional characteristics matter to policy outcomes will vary 
according to the specific nature and institutional setting.   
 
Hulst and van Monfort (2012: 140) suggest future ‘research into factors for success and failure of 
co-operative arrangements’ between local government institutions requires ‘in-depth case study 
research [to] reveal how different elements of the administrative context interact in concrete 
situations’, to help understand ‘the performance of different forms of inter-municipal co-operation 
in terms of efficacy, efficiency and democracy’.  In particular, a key research gap is the need to 
investigate ‘the relation between the territorial scale of local government and the presence of co-
operative arrangements’ to help understand the role of scale as a feature of the collaboration 
involved (Hulst and van Monfort, 2012: 139). 
 
Accordingly, a key research question is around the nature and role of specific institutional contexts 
of urban local government.  Specifically, in the context of ULAs in Scotland, there is the 
opportunity to understand more fully, the role and impact of Scotland’s urban local government 
institutional context, and its influence on the relationship between urban local government network 
actors at a specific point in time; particularly when Scotland’s institutional environment is 
undergoing a period of change and constitutional flux. 
 
The next section will introduce the institutional context of ULA’s in Scotland as a suitable unit of 
analysis and setting for the basis for the rest of the thesis research.  
 
4.3.1 Institutional Context: Urban Local Authorities (ULAs) in Scotland 
 
The previous section outlined the recognition of institutional context for understanding policy 
outcomes, including the role of ‘actor attributes’ (Feiock and Steinacker’s, 2005).  The important 
role of actor attributes and ‘contextual factors affecting political institutions of local economic 
development’ (Ha et al. 2016: 17) is key to understanding their relationship with policy outcomes 
for economic development.  The institutional context chosen to study the PV of ULAC as 
economic development policy is the Scottish economy.  As Scottish urban local authorities recently 
embarked on economic development collaboration, they are working within a wider local 
government institutional policy environment, whilst building relationships with other Scottish 
urban local authorities from dissimilar economic contexts.  An understanding of Scottish local 
government and cities is therefore key to understanding the role of institutions in the lead up to the 
development of ULAC as policy in Scotland in recent years. 
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City context: Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth and Stirling 
 
The cities of Scotland (refer to Appendix 3 for city key facts) are defined as areas with over 3,000 
people (the urban), constituting some 81 per cent of Scotland’s total population (ONS, 2012).  
Scotland’s cities are the powerhouse of the national economy and where the majority of people 
live.  The metropolitan city areas and the city-regions comprise a major proportion of the Scottish 
economy: 72 per cent of gross value added (GVA) and 49 per cent of total employee jobs for the 
four largest city-regions alone (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee) (ONS, 2012). 
 
Our understanding of urban geography and local authority boundaries in Scotland more generally, 
are a key factor to understanding the spatial role that urban networks play in Scotland.  Scotland’s 
cities are economically important, providing around one-third of all Scottish jobs and with the highest 
proportion of the population living and working within the main city-regions (see Table 9).   
 
Table 9: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SCOTLAND’S CITIES  
Geographic 
Area 
Population Size1 Unemployment 
Rate4 
Employment 
Rate3 
Political Leadership 
(Local Authority) 
2017 
Glasgow 615,070 6.5% 67.3% Con/Lab 
Edinburgh 507,170 4.4% 71.3% Snp/Lab 
Aberdeen 229,840 5.4% 70.2% Con/Ind Lab 
Stirling 93,750 4.4% 72.4% Snp/Lab 
Dundee 148,270 7.0% 66% Snp/Ind 
Inverness2 56,660 3.7% 77.2% Ind/Ld/Lab 
Perth and 
Kinross 
150,680 3.4% 77.1% Con/Ld/Ind 
Scotland 5,404,700 4.8% 72.9% N/A 
1 – Data derived from Mid-2016 Population Estimates Scotland (NRoS, 2017:Table 9) 
2 – The data for Inverness are computed from locality information from 2012 estimates since Inverness 
forms a much smaller part of Highland Council than do the other Scottish cities of their respective 
Council areas. 
3 – Data derived from Regional Employment Patterns in Scotland: Statistics from the Annual Population 
Survey 2016 (Scottish Government, 2017: Table 1.1). 
4 - Data derived from Regional Employment Patterns in Scotland: Statistics from the Annual Population 
Survey 2016 (Scottish Government, 2017: Table 2.3). 
 
The largest of Scotland’s cities is Glasgow, with an average population of just over half a million 
(615,070).  Edinburgh is second with a mid-2016 population of around 507,170.  The other two 
major cities are Aberdeen (229,840) and Dundee (148,270). 
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Figure 10 – Location of Scottish Major Towns and Cities  
 
Source: www.printable-maps.blogspot.co.uk  
 
Figure 10 provides a map of Scotland’s cities and Towns.  Scotland’s cities vary significantly in 
size (see Appendix 3 for details on Travel-to-Work-Areas - TTWAs) and apparent that some of 
Scotland’s cities are indeed comparable in size to some of its small towns.  It is also apparent from 
Appendix 3 that Scotland is relatively urbanised  (with just over 51 per cent of the population 
residing in Scotland’s urban TTWAs).  The issue of size and density of Scotland’s cities is 
considered important for clusters policies (Turok, 2008), recognising the importance of working 
between small or medium-sized cities to help ‘open up possibilities for regional economic growth’ 
(Meijers, 2008: 2323).    
 
Scotland’s cities also experience very different growth patterns, reflective of their diverse 
economic base and variety of structural change over recent years.  Table 9 highlights the variable 
economic performance across Scotland’s cities, demonstrating that city economic performance not 
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only varies with size, but its density, diversity, visibility and connectivity (Storper, 2013), giving 
some justification for why ‘bespoke’ city economic policies are needed.   
 
However, extensive policy debate surrounds the appropriate geographical scale and structure for 
which policy should focus, as highlighted in section 2.3.  The formal institutional definition of the 
city refers to the local authority legal boundary definition.  Given that functional economic 
connections (e.g. economic, housing market, travel-to-work, marketing or retail catchment factors) 
of cities are often not hard bounded (Rodriguez-Pose, 2008), cities do not function in isolation of 
their wider metropolitan and regional networks, often working in both collaborative and 
competitive form.  In other words, the ‘conceptual space’ of city and city-region concepts are 
‘largely imprecise without reference to a specific set of linkages and context’ (Nelles, 2013: 1352).  
In this sense, from an institutional perspective, both informal and formal institutions are important 
for urban performance. 
 
In the context of this thesis, formal institutions are defined by the ULA institutional boundary, and 
informal institutions defined by wider economic and social networked linkages.  The research 
focus of this thesis thus contends that the cities managed by ULAs are defined by spatial, economic 
and social network flows.  Accordingly, the following section provides an overview of formal and 
informal ‘networked’ institutional context of Scotland’s urban local government, as a contributory 
factor to understanding the relationship between ULAC and economic development performance of 
interest to this research.   
 
4.3.2 Local Government in Scotland: Formal and Informal Institutions  
 
As previously mentioned, the formal and informal institutions of local government are complex at 
the regional and urban scale, characterised by fragmented powers across different scales of 
governance.  Institutional reconfiguration and policy complexity are commonly associated with the 
delivery of economic development in Scotland and the extent and nature of different formal and 
informal approaches to economic regeneration subject to much debate.  
 
A description of the institutional evolution of local government since the 1970s – in terms of 
powers, funding, grant mechanisms and geographic structures – is provided, to help first 
understand the nature of changing institutions and powers of local government in recent years and 
since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in Holyrood in 1997. 
 
Formal institutions of local government in Scotland 
 
Scottish local government was transformed in 1975 by the findings of the Wheatley Commission 
and the subsequent Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, removing the Victorian system of 
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counties, burghs and districts and implemented a two-tier sub-national government system of 
regions and districts.  The only exclusions to this were the island areas of Western Isles, Shetland 
and Orkney, which were unitary authorities, and a pre-cursor to the changes that followed. The 
system survived until further change in 1996 as a result of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1994.  This removed the two-tier system and saw the introduction of 32 unitary LAs.  The 32 
elected unitary Local Authorities (LAs) work within a highly centralised system of complex 
legislation. Scotland’s LAs are governed by locally elected councils every 4 years, where local 
economic development is not a statutory responsibility, requiring a multi-sectoral approach to 
policy delivery and resulting in convoluted institutions, network of boards and partnerships across 
local government structures. 
 
Following a referendum in 1997 on devolution, the current Parliament was established by 
the Scotland Act 1998, in which the system and structure of local government was maintained.  
The implications for local government following devolution in Scotland meant ‘local authorities 
now work in a party-political and national institutional landscape allowing little room for 
manoeuvre, with the bulk of their budgets and the majority of their responsibilities mandated by the 
Scottish Government’ (Pugh and Connolly, 2016: 325).   
 
Local government in Scotland is largely restricted in its powers, functioning on behalf of central 
government and acting in accordance and within the formal powers of the Local Government Act 
2003, providing services largely in relation to local delivery of national services (e.g. school 
education; social work) and more generally, local services for citizens (e.g. libraries and museums, 
cleansing, parks and other green spaces) and those that combine both aspects (e.g. town planning).   
 
However local government in Scotland has been organised, its funding methods have remained 
broadly similar, in term of: a tax on housing, a tax on business premises, a transfer from a higher-
level government and rent and fees.  Figure 11 shows the most current data on LA income streams, 
with almost 60 per cent coming from Scottish Government Grants and only marginally over 10 per 
cent coming from own-source tax revenue.  The apparent inequality in local government’s revenue 
stream is important for understanding accountability and institutional powers of Scotland’s local 
government.  
 
Prior to the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, LAs institutional relationship was 
between regional (pre-1996)/unitary authority (post 1996) government and the Scottish Office, a 
department of the United Kingdom government. Christie and Swales (2010) argue that one of the 
functions of the Scottish Office and the Barnett formula (i.e. by which increases or decreases in 
Scotland’s central government allocation were putatively determined) was to secure a settlement 
above any that the formula may otherwise determine. Devolution has changed the previous funding 
relationship, and the balance of power and consequences of it, in two main ways.   
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First, it is no longer guaranteed that the political party of government in Edinburgh will be the 
same as that in London – it last was in 2007 – and so all the ‘soft’ informal relationships of party 
politics are lost in such circumstances.  Second, the Scottish Government had to carve out its niche 
and determine its functions.  The Scotland Act 1998 set out the role, competencies and powers of 
the Scottish Executive-to-be in 1999.  However, less than twenty years later, the Scottish 
Government replaced the Scottish Executive, and the power to vary income taxation was extended 
from 3p in the pound to10p in the pound.  As a result, Scotland now receives half of VAT receipts, 
where previously, all receipts went to the Exchequer in London. 
 
Figure 11: An Overview of Local Government in Scotland 2016 
 
Source: Audit Scotland (2016)  
 
The Scottish Government’s new funding and devolved powers have not been without political 
tensions with Westminster, UK government.  The party political context at the time is key to 
understanding the implications for local government from changing political relationships and 
institutions.   
 
From 1997, the local government system in Scotland had to deal with a Westminster for a short 
time before devolution.  With a landslide Labour victory achieved in the 1997 general election and 
subsequent majority Labour administrations in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, coincided with Labour 
run administrations in the majority of Scotland’s seven cities, maintaining the soft ties of party 
political power and relationships.  However, the election of the SNP-minority administration in 
2007 changed political institutional dynamics, due to a new administration with a different long-
term vision for where it wanted Scotland to be and the powers it wanted Holyrood to have.  What 
followed was the implementation of an SNP-minority administration with a different vision from 
previous years, for the relationship between local government and central government.  
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Formal institutions of national legislation and government policy delivered and accounted for by 
local government, shape the specific services of local government.  A concordat was drawn up in 
2008 between the newly titled Scottish Government and Scotland’s LAs, setting out funding levels 
and streams for LAs over the budget cycle.  The Scottish Government and LAs new relationship 
through the concordat also ended ring fencing of certain local government spending areas. Each LA 
in Scotland, through a community planning partnership arrangement, was to set single outcome 
agreements (SOA) with Scottish Ministers, mapped directly onto the Scottish national performance 
framework. The result was a return of a degree of previously centralised decision-making power to 
LAs via the SOA, setting a new tone for the new inter-governmental relationship in Scotland: 
 
‘In assessing what share of … funding should go to local government, the Scottish 
Government has taken account of the unique position held by local government in the 
governance of Scotland and the major contribution local government will make to all of the 
Government’s Strategic Objectives and the successful delivery of national outcomes… 
While the Scottish Government must set the direction of policy and the overarching 
outcomes, under the terms of the new relationship proposed in this package, it will stand 
back from micro-managing service delivery, thus reducing bureaucracy and freeing up local 
authorities and their partners to meet the varying local needs and circumstances across 
Scotland.’ 
 
And goes on further to state… 
 
‘For the entire package to remain intact, and as part of their contribution to the new 
relationship, the Scottish Government and local government will each do what is required to 
ensure delivery of key government policies and programmes including…freezing council tax 
rates in each local authority at 2007-08 levels.’  
 
Scottish Government: Concordat (2007) 
 
There was now an explicit link between the Scottish Government as policy setters and local 
authorities as outcome achievers, setting a new tone of performance management of local 
government.   For the first time, the inter-governmental relationship in Scotland was formally set 
out, clearly stating the hierarchical nature of central government.  The one tax source open to local 
government (i.e. council tax), was also by de facto, now under central government control, with the 
concordat making a clear policy threat that to upset the agreement and alter tax rates, would bring 
the system down.  The changing institutional relationship between central and local government is 
set out as one of reward and coercion, where both parties must understand that the outcome is zero-
sum.  
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The historical account of the changing political and economic institutions in Scotland since the 
development of national government at Holyrood, is key to understanding the context of local 
governments more recent perceptions of a gradual centralisation of local government, due to a 
gradual eroding of powers held before devolution.   Scottish local government control (including its 
finance and taxation powers) by the Scottish Government in recent years, and the reduction in local 
government autonomy relative to both funding discretion (reduced tax powers) and the accretion of 
central control over powers and duties, has altered the formal institutional relationship (i.e. 
financial and degree of relative autonomy by councillors) between the Scottish Government and 
local authorities (LAs) significantly.   
 
The changing context is reflective of a proactive Holyrood, arguably, more ambitious than 
Westminster was before.  However, the benefits of subsidiarity to Holyrood aren’t certain to apply 
to other levels of local government below that.  More recently, following the publication of the 
Smith Commission in November 2014: Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement 
announced additional new responsibilities and greater fiscal autonomy for Scotland, and how 
aspects of these areas translate to local government.  By implication, the benefits of devolved 
powers for Holyrood are being increasingly scrutinised by other tiers of local government.    
 
A number of City Region Deals (or City Deals) agreed or planned across Scotland, have changed 
the inter-governmental relationship in Scotland further still, with work ongoing to develop 
Regional Economic Partnerships in some areas outside of city regions.  City Deals were first 
introduced in England in 2011, to encourage economic growth by shifting decision making away 
from central to local government.  In Scotland, City Region Deals focus on cities and their wider 
regions, with three currently agreed (and a further four under discussion) in Scotland, representing 
a partnership of funding between the Scottish Government, UK Government and Scottish LAs 
(currently involving 23 of the 32 LAs in Scotland).  
 
As a result of the various historical, economic and political changes in formal institutions affecting 
local governments’ policy and power, spending and fiscal powers is a key battleground in light of 
on-going public spending cuts in Scotland.  
 
Informal institutions of local government in Scotland  
 
Within the wider context of austerity government in recent years, there exists a complexity of 
devolved formal and informal policy structures across various sectors and agencies of local 
government in Scotland, including for example, NHS health boards, regeneration companies and an 
array of local authority-led initiatives (e.g. UK/Scottish/local funded and bespoke city region 
deals).  Scottish local government now ‘operates in a fragmented, complex and interconnected 
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policy and service delivery environment characterised by associational and joint arrangements’ 
(Pugh and Connolly, 2016: 321). 
 
The move from an industrial to a more information-based society in recent years, is believed to 
have influenced the development of new city relationships, leading to a growth in both regional and 
urban development policies based on complex networks of ‘both horizontal and vertical economic 
and social interactions, both within and between cities’ (Cheng et al. 2013: 165).  Hood and 
McGarvey (2002) note that the discourse of partnership has been prevalent in the Scottish local 
governance context since at least 1992.  As such, Scottish LAs now operate in a ‘fragmented, 
complex and interconnected policy and service delivery environment’ characterised by 
‘associational and joint arrangements’ (McGarvey, 2014: 45).   
 
‘In November 2007, the SNP Government agreed a new concordat with local government, 
attempting to set out a new relationship based on ‘mutual respect and partnership’ (Scottish 
Government, 2007: 2).  The responsibility for the delivery of local economic regeneration functions 
devolved to Scotland’s LAs are characterised by the emphasis on informal institutions of 
partnership working, reflected in their community planning role, to ensure the coordination of local 
policy in line with national priorities. Area-based approaches are partnerships comprised of key 
actors at the regional, sub-regional and local levels, aimed at collectively tackling the causes of 
deprivation, although formalized by recent legislation in Scotland including the Public Bodies 
(Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2013 and the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015. 
 
‘the diverse nature of the context of crosscutting and multi-level partnerships has led to 
opaque accountabilities throughout Scotland. Scottish local government, as a level of 
governance, exemplifies the very ubiquity and ambiguity that the term ‘governance’ 
embodies’  
Pugh and Connolly (2016: 321) 
 
The realignment of local authorities’ responsibilities and their role in delivering economic 
regeneration since 2011, has been a recent attempt to rebalance local regeneration activity, given the 
background context of complex funding and governance arrangements and reduced autonomy of 
local government over the last decade.  
 
Scotland, as an economy in institutional transition, has seen substantial changes to the ‘rules of the 
game’ confronting Scottish urban local government with high institutional uncertainty.  It is worth 
considering whether changes in the nature of formal and informal institutions across Scotland’s 
urban local government have had any significant implication for ULAC as policy, where 
Scotland’s urban local government will be shown to play a key role in the development of 
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collaboration as an economic development policy network in Scotland, given the context of 
informal and formal institutional change.   
 
Accordingly, the next section will discuss Scotland’s urban policy activity relative to ULAC in 
Scotland in section 4.3.3. 
 
4.3.3 Re-emergence of cities policy in Scotland: The Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) 
 
The renewed focus on cities in Scotland post 2010, with the formation of the Scottish Cities 
Alliance (SCA) as a new more autonomous form of ‘Cities Policy’ in Scotland, followed a ‘Review 
of Scotland’s Cities’ (Scottish Executive, 2002) commissioned in 2001 by the then Scottish 
Executive18 and the first time cities as a spatial unit, had received explicit focus since the formation 
of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 (Turok, 2004). The ‘Review of Scotland’s Cities’ report 
provides significant policy recognition of the functional importance of cities and the city-region, by 
acknowledging the positive impact that Scotland’s cities have on their surrounding areas, and the 
importance of their functional markets (i.e. housing and labour) for wider patterns of demand, 
infrastructure and service provision.  The policy response was to announce a City Growth Fund 
(CGF) of £90 million over three years for infrastructural improvements to promote economic 
development (Scottish Executive, 2002), alleged a rather limited response to the complex problems 
facing Scotland’s city-regions (Turok, 2004).  A subsequent review of the CGF concluded that the 
impact of the fund had been largely limited, remaining in place until 2007-08, and thereafter, cities 
funding being mainstreamed until the creation of the Agenda for Cities, which introduced the 
Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA). 
 
Urban governance in Scotland is shifting towards the recognition of political fragmentation and the 
importance of functional economic connections beyond the urban core. The cities review points to 
how the fragmented nature of the political leadership across Scotland’s local government can be 
seen to limit their capacity to act strategically in the long-term, or act in the best interests of the 
wider city-region, suggesting that the central city and suburban/rural neighbours should form 
stronger partnerships, although a lack of detail on how this should happen.  ‘The Cities Review’ 
provides the first mention of the now Scottish Government’s focus on the importance of 
collaboration between its core cities, stating, “the unavoidable mismatch of administrative city 
boundaries with patterns of activity, means that collaboration/co-operation between authorities, 
agencies and partnerships will always be necessary to ensure the effective planning, delivery and 
monitoring of the impact of services and infrastructure.” 
  
                                                 
18 The Scottish Executive is the now renamed the Scottish Government.  
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What followed was the establishment of the Glasgow-Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative (GECI), 
established by the then First Minister of Scotland, Jack McConnell, in June 2006 as a ULAC.  Part 
of the aim of the then Scottish collaboration policy was to ensure there were enduring economic 
and social benefits from large investments, both locally and for Scotland as a whole (Turok, 2008).  
The GECI was a partnership between Glasgow City Council (GCC), the City of Edinburgh Council 
and Scottish Enterprise, governed by a Steering Group led by the respective Council Leaders.  The 
GEGI collapsed not long after its establishment, due to a lack of political support for collaborative 
working across Scotland’s two main cities (need a ref to support this).   
 
Despite previous failed attempts at inter-urban collaboration policies in Scotland (i.e. GECI) and 
the fairly rudimentary understanding of the factors affecting inter-urban collaboration in empirical 
research, the collaborative importance of cities has regained momentum in influencing the thinking 
about inter-urban collaboration as policy in Scotland:  
 
‘Cities are crucial for global sustainability and should promote greater and smarter 
collaboration and partnerships between the public and private sectors and between cities 
themselves.’   
 
Grant Thornton: Sustainable Cities (2011) 
 
Aside from the GECI being dissolved, the Scottish Government has continued with a refocusing 
and general de-cluttering of economic development policy in Scotland, to promote more local 
approaches to policy and with a particular focus on cities and economic outcomes.  The first review 
of economic development policy in Scotland took place in 2007, primarily aimed at empowering 
local authorities and local actors to take on more responsibility for delivering economic 
development functions, including: the introduction of the Concordat between Scottish Government 
and local authorities in November 2007, including the review of Single Outcome Agreements 
(SOA) by local authorities and community planning partners (CPPs); the restructuring of Scottish 
Enterprise and scrapping of Local Economic Forums (LEF) in 2010; the subsequent update of the 
National Performance Framework in December 2011, and more recently, the commission by the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA)19 to review public services and local authority 
funding in Scotland.   
 
An increased recognition of cities by the Scottish Government was reflected by the appointment of 
a Minister for Cities in 2010, primarily focused on progressing urban economic performance.  
Collaborative urban policy in Scotland is defined by the Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ 
                                                 
19The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) represents the joint interests of Scotland’s LAs.  The key relationship between 
the Scottish Government in Edinburgh and local authorities (LAs), is through their the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA).  
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- Scotland's Cities: delivering for Scotland’ (2011), resulting in the subsequent establishment of the 
Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA), to help progress a framework for closer collaboration and co-
ordination between Scotland’s cities.  The renewed focus on urban areas in Scotland was at the 
same time being reflected by the UK government, who published ‘Unlocking Growth in Cities’ 
aimed primarily at the eight English core cities, emphasising the economic potential of urban 
economies (ODPM, 2011), by progressing a framework for closer urban collaboration and co-
ordination.   
 
The establishment of the SCA is clearly stated in the ‘Agenda for Cities’ (2011) as being ‘primarily 
aimed at attracting external investment to stimulate economic activity and create jobs, by 
encouraging cities to collaborate on projects of significant economic potential’.  The ‘Agenda for 
Cities’ was the result of an intensive collaborative exercise between the Scottish Government and 
the seven Scottish Cities at the time (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, Inverness and 
Stirling).  As a result, the institutional configurations of cities policies being steered by the SCA are 
a dominant feature of an explicit cities agenda in Scotland. 
 
Overall, subsection 4.3 demonstrates how network actors in terms of Scotland’s urban local 
government will collaborate with urban government institutions of very dissimilar institutional 
context.  Scotland’s urban local authorities have been shaped by a number of spatial, economic, 
historical and political contexts over many years, likely to present challenges between the urban 
local authorities working together across urban boundaries.  The following section discusses the 
economic development literature to identify what is known about the impact of institutional 
differences (i.e. institutional distance) for the outcome of economic development collaboration, 
before concluding the chapter.  
 
4.4 Conceptual Framework of the Relationship between ULAC and Policy Outcomes: 
The key research gaps found during the review of the literature on the relationship between ULAC 
and policy outcomes is presented in this concluding section, forming the basis of the main research 
objectives and integrative conceptual framework shaping the thesis research.  
 
Figure 12 summarises the findings and research gaps from a review of the academic literature 
relating to urban economic development (Chapter Two), networks (Chapter Three), institutions and 
policy outcomes (Chapter Four).  
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Figure 12 – Research Gaps: The Public Value (PV) of ULAC 
 
 
4.4.1 Aims and Objectives 
 
As a result of the multidisciplinary review of the literature in the context of urban local authority 
collaboration (ULAC) for economic development, the thesis’ research question identified from the 
synthesis of knowledge gaps is:   
 
What is the Public Value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) as 
economic development policy according to the role of institutions? 
 
In order to fully investigate the research question and knowledge gaps on the PV of ULAC, the 
research objectives identified are detailed in Figure 13 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PUBLIC 
VALUE (PV) OF 
URBAN LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
COLLABORATION 
(ULAC)
PART 1 LITERATURE 
REVIEW: URBAN 
LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
FINDINGS: Urban local authorities 
(ULAs) use networks to contribute to 
economic development.
Research 
Question/Gap: WHAT 
does Urban Local 
Authority 
Collaboration (ULAC) 
look like?
PART 2 LITERATURE 
REVIEW: URBAN 
COLLABORATION 
THEORY AND URBAN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINDINGS: Economic development 
networks take place across different 
scales to serve different functions and 
must be understood from a multi-
disciplinary and mutli-functional 
perspective.
Research 
Question/Gap: HOW 
does ULAC function?
PART 3 LITERATURE 
REVIEW: URBAN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 
NETWORKS AND 
POLICY OUTCOMES
FINDINGS: ULAC and its PV is 
affected by institutional dimensions in 
a path dependant way
Research 
Question/Gap: WHY 
does  institutional 
context explain the PV 
of  ULAC
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Figure 13: Research Objectives 
 
 
 
The next subsection presents the integrative analytical conceptual framework that will guide 
research on the topic of ULAC for economic development policy outcomes according to 
institutional context. 
 
4.4.2 Integrative Conceptual Framework  
 
The integrative conceptual framework (see Table 10 below) has been derived through the 
integration of the three main literature review chapters in terms of: the economic development role 
of urban local government (Chapter Two), collaboration and urban networks (Chapter Three) and 
institutional networks (Chapter Four). The integrative framework brings all of the insights from the 
literature review together (Table 10) and incorporates the key research gaps, research questions and 
supporting objectives together:  
 
• AUTHORISE - A description of what ULAC looks like relative to three functional domains 
(purpose, configuration and management);  
• CREATE - An explanation of how ULAC and its functional domains create public value 
(PV)20, relative to the role of institutional context (formal and informal institutions);  
• MEASURE - An interpretive explanation of why the PV of ULAC can be explained by 
economic, spatial and governance institutional insights.  
 
                                                 
20It is worth noting that explicit counterfactual assessment of the PV of ULAC is not considered within the thesis approach, and assumed 
to be as controversial and challenging a measurement process, as is establishing an approach to PV estimation of collaboration policy in 
itself.  As such, the focus of the thesis in the first instance, is focused on a conceptual assessment of the PV of ULAC.  Thus, 
counterfactual measurement is considered a potential avenue for follow-on research. 
•A complete conceptualisation of ULAC and its public 
value (PV) relative to functional and network context
OBJECTIVE 1
•An understanding of the multli-dimensional nature of 
ULAC across three functional domains: purpose, 
configuration and management, relative to: function, 
scale, and institutional context
OBJECTIVE 2
•A multi-disciplinary interpretive understanding of the PV 
of ULAC as economic development policy, according to 
institutional context
OBJECTIVE 3
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Table 10: Integrative Conceptualisation Framework: Institutional Perspective of the PV of ULAC as Economic Development Policy  
NETWORK CONTEXT:  SCALE: Network-level Outcomes; FUNCTION: Strategic Economic Development; INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: Government Agencies 
THEORETICAL 
DOMAINS  
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS (PART A) NETWORK OUTCOMES (PART C): 
PUBLIC VALUE Purpose Configuration Management 
Spatial  Achieve spatial 
synergy/integration 
 
• Secondary-level nodal networks (i.e. 
between city organizations); 
• Network ties of proximity (organisational 
closeness); 
• Network ties of association (functional 
specialisation) 
• Network Synergy 
• Network Density (connectedness) 
• Functional integration 
• Complementary cohesion 
• Incentive Aligning (shared 
purpose/understanding of networks 
purpose)  
• Networks Structural Effectiveness 
(strength of network ties) 
• Networks Operational Effectiveness: 
(Problem solving capacity/clarity of 
purpose); 
• Network Social Capital 
(Relationship 
Efficiencies/trust/equality). 
 
Economic  Achieve economic 
efficiency gains  
 
• Improve knowledge and innovation;  
• Allocative/productive efficiency; 
• Economies of scale/scope; agglomeration 
economies 
• Flexible learning 
• Functionality of common projects; 
• Institutional innovation and creativity; 
• Reduce transaction costs; 
• Share/leverage resources. 
Governance  Achieve efficient 
policy function, 
coordination, and 
implementation  
• Flexible/dynamic modes of decision-making 
• Non-hierarchical, self-coordinated self-
regulating collaborative arrangements  
• Degree of formalization/standardization 
• Formal structure of the state (i.e. 
administrative tiers, responsibilities, scope 
and autonomy of local government, number 
and size of local authority) 
• Upper-level government’s approach to 
collaboration policy. 
• Trust 
• Reputation 
• Influence 
• Conflict 
• Rules 
• Power relations 
• Network competence 
• Incentive structures  
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS (PART B)*: (ENVIRONMENTAL; SOCIAL; FUNCTIONAL): 
• FORMAL: Rules/Laws/Contracts/Organisations. 
• INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS: Culture/routines/traditions/values/norms 
* The institutional dimensions relate to those identified in Figure 9: Path Dependent Institutional Dimensions in Economic Development  
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4.4.3 Key research gaps from the literature: 
There is a diversity of collaboration research relevant to urban government, although largely 
empirical and descriptive in nature.  Government policy networks are conceptually difficult to 
analyse due to the problematic nature of political and network relations.  Relatively little is known 
about how government networks act to support economic development (Klijn and Koppenjan, 
2000), resulting in a lack of studies analyzing how different types of policy networks relate to 
network outcomes (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007), and little available information and evidence 
on how policy networks function and the policy outcomes involved (Arku and Oosterbaan, 2014).  
For example, organizing and realizing the benefits of collaboration are rarely identified and 
understood (Malecki, 2002), and difficult to fully evidence (Loftman and Nevin, 1996).  Thus, 
much of existing evidence is largely ‘anecdotal’ (Malecki, 2002: 940), and ‘lacking a distinct 
intellectual tradition’ (Isett et al. 2011: 160) for understanding the causal relationship between 
ULAC and outcomes.  
 
Specifically, there is a lack of understanding of the diverse nature and determinants of success of 
collaboration between local authorities (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007).  Inter-municipal 
Collaboration (IMC) is prevalent in Western European countries, although, thought relatively 
underdeveloped in the UK and an apparent lack of information on how it operates, the factors 
influencing its performance, and the different institutional arrangements in use (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2012).    
 
There have been various studies that consider the role of collaboration, and specifically, inter-urban 
collaboration between cities (Carley, 2000; Carley, 2006; Edwards et al. 2000) in Scotland (see for 
example: Bailey et al. 1999; Bailey and Turok, 2001; Turok and Bailey, 2004;  Turok, 2008; and 
Docherty et al. 2004). Whilst sympathetic to collaboration at the ‘urban’ scale from the outset, 
Docherty et al. (2004) seeks to offer ‘potential answers to the question why collaborate’ (Docherty 
et al. 2004: 445) by deconstructing its theoretical premise and rationale.  However, the study 
provides limited insight of the dynamic nature of collaboration or how it can be best measured as 
key factors underpinning the rationale of collaboration, thus requiring a fuller more comprehensive 
multidisciplinary perspective. 
In extending Docherty et al. (2004) by reconstruction and conceptualisation of urban collaboration 
in relation to economic development in Scotland, there is an opportunity to establish a more 
holistic methodological framework via the ULAC context.   By providing a conceptualization 
sensitive to the role of ‘institutions’ as context, the nature, role and function of ‘urban 
collaboration’ can be more fully understood. 
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Furthermore, the institutional context of ‘urban collaboration’ as policy in Scotland has changed 
significantly since Docherty (2004), with the evolution of a new cities policy in Scotland in more 
recent years.   Accordingly, the importance of filling the above research gaps relates to the 
increasing policy focus on both the competitiveness and collaborative role of cities for economic 
performance in Scotland and UK generally (see for example, Pasquinelli, 2013).  Therefore, a 
geographically focussed in-depth study of the PV of ULAC in Scotland is timely, taking explicit 
account of the role of institutional context for conceptualisation. 
 
4.4.4 Ontological positioning of the conceptual framework: 
Ontologically, the chapter has shown how the explanatory power of different analytical approaches 
to network policies relationship with outcomes varies and is complex.  The literature review has 
demonstrated how policy network processes can be analysed in both a causal or systemic way or 
integrative or differentiated way; all of which are influenced by the dynamics of network processes.  
 
The view in this research is that by bringing together overlapping theoretical perspectives relative 
to urban network insights (i.e. economic, spatial, governance networks), it is possible to take into 
account a dynamic range of explanations to provide a holistic theoretical position.  There is much 
debate surrounding the bringing together of differently informed institutional perspectives (i.e. 
sociological governance and spatial perspectives with rationale economic perspectives), leading to 
‘an intractable divide between [the] incompatible approaches to institutional analysis’ (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998: 953).  Whilst simple models in social science can provide insights on generic 
features of network processes, the thesis research resonates with the position of Lowndes (2001: 
1968), in that ‘the different strands of institutionalise thinking’ can be brought together to help 
bridge ‘the ontological distance between sociological and rational choice approaches’ (Lowndes, 
2001: 1968).   
 
Importantly, a key aim of the research is to bring together research insights from across the main 
theoretical domains of the literature (i.e. economic, spatial and governance insights), that share 
ontological positions, consistent with for example, relative economic geography (see also Bathelt 
and Gluckler, 2003) and institutional interpretivism in public administration (see Hay, 2011).  
Therefore, through thick descriptions of the ULAC institutional context to help understand the 
local, specific and unique nature of urban policy networks, the conceptualisation of ULAC is useful 
for understanding the role and uniqueness of network dimensions within a contextualised 
institutional context, fundamental to understanding the PV of networked policy. 
 
4.4.5 Summary 
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The literature review of the last three Chapters (Two, Three and Four): urban economic 
development, policy networks, and institutions have highlighted the lack of understanding of 
ULAC and its relationship with economic development outcomes through an institutional lense. 
 
The literature recognises that urban collaboration is beneficial for economic development 
(Docherty et al. 2004), however, theoretical complexity underpinning network literature means a 
coherent multi-disciplinary, holistic conceptualization of its relationship with outcomes is lacking.  
Furthermore, whilst the literature acknowledges that institutions are important for understanding 
networks, there is a specific lack of understanding of the role of institutional context on the 
relationship between ULAC and policy outcomes for economic development (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2012), from a multi-disciplinary institutional perspective (Lowndes, 2001).  
Understanding the relationship between ULAC and policy outcomes requires analyzing: what is 
developed (i.e. the networks functional dimensions: purpose, configuration, management), how the 
network develops (i.e. the institutional dimensions: formal and informal) and why its PV 
developed the way it did (i.e. theoretical dimensions: economic, spatial, governance institutions), 
through detailed explanation of network mechanisms within a particular context, helping to 
explain: the PV of ULAC from an institutional perspective.  
 
The focus on a multi-disciplinary explanation of the role and impact of institutional context on the 
PV of ULAC is a key gap in the literature (Hulst and Montfort, 2012), requiring a description of 
the mechanisms and factors underlying the collaboration process through in-depth, rich context-
based descriptions, helping to reveal explanatory characteristics within the case study data. The 
next chapter will follow with a fuller explanation of the methodological approach to the thesis 
research. 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The Chapters Two, Three and Four reviewed the literature and empirical research relating to 
ULAC, recognising the complex ‘fuzzy’ nature (Markusen, 2003) of terms underpinning an 
understanding of ULAC, resulting in a lack of conceptual clarity across academic disciplines and 
informing the development of a conceptual framework (section 4.4.2) to facilitate an empirical 
inquiry into:  
 
The public value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration (ULAC) as economic 
development policy: the role of institutions. 
 
In order to explore the complexity of multiple conceptual identities associated with collaboration 
processes, the research explains the rationale for choosing an in-depth context-based qualitative 
single case-study research for conceptualising the PV of ULAC that appreciates the importance of 
role the ‘collaborators’ (i.e. the network member) identity.  The chapter provides the rationale for 
the methodological choices, clarifying both the ontological and epistemological reasoning (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1998), and the need for a contextualised approach that recognises the important role 
of formal and informal institutions for collaboration as economic development policy (Rodrıguez-
Pose, 2013). 
 
The selection of a suitable research methodology was thus primarily concerned with methods 
appropriate for the achievement of the primary research objective: to conceptualise the PV of 
ULAC and the role of institutions.  First, the research methodology was required to investigate 
varying formal and informal institutional contexts framing collaboration and its rationale. 
Collaboration policy is characterized by political and social constructs, calling for interpretation on 
a context case-specific basis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), through rich descriptions for understanding 
the important role of collaborators’ identity and context within which policy takes place and is 
shaped.  In order to understand what is shaping the experiences of those collaborating (i.e. in this 
case, predominantly political institutions), thick descriptions from case study research can provide 
deep insight (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the ‘particular’ collaboration setting and process.  
 
Second, the methodology choices were challenged by the complexity associated with investigating 
dynamic policy-outcome relationships, particularly relating to the thesis attempt to gain insight 
from a multi-disciplinary theoretical perspective.  According to Abma and Stake (2001) ‘social 
interaction’ is an important aspect to understanding the holistic nature and public value of a policy, 
by describing context to help judge and understand the true ‘complex’ aspect of policy outcomes.  
A deep understanding and description of contextual dynamics within a specific collaborative 
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setting is therefore crucial for conceptualising the relationship between ULAC and outcomes in 
practice, in line with Dyer and Wilkins (1991) arguments that single interpretive case studies 
provide rich descriptions of the context in which experiences occur. 
 
Albeit argued ‘there is no way to establish, beyond contention, the best [methodological] view’ 
(Stake, 1995: 108),  Stake (2005) emphasizes the uniqueness of a single case-study approach for 
being able to understand the importance of the ‘particular’, through rich descriptions of ‘context’ 
within which collaboration can take place.  The thesis methodological approach supports Stake’s 
(2005) interpretive approach to investigating the role of a particular context, believed to be suitable 
for the research focus on government institutions as the ‘collaborator’, and the ‘particular’ complex 
contextualized ‘urban collaboration’ setting in Scotland.  The selection of a single case study 
design was thus based on the ability to investigate collaboration policy characterized by some 
degree of institutionalization over time.  Figure 14 summarises the research methodology and 
approach, discussed more fully in the following chapter sections. 
 
Figure 14 Research methodology  
 
 
Stake’s (2005) single-in depth case study approach uses ‘interpretive particularization’ approach to 
interpreting data, by appreciating the importance of human experience and its subjective non-fixed 
nature, and the way in which ‘institutions are experienced by actors’ (and substantially comprised 
of actors with more or less agency).  Thus, an interpretive approach that appreciates the importance 
of the ‘particular’ content of an in-depth case study approach, is valuable for understanding how 
•Critical realism (Pawson, 2008; Sayer, 2012; Bhaskar, 2008, 1989; 
Hood, 2012; Tructures et al, 2013)Ontology
•Interpretive particularisation ( Stake, 2005); Yanow, 2007; Dyer 
and Wilkins, 1991) Methodology
•Inductive theory using 'thick decriptions' of a 'particular' context' 
(Stake, 2005; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991)Design
•Single case study: Interviews, non-participant observation, 
documentary evidence (Stake, 2005)Data Collection
•Template Analysis, thematic coding, process tracing (Suddaby, 
2009; Miles et al, 2014; George and Bennett, 2005)Data Analysis
•Research protocol; triangulation; rival explanations (George 
and Bennett (2005); Lincoln and Guba (1985); Flyvbjerg, B. 
(2006); Bryman (2008)
Reliability/Validity
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actors ‘make sense of, or apply meaning to, institutionalized practices and structures’ (Suddaby, 
2009: 181).   
 
Stake’s (2005) interpretive technique for understanding ULAC from an institutional perspective is 
particularly useful for capturing ‘process narratives’ (Suddaby, 2009: 189), to help assess how 
‘interactions are understood, not only by the researcher, but also by the participants engaged in 
them’ (p189).  Process-narratives using thick descriptions are presented throughout Chapters Six 
and Seven, to help trace the ULAC-outcome relationship. 
 
Section 5.2 elaborates on the research design and interpretive explanation through in-depth single 
case study. That section is followed by a discussion of the process of case selection (Section 5.3), 
followed by section 5.4 describing the thesis’ ontology and epistemology.  Section 5.5 presents 
data collection and data analysis’ techniques, including a subsection on research quality (5.5.3). 
Finally, section 5.6 concludes the chapter and summarises the main elements of the research 
methodology. 
 
The remainder of the chapter discusses the research approach and design, first detailing the 
epistemological premise to developing a framework for answering the main research question:  
 
What is the PV of ULAC as economic development policy, relative to the role of institutions? 
 
5.2 Research Design 
The aim of this thesis is to theorise by proposing a contextualised interpretive explanation (Stake, 
2005) of the relationship between ULAC and outcomes.  
 
5.2.1 Introduction  
As both the policy-outcome process and contextual factors relating to institutions were of interest, 
the research design was based on the ability to provide deep insight into a context-based case study, 
taking into account individuals narrative and interpretations of the process.  The research design for 
analysing policy processes, in this case, the relationship between ULAC and economic 
development policy outcomes by Scottish ULAs, is based on Stake’s (2005) interpretive case study 
approach for understanding the particularization of a situation, through contextual factors (relating 
to formal and informal institutions).  Stake’s (2005: 449) belief is that cause–effect ontologies are 
too ‘simplistic’ and ‘fixed’, requiring understanding through recognition of the individual’s 
subjective experience and context.  Using process narratives, the methodological approach to the 
research design is to describe the process of ULAC aimed at ‘causal explanation of its course and 
effects’ through the interpretive understanding of social action by embracing both ‘explanation and 
understanding’ through the interpretation of human actions (Bryman, 2008: 15).   
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Stake (1995) advocates the use of a single case study for providing insight into the complexity and 
particular nature of case analysis, through which meaning of the ULAC-policy outcome 
relationship and policy process can be created by ‘figuring out what policy-relevant elements carry 
or convey meaning’ (Yanow, 2004: 111). 
 
5.2.2 Interpretive Process Explanation from a Single Case Study 
 
Any understanding of the institutional frameworks involving collaboration requires an appreciation 
of the expectations upon which they are based.  In other words, it is necessary to understand what 
the collaborator expects to be achieved, if to understand fully how and why the collaboration 
arrangement takes on a specific form and relates to outcomes.  Interpretive research can be 
particularly useful for understanding and describing policy mechanisms within complex settings 
involving governmental institutions.  
 
The choice of a single rather than multiple case studies follow the persuasive arguments of Dyer 
and Wilkins (1991) and in particular, Burawoy (1998), who present a strong case for extended case 
method that recognizes the importance of both context specificity and the historical contingency of 
institutional development akin to an institutional approach in this thesis.  
5.2.3 Single Case-study and Context-Dependent Logic:  
 
Stake (1995) describes two types of case study – the intrinsic case study and the instrumental case 
study.  The intrinsic case study is ‘not undertaken primarily because the case represents other cases 
or because it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because in all its particularity and 
ordinariness, [the] case itself, is of interest’ (p 237).  Given the Scottish institutional context of 
ULAC, the purpose of using the single case study is therefore not to understand ‘some abstract 
concept or generic phenomena’ (p237), instead, to use the single case study situation to reveal its 
unique story.  Concrete, context-dependent knowledge of in-depth case studies can help to provide 
a thorough understanding of the characteristics and peculiarities of situations under consideration.  
 
Chapter two, three and four highlighted the multi-disciplinary nature of ULAC in that, its 
functional and institutional characteristics requires an appreciation of underpinning theoretical 
dimensions (i.e. economic, spatial, and governance network dimensions).  Consitent with Stake 
(1995), the value of a qualitative single case study approach is the ability to appreciating the 
possibility of ‘multiple views’ (p65).  The research approach taken here is recognising the 
influence of context on the process of collaboration between urban local authorities, that requires a 
single case study approach in order to appreciate the nature and influence of a variety of complex 
contextual factors.   
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Recognsing the potential limitations of theorising through single case study research (Yanow, 
2008), a cross-sectional comparative study approach could also have been used.  However, the 
single-case study approach is thought most useful for describing and understanding the ‘specific’ 
network situation.  Therefore,  to ensure validation of the research findings and given its multi-
disciplinary nature, the thesis ensures a clear consistent approach to theory triangulation to enable 
verification of the findings from multiple perspectives (see Yin, 1994).   
 
5.2.4 Explanatory Value of Single Case-study Approach  
 
The importance of a single case study design relates to its ability to provide insight into the ‘deep 
structure and social dynamics’ of a particular setting, that better appreciates the more ‘tacit and less 
obvious aspects ’ of the setting that is arguably ‘more accurate although appropriately tentative’ 
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991: 615) investigation of the single study setting. Within-case research 
design is said to be important for ‘process tracing…a procedure for identifying steps in a causal 
process leading to the outcome of a dependant variable of a particular case in a particular historical 
context’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 176).   
 
The value of process tracing in within case research is its ‘causal mechanism component of causal 
explanation’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 224), by describing and connecting the different stages of 
a policy process leading to policy outcomes, in context of dynamic events within that process. 
 
The research approach in this thesis applies process tracing, by analysing the sequence of events 
within the SCA case study across three stages of the networks development, and analysed from an 
institutional perspective using the conceptual framework (see Figure 1) developed from the 
literature review. The conceptual framework is then used to help explain the PV of ULAC within 
its historical context, and through deep contextual understanding of processes underpinning the 
sequence of events according to a process tracing approach.   
 
The interpretivist approach of the thesis means that ‘process tracing allows the researcher to look 
for the ways in which this link manifests itself and the context in which it happens. The focus is not 
only on what happened, but also on how it happened’ (Porter and Keating, 2008: 233).  The value 
of process tracing in the context of this research, thus relates to the ability to analyse the research 
gap; to identify the role of both formal and informal institutions affecting the networks 
development process, and understanding of what and how it developed relative to the ‘urban’ and 
‘national’ context of government institutions within the network. 
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The thesis research is consistent with Stake, (2005), Hood (2012) and George and Bennett (2005) 
in terms of an interpretive approach to a causal explanation from a critical realist ontological 
perspective, using process tracing from a single case study to: 
 
‘disprove claims that a single variable is needed to explain an outcome…by excluding all 
explanations but one, if that explanation makes a process-tracing prediction that all other 
theories predict would be unlikely…[within] a path dependant historical process.’ 
George and Bennett (2005: 224) 
 
…based on the belief that: 
 
‘cause and effect is transmitted through discretely structured but open systems; the 
interactions of one causal mechanism will influence the operation of others, so that the 
outcomes of any intervention are never predictable’  
Hood (2012: 7) 
 
The case study findings presented in later chapter use process tracing to summarise processes and 
factors that may explain the network process from one step to the next.   The following  section 
will explain the process of case selection how it was identified and selected. 
 
5.3 Case Study Identification  
 
The research strategy and approach uses a case study methodology, involving the empirical 
investigation of a ULAC within its real life context, through insights from multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin, 2013), providing a unique opportunity to research a situation that is largely 
unfamiliar in existing empirical research and the basis for significant generalization (Allison and 
Zelikow, 1999).  
 
A wide set of literatures are available offering different perspectives on the use and validity of case 
study approaches. Though admitting that conceptions vary, Gerring (2004: 342), defines the case 
study as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
(similar) units’. That is, case studies provide a deep context-specific investigation, where some 
limits can be drawn on what falls inside and outside the case study, with the view to theorising 
beyond the area in focus. Meyer (2001: 329) notes that one of the strengths and weaknesses of case 
study research is that there ‘are virtually no specific requirements guiding case research’, and can 
thus be regarded as a strength in that the research strategy permits flexibility. 
 
The extent to which a case study can inform and test theories is much disputed within social 
science literature, particularly for determining whether research findings are unique to the case 
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study setting, or part of a common trend.  Case studies are thus recognized for their ability to 
understand policy processes within a particular context and setting (Hoggart et al. 2002), rather 
than their ability to test specific theories or hypotheses underlying the processes. Benton and Craib, 
(2001) suggest case studies are most useful for understanding policy processes (e.g. the role, 
management and configuration of ULAC), as opposed to testing or predicting outcomes and 
theories underpinning policy processes.  In other words, case studies can help to inform theory by 
analysing policy in practice, helping to ‘verify a theoretical notion, contradict another, and discover 
some new theory, concept or model” (Vaughan, 2000: 182), helping to unravel the “loose ends of a 
case study…the stuff we can neither expect nor explain that pushes us towards theoretical 
breakthroughs’ (Vaughan, 2000: 176).   
 
The case study approach requires the need to familiarize with varying sources of information, and 
discourse analysis helping to understand how ideas and concepts are produced in a particular 
physical and social setting.  For example, case study interview data can be used to help understand 
an individual’s actions and perspective within a given institutional setting.  The context may be 
important to understanding the policy processes themselves, requiring the researcher to look 
beyond the interview text by considering underlying contexts.  Documentary analysis thus 
supplements the interview materials to help provide a fuller understanding of the meaning of 
different discourses, and taking into account the complex relationship between people, places and 
policy.   
 
Overall, the use of case study methodology for conceptualising ULAC is viewed valuable for this 
research due to its ability to unravel the policy process in practice, potentially helping to raise 
questions about existing theoretical rationale and insights on the relationship between ULAC and 
policy outcomes.  The case study methodology will help provide insights and understanding of 
ULAC within their particular physical and social setting, concerning their role and configuration in 
achieving economic development outcomes, as well as insights as to how they are managed and 
affected by the different network relationships within the ULAC 
 
5.3.1 Case Selection and Institutional Factors  
 
 Case study research can provide a helpful framework, rather than a model or theory, for 
understanding the important role of policy transfer, policy diffusion and lesson drawing within 
policy network situations.  The impact on ‘policy transfer’ as an outcome of collaboration relates 
largely to the role of power relations within networks (i.e. see the principal-agent problem 
literature), methodologically understood to require a case study approach to ensure ‘investigation 
of detailed interaction between the various principals and agents and identify the interactions and 
outcomes of individual cases with their own institutional, historical and political specificities’ 
(Bartlett, 2005: page). 
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5.3.2 Case Study Choice 
 
Analysing ULAC through a single case study serves as an ‘extreme case’ (Yin, 2003) for the 
purposes of theory building from a multi-disciplinary perspective.  The use of extreme cases 
facilitates theory building because the phenomena under study are ‘closer to the surface’ and easier 
to observe (Eisenhardt, 1989).  During the literature review it became apparent that ULAC is 
closely related to Inter Municipal Collaboration (IMC) as a concept involving collaboration 
involving manly local authorities (see for example, Hulst, 2012, Hulst and Montfort, 2012).  
However,  there are currently ‘few studies considering local government collaboration in the UK’ 
(Hulst, 2007), and in particular, a lack of consideration of the ‘scale’ of local government as a key 
characteristic of the collaboration process  (Hulst and Montfort, 2012).  Therefore,  the selection of 
Scotland as a the case study for ULAC is believed to provide a unique empirical opportunity for 
academic research.  In particular, the Scottish example is unique further in that the ULAC case 
study is the first example of a formal institutional partnership of collaboration involving all of 
Scotland’s urban local authorities.  Refer to section 4.4. for an overview of the SCA case study. 
 
5.4 Research Philosophy 
 
5.4.1 Introduction  
 
The methodological approach to research must correspond with the epistemological views on the 
nature and assessment of knowledge.  In other words, the researcher’s ontological position  
concerning people’s beliefs regarding ‘the nature of social entities’ (Bryman 2008: 18).  A key 
challenge for the nature of social activity in the context of this thesis using the conceptual 
framework (see Table 10) to explain the PV of ULAC as economic development policy in Scotland 
(i.e. the Scottish Cities Alliance), is the backdrop of national institutional flux, increasing localism, 
and austerity government as case study context.  Therefore, by taking an interpretive 
methodological approach (Stake, 2005) to the research, the focus of the research is on establishing 
understanding by gathering insights from those involved in the policy network process in Scotland 
(i.e. government agencies).   
 
The ontological and epistemological position best suited to an institutional approach to 
understanding the PV of ULAC within a specific Scottish context, is the researcher’s normative 
belief that an interpretive critical realist approach works best for this research (see also Bathelt and 
Gluckler, 2003 and Hay, 2011).  The ontological position proposed by Sayer (2004) is that ‘it is not 
causal explanation over interpretive understanding, it is one of using both…where critical realism 
argues that they are…interrelated (p12).’ Thus, a critical realist ontology suited to an investigation 
of the nature of causality in the ULAC-outcome process, is consistent with the view that an 
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interpretivist approach (Stake, 2005) can also serve a causal explanation in that interpretivism and 
critical realism are related.   
 
The emphasis of the importance of an interpretive critical realist approach relates to the contextual 
importance of explanations, without the need for establishing ‘universal laws’ (Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood, 2004: 166).  For example, Harvey (1998) argues that critical realism recognises the 
centrality of key questions, including: ‘How are texts and interpretations used within the interaction 
of institutions? How do they generate and participate in the relations of power and ordering’ (p85).’   
The ontological position of the thesis consistent with an interpretive critical realist approach, 
focussed on providing explanation, interpretation and understanding of the causal nature of policy 
processes, contextually dependant on the underlying mechanisms and structures within which 
networked policy is situated.  Hence, the critical realist ontology is deemed most suitable for taking 
into account the important role of institutional context at the regional, urban and local level of the 
ULAC network setting.   
   
Consistent with Bathelt and Gluckler (2003) (see Table on p124) perspective of the importance of a 
critical realist (evolutionary perspective) approach to the study of economic and social geography 
(akin to the economic, social geography and governance academic context of the thesis), views 
human action as taking place within ‘contextual’ ‘open systems’ and cannot be explained by 
‘universal laws’ (p126).  Recognising that critical realism ‘is not necessarily the only 
methodological alternative toward a relational economic geography’21 it is viewed to be 
particularly relevant for conceptualization that appreciates the importance of ‘context’ and 
‘contingency’ (Bathelt and Gluckler (2003: 128), consistent with the theoretical approach in this 
thesis.  In other words, critical realism is believed to ‘provide a  fundamentally different 
epistemological perspective of causality that systematically accounts for context-specificity in 
human action’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003: 126).   
 
Critical realism (Hood, 2012, Sayer and Pawson, 2006) suggests that there ‘exists a reality 
independent of our senses’ (Pawson, 2006: 20) for interpreting the ‘real, actual and empirical’ 
(Hood, 2012: 7).  The critical realist ontological position in this thesis is to view ‘cause and effect 
as being transmitted through discretely structured but open systems’ (Hood, 2012: 7), through 
explanation and appreciation of both structure and agency as being ‘fundamental to the constitution 
of our natural and social reality’ (Reed, 2000: 527). Thus, critical realism is regarded as a form of 
‘structuralism’ focussed on ‘discovering the unobservable structures that guide or determine 
                                                 
21 See Harvey and Braun (1996). Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Vol. 468. Oxford: Blackwell (1996), and also Reed 
(2000). The limits of discourse analysis in organizational analysis. Organization 7.3: 524-530. 
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events, irrespective of the beliefs of individuals or the meanings of actors’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2016:53).   
 
By considering the complex nature of causality within the ULAC-outcome process within the 
particular ULA setting, the critical realist ontology is that policy outcomes are not generalizable or 
predictable, and best understood within their ‘objective reality formed of both events and 
underlying causes, and although these dimensions of reality have objective existence, they are not 
knowable with certainty’ (Clark, 2011). 
 
Importantly, consistent the ontological position proposed by Sayer (2004:12), in that ‘it is not 
causal explanation over interpretive understanding, it is one of using both…where critical realism 
argues that they are…interrelated.’ Thus, the critical realist ontology suited to an investigation of 
the nature of causality in the ULAC-outcome process, is consistent with the view that an 
interpretivist approach (Stake, 2005) can also serve a causal explanation in that interpretivism and 
critical realism are related.  The emphasis is on the contextual importance of explanations, without 
the need for establishing ‘universal laws’ (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2004:166), instead, focussing 
on explanation, interpretation and understanding policy processes in context of underlying 
mechanisms and structures.  Hence, the critical realist ontology is suitable for taking into account 
the important role of institutional context at the regional and local level of the ULAC network 
setting.   
 
Consistent with an interpretive methodological approach of this research, the selected epistemology 
is thus consistent with the methodology in terms of how the nature of knowledge is accessed.  
Section 3.5.2 outlines the critical realists ontology suited to investigating the PV of ULAC, 
followed by a discussion of the researcher’s reflective positionality on the research (section 3.5.3).  
 
5.4.2 Critical Realism and Collaboration Policy Research  
 
The epistemological approach to research requires an awareness and choice of how to interpret or 
read case study material (i.e. the ontology).  The collaboration policy and network nature of this 
thesis research required a critical realist approach towards the case study material, appreciating that 
collaborators are ‘both producers as well as products of the corporate culture’ in relation to the 
agency-structure relationship positioned by critical realism (Welch et al. 2011: 753).  In other 
words, the epistemology of critical realism is ‘interpretivist in nature, assuming that our knowledge 
of structures, mechanisms, and events is constrained by our ability to access only a portion of the 
events that occur, and is historically and socially constructed and thus inherently subjective’ 
(Tructures et al. 2013: 935). 
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Critical realism is a relatively new approach with limited studies in the area of collaboration or 
networked policy settings (see Hood, 2012 and Tructures, 2013).  Critical realism can be useful for 
describing causality within complex network policy settings by explaining how certain events are 
produced from structures, actions, and contextual situations.  Collaboration and network policy 
within an urban local government context incorporates a range of structural elements, that from a 
critical realist perspective, both formal and informal, for example: the rules and structures within 
the network; collaboration mechanisms; individual collaborators; the relative position of the 
collaborator within the network; and the resources available.  Such structures of collaboration are 
dynamic and complex, where a key strength of critical realism is its ability for understanding 
complexity within collaboration settings through its explanatory focus and reconciliation of agency 
and structure and recognition of the wider knowledge of individuals (Clark, 2011).  
 
The research approach adopted here is also consistent with the methodological approach by 
Tructures et al.  (2013) and Hood (2012), to support critical realist case study research, involving 
explanation of collaboration-related processes relative to: key events; structures and context; 
dynamics and collaboration mechanisms; empirical corroboration of hypothesized mechanisms, 
and adoption of triangulation and multiple research methods.  Critical realism is useful for 
understanding the structure of collaboration processes that result in causal mechanisms generating 
specific events throughout the process, and an appreciation of contextual influences on that 
process.  In the context of ULAC, from a critical realist perspective, the structures and context of 
the collaboration process is the focus for explaining and understanding outcomes in a dynamic, 
complex open social system of policy making.  In this sense, internal network structures and 
mechanisms are potentially subject to external dynamics, explaining how network events are 
caused and generated. 
 
Thus, causality within the policy-outcome process is assumed to be non deterministic,  based on the 
view that structures ‘exist in open systems…of hypothetical mechanisms’ (Tructures et al. 2013: 
935) interpreted as generating or causing the observed pattern of events within the observed case 
study context.  Hence, the ontological approach in thesis is consistent with the view that ‘outcomes 
of any intervention…are never predictable…and dependent on interpretation’ (Hood, 2012: 7).  
 
A key requirement of the thesis research approach is the need to interpret the role of informal 
institutions (i.e. norms and values) within the case study context, through verbal and non-verbal 
observations. The characteristics and skills of the researcher will have an important role 
interpreting the research data, as well as ‘all research is an interpretation of an already interpreted 
world’ (Welch et al.  2011: 744).  Therefore, subsection 3.5.3 considers the important role of the 
researcher consistent with critical realism, and the researcher’s experience and relevant skills in 
relation to the research process. 
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5.4.3 Reflexivity: Researcher’s Influence on Ontology  
 
The requirement for a ‘hermeneutic and phenomenological call for reflexivity’ towards research 
relates the a researcher's ‘positionality’ in terms of their lived experience and ways in which the 
researcher’s personal background may: shape access to research intelligence (i.e. persons, 
organisations, documentation); and, shape understanding of research data (Yanow, 2007: 117).  
 
First, the researcher has both lived, studied and worked in Scotland for all of her life, with some 20 
years experience working in, and researching, public policy in Scotland.  In particular, the 
researcher has previous experience of designing and delivering ‘collaboration’ policy in Scotland: 
as a senior policy manager in Glasgow City Council (e.g. 2014 Commonwealth Games Legacy) 
and Scottish Government (e.g. Framework for Economic Development), and academic researcher 
at University of Strathclyde (Regional Policy in Scotland).  As a result, the researcher has a well-
rounded knowledge of Scotland’s national and local economic development policy/agency context.  
The researcher is thus investigating a thesis research topic with significant prior knowledge and 
personal views built on experience, as well as existing professional networks to agencies and 
individuals directly relevant to the research case study.  Second, the thesis research fieldwork 
involved undertaking a part-time internship within one of the organizations directly connected with 
the case study, as a potential ‘partial-insider’ to the ULAC case study research.  
 
Given the above context, it is important to reflect on any implications this may have for the thesis 
research and researcher’s own ontological position on the thesis research.  The research focus on 
Scottish Government and local government meant being able to ‘find ways to negotiate this 
protectionist [policy] environment’ when in the ‘uncomfortable position as organizational 
outsider’, and viewed as either ‘student, practitioner’ and/or, ‘researcher’, having a relative impact 
on the ability to access research intelligence (Einagel, 2002: 2).  Doctoral researchers are regularly 
viewed as being ‘on the periphery of the academic community’ (Einagel, 2002: 2), which is also 
understood to either enhance, or hinder data accessibility.  
 
In relation to gaining access to individuals and agencies, prior knowledge and well-established 
professional connections with the public policy sector in Scotland, provided: a) legitimacy and 
credibility when negotiating data access; b) access to a wide network of individuals and agencies 
when identifying potential Scotland collaboration policy case-studies; c) a more empathetic, 
refined and knowledgeable approach to issues discussed during interviews.  
 
Furthermore, implications from being regarded a ‘partial-insider’ to the case study process, or 
viewed as a ‘professional’ instead of ‘student researcher’ given previous working connections, 
meant taking a cautious and reflective approach to interpreting the data.  The aim was to ensure 
research findings reflected the interviewees experiences, rather than the researchers pre-existing 
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opinions.  As a result, a reflective approach to the data access, collection and interpretation was 
required, so as not to prejudice the results: academic supervisor’s providing ‘outsider’ scrutiny to 
the fieldwork and interview approach and questions.  Open interview questions were used to 
provide the option for wide discussion of the topic relative to the interviewees chosen direction. 
This was of particular importance given the ontological position of the research aimed at providing 
thick descriptions (Ponterotto, 2006) of contextual circumstances that provide meaning through 
explanation, including the opportunity for the individuals’ subjective understanding to be captured 
within the explanation of the ULAC process. 
 
There is recognition that researchers will always impact research findings, as participants 
themselves in the research process. Given that the epistemological approach can influence the data 
gathering process and analysis, the interpretive approach acknowledges that everything is 
understood and analysed within a specific social context.  A degree of reflective realism is required 
to help understand the way that knowledge is constructed, and to reflect on any preconceived ideas 
of the research findings and preconceptions (Davies, 2007). 
 
Qualitative research often involves a degree of subjectivity (Cook and Crang, 1995), meaning the 
positionality of the research findings will involve a degree of openness to challenge, although as 
Cook and Crang (1995) suggests, value can still be created from the researchers 
‘acknowledgement’ of such limitations.  Thus, it is acknowledged that the positionality of this 
research cannot be regarded as completely impartial from preconceptions and knowledge of how 
the world is understood, or the positionality of the research in terms of the epistemology in defining 
and understanding collaboration as a ULAC, due to the diversity of interpretations and definitions 
of what constitutes ‘collaboration’, as highlighted in Chapter two of the literature review.  A key 
factor in achieving positionality of the research has been to gain as full an understanding of the 
research ‘context’ as possible, through the researcher undertaking a visiting position within the 
case study organisation over the course of the data collection period, to allow as much experience 
and insight into the case study as possible. 
 
Having explicitly discussed the ontological and epistemological aspects, and building on aspects 
related to the researcher’s potential impact on qualitative research, the next section will discuss the 
impact of cultural-cognitive differences between the researcher and the participants in the context 
of data collection and analysis of an institutional context of ULAC. 
 
5.4 Data Collection and Analysis  
Data collection and analysis were intertwined in an iterative process throughout as advised by 
Miles and Huberman (1994). The methodology for data analysis drew upon Miles et al. (2014) for 
a guide on overall data analysis, including: data coding and condensation, data display and 
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presentation, and conclusion drawing and verification (see figure 1.1 of Miles et al. 2014: 14).  
Policy network analysis is often criticized as merely demonstrating the general features of a 
network albeit ‘a very useful tool for describing the policy process’ (Blom-Hansen 1997: 673). 
Limitations of policy network analysis relate to the lack of research providing a persuasive 
explanation of policy outcomes via fully determined causal explanations (Dowding, 1995).  
Therefore, an explanation of the collection and analytical approach to ULAC case study (as a 
policy network), using template analysis and document analysis is provided in the following 
subsections, helping to provide insights into the features constituting ‘good policy deliberation’ 
(Hajer, 2003: 191).  
 
5.4.1 Data Collection  
 
Document analysis is used as the analytical approach to the primary data to allow for an 
examination of both the discourses (i.e. documentation) and observations (i.e. interviews) 
contributing towards the conceptual understanding of ULAC within its respective reality.  An in-
depth analysis of the SCA in ‘real-time’ involved data collection and observation betwee October 
2013 to mid-2016.  The data covers the period from 2010 to 2016 and is comprised of observations 
at meetings, workshops, informal interactions, semi-structured interviews, and archival data (see 
Table 10 below). 
 
Table 11: Data Sources 
Type of data Source 
Semi-structured interviews (17 Hours (approx.) 23 Informants 
Non-participant Observation Data (107 Hours 
(approx.) 
• Study workshops x 2 (8 hours); 
• Management team meetings x 3 (6 hours); 
• Stakeholder governance meetings x 3 (9 
hours) 
• ‘Insider’ observation (one-day a month over a 
12 month period: Jan 2014-Jan 15 
On-Line Mediums;  
Published Reports; 
Internal Organisational Documentation. 
• Press release; Print/online media; Social 
media; Websites; Newspapers/magazine; 
Audio Evaluation reports;  
• Progress Reports; Performance Reports; 
Strategy documents; Minutes of meetings; 
Official Government Publications; Board 
Papers/Governance documents; Policy 
Documents. 
 
 
Non-Participant Observation: 
 
Part of the data collection process involved spending a period of time (between mid-2014 – Mid-
215) as a non-participant observer within the organisation of the chosen case study organisation 
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(i.e. within the Scottish Council for Development and Industry: SCDI based in Glasgow), 
collecting data by keeping a writing a diary of observed events and meetings (refer to Appendix 6 
for information on the observation proforma).  As a non-participant observer, documentary 
evidence (i.e. the organisations administrative records) were also collected and used to corroborate 
interview evidence.  The members of the organisation were aware of the purpose and scope of data 
collection process and non-participant attendance at meetings (refer to Appendix 7 for copy of 
Plain Language Statement and Data Consent Proforma), that allowed observation of the actual 
‘collaborating’ to help understand the important role of context during observation of operational 
process.  This was to help provide the opportunity for triangulation of the various pieces of data: 
comparing interview data (interviewees interpretation of the operational process), with non-
participant observation data (interviewers interpretation of the operational process), and 
documentary evidence.   
 
Documentary Analysis: 
 
Documentary evidence and analysis is a major component of the qualitative research approach, and 
equally as important as the interview data, through the recognized value of analysing key pieces of 
information, including: strategic plans, meeting minutes and annual reports.  Internal and external 
documents were collected, including documents from the member organizations of the SCA 
network, and external press and policy related documents, and analysed and coded for keyword 
content in line with the template analysis.  The different types of documentation include different 
content and provide different types of information (refer to Table 12).  For example, internal 
meeting documentation included a record of certain decisions, who was involved, why certain 
events or decision were made.   Whereas, publicly available documentation (i.e. National Policy 
Reports) provide information on stated policy objectives and policy rhetoric, that can be compared 
with the internal meeting papers to help understand the relationship between stated policy 
documentary with operational and implementation processes.  
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Table 12: Documentation included for documentary analysis (Archival Data: 2010-16) 
 
Semi-structured Interviews: 
 
Informants for interview were chosen on the basis of being able to inform the main research 
question concerning the relationship between ULAC and economic development policy outcomes, 
and in line with an interpretive approach aimed at: ‘giving a voice to the interpretations of those 
living the experience’ (Corley and Gioia, 2004: 178). 
 
Qualitative data were collected through face-to-face, in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
conducted and lasting between 30 minutes and an hour. The practitioners responded to a series of 
open-ended, semi-structured questions (Appendix 5), allowing the interviewer to option of probing 
further for specific details of interest, and to add or remove questions as necessary (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003).  
 
The qualitative information and interviews were gathered from the most senior persons 
representing Scotland’s cities within the SCA and with some prior knowledge, experience or 
engagement with the SCA (see Table 2). Senior practitioners, namely Senior Politicians, Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), Directors and Senior Managers were invited for interview in respect of 
their relevant experience, level of responsibility, and importantly, knowledge and familiarity of the 
SCA.  The participants had wide-ranging experiences in economic development, from 4 years to 
more than 30 years.  The experience of these individuals was investigated to gain greater insight 
DOCUMENT TYPES ANALYTICAL PURPOSE 
ON-LINE MEDIUMS:  
 
Press release; Print/online media; Social media; 
Websites; Newspapers/magazine; Audio; 
• Identify other actors involved in the SCA 
• To find more background information  
• Capture additional informed opinions on the 
SCA policy 
• Identify additional sources of city 
data/information 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS:  
 
Evaluation report; Progress Report; Performance 
Report; Strategy Paper; Minutes of meetings; local 
authority internal reports (minute of committees; 
council policy reports/papers) 
• To identify the different actors involved  
• Trace key events, policy process; decision 
making processes 
 
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE POLICY 
DOCUMENTS:  
 
Formal Policy Documents (relating to high level 
policy and political statements) – published by the 
relevant organisations as members of the SCA 
(e.g. Scottish Government Policy; SCA Published 
Documents).  
• Identify official political and policy rhetoric 
on purpose of SCA 
• Identify the different objectives of the 
stakeholders involved 
• Identify key sources of data relevant to the 
network member organisations/institutional 
characteristics 
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and understanding on the purpose, management and configuration of urban collaboration in 
practice.   
 
A total of thirty-two individuals, including one senior local politician per city, were invited to take 
part in an interview.  Twenty-three (n=23) in-depth interviews were secured and undertaken in 
total; in some instances, both a CEO/senior officer and politician interview were not secured for 
each of the seven Scottish cities.  All seven cities were represented in the 23 interviews either by a 
CEO/senior officer, politician, or both, and included eight (n=8) interviews representing a national 
perspective, and four (n=4) interviewees who were previously involved but not involved at time of 
interview. The collection of the interviews took place between January and October 2015, which 
was the same time as a Scottish election for Scottish devolution during the summer period of 2015, 
and a Scottish local authority election.  The implications for surrounding political context meant 
securing interviews was problematic.   Therefore, the research prioritized interviews that provided 
a range of coverage across all the main localities of Scotland (i.e. seven Scottish cities) (see Table 
A3 in Appendix 3).  
 
Twenty-three practitioners participated and interviewed, albeit thirty-two people invited for 
interview.  Although the Scottish Government were invited for interview (i.e. both the relevant 
Minister at the time, and Senior civil servant representatives), no one was available for interview.   
However, saturation point was thought reached at twenty-three with no additional information 
sought through interviews after that point (see Charmaz, 2004).   
 
5.4.2 Data Analysis  
 
Consistent with Miles et al. (2014), the first stage of the data analysis process involved reducing 
and organising the data (i.e. the quotes taken from interview transcripts) into first order codes in 
line with the main functional themes developed in the conceptual framework, and entered into 
NVIVO as the organising and analysing tool.  All the interviews were transcribed and coded into 
the three main functional domains (i.e. Purpose; Configuration; Management), followed by the 
development of emerging themes during the next phase of deeper analysis of specific areas of 
interest (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
A second key stage in the data analysis process involved using data displays and presentation of the 
data into tables and charts to further interpret the reduced data.  Descriptive timelines and network 
structure diagrams, along with process tracing (George and Bennett, 2005) tables presented with 
case findings in Chapter Six.   
 
The network process identified over the study period (i.e. network identification, implementation 
and growth), was presented using analytic-data displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994) to provide a 
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‘visualisation of the unfolding methodological process’ (Pratt, 2009: 860), shown in Figure 15 
(adapted from Pratt and Rosa (2003: 397). 
 
Figure 15: Thematic Data Analysis 
 
 
An initial timeline of key events within the network process was first developed from the interview 
data in order to provide a display of the key sequence of events chronologically during the study 
period.  Subsequently, consistent with Miles and Huberman (1994) descriptive explanations and a 
timeline of events were then turned into descriptive codes consistent with the conceptual 
framework (i.e. first order codes: purpose; configuration; management). Typical first order codes 
were consistent with items identified through the conceptual framework (see Figure 15). 
 
Further within-case analysis was then undertaken to identify any patterns that may help to explain 
the ULAC-outcome relationship, and compared across the various respondents’ data to determine 
whether a pattern is consistent.  The analytical process used template analysis as a ‘recursive 
process-oriented, analytic procedure’ (Locke, 1996: 240) of inductive analysis in line with (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985).  The analytical process was aimed at identifying causal mechanisms of the 
networked process, investigating the key events explaining certain policy outcomes. 
 
In order to identify potential causal mechanisms indicative of the PV of the ULAC process, process 
tracing charts and sense making tables were produced for each distinct stage of the networks 
process defined by key events.  Within each network stage, first order and second codes were used 
alongside process tracing (George and Bennett 2005), to help analyse the Interview Questions.  For 
PHASE 1: 
DISCOVERY
• Define first order categories
PHASE 2: 
NARROWING
• Analyse how categories fit together: identify initial relationships
PHASE 3: 
ENRICHING 
• Category verification and enrichment, addition, or disconfirmation 
PHASE 4: 
VALIDATING
• Analyse how categories fit together: identify initial relationships
• Probing for relationships
• Constructing and reconstructing theoretical insights
• Examine extant theory for additional insights
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example: ‘why did the cities decide to first collaborate’ described the rationale (A = what); ‘what 
happened following the decision to collaboration’ highlighted the role of context and institutional 
mechanisms (B=how); and impact of institutions (why) that led from event A (i.e. cities initial 
decision to collaborate), to process B (Scottish Government’s formalisation of SCA structures), 
leading to value C (perception of the value of formal structures). This procedure was carried out 
across the three separate stages of network identification, implementation and growth stages, 
leading to the development of first and second order codes (analytical concepts) (Yin, 2013). 
 
Network structure diagrams, process tracing tables and sense making statements are included with 
the findings in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. Throughout the data analysis, emerging findings were 
continually matched back against the rich context-based interview data to ensure a close fit 
between the collected data, emerging causal explanations and developing network development 
process models, in an iterative process of verification (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
 
Template analysis and analytical coding process: 
 
The data analysis takes an inductive approach (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) combining theory-driven 
template coding (King 1998, 2004) with inductive code generation methodology (Boyzatis, 1998), 
to help identify key data themes and aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al. 1994). The template 
analysis involved a ‘recursive process-oriented, analytic procedure’ (Locke, 1996: 240), as the 
basis for rigorous analysis of the qualitative data and used to analyse the process-based factors of 
the policymaking process.  
 
The process of analysis began with the first cycle of coding of the interviews and documents on the 
pre-established first order categories in relation to the three main functional domains of ULAC, 
derived from the literature review (see Figure 16  below), by focusing on the interviewees 
perceived rationale of the purpose, configuration and management of ULAC.  The interviews 
focused on the broadly defined functional domains of ULAC as first order codes, in line with that 
outlined in the integrative conceptual framework in Chapter Four:  
 
• Purpose of ULAC: The role/remit/objective of ULAC for economic development;  
• Configuration of ULAC: The ownership, organisational structure, size and nature of 
membership of the ULAC network and what it looks like; 
• Management of ULAC: The implementation process of the ULAC network and how network 
actors are governed and interact;  
• Public Value of ULAC: The network member’s perceived value from being involved in 
ULAC. 
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The first stage in coding was to identify key concepts in the data and group them into the three 
main template categories, using NVIVO to organise and develop into first order codes (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) using the language and statements provided by the interview informants, to represent 
simple descriptive phrases.   The first order coding (i.e. template analysis) is used to identify 
themes in advance (i.e. a priori themes) and developed after the initial literature review and refined 
and modified during the analytical process. The first order codes helped to ‘thematically organise 
and analyse textual data’ (King 2004: 256) representing three descriptive levels of ULAC, as ‘an 
inventory of topics for indexing and categorising’ (Miles et al. 2014: 74). 
 
Figure 16: The Descriptive Dimensions of ULAC (First, Second Order Coding) 
 
 
 
Consequently, the first and second order codes were further developed to identify any linkages, 
relationships and subdividing categories through an inductive process of discourse analysis to help 
provide ‘replicable and valid interferences from data according to their context’ (Krippendorff, 
1980: 69).  Thus, a second cycle of coding was undertaken to identify relationships or ‘pattern 
codes’ (Miles et al. 2014: 86) between the codes, revealing: key themes; causal or explanatory 
codes; people dynamics; and theoretical constructs (Miles et al. 2014).  Axial coding identifies key 
Public Value
Purpose      Benefit Small Cities
Mutual Gain
Resources
Political Gain
Economic Gain
Place-Advantages
Raise Profile
Configuration         
Size
Membership
Structure
Governance/plans
Rules
Member Roles
Management
Changing Remit
Leadership
Expertise/Skills
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relationships between and among the first round of coding and reassemble into more analytical 
themes to form the basis of the emergent conceptual framework.   
 
The pattern codes were then clustered together to reveal three aggregate analytical dimensions, 
representing a new set of higher-order analytical themes (see Figure 17 below), and comprising the 
basis of the emergent conceptual framework.  In other words, the first and second tier codes 
identified in the first round of coding were analysed to establish bottom-up themes, developed and 
refined during the analytical process to ultimately identify various attributes relating to higher order 
analytical themes (refer to Appendix 10).  
 
The coding process helped to form a network process narrative that continued until the emerging 
theoretical relationships and additional interviews failed to reveal new data relationships. The final 
data structure makes up the conceptual model of the network-outcome relationship. 
 
Figure 17: The Analytical Dimensions of ULAC (Aggregate dimensions) 
 
 
 
The analytical coding is focused on identifying causal explanations following the first round of 
coding, focused on identifying institutional impacts: both formal and informal, and internal and 
external to the network.  The various causal relationships are identified through the process tracing 
and sense-making. 
 
The contextual dimensions can be both internal and external resulting mainly from environmental 
FUNCTIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPACTS:
STRUCTURE/MANAGEMENT 
MECHANISMS (INTERNAL): Leadership; 
Communication; Clarity; Accountability; 
Transparency; Stability/Robustness
CONTEXTUAL MECHANISMS: 
(EXTERNAL):
Culture; Power; Opinions/Beliefs ; Financial; 
Political; Economic; Historical 
BEHAVIOURAL MECHANISMS 
(INTERNAL): Trust; Conflict; Consensus; 
Commitment; Equality; Culture; strength of 
ties; Ambitions/Agendas; Power Dynamics
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institutional factors.  ‘Structural and management dimensions’ relate largely to the operational 
institutions of the network, and the ‘relationship dimensions’ relate to impact on the social 
relationships between the members of the network.  All of the identified dimensions result in 
functional and institutional impacts from the whole network, which can be used to explain the 
networks PV.   
 
Each interview was recorded and transcribed verbatim. NVIVO software was then used to identify 
themes and patterns in the data (see Appendix: coding Framework), and was useful for indexing 
segments of text in relation to the Template themes (King, 2004) and is therefore used for eventual 
interpretation and judgment of the data. 
 
Key response categories were created prior to line-by-line coding, which is generally considered 
the most appropriate coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) – (i.e. capital letters within the 
coding framework guide), an interactive and inductive process allowing the data to direct the 
development of themes.  
 
Transcripts were coded according to the emerging themes and then reviewed by key categories 
several times to ensure that concepts relating to the same theme were placed in the same category. 
The same coding scheme was used for all interviews, which is the most effective way to compare 
responses. A topic list was also used to ensure that data analysis was consistent (Krefting, 1991; 
Patton, 1987). 
 
The analytical approach to establish meaning from case analysis involved an interpretive approach 
to establishing meaning from ‘data that is situation-specific’ providing ‘highly contextualized 
meanings’, (Yanow, 2007: 113), using thick descriptions (Ponterotto, 2006) to ‘develop vicarious 
experiences (Stake, 1995: 63).  The ‘thick descriptions’ help to ‘interpret the behaviour within the 
context’ by interpreting an individuals thinking and what is being observed or witnessed 
(Ponterotto, 2006: 542).  
 
5.4.3 Research Quality: Validity, Reliability and Triangulation 
 
In line with the research protocol adopted at the outset of the thesis approach, provided an 
indication of: the research gap, research questions; theoretical context and included a sample semi -
structured interview guide. 
Various sources of information was used as evidence gathering, mainly: interview data; 
observation; internal and external documentation relating to the case study organisation.  The 
strength and reliability of the data collected and sourced externally, was sense checked during the 
interview process with expert participants (mainly of CEO, political or senior officer status), who 
were able to provide suggested information sources and some cases, provided additional materials. 
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Furthermore, the reliability of selecting individuals for interview and sourcing of information was 
sense checked at the start, during and end of the data collection process, referring to members of 
the host-case study organisation for continuous guidance on matters concerning: ‘who should be 
interviewed; what documents area available; where can information be sourced; what are the best 
sources of information’.   
 
Therefore, to ensure the data collected was reliable, a process of triangulation was used.  
Triangulation (Figure 18) is a method most commonly used to help check and establish data 
validity. Given that more than one method of data was collected, this helped to capture the different 
dimensions of the research questions and ensured validation of the research findings.  Also, given 
the range of different methods of data collection in various formats, a direct comparison of the 
results from each method was not possible as different methods used in qualitative research may 
only provide a partial view of the whole picture.  Therefore, the result was also assessed against 
other empirical interpretations and observations found in the academic literature, specifically those 
relating to institutional insights.  
 
Figure 18: Triangulation  
 
 
 
Given the political nature of the case study selected (i.e. involving national government officials, 
politicians, and senior officers), the research approach was required to ensure it was delivered in a 
suitably ethical manner, to protect the confidentiality of those selected for interview and 
observation.  As a result, all interviews were transcribed using codes (e.g. RI1; RI2…RIX) to 
protect the identity of those interviewed. 
 
To ensure that research participants were treated with respect and confidentiality, the researcher 
has a moral and ethical obligation (Greenwood, 2015) to the interview approach.  As a result, the 
approved approach to the interview process meant that no transcribed or recorded data was shared 
with anyone except the interviewee (post-transcription to allow for feedback), consistent with the 
DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS
NON-
PARTICIPANT 
OBSERVATIONS
STAKEHOLDER 
INTERVIEWS
 141 
ethics and confidentiality approach approved by the University Ethics Committee (see Appendix 
7).   
 
Finally, a key the drawback of the single-case design is its inability to provide a generalizing 
conclusion, particular within a context that is though specific or even rare.  One way of overcoming 
this is through the process triangulating the study with other methods, in order to confirm the 
validity of the process. 
 
5.4.4 External and Internal Validity   
 
Unlike positivists’ thinking on the importance of generalisabilty as criteria for supporting the 
validity of a research approach research (see Yin, 2003, for example), interpretive research 
approaches to policy analysis are ‘highly contextualized, rather than aiming for generalizations that 
might be applicable, in a context-free manner, to all situations’ (Yanow, 2004: 111).  In this sense, 
the purpose of an interpretive single case study approach is not to ‘generalize to other cases’ 
(Bryman, 2008: 57), rather, to understand a situation in-depth in order to generate theory relating to 
the specific.  Indeed, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that generalization from single case studies ‘may be 
central to scientific development’ in order to supplement alternative methods, based on the view 
that ‘generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development and the force of example 
underestimated’ (p13).  In other words, the in depth nature of single case study research is to 
provide well documented research that can support theoretical arguments, thus, the importance of 
being able to ‘make connections between different ideas…and how well the researcher generates 
theory out of the findings’ (Bryman, 2008: 57) is supposed more important than generalisability.  
 
The purpose of this research therefore, is not to be able generalize the findings, in line with 
interpretivist theory, by ‘rejecting generalization since each instance of observed social interaction 
is unique and social settings are complex and indeterminate’ (Denzin, 1983). 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Methodology for the Study of the relationship between ULAC and policy 
outcomes   
Chapter five has described the research methodology used in this thesis relevant to the key research 
questions and suitability to the study of institutional context.  Although various other 
methodological approaches were considered possible (i.e. multiple case study) during the research 
design process, this meant considering various empirical examples and the range of approaches for 
identifying the best opportunity for deep investigation of ULAC as a process. 
 
Key factors considered during the selection of the most suitable approach related to: 
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- The ability to understand the important role of institutions through deep contextual insight 
of functional, political and institutional processes (single case study design); 
- The ability to take into account the ‘social’ context of public value and the nature of policy 
outcomes; 
- The ability to identify to important role of both agency and structure within the policy 
process (through process tracing, sense-making and thick descriptions) 
Based on the above consideration during the research design process, the PV of ULAC and the role 
of institutions is conceptualised and analysed in the remainder of the thesis, to provide a valuable 
contribution to both academic, empirical and policy research.  Chapter Six moves on to present the 
first set of findings from the in depth case study analysis, to first identify and describe what ULAC 
looks like in Scotland, before leading into more analytical chapter in Chapter seven and eight, to 
reveal the conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC through the role of institutions.  
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Chapter Six: ‘What’ does ULAC look like: its purpose, configuration and 
management? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following on from the literature review in Chapter Two, Three and Four, the research focus and 
aim of the thesis is to: Conceptualize the Public Value (PV) of urban local authority collaboration 
(ULAC) by considering the role of institutions.  The conceptual framework (Table 10) is structured 
around a multi-disciplinary, new institutional perspective (Lowndes, 2001), building on Stake’s 
(2005) interpretive explanation through the qualitative exploration of an in-depth single case study.   
 
Chapter Six presents the first set of findings from the qualitative research, examining what ULAC 
in Scotland looks like along with representative data in the following subsections.  The central 
deductive assumption is that the SCA is composed of a limited number of public sector institutions 
and elite policy professionals. The aim is to draw upon both documentary evidence compared to 
interview respondents’ perceptions, concerning the purpose, configuration and management of the 
SCA network over the study period January 2010 until mid-2016, to reveal the SCA key structures 
and the hierarchical nature and management of the network. 
 
The chapter provides a descriptive account of the purpose, structure and management of ULAC by 
identifying a series of critical events, to facilitate the interpretation of the PV of ULAC in later 
chapters (Chapter 7 and 8). The first of three research question is addressed:  
 
What is the mutli-dimensional nature of ULAC across three functional domains: 
purpose, configuration and management? 
 
First, section 6.2 provides the strategic rationale on the purpose of ULAC according to 
documentation and members of the SCA across the study period (2010 to 2016), to reveal the 
changing identify of the network over time.  For analytical purposes, the analysis of the SCA’s 
development over the study period reveals a series of key events between conveying three distinct 
network phases: Network Identification (T1); Network Implementation (T2); and Network Growth 
(T3).  The key network time periods were identified and validated across the range of respondent’s 
statements, to reveal critical moments shaping the development of the SCA over the study period.  
 
Second, in line with an interpretive critical realist approach, section 6.3 provides the individual 
network members’ narrative on their perceptions and understanding of the functional 
characteristics, structures and objectives of ULAC, analysed in line with the three network 
timelines to reveal areas of dissimilarity among network members understanding and rationale of 
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what ULAC in Scotland represents.  Finally, the interviewees’ narrative of the functional nature of 
the SCA is identified to provide a typology of ‘What ULAC in Scotland looks like’ across the three 
distinct time periods.  A dynamic policy process of interaction between the network members is 
revealed through the narrative of local government senior officers (Chief Executive Officers and 
Service Directors), elected members (council Leaders) and other actors involved in the network 
process.  
 
6.2 ULAC in Scotland  
 
The analytical data in the following sub sections is taken from three main sources of information: 
a) secondary information, from meeting notes, policy/strategy documents, press articles (i.e. mainly 
used to support the understanding of the case study material, rather than contributing to the 
development of theoretical codes); b) observation of meetings between the individual 
representatives and member professions and organizations of the ULAC network c) interview data 
from key representatives of the ULAC.  It relies on coding and on categorizing of information in 
accordance with the template analysis and methodological approach discussed in Chapter Five.   
 
Analysing coded data and emerging themes to ensure explanation goes beyond mere description, 
requires clarification of how these themes were derived ‘through the use of structured organizing 
charts’ (Pratt, 2009: 860).  The data is thus presented as follows:   
 
• A timeline of key events within each network phase to help with process tracing; 
• A network structure diagram highlighting significant structural differences between each of the 
three network phases; 
• Thick descriptions of the network characteristics, drawing on key statements from the coded 
data throughout the discussion. 
 
The combined timeline of events and network structure diagrams provide an overall analytical 
representation of the process tracing of the data, to provide an interpretive understanding of: what 
ULAC looks like in Scotland. 
 
6.2.1 Network Phases and Membership 
 
Three key network phases (i.e. Network Identification; Network Implementation; and Network 
Growth) were identified based on important network milestones/events indicating substantial 
changes to the networks organisational structure and strategic direction, as found in supporting 
documentation and archival information and validated by respondents statements.  Figure A9 in 
Appendix 9 provides a summary of the key SCA network phases identified over the study period, 
to represent a time line of events between January 2010 and ending June 2016, in chronological 
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order.  The following sections explain each of the events in turn, relative to the different stages of 
the network process.  
 
The network ‘identification stage’ started in 2010 with an informal group of six cities and the 
Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI) participation. The Scottish Government 
then formalized the network in 2012, leading into the ‘implementation stage’ following the first full 
meeting of the SCA, including the Scottish Government and SCDI as Chair in March 2012.  The 
implementation phase represents a two-year period when the SCA was being formalized, including 
various new governance processes, structural and staff changes.  The network then moves into a 
‘growth phase’, characterized by further important staff changes and clarification of the strategic 
direction and governance structures.  In particular, the network growth period, during which 
observation and interviews took place, the SCA was reviewing the governance relationship with 
the Scottish Government, before the launch of the ‘Empowering Cities Report’. 
 
Although the nature, structure and management of the SCA network changes over time, it is useful 
to briefly define the main membership at the outset.  The main organisations involved through the 
different stages of the SCA are as follows (refer to Appendix 11 for institutional details on each 
organization): 
• The Scottish Council for Development (SCDI)  
• Scotland’s main Urban Local Authorities (ULAs)  
• The Scottish Government  
 
The key phases of the networks development leading towards the networks perceived strategic 
‘empowerment’ are described in detail in the following sections.  It is important to understand the 
key events and the nature of changing membership, throughout the SCA’s formalisation and 
structural journey to allow analysis of the PV of the network in later chapters (i.e. chapter 7 and 8) 
and to help identify its changing contextual identity over time.  The following sections (6.3, 6.4, 
6.5) provide fuller examination of the range of documentation and personal statements concerning 
the purpose, structure, and management of the SCA. 
 
6.3  Network Identification (T1) – (January 2010 December 2011) 
 
The ‘Network Identification’ phase sees ULAC moving from a situation of an informal cities 
lobbying group in 2010 with no formal structures to support the networks development, to one that 
ends with the announcement of a Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) by the Scottish Government in 
December 2011, as a key policy mechanism leading to the formalization of ULAC in Scotland in 
2012.  The Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI) played a key role in facilitating 
and supporting city collaboration in the network identification phase.  The SCDI maintain their 
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coordinating role following the announcement of a national SCA policy, acting as chair throughout 
the implementation phase of the network. 
 
6.3.1 Strategic Rationale 
 
A formal statement of the need for a network of collaborating cities in Scotland was signaled by the 
first signing of ‘Scotland’s Six Cities: A Shared Vision for Scotland’s Success’ in May 2011, 
stating: 
 
‘We the undersigned recognise the essential role Scotland’s Six Cities play in creating and 
delivering a successful economic future.  We will work individually and collectively in 
partnership with government, stakeholders, and citizens to drive forward our shared vision of a 
successful, inclusive and sustainable Scotland’ 
‘Six Cities Vision’ (May, 2011: 2) 
 
The signing of the ‘Six Cities Vision’ was facilitated by the SCDI as a national (and supposed 
impartial) organization.  The singing of the vision is significant in reflecting a shared commitment 
and strategic ambition of cities to be recognized as key drivers of Scotland’s economy, promoting 
collaboration between cities as a key element of a cities policy agenda as follows: 
 
‘to extend economic partnership and collaboration with each other for mutual benefit, while 
recognising and celebrating their distinctiveness and diversity’  
‘Six Cities Vision’ (May, 2011: 3)    
 
The following shared priorities and values are stated in the ‘Six Cities Vision’:   
 
1. Our Cities need infrastructure that delivers economic impact  
2. Our Cities need innovative finance and investment models 
3. Our Cities are creative centres of productivity, knowledge and innovation  
4. Our Cities are key to a sustainable Scotland  
5. Our Cities deliver inclusive partnerships with people, regions and government  
6. Our Cities are the international gateways to Scotland  
 
The priorities of the ‘Six Cities Vision’ reflects a strong emphasis on infrastructure development 
and investment as a key driver of urban economic development, raising the awareness of the need 
for a cities collaboration policy in Scotland.  The early lobbying work for a cities agenda in 
Scotland supported the development of a dialogue with Scottish Government officials during 2011, 
that would help raise the national policy significance and recognition of the need for a dedicated 
Scottish cities collaboration policy.  
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At this stage in the process ‘Network Identification’ is significantly shaped by the Scottish 
Government’s publication of ‘Scotland’s Cities: Delivering for Scotland – ‘Agenda for Cities’ 
(December 2011).  The Scottish Government announced a policy to work with the Scottish Cities 
of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, Inverness and Stirling, facilitated by the SCDI, stating: 
 
‘This agenda has been developed with the six cities and the SCDI. It sets out where we 
collectively think collaborative efforts between the six cities, Scottish Government, national 
agencies, academia – and, critically, the private sector – can have most impact...We do this in 
the strong belief that successful cities strengthen city regions for the benefit of all of 
Scotland…It is the role of the Scottish Government to help our cities realise their city visions 
and strengthen these partnerships. We will do all we can to provide that strategic support and to 
remove barriers, but it is cities themselves, with their partners, that must be in the driving 
seat…This Agenda for Cities sets out our collective ambitions.’ 
 
‘Agenda for Cities’ (December, 2011) 
 
The Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ was the first official policy stating the formal 
establishment of the Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA), creating seed corn funding to support a cities 
collaboration policy in Scotland: 
 
‘The six cities and the Scottish Government will establish the Scottish Cities Alliance [SCA] to 
take forward a programme of collaborative action. This alliance will be independently 
facilitated by the SCDI, continuing the role they have previously carried out for the six cities.’  
 
‘Agenda for Cities’ (December, 2011: 11) 
The stated vision in the ‘Agenda for Cities’ is for: 
 
‘A Scotland where our cities and their regions power Scotland’s economy for the benefit of 
all’ 
 
‘Agenda for Cities’ (December, 2011: 6) 
 
The Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ statement makes clear the ambition for two 
‘enabling frameworks’ to: ‘strengthen collaborative action’ and ‘improve access to finance’, 
focused on the following key objectives: 
 
1. developing a clear investment prospectus for Scotland’s cities that optimises sustainable 
economic growth;  
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2. aligning public investment to priorities in a way which helps support and maximises 
private sector investment;  
3. delivering high impact projects and programmes in areas which best support our cities 
sustainable economic growth ambitions; and  
4. developing effective UK and international city-focused collaborations  
 
The early SCDI facilitated cities network focussed on lobbying is key to the Scottish Government’s 
recognition of ‘network identification’ through the establishment of a cities policy in Scotland at 
the end of 2011, resulting in a subsequent formalisation of the SCA as a collaborative partnership 
between the Scottish Government, SCDI and Scotland’s six ULAs up to the end of 2011.  
 
6.3.2 Narrative on Network Identification (T1) (January 2010 – December 2011):  
 
Networks Purpose  
 
With the increasing emphasis of economic development policy to collaborate for resource and 
efficiency outcomes in recent years, the ‘Six Cities Vision’ reflects ambitions for greater 
recognition of the important economic role of closer working between Scotland’s cities for the 
wider benefit of the regional economy and sustainable economic growth, emphasising the need for 
‘empowerment and strategic support from government’ (SCDI, 2011: 2).   
 
Recognising the varying size and diversity across Scotland’s cities, the perception that cities could 
benefit from working closer with each other, as well as with the wider city-region, was referred to:  
 
‘the initial concept of the city-region was the start, and a carefully constructed narrative 
around the travel to work area’ 
Respondent (I23)  
 
‘so we felt a dialogue on collaboration should focus on growth rather on competition on the 
misery index! Then the smaller cities came on board’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
Recognising the economic potential from greater city collaboration, there was acknowledgement 
among six of Scotland’s ULAs during 2010 that the economic and spatial diversity of Scotland’s 
cities is a key rationale of greater collaborative working: 
 
‘it was recognized that, the important role that cities can and should be playing in other 
countries around the world, we began to consider that if we wanted Scotland to achieve its 
full economic potential, that having strong cities with strong economies that attracted lots of 
 149 
investment would be a really positive approach to start taking, and that getting the cities 
together to try and find a way of helping them be more than the sum of their parts would be a 
really strong way to do that’ 
Respondent (I22) 
 
The size of Scotland’s cities was a particular characteristic underpinning Scotland’s cities desire to 
collaborate: 
 
‘as a small city…we don't have the capacity to do it all ourselves’  
Respondent (I11) 
 
 ‘Scotland’s cities are…economically diverse, geographically diverse…Probably a sense that 
Glasgow and Edinburgh have something in common. Dundee and Aberdeen at a push. The 
rest of them quite different.’  
Respondent (I8)  
 
‘given the size of Scotland and the scale of our cities, there is a greater need for partnership 
working, both at a larger city like Glasgow and Edinburgh who by working together could 
actually probably achieve more, unlock capital, unlock funding, derive synergies, 
internationalise, and at the same time, help to almost pull up the smaller cities’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
Given the initial rationale for closer working between Scotland’s cities, the purpose of the cities 
network was articulated by the signing of a ‘Six Cities Vision’ document, representing a renewed 
commitment between Scotland’s cities of all sizes, to work in partnership for mutual economic 
benefit.  The cities ambitions and purpose of the cities network clearly states cities ambitions to 
gain national recognition for cities to collaborate in Scotland, with cities formally stating their 
commitment to work together in a concordat agreement: ‘The Six Cities Vision’.   
 
Network Structure  
 
The second key aspect of city network member’s perceptions relates to the structure of collaboration 
during the identification stage, to reveal the nature of the different institutions and network ties 
between the members of the network.  The cities network is comprised of Scotland’s six cities at this 
stage (given that Perth and Kinross aren’t yet recognised as a city), and including the SCDI as a 
member.  Through consideration of the range of perceptions of the collaborative working at this 
stage, the structure and hierarchy between the members of the network is revealed. 
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The network structure diagram (Figure 19 below) during network identification stage highlights the 
institutional-related structures.  To help bridge a relationship between the six Scottish cities, SCDI 
formed an informal coordination role by establishing a ‘cities group’ to help support cities lobby 
the Scottish Government.  The SCDIs role in facilitating the Scottish cities group involved the 
SCDI’s Chief Executive (CE) attending the cities network meetings, supported by a programme 
manager within SCDI.   
 
Figure 19: Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) – SCA Network Identification 
 
 
 
The nature of the institutional relationships between the cities and the SCDI within the cities-network 
at this stage is relatively informal, with the SCDI represented at the group by their Chief Executive 
and mainly senior representatives from Scotland’s six cities attending the meetings, albeit, not always 
the ‘right’ people believed to be attending at this stage: 
 
‘we didn’t get necessarily the right representatives from the cities attending meetings all the 
time’ 
Respondent (I1) 
 
‘the Chief Executives and some Leader’s wouldn’t attend, but by on large, well attended’. 
Respondent (I20) 
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It was perceived that having SCDI as a member of the group, they could help provide a facilitation 
role in addition to their existing relationship with cities, but additionally, they could help to 
resource the facilitation process: 
 
‘The Chief Exec didn’t chair it…as an action-orientated think tank, [SCDI] represent all of 
Scotland, [SCDI] working very closely with all the local authorities and with the cities for 
years…actually managing the COSLA relationship as well’ 
Respondents (I18) 
 
SCDI’s role is perceived as helping to resource the facilitation of the group given their already 
established relationship with the cities.  In the latter stages of the implementation stage, the Scottish 
Government would announce the creation of the Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA), which would then 
lead to some changes to the existing structure of the cities-network in the following stages: 
 
‘Following the run-up to the May 2011 Holyrood elections, the SNP included a manifesto 
commitment to develop a City Strategy for a Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) to be formed’ 
  
Respondent (I12) 
 
Although the cities recognised the need to work together to raise the profile of a cities strategy in 
Scotland, their existing links with the Scottish Government were not within the cities network at 
this stage.  The structure of the cities group excludes the Scottish Government, although 
recognising the need for, and lack of, an institutional relationship with the Scottish Government at 
the time: 
 
‘There wasn’t a cities team in the Scottish Government when it all first started…the [Scottish 
Government’s] Chief Planner kept saying, well, actually I’m not sure I’m the right person here. 
Then a cities team was established [by Scottish Government] during the summer of 2011, and 
we finally had someone we could talk to’  
Respondent (I1) 
 
Then in September 2011, an officer from one of the cities was seconded into the Scottish 
Government following the election, reflective of a previous lack of civil servant structure to 
support cities within Scottish Government and that would lead to the announcement of an SCA 
policy by the Scottish Government in December 2011: 
 
‘I ended up spending just over three months working in government with the team, as I say, 
with a very clear focus of pulling together a strategy document.  The idea of the Alliance I 
think really came from them but I was helping to shape the early stages of that…the 
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[Scottish Government’s] main constraint was the lack of manpower, I would say, both within 
that team and across the wider government piece which I think is why they welcomed an 
additional pair of hands with open arms’ 
Respondent (I1) 
 
At this stage in the network development process, the structure of the cities network relationship 
with the Scottish Government is external to the group, up until the creation of a cities team within 
the Scottish Government and until an officer from one of the ULAs is seconded into the Scottish 
Government later in 2011; starting a process of closer working institutional links between the 
cities-network and the Scottish Government.  The formal announcement of the SCA in December 
2011 would end the identification stage and existing cities-network structure.   
 
Network Management  
 
Aside from the purpose and structural institutional nature of the collaboration process, the 
administrative institutional nature of the management of the cities network is a further important 
consideration in determining what form ULAC takes at this stage.  The SCDI managed the Scottish 
cities’ network on behalf of the six cities during identification stage, with a remit to lobby for 
national recognition of the need for a cities policy.  The perception of SCDI’s facilitation role at the 
start of the process was viewed as neutral and largely helping to provide much needed coordination 
and resources to support the process: 
 
‘we, kind of, spotted an opportunity to work together.  [SCDI] brought additional resources 
to it…so we began an informal alliance of working with…SCDI and XX had a press 
background which helped because we had a Comms plan alongside the lobbying activities so 
XX in [SCDI] was very well placed to help with that’ 
Respondent (I1) 
 
‘our role was strategic because SCDI wasn’t to deliver, nor did the cities need any external 
organisations to help them to deliver…it was also relatively informal when it started, there 
was a lot of common understanding and agreement in the group…it was more an 
understanding that – there was actually partnership agreements that we signed that were 
quite clear, but they were quite simple, they were really quite simple, and it was all about 
just sort of working in partnership to drive strategies, to share a common agenda, it was all 
about economic growth…a broad range of objectives. And infrastructure as well, it was 
making sure that there would be synergies and value’ 
Respondent (I18) 
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‘it needed leadership and a commitment, both from a political level and from an executive 
officer level…it needed an independent body to be able to provide that facilitation role and 
to act as the glue to hold it all together.’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
 ‘it was an opportunity for cities to work together, and SCDI brought additional resources 
and people to support it’ 
Respondent (I1) 
 
‘it required people who were willing to give up a fair amount of their time to help set things 
up and it didn’t happen overnight, it took a lot of effort’ 
Respondent (I22) 
 
‘SCDI facilitating the process made it a very ‘sit back and do’ process.  A key output was the 
development of the ‘Six Cities Vision’ at an away day with only the cities’  
Respondent (I20) 
 
SCDI’s role was perceived as providing an independent coordination role that was able to provide 
people resources to bring the cities together, given the perceived time and effort required by the 
process.  Having a national independent agency fulfill that role was viewed helpful in the absence 
of any formal budget, helping to pull it all together and help produce the first strategic statement 
from the group in the form of ‘Six Cities Vision’: 
 
‘we got those leaders together in a room, I think it was in Glasgow, and we started talking 
about the things that we thought were important to the economy of Scotland and the 
economy of cities.  And we started discussing could there be some sort of shared agreement 
or shared document that the cities would kind of agree to…almost all those leaders coming 
to life and saying, we want to work together because we know that we can have strong 
economies and be more resilient by working together.  So they agreed to do this, they agreed 
that SCDI should be the neutral broker in the middle that could pull this together.  We came 
away from that meeting and created and drew up the shared commitment [Six Cities Vision 
document] and a statement of intent, it was saying that we want to work together’ 
 
Respondent (I22) 
 
It is apparent that the management of the cities network in the early stages resulted in the 
development of the ‘Cities Vision’, which secured a commitment from Scotland’s six cities to work 
in partnership to lobby the Scottish Government for increased recognition.  SCDI’s role was mainly 
to help bring the group together with minimum resources at this stage.  The perception of the 
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management process was indicative of a passive, unfunded, largely non-strategic planning forum.  
The network links with the Scottish Government at this stage are outside of the cities network, until 
an officer is seconded into the Scottish Government’s team to help support the development of a 
city strategy.  The end of the process results in the Scottish Government’s announcement of the 
SCA in December 2011.  The key events shaping the cities group between 2010 and December 
2011 are summarized in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Key events leading to the SCA ‘Network Identification’ stage 
 
6.3.3 What ULAC looks like at ‘Network Identification’ Stage 
 
Consistent with the idea that collaboration between cities should be considered an alternative 
model (or ‘third way’, see Amin and Thrift, 1994; Stoker and Young, 1993) of urban policy, the 
perceptions on the purpose of the network among members is broadly consistent with the strategic 
view that collaboration, as well as competition, can serve wider sustainable economic growth at 
both a city and regional level.   
 
The structure of ULAC between Scotland’s ULAs as an informal voluntary arrangement is akin to 
what Hulst and van Montfort (2012) call ‘planning forums for socio-economic development 
agendas’, typically reflecting the need for ‘regulation of externalities of local policies and the 
distribution of scarce resources in a way that is rational from a supra-local perspective’ (Hulst and 
van Montfort, 2012: 123).  Davies (2003) describes this type of collaboration as an ‘urban regime’ 
(p254) involving autonomous and informal networks. 
 
According to Hulst and van Montfort (2012) conceptualization of the different types of IMC, the 
structure of different collaboration arrangements will depend on ‘the tasks involved…the degree of 
NETWORK 
IDENTIFICATION  
STRUCTURAL EVENT INTERPRETATION 
June 2010 Scottish cities attend ‘league of 
Scottish Cities’: Lobbying Event 
Cities respond to the collapse of 
‘Glasgow-Edinburgh’ collaboration 
initiative and lack of national 
recognition and link between cities in 
Scotland 
January 2011 SCDI appoint a ‘cities’ programme 
manager 
SCDI provide a resource to help 
support the informal facilitation and 
coordination/collaboration between 
Scotland’s cities 
July 2011 Scottish Government Cities Team 
established  
Scottish Government create a team to 
work with cities and an officer from 
one of the cities is seconded into the 
Scottish Government to support the 
cities network 
December 2011 SCA announcement by Scottish 
Government  
Scottish Government create a formal 
‘SCA’ policy to focus on national 
inclusive growth 
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institutionalisation and the extent of decision-making powers’ (p127).  The cities network at the 
identification stage involves collaboration between ULAs and other agencies (i.e. SCDI) for the 
purposes of strategic policy coordination.  Consistent with an informal institutional structure, the 
cities-network is defined by a concordat arrangement between senior city representatives from six 
of Scotland’s cities.  The SCDI are a national organization and their hierarchical role within the 
network is neutral and on the same level as the city members at this stage.  
 
Table 14 summarises what the ‘network identification’ stage looked like relative to the three 
functional domains: purpose, management and configuration, which can be described as a: 
 
‘planning forum…a loosely coupled network of municipalities and other public or private 
actors that engage in the coordination and planning of their respective policies or activities. 
Their institutional integration is low: participants maintain more or less stable relations and 
they interact on a regular basis. There is no standing organization with formal decision-
making authority’  
Hulst and van Montfort (2012: 127) 
 
Table 14: Key Characteristics of ‘Network Identification’ stage 
 
PURPOSE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
• Promote economic 
importance of cities and 
city collaboration 
• Lobby Scottish 
Government to increase 
national profile of cities 
 
Planning Forum (cities 
network):  
• Six ULAs 
• SCDI Chief 
Executive and 
Programme Manager 
 
• Strategic Partnership- 
Concordat (Six Cities 
Vision) 
• No Budget 
• Informal Facilitation  
 
6.4 Network Implementation (T2) - (January 2012 – December 2013):   
 
The ‘Network Implementation’ phase sees the cities network moving from an informal 
coordination structure, into a formalization process that changes the ‘cities network’ into the 
Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) in January 2012.  The SCA implementation phase represents a 
widening of the network membership to include all seven cities, the Scottish Government and 
SCDI as chair of the network.  As the network adjusts to a more formalized structure, a number of 
key strategic events reveal a process of strategic, structural and management change during the 
SCA network implementation. The implementation stage ends with the appointment of a new Chief 
Executive of SCDI, resulting in the appointment of a new Strategic Programme Director at the start 
of 2014, who would lead a review of the SCA into a new ‘growth phase’.  
 
6.4.1 Strategic Rationale 
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Following the Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ announcement in December 2011, the 
‘Network Implementation’ stage would begin with the initial formalization of SCA network, 
replacing the cities network. The informal cities network would be replaced by a more formal SCA 
group, including a widening membership and formalization of governance arrangements, and the 
implementation of structural arrangements to facilitate the development of strategic plans and 
administration of core funding including a £7million ‘Cities Investment Fund’ from the Scottish 
Government over a three year period:   
 
‘Following the launch of Six Cities: Delivering For Scotland in December 2011, it has been 
identified that in order to support the ongoing development of the shared agenda between the 
Six Cities and the Scottish Government, there is a requirement for a structure and process to 
be developed to ensure delivery of the shared objectives of the Scottish Cities Alliance 
(SCA)…The paper proposes an outline structure to resource the ongoing work which will 
develop and build upon the joint work identified…SCDI seeks a ‘three-year in-principle’ 
funding commitment from each city and the Scottish Government, to enable the SCA to 
commence recruitment and implementation of formal processes supporting the SCA’  
 
‘Outline Structure and Support of Cities Engagement Strategy’ (SCDI, December 2011). 
 
The introduction and proposal for formal structures to support the implementation of the SCA 
would provide a budget of around £150k per annum for the next three years, comprised of Scottish 
Government funding and match funding from the six cities (i.e. £45k three 3 largest cities; £30k 
from 3 smaller cities; £75k from the Scottish Government).   
 
Consistent with that stated in the ‘Agenda for Cities’ document, the SCA ‘will be independently 
facilitated by the SCDI, continuing the role they have previously carried out for the six cities’ 
(2011: 11).  The SCDI (2011) paper also set out the proposed outline structures, stating that ‘the 
SCDI would provide the platform and mechanisms to ensure the delivery of the programme’ 
(SCDI, 2011), including budget administration, including: 
 
• Strategic facilitation of a Cities Leadership Group to provide direction for the work programme 
of the Delivery Group and Action Teams 
• Support and facilitate the work of the Action Teams and the Delivery Group to deliver their 
objectives as agreed by the Leadership Group 
The new structures were clearly set out in the ‘Agenda for Cities’ and introduced by the SCDI at the 
start of 2012 (Figure 20): 
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Figure 20: SCA Governance at ‘Network Implementation’ stage 
 
 
Source: ‘Agenda’ for Cities (Scottish Government, 2011) 
 
The SCA Leadership Group’s main role was to oversee the co-ordination of a cities policy by 
‘agreeing priorities for the SCA and provide strategic direction for the work programme of the 
Delivery Group and Action Teams’ (Scottish Government, 2011: 11), including delegated decision-
making power and management of financial resources on behalf of its members. 
 
In March 2012, the first meeting of the ‘Leadership Group’ would mark the implementation of the 
SCA as policy, chaired by the Chief Executive of the SCDI and comprised of the Political Leaders 
of all seven cities, senior officers from the seven local authorities and the Deputy First Minister (as 
Minster for Cities) (Nicola Sturgeon). 
 
A note of the first SCA meeting highlights that agreement on governance arrangements were still 
largely ‘to be clarified…with the need for a further level of oversight by the Leadership Group and 
the governance roles of the Leadership and Delivery groups still unclear.’ (Leadership Group, 
March 2012).   
 
There was now the existence of two documents: The ‘Six Cities Vision’ document produced by the 
six cities during the identification stags, and the Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’.  On 
comparing the ‘Six Cities Vision’ and  ‘Agenda for Cities’ strategic priorities, a clear focus on 
sustainable infrastructure investment is common to both documents.  A comparison of the language 
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used to articulate the strategic objectives set out in the two existing documents that the SCA were 
working to are summarised in Figure 21 below: 
 
Figure 21: Comparison between ‘Six Cities Vision’ and ‘Agenda for Cities’ (emphasis added 
in bold)  
 
‘Cities Vision’ Objectives: ‘Agenda for Cities’ Objectives 
We recognize the role our six cities play in 
creating and delivering a successful economic 
future. 
 
 
Our cities need: 
 
- infrastructure that delivers economic 
impact…and a sustainable Scotland  
- innovative finance and investment models 
- creative centres of productivity, knowledge 
and innovation  
- inclusive partnerships with people, regions and 
government  
- international gateway to Scotland  
 
A Scotland where our cities and their regions 
power Scotland’s economy for the benefit for 
all. 
 
A collaborative and collective city-regions 
approach should therefore focus on: 
 
- investment prospectus for sustainable 
economic growth;  
- aligning public investment to support and 
maximises private sector investment;  
- delivering high impact projects…support 
sustainable economic growth ambitions;   
- UK and international city-focused 
collaborations  
 
 
It is apparent from Figure 21 that both the original ‘Six Cities Vision’ document compared to the 
SCA ‘Agenda for Cities’ document both largely focus on similar strategic priorities: sustainable 
infrastructure investment; innovative public and private sector investment; productivity, 
sustainability and internationalisation and sustainable economic growth.  The key difference in the 
use and focus of language between the two documents relates to: ‘Cities Vision’ emphasizing a 
‘city’ focus, and the ‘Agenda for Cities’ including a ‘city-regions’,  Scottish economy and 
international focus. 
 
During the first year of the SCA implementation and as part of the evolving strategic direction, a 
Strategic Implementation Plan was developed ‘to structure the Alliance work programme over the 
next three years’, focused on: Attracting Investment; Creating the Conditions for Economic 
Growth; and Research and Best Practice (SCA Annual Progress Report 2012-13).  
 
An update on the ‘Cities Investment Programme’ at a meeting of the Leadership Group in April 
(2013) notes the desire to widen its focus to include the city-region, for example: 
 
‘Cllr Burns [Political Leader of Edinburgh City Council] noted that the wider city regions 
should be included in the investment activities where appropriate…Cllr Matheson noted the 
City Deals being progressed by some English cities and suggested that similar schemes 
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could be considered here [by the SCA]…Cllr Matheson suggested a city deals presentation 
for a future meeting’ 
 
Leadership Group meeting (SCA, April 2013) 
 
As part of the SCA member’s interest in city-region investment, an update on the ‘Cities 
Investment Programme’ at the Leadership Group in September 2013 notes the increasing interest in 
city-region investment models, including City Deals: 
 
 ‘Cllr Boyd [Political Leader of Stirling Council] provided a summary of the discussion that 
had taken place amongst the Leaders and the Minister for Local Government and Planning, 
the previous evening.  It was noted that there was a shared desire to explore the opportunities 
arising from city deals for Scotland’s cities similar to those being developed for English 
cities.’ 
Leadership Group meeting (SCA, September 2013) 
 
There followed a presentation by Glasgow City Council (GCC) titled: ‘A New Deal for Scotland’s 
Cities’, highlighting learning on the direction of cities policy elsewhere in the UK (England):  
 
‘We believe that transferring powers from government to cities will make it easier for cities 
to achieve economic growth…In order to legislate for this, the Localism Act 2011 
introduced the Core Cities Amendment. This allows local councils to make the case for 
being given new powers to promote economic growth and set their own distinct policies. The 
main way this is being delivered is through City Deals.’ 
 
The paper proposes… 
 
‘that the Scottish Government and the 7 cities develop a new Urban Policy for Scotland….it 
is proposed that the first part of this new policy should be the establishment of Scottish City 
Deals…It is recommended that the 7 cities enter into discussions with the Scottish 
Government as a matter of priority to agree a mechanism to devolve funding for skills and 
the economy to the local level…the establishment of Scottish city deals as the first step 
towards greater devolution for Scotland’s cities. This should be considered to be a process 
rather than an event, with the Cities Alliance [SCA] being given a new role to negotiate 
further devolution of powers’. 
 
A New Deal for Scotland’s Cities (GCC, September, 2013) 
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The paper highlights Glasgow’s ambitions for a City Deal in Scotland, further requesting that the 
SCA ‘Leadership Group’ consider options for the strategic focus of the SCA to develop a new 
urban policy for greater devolution for Scotland’s cities. The paper also notes that ‘the UK 
Government’s approach [to cities] is increasingly about encouraging competition, whilst the 
Scottish approach has been to foster greater collaboration between the seven cities’ (SCA, 2013: 1).   
 
A minute of the Leadership Group (SCA, 11th September 2013) would formally note the response 
to GCC’s request for strategic support from the SCA.  There followed a discussion on how the 
SCA could support the development of a strategic city devolution approach and agreed to expand 
the strategic focus of the SCA:   
 
‘to support, in principle, the City Deals Scoping Study Paper as part of the [SCA] Strategic 
Implementation [and] a shared desire to explore the opportunities arising from city deals for 
Scotland’s cities similar to those being developed for English cities.  There was an appetite 
to develop, for consideration by Leaders, an additional strand of SCA work looking at what 
further powers and budgets might usefully be devolved to cities and city regions. The range 
of existing powers available to cities will also be reviewed and consideration given to the 
opportunities to make best use of these.’  
 
Leadership Group Meeting (SCA, September, 2013)  
 
The meeting notes the SCA Leadership Group agreement to ‘establish a workstream to focus 
specifically on empowerment of cities and consideration of powers to be devolved from Scottish 
Government to local authorities’ (p8), supporting in principle, to a wider investment focus of the 
SCAs Strategic Implementation Plan. 
 
The strategic focus of the implementation phase of the SCA reflects both the widening membership 
of the cities network to include the Scottish Government and the strategic ambitions of the ‘Agenda 
for Cities’, but also, the strategic focus of the SCA up until the end 2013 to include an evolving 
focus on ‘a new role to negotiate further devolution of powers’ for ULAs across Scotland.   
 
6.4.2 Narrative on Network Implementation of ULAC (T2) 
 
The following section describes the purpose, structure and management of SCA marked by key 
events between March 2012 and the end of 2013.  Network members perceptions reveal an 
apparent mismatch between city members’ perceptions of the purpose of the SCA and the Scottish 
Government’s strategic ambitions.  The range of personal statements elicited from individual 
network members regarding the implementation stage also reflects SCDIs attempt to realign the 
 161 
cities network established at identification stage, with the Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for 
Cities’ as part of the formalization of the SCA process.   
 
Network Purpose  
 
As highlighted in section 6.4.1 (see Figure 21), the two strategic documents that the SCA and 
cities-network have produced to date include the ‘Six Cities Vision’ (published in May 2011) and 
the ‘Agenda for Cities’ (published in December 2011).  The perception among the members of the 
network during early implementation reflects an evolving agenda that reflects both strategies:  
 
‘we got a strategic implementation plan agreed at the end of the first year. Which set out the 
broad intent…it was mainly about investment.’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
 ‘rather than each city doing things individually, they could pool resources… there was 
aspiration that this could lead to collaborative procurement…in relation to the operational 
plan, attracting investment for infrastructure.’ 
Respondent (I21) 
 
 ‘the focus on the investment side, the publication of the cities investment plan was critical. 
Then we had a leadership group where we got commitment from the leaders to agree to a 
percentage spend around economic development activity to drive forward investment in 
cities’ 
Respondents (I1) 
 
The purpose of the SCA during its first year of implementation is focussed on a cities investment 
programme as ‘the overarching priority of the Scottish Cities Alliance…led by Edinburgh, who 
developed a detailed programme of collaboration on cities investment’ (SCA Annual Report, 2012-
13: 4).   The ‘Investment Programme’ in 2012-13 focuses on: Infrastructure Investment Models; 
Sector Analysis; Investment Propositions and International Promotion.  
 
Network members’ perceptions of the purpose of the SCA also reflects SCDIs attempt to realign 
the strategic direction of the SCA between 2012 and 2013, in line with a national Scottish economy 
focus stated in the ‘Agenda for Cities’: 
 
‘there is a key subtle difference between the seven cities on the one hand and the alliance on 
the other, and I suppose…they [SCA] are still working to the operational plan of the 
previous SCA, which is much more narrowly focussed on infrastructure investment’ 
Respondent (I13) 
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‘what government want is collaboration and inward investment.’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
 ‘I think there’s been some move towards trying to tailor things towards the government’s 
agenda. I’m not sure it’s quite there yet…things have been totally focussed on infrastructure’ 
Respondent (I14) 
 
‘it needs to focus on the significant investment plan for Scotland rather than a city focus 
only, so I think the strategy is developing.’ 
Respondent (I11) 
 
It is apparent that the focus of the SCA group is on the development of the cities investment 
‘Implementation Plan’ relating mainly to the intensions set out in the ‘Six Cities Vision’ focused 
on city infrastructure.  Given the existence of two documents, on comparison, there is a clear 
distinction between the city and national focus, reflecting differing network members’ perceptions 
relative to cities ambitions and Scottish Government’s, for example, there is a perception that the 
SCA is about: 
 
‘cities wanting to get to a place where the SCA is about the seven cities.’ 
Respondent (I13)  
 
‘the Government see it as what's best for Scotland, whereas the cities see it as what's best for 
their city’  
Respondent (I21) 
 
Therefore, perceptions of the purpose of the SCA amongst members of the network during the 
implementation stage largely reflects the legacy of the cities group focus on cities investment, and 
the Scottish Government’s desired focus on national priorities, to include inward investment.  The 
perceptions among members of the SCA during the implementation phase reflects the adjustment 
period during a process of formalization and realignment of the networks strategic purpose and 
structures in line with the ‘Agenda for Cities’. 
 
Network Structure 
 
During the first year of SCA implementation the network increased its city membership to include 
Perth and Kinross, following its designated 7th city status on the 14th March 2012.  Changes to the 
structure and membership of the group include the Scottish Government’s Minister for Cities, the 
Leaders and Senior Officers (Chief Executives) from Scotland’s seven ULAs (referred to as the 
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‘cities’), ‘drawing in the expertise of senior private sector representatives’ as required (Scottish 
Government, 2011: 11).  The political membership of the SCA during 2012 also changed from the 
previous identification stage following a local government election during May 2012, meaning 
SNP would now lead Dundee and Perth and Kinross ULAs as members of the SCA.    
 
Figure 22 shows that having the Scottish Government as a member of the network created an 
additional layer of formal governance complexity to the network structure comprised of both the 
Leadership Group and Delivery Group.  The SCDI’s previous role as impartial facilitator would 
now take a more formal quasi-organisational structure, having to take a dual role of maintaining a 
focus on cities as well as formally supporting the implementation of the SCA national policy 
priorities on behalf of the Scottish Government.  
 
The network structure diagram (Figure 22 below) during network implementation stage highlights 
the institutional-related structures. The SCDIs role as Chair and host of the SCA would create a 
larger SCA support team to help coordinate the Delivery Group and provide budget and 
programme management assistance.  
 
Figure 22: SCA network structure during ‘Network Implementation’ stage 
 
 
 
The SCA network member’s perceptions relating to the structure of collaboration during the 
implementation stage reveal the hierarchical nature of institutional network ties.  The status and 
 164 
structure of the original SCDI facilitated cities network changed following the SCA announcement, 
largely the result of Scottish Government inclusion and funding: 
 
‘It got more sophisticated. It got a wee bit more ambitious…and became more complex and 
given that financial commitments and funding started to flow towards it, there was a 
requirement to put in a much more formalised governance structure to make sure that the 
SCA was accountable. And we were very mindful that this would be public sector funds that 
we were spending. So once we finally started to get some money in it, we made some 
appointments’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
Following the formalisation process, various staff changes took place within SCDI to support the 
SCA network, including replacing the Programme Manager appointed during 2011 with a 
Programme Director in June 2012, supported by a policy officer to help manage the process. 
 
Additional members of the SCA team included an Inward Investment Promotion Officer, seconded 
from the investment team in Edinburgh, to lead on the development of relationships with other city 
investment teams in other cities and to help create ‘a virtual investment team to…work with the 
cities to develop an investment promotion strategy and programme of shared investment promotion 
activity’ (SCA Annual Report, 2012-13): 
 
‘Glasgow City Council applied for funding from the City Investment Fund (the Scottish 
Cities Alliance pot of money), for a post that the dedicated purpose of which was to 
disseminate learning from Future City Glasgow to the Scottish Cities and help to develop a 
national strategy for Smart Cities or Future Cities.’ 
Respondent (I19) 
 
As well as staff arrangements supporting the SCA changing, the nature of the political membership 
within the SCA during 2012 also changed: 
 
‘Nicola Sturgeon [Deputy First Minister] was quite heavily involved at the beginning. She 
didn’t chair the leadership group but she participated in it’  
Respondent (I10) 
 
‘Glasgow [City Council Political Leader] was the only city leader who spanned the 2011-
2012 SCA and was the only one who was there from the start 
Respondent (I12) 
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The SCDI Chief Executive was involved in the SCA from the beginning and started to chair the 
group during 2012. However, the SCDI Chief Executive resigned during 2013, although continued 
to chair the SCA until the middle of 2013: 
 
‘There was a very long gap between June and November 2013 without leadership for the 
board of SCDI.’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
A new SCDI Chief Executive was put in place at the end of the implementation stage in December 
2013.  Therefore, the various staff changes during 2013 meant that both the SCDI and SCA staff 
were without management or leadership for a period of time. 
 
Network Management 
 
The Scottish Government announcement on the SCA meant that the SCDI was now formally 
‘hosting’ the SCA as a distinct and separate policy within their organization: 
 
‘to the SNP’s credit, the result of the [cities] strategy was that the government gave us 7 
million to get the SCA started’  
Respondent (I7)  
 
‘the SCA is a programme within SCDI, so that SCA-related staff were legally SCDI staff 
employed and managed, but funded through the government and cities strategy funding’ 
Respondent (I23) 
 
The focus of the work at the start of the SCA was wide ranging and largely cities focussed and led, 
with a clear attempt thereafter, to realign the focus of the SCA with the Scottish Government’s 
agenda: 
 
‘it never really got to the position of having a proper portfolio of work at the start and in 
fact… all of that was reviewed and the focus on inward investment was increased’ 
Respondent (I8) 
 
Therefore, the strategic direction of the SCA changed during 2013 in an attempt to realign the SCA 
projects (developed by the earlier cities network team between 2011-2012), with the Scottish 
Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ as a post-hoc exercise: 
 
‘we weren't working directly to the Agenda for Cities strategy… members were picking 
projects to fit into each of the four key strategic headings of ‘Agenda for Cities’ 
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Respondent (I21) 
 
‘we were working to it [the Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’] to an extent, but it 
was too high level’ 
 Respondent (I20) 
 
SCDI’s facilitation role of the SCA core team was perceived as providing support and secretariat 
functions for the SCA, to help deliver and provide the overall administration support for delivering 
the strategic agenda of the SCA: 
 
‘We’ve been quite strict about saying, cities are leading on responsibility, so they need to 
provide the admin resource. We should facilitate, we can't be used as a resource to help 
[cities] take things forward.’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
A series of key events shaping the network implementation stage (Table 15) reflect network 
members perceptions of what ULAC looked liked.  It is apparent from both the network events and 
members perceptions that the management and structure of the SCA is going through a process of 
strategic realignment and clarification, as previous projects were largely selected to reflect 
individual city ambitions.  The process involved SCA employing more support staff and making 
clear their facilitation role, and that the SCA should not be delivery focused, instead, strategic 
focused.   It is apparent therefore, that there is an attempt during the implementation stage to align 
the SCA work to the Scottish Government’s strategy ‘Agenda for Cities’, although mainly 
perceived as still working to the cities objectives identified during the identification stage. 
 
Table 15: Structural events leading to formal SCA ‘Network Implementation’ stage 
 
NETWORK 
IMPLEMENTATION 
STRUCTURAL EVENT INTERPRETATION 
March 2012 First Meeting of The SCA City 
Leadership 
Formalisation of the SCA to 
include Perth and Scottish 
Government, and proposed new 
governance structures  
June 2012 SCDI appoints a SCA Programme 
Director  
Widening membership and new 
governance required a Programme 
Director and policy officer to help 
manage the process 
September 2013 Glasgow presents a paper on 
devolving powers for Local 
Government at the Leadership 
Group meeting 
An addition to the strategic 
direction of the SCA to consider 
LAs powers.  
December 2013 SCDI Chief Executive resigns and 
new one appointed to chair the 
SCA  
Further staff changes to the 
network and appointment of new 
Chair of the Leadership group. 
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6.4.3 What ULAC looks like at ‘Network Implementation’ Stage 
 
The Scottish Government’s role is crucial in the implementation stages for securing funding and 
for cities achieving national policy recognition.  The network member’s perceptions on the purpose 
of the network during this stage reflects its formalisation and introduction of governance structures, 
typical of urban planning in Scotland often believed to be ‘micro-managed…and over-governed’ 
(Turok, 2008: 80).   
 
Different governance mechanisms, and in particular, the introduction of the Scottish Government 
as a member of the SCA, replaces the previous informal voluntary arrangement, reflective of: 
 
‘the relative degree of power of the decision makers to overcome obstacles to 
action…challenging the assumption that voluntary membership networks create enough 
power to bring about publicly significant results…to solve problems and to achieve change 
in an increasingly complex and fragmented environment’ 
 
Ataov and Eraydin (2011: 88)   
 
Therefore, through the introduction of the Scottish Government and more formal arrangements, the 
SCA structure is consistent with what Hulst and van Monfort (2012: 129) describe as a ‘quasi-
regional government’ joint organisation with formal decision-making powers:   
 
‘Quasi-regional government structures…are entrusted with formal decision-making power 
and financial resources. Generally, a council and an executive board, composed of delegates 
from the participating municipalities and accountable to the local councils, govern quasi-
regional governments. As a rule, they are active on a number of policy fields and sometimes 
also involved in service delivery. Planning tasks frequently involve spatial planning and 
socio-economic development.’ 
 
Hulst and van Montfort (2012: 127) 
 
Table 16 provides a summary of what the ‘network implementation’ stage looked like relative to 
the three functional domains.  Davies (2003) would describe such formal structures as typical of 
UK ‘regeneration partnerships depending on an ideological commitment to collaboration within 
local authorities, involving bureaucratic structures under strong central government control’ 
(p254).  Although the SCA isn’t governed by a ULA, instead, the SCDI takes the role as chair of 
the Leadership Group, reflective of their neutral organizational stance.  Therefore, SCDIs 
institutional relationship with the Scottish Government is more formalized, meaning they would be 
required to report on their administration and management role of the ‘Cities Investment Fund’. 
 168 
Table 16: What does ULAC look like at ‘Network Implementation’ Stage  
PURPOSE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
• Develop City 
Infrastructure 
Investment Plans 
• Re-align the SCA 
work plan to 
National ‘Agenda 
for Cities’ priorities 
Quasi-regional, regeneration 
partnership structure (SCDI 
Host SCA): 
• Seven ULAs 
• SCDI CEO Chair of 
Leadership Group 
• SCA Programme 
Director Chair of 
Delivery Group 
  
• Formal Governance Processes 
(Agenda for Cities) 
• City-focused Operational Plans 
(resourced) 
• £7 million Scottish Government 
Budget (match funded by 
ULAs) 
 
 
 
6.5 Network Growth (T3) - (January 2014 – June 2016) 
 
6.5.1 Strategic Rationale (T3) 
 
The final stage of the SCA network during the observation period is ‘Network Growth’ begins in 
January 2014 followed by a period of further restructuring of governance arrangements and revised 
strategic policy documentation.  In June 2014, the SCA would finalise its operational plan and 
agree three main work streams: infrastructure, low carbon and Smart Cities, aimed at attracting 
investment and development of the national economy by supporting urban economic growth. 
 
Near to the end of 2014, the seven cities (excluding Scottish Government) produced a report 
proposing to reshape the future governance and strategic direction of the SCA: 
 
‘The City Leaders felt that it would be helpful for them to have an informal meeting 
themselves to discuss collectively the issues, before bringing the consensus of that discussion 
back to the Leadership Group’  
 
The note of the meeting sets out proposals for: 
 
‘a revised governance framework for the Alliance in light of: the current political and 
legislative landscape; the strengthening consensus across all levels of government that cities 
have a significant role to play in driving economic growth; and that the Alliance’s proposition 
has developed to a stage that it is moving into delivery and is consequently attracting an 
enhanced profile…The view is that with new powers coming to Scotland as a result of the 
Smith Commission, there was an opportunity to use the Alliance as a forum to consider what 
might devolve further to cities.’ 
 
Note of Leadership Group Meeting (SCDI, December 2014: 3) 
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The private meeting between the seven cities and excluding the Scottish Government was to 
progress discussions for a ‘Review of City Networks’ and to agree a collective approach and 
update to the ‘Six Cities Vision’ paper originally signed in April 2011 by the then six cities.  The 
December 2014 meeting would make clear: 
 
‘a general view amongst the [city political] Leaders that it would be appropriate for future 
Leadership Group meetings to be chaired by a Leader of a city’  
 
Note of Leadership Group Meeting (SCDI, December 2014: 3) 
 
The December 2014 SCA Leadership Group meeting marks a key phase for network growth as 
Scotland’s cities progress their own strategic ambitions for more direct control of the SCA 
Leadership Group and desired change to current SCA governance arrangements.  
 
New SCA governance arrangements were introduced in March 2015, with the current Chair of the 
Leadership Group also being replaced by Cllr Burns (Political Leader of Edinburgh City Council) 
and including a new set of wider governance arrangements (see Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: SCA Governance Arrangements During ‘Network Growth’ Stage 
 
Source: Revised Governance Protocol (SCA, March 2015) 
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The new SCA governance arrangements make clear the separation between strategic and 
operational focus of each group, including a new set of City Leadership groups (involving cities 
political leaders only) focused on setting the strategic Vision of the SCA:  
 
• the Leadership Group continuing to meet three times per year;  
• a City Leaders group meeting three times a year to take a portfolio responsibility for one of the 
six key areas detailed in the city leaders’ Vision;  
• Chief Executives (of ULAs) to take additional project sponsorship role to support operational 
delivery of the Cities Vision.  
In January 2015 a cities discussion paper on ‘a review of city networks’ was discussed and noted in 
the March Leadership group meeting, stating the Scottish cities proposals for a refreshed ‘Seven 
Cities Vision’ statement to: 
 
‘build on the original document signed in 2011 and set out the city leaders’ long-term vision 
to drive economic growth. It has been updated to include Perth, which joined the Alliance in 
2012 and some new areas of focus around Smart Cities, the need to tackle inequality and 
play a lead role in taking forward the decentralising democracy agenda. The refreshed Vision 
continues to recognise the mutual benefits realised by all seven cities working together and 
in partnership with both the Scottish Government and UK Government.’ 
 
Leadership Group Meeting (SCA, March 2014) 
 
Following the introduction of new governance arrangements, including a city Chief Executives 
group and City Leadership Group (which would exclude the Scottish Government), the period 
April and May 2015 would involve a series of key events leading to a change in the overall 
strategic direction of the SCA in addition to the new governance structures, including: the cities 
agreeing new ‘Areas of Responsibility’ at a Chief Executive meeting in April 2015, and a refreshed 
‘Seven Cities Vision’ to include new areas of focus, including: Smart Cities; the need to tackle 
inequality; and the SCA’s lead role in taking forward the cities decentralising democracy agenda.   
 
The seven cities as members of the SCA published a revised ‘Seven Cities Vision: Empowering 
Scotland’s Cities’ (2015) in May 2015, rearticulating cities desired relationship with the Scottish 
Government within the SCA: 
 
 ‘…to deliver, our cities require empowerment and strategic support from government to 
ensure they maximise their assets, infrastructure, skills and opportunities, for all of Scotland’s 
people. They need the freedom to decide locally, to raise funds through taxes and invest to 
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create jobs and economic growth and to deliver services, which are tailored to cities and city 
regions’ 
 ‘Seven Cities Vision’ (SCA, May 2015) 
 
A significant factor separating the refreshed ‘Seven Cities Vision’ (2015) from the Scottish 
Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ (2011) is a departure from the ‘partnership’ terminology. The 
revised ‘Seven Cities Vision’ (2015) reflects a shift in the strategic relationship between the cities 
and the Scottish Government as members of the SCA, from one of equal ‘partnership’ working, to 
one that notes the hierarchical nature of the Scottish Government by ‘requesting city 
empowerment’ from the Scottish Government. 
 
The Scottish Government’s response to the ‘Seven Cities Vision’ makes clear a growing 
disagreement between the cities and the Scottish Government:  
 
 ‘whilst Scottish Government shares many of the ambitions contained within the city Leaders’ 
Vision some elements do not align with current policy. The Scottish Government welcomed 
further discussion of these elements with the cities. Consequently, it was noted that the Vision 
has been developed by city Leaders and belongs to them and not the Scottish Government.’ 
Leadership Group meeting (April 2015: 3) 
 
The Scottish Government would follow to hold a ‘Cities Convention’ in Perth on 13 November 
2015 with the ‘aim of bringing citizens and city leaders together to feed into a refreshed 2011 
‘Agenda for Cities’, leading to the publication of a refreshed Scottish Government ‘Agenda for 
Cities’ (March, 2016), restating the ‘Vision’ and focus on: internationalisation; investment; 
innovation and inclusive growth.   
 
The Scottish Government did not provide any formal response or support for Scotland’s seven 
cities request for greater devolved taxation powers.  However, the ‘Agenda for Cities’ does refer to 
Scotland’s city regions as an important and appropriate scale at which resources can be pooled, and 
functional economies harnessed. 
 
Finally, in May 2016 the seven cities as members of the SCA would commission a report, 
‘Empowering Scotland’s Cities’, which states:  
 
‘Scottish cities require a New Deal with the Scottish and UK Governments… A new 
partnership requires local government, central government, national agencies and key business 
stakeholders to work collaboratively to maximize the beneﬁts from both local decision-making 
and joint working on prioritized national outcomes if Scottish cities are to reach their economic 
potential and meet the big challenges that lie ahead…’  
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‘…The cities also advocate utilising the Scottish Cities Alliance [SCA] as a facilitator and 
delivery vehicle for this work’ 
Empowering Scotland’s Cities (Ernst and Young, May 2016) 
 
The Empowering Scotland’s Cities (2016) report was commissioned by the seven cities in January 
2016, ‘to build on the framework above…and a primary role to act as a facilitator for discussions 
between the representatives of the city councils’ (p13) and makes clear that ‘the publication [of the 
earlier discussion paper – Empowering Scotland’s Cities’] was outside the remit of the SCA and 
led by the seven cities themselves’ (p13).  
 
The network growth stage is therefore characterised by a shifting strategic direction and divergent 
ambitions for the SCA between both city and Scottish Government as members of the network.   
 
6.5.2 Narrative on Network Growth of ULAC (T3)  
 
The network growth phase of the SCA sees a significant addition to the strategic ambitions of the 
seven cities as members of the SCA. As well as working with the Scottish Government in 
partnership as part of the ‘Agenda for Cities’ evolving work programme, the seven cities have 
developed an additional ambition to ‘lobby’ Government for greater devolution of powers between 
national and local government in Scotland, creating additional cities-only structures similar to that 
in the identification stage. 
 
Network Purpose 
 
As section 6.4 highlights, the strategic focus of the SCA during implementation was on 
establishing a strategic partnership between the Scottish Government and seven cities, towards 
achieving greater national growth in line with the ‘Agenda for Cities’.  Given the existence of the 
two strategy documents, ‘Six Cities Vision’ and the ‘Agenda for Cities’ the perception among the 
members of the network during the growth stage reflects a gradual expansion of the networks 
strategic purpose and ambitions, particularly among the city members.   
 
The perception of the purpose of the SCA at this stage is thought:  
 
‘very different to the original rationale for the SCA’  
Respondent (I23) 
  
The purpose of the SCA among the city network members is that the SCA should be about: 
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‘shaping government policy…influencing what Transport Scotland do, things like increasing 
the funding available for vacant and derelict land.  It would be things like tackling high 
concentrations of multiple deprivation.  It would be increasing the degree to which cities are 
part of the Scottish policy landscape.’  
Respondent (I13) 
 
City perceptions of the purpose of the SCA during the network growth stage maintains a focus on 
influencing national policy for increased recognition of the importance of cities and urban policy in 
areas of planning, deprivation and funding, whilst recognizing the importance of establishing a 
stronger relationship with the Scottish Government:     
 
‘taking into consideration the wider economic and social agenda…there’s been some move 
towards trying to tailor things towards the government’s agenda...I think things have been 
totally focussed probably on infrastructure. 
Respondent (I14) 
 
The infrastructure focus of the SCA throughout its development is still very much present, with 
some alignment with national priorities, although an increasing recognition of the SCAs role in 
evolving ‘City Deals’ in Scotland: 
  
‘The objectives at one level are simple so far as it is to promote cities partnerships with the 
Scottish Government, to drive economic development and the way that it does more clearly 
than over the past year and a half, through the low carbon work streams and infrastructure 
and smart cities.  What’s happening now is that the cities are taking on a broader role than 
originally set out over the period of transition of the SCA and how the cities fit into that.’ 
Respondent (I13) 
 
‘The investment focus is still very much there, and I think that features in all of the City 
Deals that have been developed…And in many ways we’re just trying to ensure that, you 
know, because for all its faults, what the City Strategy is at least – at the very least – an 
initial recognition that cities are the drivers of the national economy and we need to invest in 
success.  So we’re just trying to bolster that and push it forward and make sure that key 
drivers of the economy are invested in and that we don’t ignore them or undervalue them.’  
 
‘the programme of infrastructure work streams include: Housing; Commercial and Business 
Space; Digital and Transport Infrastructure; but as we grow we realise that the tenants of 
transport and digital infrastructure work is slightly different from the housing and 
commercial which I should say, includes regeneration, so as you can see it is very wide 
ranging.’ 
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Respondent (I17) 
 
Therefore, the perceptions of the city infrastructure and delivery focus of the SCA are still apparent 
during the growth stages, alongside cities taking on ‘a broader role than originally set out’ (RI13). 
 
Network Structure 
 
During the first year of the SCA growth stage in 2014, various staff changes were made to increase 
the size of the SCA support team, including a new more senior Strategic Director and Programme 
Director, and a new Chief Executive within the SCDI. There were also some key changes to the 
Leadership Group in December 2014, including: the resignation of the previous SCDI Chief 
Executive as Chair of the SCA Leadership Group and replaced by a Political Leader from one of 
the ULAs, and Keith Brown MSP taking over from Depute Leader Nicola Sturgeon, as the Scottish 
Government’s political representative at the Leadership Group. 
 
Figure 24 shows the institutional structure and nature of network ties resulting from the increased 
governance arrangements, with a further layer of informal governance complexity resulting from 
the addition of a cities-only group, with amore informal relationship with the rest of the groups. 
 
Figure 24: SCA network structure during ‘Network Growth ‘stage 
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In January 2014 the new SCDI Chief Executive would recruit a new more senior SCA Director 
(part-time) seconded from one of the member cities (as Chief Executive Officer of Stirling City 
Council).  The appointment of a more senior SCA Strategic Director was to act as a key link person 
between the Political Leaders and Chief Executives within the SCA group, aimed at providing a 
more senior strategic role, including:  
  
‘getting more senior people in, we needed to get the right people in and they needed to have 
more, I guess, senior, more strategic input into what the cities were wanting together’ 
Respondent (I22)   
The process of appointing a more senior SCA Strategic Director involved: 
 
‘changing one of the SCA posts [Programme Director] to become a more senior post, and 
removing another post.’ 
Respondent (I23) 
 
Nearer to the end of 2014 there was also a change in ministerial responsibilities, with Nicola 
Sturgeon stepping away from the SCA to be replaced by Keith Brown as The Cabinet Secretary for 
Infrastructure, Investment and Cities.  Thereafter, the Strategic Director appointed in January 2014 
was further replaced in January 2015, with the appointment of a new full-time Programme 
Director. 
 
A key change to the chair position of the SCA was the appointment of a cities political leader as 
chair of the leadership group in March 2015: 
 
‘the [Chief Executive of SCDI] chaired the cities group, but due to contractual relationships, 
that became unworkable.’ 
Respondent (I23) 
 
‘within the confines of the SCA there was some confusion as to who should chair: whether it 
should be deputy first minister or someone from the cities, in terms of a political leader, as it 
is now.  This has been resolved with the leader of the capital city now chairing but there is 
still a lack of clarity in terms of function and purpose.’  
Respondent (I23) 
 
The growth stages included the seven cities starting to meet outwith the formal SCA governance 
structures put in place during the ‘implementation phase’: 
 
‘so basically what we did roughly [in 2014] was start a dialogue and a discussion, a process 
about trying to move the Alliance more towards being cities-led, and we basically organised 
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a couple of private meetings where the seven city leaders met without the minister or others 
present….everybody was in agreement that we should try and move it towards being more 
cities-led…I mean, there’s been a bit of a compromise in the sense that it’s not six meetings 
of just the city leaders, it’s three meetings of just the city leaders and three meetings of the 
city leaders with the Cabinet Secretary…it’s called the Leadership Group, and Keith Brown 
is present, the civil servants are present, and then every alternative meeting is just a leaders 
meeting, so it’s just the seven leaders.’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
‘a series of private meetings took place between the City Leader’s…outside formal 
structures…and due to a previous lack of leadership…a new programme structure was put in 
place to resolve that and to get leadership committed’ 
Respondent (I13) 
 
‘we’ve tried to move it towards being more cities led, frankly, and not government led. And 
as part of that process there’s no longer an independent or sort of quasi-independent chair 
anymore…it was chaired by this quasi-independent person, and there was no space, private 
or otherwise…’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
‘So the cities now meet three times a year without the government there, and the government 
is there for the other three meetings, so this is the compromise and I think will see them 
through a transition point through whatever comes next.’  
Respondent (I23) 
 
The governance structures also considered where the SCA should sit, as being either within the 
SCDI or within a city.  As one member of the SCA pointed out: 
 
‘as part of the new governance arrangements, it was agreed that it [SCA] could look to 
moving, being within a city. But I don't think that that would work..as we're going through 
this stage at the moment, we need to stay here’ 
Respondent (I21) 
 
‘i see the alliance as a fledgling bird beginning to fly, but not taken the leap yet.  So as each 
step has been taken, whether the appointment of chair, staff, vision, strengthening of 
relationship between government and cities etc. are all steps to stand on its own that wouldn't 
need to sit within SCDI’ 
Respondent (I23) 
 
 177 
Therefore, it is apparent that the growth stage experienced various staff changes, further revised 
governance structures and increasing city ambitions.  The new structure of the SCA reflects cities 
ambitions for inclusion of an informal cities only group excluding the Scottish Government, and 
two CEO groups to deliver SCA operational activities (directed by the SCA Leadership Group) and 
city-leadership strategic functions (directed by the ULA political leaders). 
 
Network Management 
 
The appointment of a new Strategic Director at the start of January 2014 to lead the introduction of 
a new set of governance arrangements was largely perceived as a key milestone in the growth of 
the network: 
 
 ‘XX coming in I think, really helped it, I think he gave it a bit more of a focus, I think, it is 
more deliverable now…XX has taken it in a different direction, making it a bit more 
deliverable, by trying to focus on things where collaboration can work.’ 
Respondent (I9) 
 
The management role of the new, more senior Director of the SCA was largely perceived as 
providing a key role in improving: governance; leadership; strategic focus and collaborative 
direction, for example: 
 
• ‘better governance rigor now’(RI11) 
• ‘refocusing us down into the operational plan’ (RI21) 
• ‘the organisation changed…trying to change the structure’ (RI10) 
• ‘much more collaborative and focussed, more directive and collaborative than the team that 
was in before’ (RI15) 
• ‘more aggressive towards Scottish Government and lobby it harder and push the cities 
more’(RI10) 
Further to the new strategic appointment, a change to the chair of the SCA being a political leader 
was largely perceived as providing more collaborative management approach: 
 
‘really good because I’ve been very impressed by him – he definitely gets the need for 
collaborative working and he’s got that ethos so I think that’s a good move.’ 
Respondent (I10) 
 
The SCA’s management during the growth stages is thus perceived positively due to new 
leadership roles and the tightening of governance structures and strategic focus: 
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‘undoubtedly, you know, not just probably, it will undoubtedly move towards a type of more 
formalized outcome focused structure over the course of the next 24 months, I’m sure of it.’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
Therefore, the series of key events shaping the network growth stage (Table 17) reflects network 
members perceptions of what ULAC looked like.  It is apparent that the changing governance 
structures reflect the cities steering and refocusing of the network towards being cities-led again.  
Although the formal SCA/Scottish Government structures are still in place, the perceptions of the 
strategic realignment and clarification of cities ambitions within the SCA during network growth 
stage, marks a significant milestone in the development of a distinct cities agenda (in addition to 
the Scottish Government’s Agenda for Cities) within the SCA between January 2014 and 2016. 
 
Table 17: Structural events during ‘Network Growth’ stage 
NETWORK 
GROWTH 
STRUCTURAL EVENT INTERPRETATION 
January 2014 New SCA Programme Director 
Appointed (Chief Executive of Stirling 
City Council) 
The SCDI appoints a new more senior 
Programme Director to progress 
formalisation of SCA arrangements 
Summer 2014 Private City Leader’s Meetings Duel structures start to evolve due to 
growing desire of the cities to work 
without the presence of the Scottish 
Government 
May 2015 Leader of Edinburgh City council 
appointed as Leader and cities group 
created 
The SCDI as chair was seen as no 
longer viable and to avoid any conflicts 
of interest.  Leader of Edinburgh City 
Council takes on the role chairing the 
Leadership 
March 2016 Refreshed Scottish Government 
Agenda for Cities 
The need to update and refresh the 
Scottish Government’s commitment to 
national priorities following new duel 
governance arrangements  
May 2016 Empowering Scotland’s Cities Report Following the Scottish Government’s 
refresh, the cities follow with a 
statement to mark their ambitions and 
reformed structures similar to the 
original cities group. 
 
6.5.3 What ULAC looks like at ‘Network Growth’ Stage 
 
The cities role is key to the nature of the growth stage for establishing clearer structures that maintain 
cities involvement in the SCA, whilst providing structures to suit both city and national government 
aspirations.  Having adjusted the SCA to a more formalized process during the implementation stage, 
stronger leadership and improved clarity of purpose (see Table 17), ensures that the mixed ambitions 
between the network members are formally reflected by the development of new structures to 
facilitate duel ambitions. 
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The SCA’s journey towards the ‘Empowering City Government’ report (2016), marks a significant 
milestone in the growth of SCA and process of ULAC in Scotland. Approximately 4 years on from 
the initial SCA Leadership group meeting of the Cities and the Leaders and Chief Executives of the 
seven cities in March 2012, June 2016 represents a turning point for what the SCA looks like, 
reflecting ‘cities wanting to take on more as a group of cities’ (RI13). 
 
The complex duel structures of the SCA during this stage also reflect an ‘over-complicated, 
bureaucratic, cluttered’ governance structure (Turok, 2008: 80), as an attempt to provide some 
separation between the informal and formal structures: ‘authority, or leadership, in networks is 
often organic and informal in character…not granted automatically because of formal titles (Weber 
and Khademian, 2008: 342).  Therefore, SCDI’s formal role as chair is replaced by an evolving 
political leadership role that takes over as chair.  
 
Table 18 provides a summary of what the ‘network growth’ looked like relative to the three 
functional domains.  The SCA is now chaired by a political member from one of the ULAs, 
reflective of the cities increased steering of the SCAs direction.  Alongside new governance 
arrangements are further staff changes and increasing resources from the members of the network, 
as well as leveraged funding from evolving projects. 
 
Table 18: What does ULAC at ‘Network Growth’ Stage  
PURPOSE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
Duel Purpose: 
• Cities-leading reforms 
for urban local 
government  
• National Agenda for 
Cities focus on 
Inclusive Growth 
Quasi-regional structure 
and Planning Forum: 
• Seven ULAs 
• ULA Political Chair  
• Senior SCA Strategic 
Director  
• ULA Chief Executive 
Group  
• Formal and Informal governance 
arrangements 
• Increasing resources 
• Refreshed City and Scottish 
Government Strategic Documents; 
• Strategic and Operational/Delivery 
Plans 
 
6.6 Summary of Findings 
 
The strategic documentation and interview evidence presented in chapter six provides an indication 
of what ULAC looked like over the study period, in terms of its purpose, configuration and 
management across three key stages of the networks process (i.e. T1; T2; T3).  The strategic events 
identify three key phases describing the evolving purpose and structure of the SCA: starting as a 
cities-led informal planning forum focussed on strategic city ambitions; followed by a national 
government-led quasi-regional structure focused on resource allocation and strategic planning; 
finally, evolving into a cities-led duel purpose network focussed on both strategic planning and 
operational delivery of projects. 
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Therefore, relative to the functional characteristics identified in Chapter Three (i.e. Part A of the 
conceptual framework: Table 8 in section 3.5), Table 19 below provides the first set of conceptual 
results of the functional characteristics of the SCA:  
 
Table 19: Concetpualising Matrix: Functional Characteristics of the SCA:  
NETWORK 
PHASE 
NODE: URBAN LOCAL AUTHORITY  
FUNCTION: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 PURPOSE STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT 
T1 • Political Lobbying 
• Strategic Planning 
 
• City-centric 
membership 
• Neutral Facilitation 
• Informal Planning 
Structure 
• Informal 
Leadership/Governance  
T2 • Public Resource 
Allocation 
• Strategic Planning 
• Mixed/expanding 
membership 
• National Agency-
led 
 
• Formal Quasi-Regional 
Structure 
• Formal 
Leadership/Governance 
T3 • Public Resource 
Allocation 
• Operational and 
Project Delivery 
• Strategic Policy 
Making 
• Political Lobbying 
• Mixed/expanding 
membership 
• City-led (Political)  
 
• Formal Quasi-Regional 
Structures  
• Informal Planning 
Structures 
• Formal Political 
Leadership 
• Formal Strategic 
Leadership  
 
Chapter Seven will progress the research findings by undertaking an institutional analysis of the 
SCA network, to identify the role of institutions to help provide causal explanation of ‘How’ the 
PV of the SCA network can be understood.  Detailed explanation of network context and 
institutional influences assumed to have causal relevance to the network events are explained and 
the resultant relationship with SCA’s perceived PV.  
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Chapter Seven: ‘How’ does ULAC create Public Value (PV): the role of 
institutional mechanisms? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
   
Having identified what ULAC looks like in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven explains how ULAC and 
its functional domains create PV as a ‘value-creating’ process (Crosby et al. 2014: 448), through 
explication of institutional mechanisms that are ‘partly descriptive … and partly normative’ 
(Crosby et al. 2014: 448), to identify what is causally relevant to the network events identified 
previously (see Appendix 10).    
 
When trying to understand the collaborative nature of ULAs ‘the variation both in the institutional 
context and in the policy making capacity’ (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007: 4) of local government 
is important to take into account.  The aim of this chapter is to highlight the role of institutional 
mechanisms within the contextualised network setting, detailing the SCAs perceived PV to 
enhance the understanding of ULAC identified in Chapter Six. The institutional mechanisms are 
revealed through sense-making of analytical themes identified during the second round of 
analytical coding.  The extent to which Scottish Government and ULAs institutional context can 
explain the PV of ULAC – as formal and informal institutional mechanisms - is revealed, including 
important power constellations and socio-cultural institutional dynamics.  
 
The Chapter addresses the second of three research questions:  
 
How can the perceived public value (PV) of ULAC be understood relative to 
institutional context? 
 
7.1.1 Analytical Approach 
 
Having split the network into three stages, each is discussed in turn highlighting the role of 
institutional mechanisms on the PV of ULAC.  Using first order (descriptive) coding – through 
template analysis - to describe what ULAC looks like (Chapter Six), the data is refined into higher 
level analytical codes of emergent themes, revealing three main institutional mechanisms: 
contextual, functional and relationship mechanisms.  Respondents’ perceptions of institutional 
mechanisms are analysed, to help understand their role on how PV is created from ULAC. 
 
Analysing coded data and emerging themes to ensure explanation goes beyond mere description 
requires clarification of how these themes were derived.  The analysis uses interview 
data/quotations to provide sense-making of aggregate dimensions (i.e. institutional mechanisms) 
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(Gioia et al. 1994), including: interpretive-descriptive functional characteristics and institution-
related characteristics of network events and socio-cultural relationships.  In line with an 
interpretive critical realist approach to the research, the themes are identified within their specific 
context, highlighting: ‘the role constructs play in a particular setting’ (Dyer and Wilkinson, 1991: 
634). Thick descriptions of the supporting quotations are provided to describe the ‘rich’ (Dyer and 
Wilkinson, 1991: 634) social and institutional structures of ULAC.  
 
The combination of key events and network structures identified in Chapter Six, combined with 
sense-making statements and thick descriptions in the following sections, provides an overall 
analytical representation of how the PV of ULAC can be understood relative to the role of 
institutional context.  Table A10 in Appendix 10 summarises the main institutional mechanisms 
found to have causal relevance for the PV of ULAC relative to key events during each stage of the 
network process. 
   
7.1.2 The Role of Institutions on the PV of ULAC  
 
‘Institutions cannot be considered only as formal organizational structures; they are dynamic 
and historically embedded entities that sustain and disseminate complex formal and informal 
political systems of arrangements. These organizations function within an interdependent 
and complex set of relations in the process of urban governance.’ 
Ataov and Eraydin (2011: 95)   
 
Having identified a series of key events describing ‘what’ the SCA looked like between 2010 and 
2016, key points of strategic, structural and management change are apparent across three network 
stages.  Thick descriptions of the perceived role of institutions relative to the network events, 
highlights the causal relevance of both formal and informal institutions for the PV of ULAC.  
Building on Williamson (2000) institutional framework identifying four levels of social analysis 
(first set out in Williamson, 1998) (see Figure 1 of Williamson 2000: 597), reveals a fully 
interconnected process.  
The research approach taken here identifies institutional mechanisms that are consistent with levels 
one, two and three (L1: Embededness; L2: Institutional environment; and L3: Governance) of 
Williamson’s (2000) NIE conceptualization, referred to as: functional; contextual and behavioural 
mechanisms (Figure 25).  
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Figure 25: Three Path Dependant Levels of Institutional Mechanisms 
 
Figure 25 builds on Williamson’s (2000) conceptualisation of different institutional mechanisms, 
although instead of assuming away behavioural mechanisms (i.e. Embeddedness in Williamson, 
2000), the analysis here provides an empirical assessment of the role of all three institutional 
mechanisms to identify the combination of formal and informal institutions.  In other words, 
behavioural mechanisms shaping the dynamics of how network members interact outwith and 
within the network, will be shaped by, and shape, both the contextual mechanisms of the rules of 
the network (e.g. available resources), in turn, affecting the functional mechanisms of how 
collaboration takes place (e.g. governance, strategies). 
The solid arrows in Figure 25 connect the upper mechanism to the lower mechanism, to suggest 
that the higher mechanism contextualises and interacts with the lower level mechanism (e.g. history 
and culture – informal mechanisms - will influence the formal structures of national state – formal 
cultural mechanisms – in turn, influencing formal organisational structures at a sub national and 
local level – formal functional mechanisms).  The dashed lines indicate feedback across the three 
mechanisms (e.g. formal functional mechanism at a lower local level will feedback up to the formal 
national state level, which will in turn, respond and react to lower level mechanisms…and so on), 
to reveal the overall path dependant nature of an institutional perspective of ULAC. The contextual 
mechanisms relate to external formal environmental institutions (i.e. policy, laws) that can be 
described as the ‘rules of the game’; the functional mechanisms are internal to the network and 
relate to formal structural and operational institutions (i.e. governance, resources) to influence ‘how 
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the game is played’; and finally, the behavioural mechanisms can be both internal and external to 
the network and relate to informal behavioural institutions (i.e. norms, customs, traditions, trust), 
that influence and shape the social dynamics of the game.  
 
The institutional mechanisms interact across each stage of the network process, and across each of 
the different institutions.  Further to the above categorisation of three main institutional 
mechanisms, Williamson’s (2009: 373) conceptualisation of different combinations of formal and 
informal institutions are identified relative to their strength (i.e. as a constraint) of institutions as 
either weak (lack of constraint) or strong (well-developed constraint). Williamson (2009) uses a 
quantitative approach to categorising the strength of formal and informal institutions.  However, 
the approach taken here is to classify the strength of all three types of institution from an 
interpretive critical realist perspective, categorising the strength of institutional mechanisms 
relative to network member’s perceptions of the constraining effect of different combinations of the 
three main institutional mechanisms.  For example, the perception that political mechanisms are 
constraining the network process indicates the role of strong formal institution, whereas, a lack of 
perceived constraints from political mechanisms indicates the role of weak formal institution.  On 
the other hand, the perception that private socio-cultural rules are constraining network behaviour 
suggests the role of strong informal institution, whereas, the lack of perceived private socio-cultural 
rules constraining the network represents a weak informal institution. 
 
The three main institutional mechanisms do not function in isolation of each other as they interact 
in an on-going, complex dynamic way throughout each stage of the network process.  For example, 
functional mechanisms influencing the operation and structure of the network at the identification 
stage, interact and condition social relationships between network members in the subsequent 
stages of the network, and interact to affect other institutional mechanisms of the contextual 
environment.  
 
Therefore, the role of institutions across each stage of the network events are described in sections 
7.2, 7.3, and 7.4, through the use of sense-making tables, that summarise the role of institutions are 
each stage of the network, before summarising the overall combination of institutions across the 
SCA over the study period, in section 7.5 
 
7.2 Network Identification (January 2010 – January 2012): the role of institutions 
 
Process tracing in Chapter Six revealed what the identification stage of the SCA looked like (see 
Table 14), as an informal strategic planning network involving six of Scotland’s cities lobbying for 
increased national recognition of their economic importance, facilitated by a neutral national 
organisation (i.e. SCDI).  The identification stage ends with the Scottish Government’s positioning 
for formal involvement in the cities-network, creating a Scottish ‘Cities Investment Fund’ via a 
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SCA policy: ‘Agenda for Cities’.  Having identified what the ULAC network looks like at the 
identification stage, the following sections describe the role of institutional mechanisms for the PV 
of ULAC at this stage.    
 
7.2.1 Contextual Mechanisms during Network Identification:  
 
Strong formal institutions (national policy, history, economics): 
 
Important national policy context affecting local government at the same time as network 
identification included, for example, the ‘Cities Growth Fund (CGF)’ being stopped in 2008 (a 
£90m fund), followed by various other policy changes affecting funding for local government more 
generally: including various funds being wrapped up into local government’s block grant; the 
development of Single Outcome Agreements (SOA) in 2009, as the Concordat signed by the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) (i.e. a national institution designed to represent 
the joint interests of Scotland’s LAs with the Scottish Government) and the Scottish Government in 
November 2007; and the requirement for LAs to develop a Single Outcome Agreements (SOAs).   
 
The wider national policy context of austerity government affecting funding for cities and local 
government in recent years, is an important contextual mechanism perceived as influencing cities’ 
increasing desire to collaborate, including a perceived lack of national policy recognition of the 
economic importance of cities in Scotland, for example:  
 
‘money is being spent away from cities and towards rural areas’  
Respondent (I18) 
 
‘the trouble is there aren’t great funds for cities…given current economic circumstances, it’s 
unlikely there is anything [funding] of scale available to cities’ 
Respondent (I1) 
 
The Scottish Government’s role over local government is primarily to provide funding, having 
prescribed a council tax freeze (one of LAs main revenue raising powers) as part of the Concordat, 
coinciding with the network identification period.  Some LAs (characterised by political diversity) 
viewed the freeze as a gradual creeping centralisation of local government, by failing to properly 
compensate LAs for maintaining the freeze. Thus, the national funding context of Scottish local 
government at this time is perceived by cities as representative of national government’s increasing 
centralisation and control of local government: 
 
‘while I had partly lived in Scotland for many years, I didn't really know how it worked and 
was amazed I had to write to the minister for permission on inward investment in our city - 
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someone in the English capital having to write to a minister in west minster for permission, 
well!  I am intrigued by the level of control, we [cities] are very restricted.’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
The apparent perception of increasing centralisation of Scotland’s cities at the same time as 
reduced funding mechanism for local government, is perceived as a strong formal national policy 
institutions affecting ULAs financial autonomy in Scotland and an important contextual 
mechanism shaping cities desire to lobby Scottish Government as well work closer together for 
sharing resources.  
  
The policy context of local government and their complex relationship with national agencies in 
Scotland is far from straightforward. There is a perception that national agencies lack sufficient 
recognition of the important role of cities in Scotland, for example: 
 
‘COSLA considers that all councils are treated equally, when that’s incorrect’ 
Respondent (I22)   
 
‘as an action-orientated think tank for national economic growth in Scotland, SCDI works 
closely with all LAs and cities to support and manage their relationship with COSLA…but 
there’s this ownership issue that people don’t necessarily want to give up, so that’s why I 
think having a third party acting as that broker facilitator is perhaps easier to drive it 
forward, and they could stand outside the politics and the different agendas that we’re maybe 
operating or were getting clouded by other things that were going on at the same time. 
Respondent (I18)  
 
The perceived lack of recognition of cities by various national organisations in Scotland is a strong 
formal national institution, potentially constraining ULAs strategic importance and profile in 
Scotland and an important contextual mechanism shaping cities desire to seek alternative routes to 
increase their profile in Scotland, via their existing links with SCDI to support coordination of a 
cities network.  
 
The economic, spatial and historical nature of cities in Scotland is perceived as strong formal 
context shaping the need for national policy recognition of the importance of city-city collaboration 
to help overcome the challenges that city economic geography presents: 
 
‘Scotland’s cities are economically diverse, geographically diverse…probably a sense that 
Glasgow and Edinburgh have something in common. Dundee and Aberdeen at a push. But 
the rest of them quite different.’  
Respondent (I8)  
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‘given the competitive nature of cities, and actually they don’t collaborate very well together 
historically, a whole host of reasons, it needed an independent body to be able to provide that 
facilitation role and to act as the glue to hold it all together.’ 
Respondent (I18)  
 
During 2011 the political context of an impending Scottish Parliament election in May 2011 
delivered the first majority (SNP-led) government since the opening of the Scottish Parliament at 
Holyrood, perceived as important political context shaping city collaboration in Scotland.  The 
cities, working with SCDI, embraced the opportunity of an impending election by lobbying the 
politicians for greater recognition of cities:  
 
‘to provide a real lobbying weight to help open doors in government that perhaps cities 
wouldn’t otherwise manage to open on their own’  
Respondent (I1) 
 
 ‘the aim was to create a coalition of cities that lobbied the government before the [2011] 
elections and for urban policy to be put into the manifestos of Scotland’s political parties’  
Respondent: (I18) 
 
Consistent with the stated ambitions in the ‘Six Cities Vision’ for ‘empowerment and strategic 
support from government’ (SCDI, 2011: 2), a key political mechanism is the impending electing 
providing an opportunity for cities to jointly lobby for increased recognition in the run up to the 
impending Scottish Parliament election. The political parties in the lead up to the May 2011 
formally recognised the national importance of Scottish cities in their political manifestos, 
perceived as ‘a political opportunity’ (RI23) leading to the Scottish Government’s announcement 
of the SCA in the ‘Agenda for Cities’.   
 
Furthermore, the strength of institutional ties between SCDI and the Scottish Government can be 
seen to have facilitated the political and subsequent, national policy recognition of cities via the 
‘Agenda for Cities’: 
 
‘the different political parties put things in their manifestos around cities at the last election 
[2011]…SNP committed that they would appoint a cities minister’  
Respondent (I22) 
 
‘the idea was based on the notion of what was going to be called the 'league of Scottish 
cities' based on the California league…then the government in the run up to the 2011 
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elections saw a political opportunity, and decided they would be part of it…made it SCA, 
and gave it to SCDI and funded it with a deal done with the leader of SCDI’ 
Respondent (I23) 
 
The role of economic, political and financial context of ULAs in Scotland are perceived to play a 
strong role in shaping cities perceived value of the strategic purpose of a cities network facilitated 
by the SCDI.  Typically, a strong intermediate tier of government - with formal competencies, 
resources and willingness to co-ordinate regional policy – is found to reduce ‘the need for local 
government to provide regional co-ordination and planning through co-operation’ (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2012:128).  Therefore, the cities-network arguably reflects a response to the perceived 
role of: weak formal institutions (relationship with national agencies), strong formal institutions 
(austerity government; political opportunity), and strong informal institutions (urban economic 
geography and competitive culture of cities).   
 
7.2.2 Functional mechanisms during Network Identification: 
 
Weak formal institutions (governance, resources, strategies):  
 
During the identification stage the development of the ‘Six Cities Vision’ was the only formal 
documentation representing the cities commitment and intent for closer collaborative working.  The 
lack of formal strategic documentation or clear coordination or governance processes resulted in a 
general perception that communication of the purpose and focus of the network wasn’t clear, 
resulting in a lack of shared meaning or understanding of the overall purpose and value of the 
network: 
  
‘it's was like herding cats…what happened was that nothing got done…it was a bit of a talking 
shop, yes, a talking shop.  It was pretty directionless’ 
Respondent (I9) 
 
‘it wasn’t clear. I mean, I think it just seemed like different organisations, you know, doing 
their own things…the cities themselves were trying to understand how they could work, 
because they hadn't worked together before’  
Respondent (I14) 
 
Although the cities network was purposefully structured as an informal lobbying network, by 
implication, the press and political focus on the networks activities resulted in an evolving work 
programme that lacked clear strategic purpose or focused direction: 
 
 189 
‘the reason the delivery element is there was…we needed something to do in between the 
policy lobbying, and because of press/political focus.’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
Although the SCDI appointed a programme manager to help resource the facilitation and 
coordination process, perceived weak formal functional mechanisms, including time/resource 
constraints and limited membership, limited the functional capacity of the network: 
   
‘The operational constraint [for cities] is finding some kind of the match funding because 
every council’s discretionary budget has been reduced’  
Respondent (I10) 
 
‘I think we didn’t probably adequately resource the core team within the Cities Alliance, this 
is where it became grey.  We made it quite clear that the network was not SCDI, but we were 
hands on, and it actually became almost like a full-time job. We were actually having to do 
all the work for the cities and write proposals and write their stuff, and that wasn’t 
sustainable.  So I think if I look back and if there were lessons that I learned, it was that we 
didn’t adequately resource it - the cities themselves didn’t recognise how much resource 
intense it would be.  SCDI carried it for quite some time...we actually starved it! I think we 
needed to have the Scottish Government and people like Scottish Enterprise involved’  
Respondent (I18) 
 
The role of formal functional institutions during the identification stage can be perceived to be 
largely the result of: passive facilitation, no governance, lack of strategic direction; poor 
communication, all perceived to have played a key role in shaping cities perception of a lack of 
progress or functional impact value on the cities network.  The PV of the cities network during 
identification stage due to the perceived role of functional mechanisms therefore relates mainly to 
the presence of weak formal institutions (i.e. lack of resources or leadership, poor governance or 
strategic direction). 
 
7.2.3 Behavioural mechanisms during Network Identification: 
 
Strong informal institutions (lack of trust, weak ties, competitive culture) 
 
The culture of cities is recognised as a strong informal institution acting to constrain the social 
relationships between network members within the cities network, particularly given the national 
policy context that historically encourages cities to compete (as a contextual mechanism).  As a 
result, the network ties between the larger cities is perceived as being loose, but also, the ties 
between the larger cities and the smaller cities are also loose, as larger cities tend not the value 
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working with the smaller cities.  The result is that that some of the cities are coming together for 
the first time, resulting in a perceived lack of trust and competitive culture between the cities. 
 
The general attendance of network members during the network process was perceived as largely 
positive and indicative of a general sense of commitment among members to collaborative 
working: 
 
‘the Chief Executives and some Leader’s wouldn’t attend, but by on large, well attended, 
although there was some concern at the start that these individuals had to be kept interested 
to ensure their attendance’. 
Respondent (I20) 
 
The development of the Scottish Government ‘Agenda for Cities’ was viewed as a very difficult 
and stressful time between the cities and the Scottish Government’s ambitions for being more 
formally involved: 
 
‘XX left that team off sick for about six months, very shortly around the time that the SCA 
strategy was published, partly because, I think potentially largely caused, by the stress of 
putting together the strategy. So it was a tense time, I mean, this wasn’t a straightforward 
thing to do.’ 
Respondent (I22)  
 
The tense relationship between the Scottish Government and cities network was also affecting the 
relationship with the SCDI as facilitator of the cities-network: 
 
‘there was some tension that existed between SCDI wanting to do this neutral role and the 
Scottish Government which obviously had political objectives and that they were being 
given for the Alliance too.  But we managed to get through that, and I think the most 
important thing that we managed to achieve, this is beyond my time, but we managed to get 
through the referendum without anybody pulling out of the Alliance’ 
Respondent (I22) 
 
The role of behavioural mechanisms during the network identification stage was a common 
perception of LAs tense relationship with national agencies and other cities (i.e. member conflict), 
affecting the level of member involvement (i.e. member commitment), strength of relationships 
(i.e. membership ties), and a perceived inequality between network members, due largely to diverse 
range of network member characteristics (i.e. membership equality). 
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The six city LAs identification of a city-collaboration opportunity was driven mainly by the cities 
themselves.  Membership commitment and participation at the start of the network process was 
viewed as being relatively easy and consistent (commitment mechanism), particularly whilst 
‘lobbying’ for national policy recognition (agenda mechanism).   
 
The continued and consistent involvement of all the cities throughout the identification stage was 
said to have varied, reflecting a perceived lack of shared commitment for the networks value.  The 
lack of commitment was perceived as being partly due to the economic diversity of cities, but also, 
the existence of a historically weak relationship between some of the city network members: 
 
‘there was a bit of a tension just in terms of a sense of, we’re Glasgow, why do we need this? 
…what are we doing in a room with these much smaller places?’  
Respondent (I18) 
 
 ‘If you look at Perth and Stirling, they do provide a number of commuters and supply chain 
to the larger cities so they have a rightful place, but it did cause a little tensions with the 
bigger cites’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
The historical context of a difficult relationship between Edinburgh and Glasgow (strength of ties) 
was also reflective of previous failed attempts at city-city collaboration (i.e. the Glasgow-
Edinburgh-City Collaboration Initiative).  Therefore, both the historical and economic context of 
cities in Scotland can be viewed as strong external informal institutions influencing the behavioural 
mechanism within the cities-network: 
 
With the SCDI having previously identified a lack of civil servants for ULAs to liaise with, the 
Scottish Government responded by creating a national ‘cities team’ during the SCA identification 
stage.  However, the cities and SCDI would progress the cities collaboration process without 
formally including the Scottish Government’s cities team in all meetings, much to the civil 
servants’ dissatisfaction (tension mechanism), contributing towards ULAs already difficult 
relationship with the Scottish Government.   
 
The cities then approached a formal strengthening of their relationship with other cities through the 
development of a partnership ‘statement of intent’ (commitment mechanism), via SCDI’s 
facilitation of cities signing of the Six Cities Vision.  SCDI’s facilitation of the process reflects their 
already well-established informal relationship with LAs (strength of informal ties) at this stage.   
 
Nearer to the end of the second year of the network identification stage (December 2011), the 
‘political opportunity’ (RI23) from the Scottish Government’s announcement of an ‘Agenda for 
Cities’ during the May 2011, would by implication result in the formalization of the SCA and both 
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Scottish Government and SCDI’s membership within the process.  Although the strength of 
relationship ties between ULAs and the SCDI during the initial informal coordination stages of the 
cities network was perceived favorably, an emerging perception that SCDI had an ‘alternative 
agenda’ (RI14) was perceived as being not in the best interest of cities (weakening informal ties 
and trust).  ULAs tense relationship and mistrust of other national agencies (i.e. Scottish 
Government, COSLA) and other cities (weak ties), was becoming increasingly apparent.   
 
The strong formal political institutions contextualizing the city members of the network are also 
perceived as creating a perceived inequality between network members, further contributing 
towards a lack of trust and weak network ties.  
 
‘the relationship between Glasgow and Edinburgh wasn’t collaborative, it was quite 
competitive’  
Respondent (I12) 
 
The political and economic diversity across ULAs is thus believed to have contributed towards a 
perceived inequality and lack of trust between some city members, particularly the perception that 
ULAs with shared political alignment to national government provided some network members 
with distinct advantage for their relationship with national government, resulting in a lack of trust 
and perceived inequality between some network members.   
 
7.2.4 The Role of Institutions on How ULAC creates PV at ‘Network Identification’ Stage: 
 
The role of institutions on the PV of ULAC relative to what the network looked like during the 
identification stage is provided in Table 20.  
  
Table 20: Sense Making: The role of institutions during ‘Network Identification’  
PROCESS TRACING  ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
Purpose:  
• Political Lobbying 
• Strategic Planning 
 
Configuration 
• City-centric membership 
• Neutral Facilitation 
 
Management:  
• Informal Planning Structure 
• Informal Leadership/Governance 
 
Contextual Institutions*: 
• Strong formal institutions (COSLA; national 
policy; urban economics) 
Functional Institutions: 
• Weak formal institutions (no governance; 
weak strategy/leadership) 
Behavioural institutions:  
• Strong informal institutions (lack of trust, 
weak ties, competitive culture) 
 
*External contextual mechanisms were identified to have had a role across all stages of the network 
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The role of contextual institutional mechanisms makes apparent the complex relationship between 
ULAs and national agencies in Scotland, within a context of austerity government and perceived 
increasing centralisation and performance management of local government.  Given LAs already 
complex relationship with national agencies (e.g. COSLA) between 2010 onwards, SCDI is 
initially viewed as an alternative for providing informal governance of ULAs relationship with the 
Scottish Government.  Cities initial preference for informal links with the Scottish Government 
outwith other more formal routes (i.e. via COSLA), can thus be perceived as reflecting a potential 
inefficiency in existing formal governance institutions in Scotland. 
 
Functional and relationship mechanisms during the identification stage therefore reflect an 
evolving shift in cities relationship and perceived value of SCDI’s role as facilitator and manager 
of the SCA, due to their weak functional facilitation role.  There is also an evolving perception 
among ULAs that SCDI is pursuing an ‘alternative agenda’, resulting in a lack of trust and 
weakening of the existing relationship between ULAs and SCDI.  The context of a lack of strong 
ties between cities also contributes to an environment of mistrust in relationships, as well as the 
political and economic diversity among cities resulting in a perceived inequality and lack of 
commitment from some of the larger cities (i.e. Glasgow).   
 
7.3 Network Implementation (January 2012 – January 2014): the role of institutions 
 
ULAC during the network implementation stage can be described as a formal policy network of 
seven Scottish cities and the Scottish government, formally managed and hosted within the SCDI 
as a quasi-independent organisation, tasked with funding and supporting the development of city 
infrastructure investment plans aimed at contributing towards national economic growth priorities 
for Scotland.    
 
Key events shaping the PV of the network process include: formalising SCA meetings to include 
all Scottish Cities and the Scottish Government’s Minister for Infrastructure and Cities, followed 
by the SCDI’s gradual implementation of new governance arrangements.  The implementation 
stage ends with a significant strategic event following Glasgow’s presentation of a paper at the 
September 2013 Leadership group, for the SCA to create an additional workstream on devolution 
and ‘City Deals’.  The appointment of a new SCDI Chief Executive also took over as chair of the 
Leadership group.  
 
7.3.1 Contextual mechanisms during network implementation 
 
Strong formal institutions (national politics/national agencies policy) 
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The changing external formal policy, political and economic context shaping the development of a 
new cities policy in Scotland is an important mechanism that marks the start of a significant shift in 
Scotland’s focus on urban economic policy in Scotland at the start of 2012.  Following the May 
2011 election and creation of the SCA, the membership and political personalities involved in the 
earlier cities network at identification stages (2010 -2011), changed dramatically during the 
implementation stages (2012-2013).   There was now an SNP-led Scottish Government who first 
introduced the formalisation of the SCA to mark the start of a dedicated cities policy for Scotland, 
including the creation of a dedicated Cities Minister in Scotland for the first time. 
 
Up until the creation of the SCA post-2011, the recognition of cities had had little impact on 
Scottish policy, and Scottish Government policy largely non-spatially focussed.  The Scottish 
Government’s formalisation of the SCA through the ‘Agenda for Cities’ is the first formal policy 
recognition of the economic importance of cities by Scottish politicians and the Scottish 
Government civil service, which embraces the idea that cities can have an important contribution to 
national economic growth. 
  
The political context of Scottish local government also changed during the course of the 
implementation stage, with a local election in May 2012 and SNP overtaking labour to win the 
highest share of the votes, retaining and strengthening its political position (also taking control of 
two LA areas, one being Dundee and a member of the SCA) and more local councillors overall in 
Scotland.  Glasgow retained its majority of Glasgow City Council, and followed with a change to 
the appointment of its Leadership.   The national policy and political institutions in Scotland during 
the implementation stage can be seen to change significantly (for example, the subsequent update 
of the National Performance Framework in December 2011), and affecting the SCA networks 
perceived PV among its members:  
 
‘I think there’s a lot of politics at play, particularly in Scotland, because we went through 
quite a lot of election cycles from when Alliance first started to where we’ve got to now, I’ve 
lost count of the number of elections, including referendums.’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
‘I think at the moment we’re struggling from the fact that, you know, we’ve got different 
agendas and different…you know, Westminster are setting one set of rules and the Scottish 
Government are trying to impose a different set of rules. I think we’re struggling from that, 
you know’ 
Respondent (I14) 
 
The new national politics, the heterogeneous nature of cities and the increasing political diversity 
between SCA city members during the network implementation stage was highlighted as strong 
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formal contextual mechanisms of the network, that can be seen to affect the relationships between 
network members and further implications for the networks functional mechanisms. 
 
In additional to the changing political context, there were also significant changes to the role of 
some national institutions in Scotland. The context of the restructuring of Scottish Enterprise can 
be seen to act as s significant strong national institution affecting their relationship with cities. For 
example, Scottish Enterprise’s support for cities was perceived negatively: 
 
‘they [Scottish Enterprise] just recognised regions, and at that time they’d actually removed 
all the local enterprises.  So they’d dismantled the structure that was there specifically to 
support cities…I’m not saying they went out to undermine [the SCA], but they didn’t do 
anything to support it. (RI20).   
 
Although Scottish Enterprise had already shifted from a spatial to a business focus in the 1990s, 
recent policy changes (including scrapping of Local Economic Forums in 2010) can be seen to 
further reduce the organisations focus on cities, reflected by their lack of support of willingness to 
be involved in the SCA at the identification stage and continuing into the implementation stage. 
 
‘it was recognising that everybody [national agencies in Scotland] has a bit of the jigsaw but 
nobody’s got it all.  So it’s this recognition that you both have to work together’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
There has been increasing tension in local government relating to the delivery of key economic 
development functions, having not been fully prepared to receive new responsibilities from the 
restructuring of Scottish Enterprise, particularly in the South of Scotland, for example: 
 
‘we believe that the restructuring of Scottish Enterprise, and the centralising impetus behind 
that restructuring, has had a negative impact on the economic development and enterprise 
culture in the south of Scotland’ 
 Scottish Affairs Committee (2015) 
 
Therefore, although it is perceived among the SCA members that although not all national agencies 
have a clear role in working and supporting cities, it is thought that by working together within the 
SCA there would be an opportunity to draw on the parts where there is commonality and joint 
interests.  However, the implementation stage can be seen to struggle to secure all the support of all 
those agencies thought important. 
 
7.3.2 Functional mechanisms during network implementation:  
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Strong internal formal institutions: 
 
The role of the SCDI as the chair of the SCA was perceived as an important functional mechanism 
that could help achieve effective impartial co-ordination of the inherent political nature of the SCA 
and varying agendas among both national and city members of the network: 
 
‘there’s this ownership that people don’t necessarily want to give up, so that’s why I think 
having a third party acting as the broker facilitator is perhaps easier to drive it forward, and 
they could stand outside the politics and the different agendas that are maybe operating’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
‘if you look at the models that are emerging like core cities, I actually do think you need it to 
sit outside those structures, because people have their day job and that’s what they’re 
focused to do, that’s what they’re measured on, that’s what they’re accountable for.  I think 
you need that independent thinking that can move at a pace and has no axe to grind.’  
Respondent (I18) 
 
The Scottish Government made clear that SCDI would take on a neutral facilitation role of the 
SCA in the ‘Agenda for Cities’, although there is an apparent perception of a hidden level of 
control of the SCA on Scottish Government’s behalf: 
 
‘they wanted to be the ones who facilitated the cities’ collaboration. Like, they wanted to take a 
governance role really.  It was clear that they were determining what happened and what didn’t 
happen.  Soft power and influence if you like rather than rules.  So you couldn’t point to a 
government structure, but it was absolutely clear that, you know, ministers want this to happen 
and don’t want that to happen.’ 
Respondent (II8) 
 
However, SCDI’s role as chair of the SCA was now of a more formal nature (than was previously 
during the identification stage), albeit a hidden level of control from the Scottish Government.  
Furthermore, the perception of network member’s rationale for participating in a more formalised 
SCA structures is understood to be largely a reflection of Scottish Government’s contribution of 
resources through the creation of a ‘Cities Investment Fund’: 
 
‘the perception was that the Cities Alliance was very much, you know, there was a pot of 
money which was government money’  
Respondent (II8) 
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‘to be honest with you, I think if the funding wasn’t available, I think we [the cities] 
probably wouldn’t be at the table, you know…there has to be an incentive, you know. So, 
yeah, I think their funding is probably crucial actually to making sure that, you know, the 
whole process has a future. 
Respondent (I12) 
 
Although the new SCA structures brought with it policy funding, which was initially perceived as 
an attractive incentive to help cities stay involved in the network, the evolving strategic direction of 
the process is viewed to be confusing and without high value among the members, resulting in a 
gradual perception that the formal structures of the SCA are a major drawback from having more 
money from the Scottish Government.  For example, the formalisation of the structures meant that 
the nature of the governance increased and now included all the lead politicians as well as Chief 
Executives from all the ULAS, as a result, the changing nature of governance wasn’t perceived 
positively:  
 
 ‘The chief execs have struggled to find their role, really.  They don't really have, they don't 
say anything, really, on the leadership groups…. they’ve kind of been given a portfolio 
responsibility, and they all meet themselves to discuss taking it forward. Whereas the chief 
execs in the core cities group, they have a role.  They're there to the deliver’ 
Respondent (I21) 
 
‘I think the danger is that what happens, is the kind of bureaucracy of the public sector then 
creeps in, and if anything we were trying to have it sit outside those frameworks…then it 
actually starts to creep, it creeps, and it then stops your organisation from moving at the pace 
that it needs to move.’  
Respondent (I20)  
 
Indeed, the governance processes involved a Leadership Group (made up of the city leaders) and a 
Delivery Group (made up of council officers), their role was perceived unclear as well as the 
strategic focus of the Agenda for Cities unwelcomed and thought too strategically high level and 
purely there for the purposes of the Scottish Government’s manoeuvre to be involved: 
 
‘SCA governance arrangements weren’t clear. I mean it just seemed like different 
organisations were just doing their own things’  
Respondent (I14)  
 
‘The Scottish Government wanted to be at the table and they put money in to bring them to 
the table. And that's where the Agenda for Cities fitted in. I think that also slowed the SCA 
progress for about a year’. 
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Respondent (I21) 
 
‘The [Agenda for Cities] objectives were too high level’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
‘overarching aspirations are clear, but individual targets/milestones aren't as clear. So there 
weren't milestones for investment clear at the time. There was a clear action plan however, 
but no targets’ 
Respondent (I15) 
 
 
Although the formalisation process brought with it funding, this meant having to also realign the 
cities-network evolving activity into a national strategic programme that better ‘fitted’ with the 
Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’, as opposed to be city-centric.  The process of 
realignment was perceived as unstrategic and in itself, unfocussed and limiting for the group: 
 
 ‘There wasn't any real analysis done before the projects were chosen…the cities just threw 
in things, like Green Deal, Digital Connectivity.  But there was no understanding of what 
that meant, and what outcomes they were wanting to be achieved’ 
Respondent (I21) 
 
Albeit strategic realignment towards a national focus was apparent, there is still a perceived 
underlying ‘delivery focus’ of the group that is though to be undermining the strategic 
infrastructure focus of the SCA in the ‘Agenda for Cities’.  For example, the refocusing of the 
group at this stage to be wider than a focus on infrastructure, was perceived as: 
 
 ‘a missed opportunity’ in that ‘the cities team do not have, or are not allowed to have, a role 
that says, right, education. Get in here and explain what you do for cities. That was just not 
where they are contextually or organisationally’ 
Respondent (RI8) 
 
There is also an increasing perception that the delivery focus of the SCA is overshadowing the 
importance of the strategic role city members would prefer the SCA to focus on: 
 
‘it is much more about getting project a and b done to politicians steer and without thinking 
about the medium or longer term agenda.’ 
Respondent (I7) 
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‘XX took a paper to them [SCA members], I think XX sprung it at a dinner out the back 
pocket and called for the abolition of Scottish Enterprise, instead of Development Scotland, 
asking for their functions to be transferred from central government to local government…it 
was September 2013…this is what the SCA should be doing, the cities should have control 
of all of this activity… XX was disappointed by the way it ended up.  The government said, 
oh, we need to have a wee look, and it just dragged on and dragged on, and I think that gives 
you an example of the lack of dynamism in it.’ 
Respondent (I9) 
 
The SCDI progressed to support the management of the cities collaboration process until the 
Scottish Government put in additional resources, and it became apparent that there was a perceived 
lack of skills among the team facilitating the SCA, that was restricting the SCA’s capacity to take 
the process forward effectively during implementation stages: 
 
‘the programme management was maybe not the appointment I would have made…but it 
was the cities’ choice, and it was a bit more in desperation really than thinking through…we 
probably should have carried it rather than making the appointment we did.’ 
Respondent (I18) 
 
‘I think the first director of the Alliance wasn’t an influence, or wasn’t a senior influence, 
and therefore the direction of travel and the content of the programme wasn’t visionary, 
ambitious, stretching’ 
Respondent (I8) 
 
‘I guess the initial director maybe just found it quite difficult to look after…it was quite 
tricky for and also SCDI didn’t have a chief exec.  I mean I always felt the strategic 
leadership role was missing; it was quite operational – organising meetings and 
things…more operational than strategic.  Partly that was needed to get off on a sound footing 
and running the nuts and bolts but it wasn’t taking it in a particular direction and I also think 
but there was a bit of a flux in the SCDI: there wasn’t chief exec for one.’  
Respondent (I10) 
 
Therefore, alongside a lack of sufficient skills is the apparent lack of strategic direction or 
leadership of the SCA.  Apart from appointing the wrong people to support the SCA at early 
implementation stage, there was a sense that individuals did not have the right mix of skills or 
experience either.  Indeed, the various staff changes during 2013 meant that both the SCDI and 
SCA staff were without management or leadership for a period of time, resulting in a lack of focus 
and clarity of evolving governance arrangements:     
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‘I didn't understand that there was a vision, which six of the city leaders had signed up to, in 
advance of the Agenda for Cities... It was all guesswork’ 
Respondent (I14) 
 
There is a perception that the people resources supporting the SCA network lack sufficient 
knowledge or skills, perceived as an inefficient functional mechanism: 
 
‘a specific example is the publication of a piece of work, and the new team in SCA wanted 
changes which delayed things to the extent where we almost missed a deadline due to a lack 
of understanding about what was needed’ 
Respondent (I15) 
 
The SCAs formal processes lacked authority or credibility among city members: 
 
‘my line of command and control is very clear for me which really relates to my own 
organisation..their command and control is limited, I can't take direction from the SCA 
Delivery group’ 
Respondent (I15) 
 
It is apparent therefore, that the role of weak functional mechanisms during the implementation stage 
(poor strategic clarity; hidden agendas; lack of direct leadership, a lack of skilled staff, are all 
contributing towards a low perceived PV of the SCA network at this stage. 
 
7.3.3 Behavioural mechanisms during network implementation: 
 
Strong informal institutions:  
 
The informal competitive nature and culture of city members is perceived as affecting the strength 
of network ties and level trust between the network members: 
 
‘politicians are always going to look for what their cities get out of it’ 
Respondent (I13) 
 
There is also a perceived network tension between the various members of the network, due to 
varying ambitions for the role of the SCA.  A perceived tension between the national members of 
the SCA network, relates to their lack of authority that the SCA has over its members, and in 
particular, a ‘hidden’ element of control being excerpted on the behalf of the Scottish Government: 
 
‘Another concern has been the constant vying for control between the SCDI team and 
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Scottish Governments team’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
As well as an apparent tension between the national agencies in the SCA, there is also a perceived 
lack of trust between some members of the network due perceived hidden agendas: 
 
‘XX was pursing X career by keeping a hand in on this interesting project, continuing to 
chair it meanwhile not taking any concern over us the SCA staff’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
During network implementation, network members are developing their connections and 
relationships with other members of cities network in Scotland, via the development of projects and 
sharing of information and resources.   
 
The role of underlying behavioural mechanisms during the implementation stage of the SCA can 
be seen to play a key role in shaping the perceived value and lack of strategic clarity during the 
SCAs management at this stage. 
 
Cities relationship with the Scottish Government within the SCA in particular, is thought: 
 
 ‘their relationship with the government should not be embedded within the SCA’  
Respondent (I13) 
 
A clear difference between what the cities want the SCA to be and what the Scottish Government 
wants the SCA to be is a clear behavioural mechanism during the implementation stage, which is 
contributing towards a network tension and weakening relationship between ULAs and the Scottish 
Government.  
 
Even although they were trying to steer it from the background, they didn’t want to take lead role: 
 
‘It was seen as very much SCDI would play this trusted intermediary role in the sense that, you 
know, looking round the table none of the cities wanted to chair it.  The government said they 
didn’t want to lead it, so we had to find somebody who would.’ 
Respondent (I8) 
 
Given that the Scottish Government were attempting to steer the direction of the group in a hidden 
way, could be seen to add to the tension and mistrust in their relationship.  There was also a clear 
behavioural mechanism from an evolving agenda nearer to the end of the implementation stage, 
with Glasgow presenting a paper for a new cities policy focus, that by implication, triggered a new 
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work stream of the group to consider powers of LAs (different to that currently being pursued by 
the SCA ‘Agenda for Cities’), that also widened the relationship with government.  
 
The paper provides a briefing to all SCA members, highlighting the need for cities to embark on a 
different relationship with the Scottish Government and a markedly different ‘strategic and 
political agenda’ to that set out in the ‘Agenda for Cities’.   At this time, it was also apparent that 
some of the city members had varying agendas that can be seen to influence the strategic direction 
of the group: 
 
‘at this same time, the leaders of the cities, were becoming more exposed to and involved in 
the Cities Alliance.  And there was at times a, kind of, open questioning by the leadership in 
X City about why are we involved in this.  Should we just bail out of this? This is not really 
our show’ 
Respondent (I8) 
 
‘I noticed that when the cities stopped chairing it, the directors from the cities stop attending.  
That was a little worrying, and I wonder whether gradually, the thing that happens with these 
groups, the more it gets delegated downwards, if the centre isn’t strong and the cities not 
being fully involved, it will just be seen as a talking shop’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
‘The delivery group meetings started to not happen….that never happened before’ 
Respondent (I21)  
 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that the functional mechanisms were poorly perceived as being weak, 
given their lack of strategic clarity, as well as different levels of commitment among its members.  
Indeed, the level of commitment that was firs demonstrated at the identification stage is seen to be 
starting to fall amongst the members.  
 
The culture of conflict among local government institutions is again apparent at this stage, and it is 
also a common feature when collaborating on policy and a key reason why quasi-regional 
government structures for collaboration ‘seldom arise spontaneously’ due to an unwillingness of 
local governments to develop ‘joint authorities with formal decision-making powers’ (Hulst van 
Monfort, 2012: 131).  The observation of the role of institutional mechanisms during the 
implementation stage are therefore consistent with the perceived implications of the formalisation 
of the SCA as contributing towards a growing tension between network members.  
 
7.3.4 The Role of Institutions on how ULAC creates PV at ‘Network Implementation’ stage: 
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Table 21: Sense-making of key events for the role of institutions on the PV of ULAC during 
‘Network Implementation’ 
 
PROCESS TRACING  CAUSAL ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
Purpose:  
• Public Resource Allocation 
• Strategic Planning 
 
Configuration:  
• Mixed/expanding membership 
• National Agency-led 
 
Management:  
• Formal Quasi-Regional Structure 
• Formal Leadership/Governance 
 
Contextual mechanism:  
• Strong formal institutions (national 
politics/policy) 
Functional mechanism: 
• Strong formal institutions (governance, 
strategies) 
Behavioural institutions:  
• Strong informal institutions (lack of trust; 
agendas) 
 
The announcement of the ‘Agenda for Cities’ signals a policy formalisation of the SCA, contrary to 
cities preference for an informal relationship with national agencies.  Furthermore, the creation of a 
cities team in the Scottish Government to support the implementation of the SCA and associated 
funding, by implication, will bring with a requirement for performance management and clearer 
governance, within an already tense context of creeping centralisation of national government’s 
approach to local government.    
 
The new SCA governance structures introduced by the Scottish Government suggests their 
essential role in establishing formal structures to aid collaboration between Scotland’s cities, to 
support the variation in physical, social, economic and political homophily between the cities and 
help ensure a focus on national inclusive growth.  With SCA governance arrangements still 
somewhat incomplete and evolving, the inclusion of the Scottish Government as a member of the 
network sees the membership dynamic change significantly and injecting a different level of 
political seniority to the group.  The Scottish Government’s membership can be seen to undermine 
the SCDI’s role as chair.  As a result, the SCDI’s role as chair can be seen as being passive and 
without significant influence on the networks effectiveness.  
 
7.4 Network Growth (January 2014 – June 2016): the role of institutions 
 
7.4.1 Contextual mechanisms during network growth 
 
Strong formal institutions 
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There were two significant national political events during the growth stages of the SCA, seen to 
act as strong formal institutional mechanisms: A referendum on Scottish independence from the 
United Kingdom on 18 September 2014, followed by a 2016 Scottish Parliament election on 
Thursday 5 May 2016.  Both events are perceived as important contextual mechanisms for the 
SCA. 
 
The political significance of a Scottish referendum and newly elected SNP-led majority parliament 
for the first time since Holyrood's establishment, overlapped the growth stages of the SCA, and 
politically, can be seen to provide fresh momentum to a ‘formerly moribund debate about the 
powers available to local authorities’ (Lowndes and Garner, 2016: 6), with increasing calls for 
greater scrutiny of local government autonomy and demarcation of funding powers across local 
government in Scotland.  
 
The apparent shifting strategic focus of the SCA coincides with the post-2015 referendum, 
reflected in Glasgow’s increasing ambitions for city collaboration approach that is comparable to 
the ‘English Core Cities’22.  The UK national context of cities policy in the UK is a strong external 
mechanism affecting Scotland’s cities increasing understanding of, and ambitions, for greater 
autonomy and devolution of powers for local government, and a key formal contextual 
mechanisms affecting cities strategic ambitions and political agenda for steering the SCA towards a 
more cities-led approach.  For example, in August 2014, Glasgow joined the English Core Cities 
Group: 
 
‘[Glasgow] likes being part of the core cities, because there’s a size and a scale to that.  
Edinburgh were invited along, came along, really liked the look of it and then took it back 
and said that they couldn't support it because they saw it as being, not anti-government, but 
potentially pushing the government on certain things…so the only city in Scotland that could 
come close to Glasgow in size and scale is still thinking, I don't want to rock the boat that 
much…. I’m not suggesting that Glasgow wants to rock the boat, but our position would 
always be that we're in it for Glasgow’ 
Respondent (I9) 
 
In September 2014, the ‘City Growth Commission’ published a report on the outcome of a twelve-
month inquiry that considered the ‘signiﬁcant power shift away from the centre and towards cities’ 
in England, aimed at: 
 
                                                 
22 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland’s main economic development agency, aimed at supporting the delivery of national economic growth 
in Scotland.  On 1 April 2008, the skills function of Scottish Enterprise moved out of the organisation to the newly formed Skills 
Development Scotland. 
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‘inﬂuencing all political parties in the run up to the 2015 UK General Election, and make the 
case for cities to take a new role in our political economy….the UK economy is falling short 
of its potential as our cities, with their concentration of labour, capital and information ﬂows, 
are stiﬂed by the overt centralisation of policy decision-making... the UK’s default mode of 
centralisation which emerged over the last half century, still represents a signiﬁcant hurdle’ 
Cities Growth Commission (September, 2014) 
 
The UK City Growth Commission focus on city region devolution is taking place within a context 
of national power being tightly retained by the Scottish Government. Glasgow’s membership of the 
English Core Cities Group23 is an important external contextual mechanism seen to affect the 
functional and behavioural mechanisms at this stage in the networks process. 
 
‘going towards the election I think there will be significant changes on how the SCA works 
and it is under resourced, given its aspirations, so there has to be a reassessment of the SCA 
aspirations, and in particular, this will have a political challenge and the city deals are in 
opposite direction to collaboration and will really require competition between cities’  
Respondent (I15) 
 
‘UK cities are currently buoyed by greater local autonomy through city deals and devolution 
deals and are enjoying first mover advantage in setting conditions for success based on local 
circumstances and clearer joint working between local government, national government, 
agencies and the private sector…Current economic trends indicate that although Scotland’s 
cities remain drivers of the national economy, they risk falling behind UK counterparts in 
this highly competitive environment’ 
City Devolution paper (2015)  
 
 ‘You’ve now got Glasgow and the Clyde Valley City Deal, we’re working on one in 
Midlothian and Edinburgh, but also Inverness and Aberdeen as well, so there’s a huge 
amount of very, very positive economic activity going on. I think Glasgow and the Clyde 
Valley one was driven very much by Glasgow and the Clyde Valley.  I think although the 
Cities Alliance is now becoming supportive of the other local authorities pushing these City 
Deals, none of them have been delivered in Scotland beyond the Clyde Valley one just yet.  
But there’s no reluctance to support them, Keith Brown is the relevant minister who’s been 
very, very supportive of our own over here, Edinburgh and Midlothian.  I don’t think you 
                                                 
23 The Core Cities Group (also English Core Cities, UK) is a self-selected and self-financed collaborative advocacy group of large 
regional cities in the United Kingdom and outside Greater London. The group was formed in 1995 as a partnership of eight city 
councils: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, and Sheffield. (Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_Cities_Group) 
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can claim that any have been delivered because of the Cities Alliance yet. Hopefully soon 
though.’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
How cities and city policy manifests in terms of the relationship between Holyrood and Scotland’s 
major city-regions is fundamental context to the perceived strategic value and direction of the SCA 
during the growth stage.  City Deals reflect tripartite negotiated settlements involving a coalition of 
local authorities, the Scottish Government and HM Government agreeing to a set of commitments 
over a 20 to 30 year period, focussed on infrastructure investments along with labour market and 
welfare policies in some instances. The tripartite nature of city deals.  Therefore, the SCA can be 
seen to shift its political focus towards greater collaboration across Scotland’s main ULAs focussed 
on lobbying, as well as ‘asking’, for a redistribution of policy and power across Scotland’s ULAs, 
similar to the English ‘core cities’, and positioning for ‘city deals ‘across Scotland.   
 
Indeed, coinciding with the network growth stages, a key contextual mechanism has been the 
precedent for city dealing that Glasgow set, with other cities lobbying for City Deals in Scotland 
thereafter.  By implication, Glasgow’s first move in securing a City Deal developed support from  
Westminster and Holyrood governments, which was announced prior to the Scottish independence 
referendum in September 2015, acting as a strong political institution. 
 
It is apparent therefore, that the political context in Scotland and ULAs complex relationship with 
national agencies, in particular, the Scottish Government and COSLA, is far from straight forward, 
coinciding with the development of the SCA between 2010 and 2016.  Indeed, during 2015, four 
LAs (i.e. Aberdeen City Council, Glasgow City Council, Renfrewshire Council and South 
Lanarkshire Council) also left COSLA to form a new organisation, the Scottish Local Government 
Partnership (SLGP).  The four LAs who left COSLA were all labour-led LAs at the time, reflecting 
dissatisfaction with funding settlements from a newly elected SNP-led Scottish Government around 
this time: 
 
‘I think local government is going to go through a period of quite big change post May 2016 
once the next Holyrood elections are out of the way because everybody knows the status quo 
is not tenable, and government ministers even say privately they know that the Council Tax 
freezes are unsustainable’ 
 Respondent (I12) 
7.4.2 Functional mechanisms during network growth:  
 
Strong formal institutions (development of informal structures to counteract presence of strong 
formal institutions) 
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During the network growth stage, Government funding was not regarded as the most important 
factor for encouraging cities to work together, indeed, it was found to be a rather small amount in 
order to keep cities interest, as one city member states: 
 
‘I mean, I think the alternative to the Scottish Governments’ funding support of the SCA is 
money from the cities and the potential of other external funds, whether it’s European or 
elsewhere.  It’s £7m across seven cities in the whole of Scotland…I am not bemoaning it or 
saying that they’ll think I don’t want it, of course we’ll have it, but in the greater scheme of 
things it’s quite small’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
The incentive of Scottish Government funding appears to no longer be the main incentive to 
encourage the cities to work together, as was the case during the implementation stage.  The 
indication is that the incentive of cities as members of the group are therefore changing.  During 
this time, there is a significant change to proposed governance structures once again, although, 
driven mainly by the cities and without full buy-in or involvement of all members of the network: 
 
‘There was no input from the Alliance core team, or the delivery group.  It was very much 
drafted in isolation.   And that is one aspect of it I find, which I don't think is...it goes back 
again to how we approached things at the very beginning, about how they chose projects. 
The reason for choosing those projects was not informed. The reasons for the things being in 
the vision document, it's not informed as well, in terms of what the Alliance was already 
doing.’ 
Respondent (I21) 
 
The start of the development of a new strategic approach of the network during the growth stage is 
largely perceived as a ‘hidden’ approach, non-transparent, and not being delivered via the formal 
governance structures that are in place.  In this sense, the formal governance can be seen as weak 
and to have a fundamental effect on the direction of the network towards a cities focussed agenda, 
as city members are seen to be developing their own approach to collaboration alongside, or 
indeed, outwith the formal SCA structures put in place previously.   Although the SCA governance 
arrangements are being reviewed again, it is perceived as a difficult process for the network, 
possibly a reflection of the untransparent nature in which it is taking place: 
 
‘within the confines of the SCA and as currently structured, raises some confusion as to who 
should chair: whether it should be deputy first minister or someone from the cities, in terms 
of a political leader, as it is now. This has been resolved with the leader of the capital city 
now chairing but there is still a lack of clarity in terms of function and purpose.’ 
Respondent (I23) 
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‘we’ve changed the structure, it’s been quite a journey to get there getting the government on 
board… the fact the a minister isn't chairing things allows the cities to be a bit more 
reflective about prioritise…we basically organised a couple of private meetings where the 
seven city leaders met without the minister or others present. I mean, it’s important to say at 
that time a few of the cities were still SNP led, four Labour led, so there’s still a cross-party 
mix. And everybody was in agreement that we should try and move it towards being more 
cities-led. But there’s reluctance with a small r, on behalf of the Scottish Government, there 
was quite a lot just to go down this route of a political chair of the Cities Alliance and also a 
division away from all six meetings being with the minister.  But over the course of the last 
few months we’ve kept them with us. there’s just been a bit of a reluctance to let go of those 
controls, and I think there is a political issue and it’s an irony, isn’t it, Scottish Government 
obviously testing more powers for Holyrood, but pushing them down to local councils is not 
one of their priorities…there is a very broad level of support both amongst the seven leaders 
and the seven chief execs for the direction of travel.  The slight resistance has not been from 
those quarters, it’s more been from central Scottish Government.  So there is strong sense 
that council leaders, to be fair, that’s all seven across the political spectrum and the chief 
executives are quite up for going down this route.’  
Respondent (I12) 
 
The lack of transparency in the development of the new SCA governance structures, to include a 
cities only-group and city-politician chairing the group is a strong response to create informal 
structures over and above the weak formal functional governance mechanisms can be seen to no long 
act as s constraint on the networks PV.  The strategic focus of the SCA during the growth stage thus 
changed significantly, as a new strategic director was appointed and put in place a new operational 
plan, which allocated new areas of responsibility across members of the group.  The previous 
programme manager was replaced with a programme director who was a Chief Executive of one of 
the other councils.  This was good for strengthening the city-city relationships with the director and 
helping to build trust between the other city members. 
 
‘you've now got a chair who can resolve the issues, before they even happen!’  
Respondent (I20) 
 
‘…there was a negotiation to be had in terms of short term political aims of the SCA, and 
longer term stability, so a resolution was had by changing one of the SCA posts to become a 
more senior post, and removing another post. 
Respondent (I23) 
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Importantly, the process was seen as keeping the cities on board given their falling commitment and 
value of the network during the previous stage of the networks formalisation: 
 
‘by demonstrating to the leader's that we could actually deliver something, that was why the 
infrastructure work was important, because what it said to the leaders was 'hang on a minute, 
these guys can work together and they can deliver something helpful for them as politicians. 
Respondent (I13) 
 
The perception of new revised SCA governance arrangements is their ability to provide stronger 
leadership that best suits the ambitions of city network members:  
 
‘the governance is clear and a very clear hierarchy and lead city politicians etc., and a 
willingness to make this work. There is a general commitment and clear roles… at least now 
things can be taken back to the delivery group, which does feel a bit heavy handed’  
Respondent (I15) 
 
The influence of the new political chair is seen as a strong formal institutional mechanism: 
 
‘I've noticed a big difference. Because he's able to do that reassurance. So I've noticed that, 
because he's able to step in, and do all that reassurance bit, that you kind of, that... I: That 
you needed. R: ...I needed. The team needed. So it didn't become a stepping on tiptoes trying 
to predict what everyone would think, all that’ 
Respondent (I20) 
 
The changing nature of the SCA during the growth stage is thus perceived as a positive outcome 
for the value of the SCA among city members.  The process has meant clarifying the focus for 
collaboration, largely on joint promotion of cities for the purposes of inward investment.  Clearer 
focus for the group is useful in reducing areas of conflict. 
 
7.4.3  Behavioural mechanisms during network growth:  
 
Weak informal institutions (strengthening network ties, trust) 
 
The previous stages of the network demonstrated the presence of strong informal mechanisms 
hindering the value of the network, including weak ties between the cities, and between the cities 
and national organisations.  There was also the appearance of significant conflict between the 
Scottish Government and city members, as well as a general sense that the culture of 
competitiveness between cities was hindering the collaborative nature of relationships.   
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However, the changing functional nature of the SCA (as informal structures are introduced to work 
alongside the strong formal governance function of the SCA), during the growth stage can be seen 
to strengthen network relationships over time.  In particular, the nature of ties between the larger 
cities and smaller cities is changing, as cities are starting to recognise the value from knowledge 
sharing on ‘city deals’ and what opportunities and value that presents to cities across Scotland:  
 
‘I would definitely say that being part of the SCA has helped us with some of the thinking 
and some of the work on city deals…so back towards the end of last year we were working 
with Scottish futures trust.  I was making the point that the city deals for Glasgow and the 
growth accelerator Edinburgh were developing was great but those were already quite 
purged dynamic places and we needed to show that this was bringing some value to other 
parts of Scotland.  So Scottish futures trust said, well you guys seem to have quite a good 
clear strategy where you want to go – I’m paraphrasing a bit – but we would like to help you 
because we can see that the growth accelerator model could well be applicable for what you 
are trying to achieve and so we started to do some work with them just around the Christmas 
period last year (2014) and that’s really developed into some of the work we are doing for 
our city region deal.’ 
Respondent (I10) 
 
‘I think there has been a significant amount of institutional learning which is intangible and 
difficult to measure, but I think the cities relationships have led to them learning from each 
other and I think that partnership will probably make for smoother working in the years 
ahead, the relationship building element has been a big success. In particular the smaller 
cities have been getting investment and promotional experience from the larger cities’ 
Respondent (I15) 
 
‘For example, Perth was on the only city who had a strategic investment fund of £million, 
and Glasgow didn't even have that, So there has been room to learn what each other was 
doing. So, we have learnt for each other.’ 
Respondent (I7) 
 
There is a sense of an improved relationship between the cities, although city-city relationships 
appear to be strengthening, the relationship with the Scottish Government doesn’t appear to have 
changed in any significant positive direction so as to act to improve the relationship within the 
SCA: 
 
‘I think the cities don't welcome them on the group, mainly due to local politics and 
competing priorities, and that the Scottish government don't understand what the cities 
contribute’ 
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Respondent (I15)   
 
 
‘there’s no doubt having X in the chair, has changed the dynamic because you don’t have an 
independent person in your chair.  So that has changed the dynamic, but then again…they’ve 
gone along with it, there’s been tension but so far so good.’  
Respondent (I12) 
 
Furthermore, although the Scottish Government reluctantly went along with the new SCA structures, 
the role of some of the larger cities is perceived as slightly unbalanced and potentially acting to 
hinder the overall relationship of cities with the Scottish Government.  The relationship is being 
tested due to cities increasing desire for greater powers for local authorities: 
 
‘Every decision Glasgow makes on the group is politically based, and this differs to the other 
cities, because it is the biggest city and has a larger profile and in reality if Glasgow wasn't a 
member, then the SCA would be undermined, and Glasgow know they are important in that 
respect’ 
Respondent (I15)  
 
‘there’s just been a bit of a reluctance to let go of those controls, and I think there is a 
political issue and it’s an irony, isn’t it, Scottish Government obviously testing more powers 
for Holyrood but pushing them down to local councils is not one of their priorities.’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
Therefore, although city ties have strengthened, largely a result of informal mechanisms, there is 
the apparent balance of power within the network more on the side of larger cities: 
 
 ‘Glasgow didn't play a role in the SCA from the outset...but they have now got to this point 
as a massive step forward.’  
Respondent (I23) 
 
‘I think a combination of Edinburgh and Glasgow, to be honest are the drivers behind it 
now.’ 
Respondent (I12) 
 
If the network is to be successful and inclusive, however, the institutional structure must be seen to 
meet the diverse needs of all its members, including small cities, like Perth, and larger cities, like 
Glasgow and Edinburgh.  SCA members are suggesting that the SCA was being used at this stage 
to lobby and push for city deals for the cities.  Aspirations for ‘city-deals’ by city members of the 
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SCA can help explain preferences for the evolving plural governance structures and cities-only 
group, comparable to a English core-cities model, as highlighted by one members of the SCA:  
 
‘The Core Cities Network is very much of the cities and by the cities.  The secretariats are in 
Manchester City Council and they structure their meetings where they invite a government 
minister in, and then they kick them out again.  They publish papers, they lobby, they talk to 
industry, it’s very pro-active’  
Respondent (I13)   
 
A second report to the SCA Leadership group during March 2015: ‘Glasgow and the Core Cities 
Network’, briefed the SCA members on Glasgow’s role as a member of the English Core Cities 
group. The paper highlights key points of relevance underlying the emerging structure of the SCA: 
 
‘Core Cities describes itself as a unique and united local authority voice to promote the role 
of UK’s cities in driving economic growth…arguing for greater devolution of power and 
responsibility to cities and city-regions….Glasgow’s position is that there is a danger for the 
Scottish cities that it may appear that powers have been devolved, but as long as they remain 
at national parliament level, we could be left behind our English and Welsh counterparts’  
 ‘Glasgow and the Core Cities Network’ (March 2015) 
 
By implication, the paper suggests that city members’ of the SCA are steering the SCAs structure 
towards one comparable with the English Core Cities, and potentially explaining the resulting 
cities-only structure that emerged during the growth stages.  Key relationship mechanisms help to 
explain members’ perceived value and desire for plural structures within the SCA, relative to 
‘membership agendas’ for city-deal models and core-city structures.   
 
Therefore, if the city relationships within the SCA continue to strengthen as suggested and the SCA 
structures continue to change, then as one interviewee points out there is even more potential for 
the SCA to mirror the English Core Cities model. 
 
7.4.4  The Role of Institutions on how ULAC creates PV at ‘Network Growth’ Stage: 
 
 
 
Table 22: Sense-making of key events for the role of institutions on the PV of ULAC during 
‘Network Implementation ‘growth stage. 
PROCESS TRACING  CAUSAL ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
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Purpose:  
• Public Resource Allocation 
• Operational and Project Delivery 
• Strategic Policy Making 
• Political Lobbying 
Configuration: 
•  Mixed/expanding membership 
• City-led (Political)  
Management:  
• Formal Quasi-Regional Structures  
• Informal Planning Structures 
• Formal Political Leadership 
• Formal Strategic Leadership 
Contextual Institutions:  
• Strong formal institutions (national 
politics/policy) 
Functional Institutions: 
• Strong formal institutions (development of 
informal structures to counteract presence of 
strong inefficient formal institutions) 
Behavioural institutions:  
• Weak informal institutions (strengthening 
network ties, trust) 
 
 
The causal role of institutions on the PV of ULAC at the growth stage can be seen to contribute 
towards positive outcome and PV of the SCA from a cities perspective.  The strengthening of 
relationships between the cities as a result of weaker informal mechanism acting to support the 
networks PV, albeit there is still the presence of a loose ties with national agencies.  Furthermore, 
weak informal institutions appear to be having a more dominant and positive effect on the PV of 
the network, as they are seen to over ride the negative PV of strong formal governance (and 
development of informal structures), that act to create weak formal functional mechanisms overall.  
 
 However, the remaining loose ties between the cities and national agencies increases the 
possibility that the SCA may collapse in future, due to increasing hostility and strategic differences 
between cities and Scottish Government.  This therefore implies that the further stages of the 
network would be either: further growth or network failure. 
 
7.5 Conclusions: The Role of Institutions on the PV of ULAC 
 
Chapter seven has revealed substantial differences in the typology of, positioning and power of key 
actors within the policy network.  The findings highlight the key role of institutions, and more 
particularly institutional differences between network members and at different stage of the 
networks development.  
 
Network Identification was focused on building recognition of the need for a coordinated cities 
policy in Scotland, to reveal a missing tier of governance between cities, and between cities and the 
Scottish Government.  Network Implementation highlights the implications of creating and 
implementing formal governance structures through a nationally recognised city collaboration 
structure in Scotland, to reveal an underlying complexity of institutional distance across both 
national and subnational tiers of Government.  Table 23 provides a summary of the perceived role 
of different institutional mechanisms across the three network stages, to reveal how they develop in 
a ‘contextual, path-dependent way’ (Bathult and Glucker, 2014: 342).   
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Table 23: Sense-Making: Conceptualising Matrix (PART A) - The Role of Institutions for the Public Value (PV) of the SCA 
 Functional and institutional dimensions (sense-making statements) -  institutions are either weak (lack of constraint) or strong 
(well-developed constraint) 
 
Network 
phase 
Contextual mechanism  
(external to the network): 
Functional mechanism  
(internal to the network): 
Behavioural mechanisms 
(internal and external to the network): 
Total combination of 
institutional mechanisms 
T1 Strong formal institutions 
- Weak role of COSLA; 
- Weak impact of national policy (reduced 
public funding; role of cities); 
- The negative implication of urban 
economic diversity between cities; 
- Culture of city competitiveness.  
Weak formal institutions: 
- No governance; 
- Unfocussed strategy; 
- Poor communication; 
- No resources. 
 
 
Strong informal institutions: 
- Cities competitive culture; 
- Weak ties; 
- Lack of Trust.  
• Formal contextual 
mechanism (strong) 
• Formal functional 
mechanism (weak) 
• Informal behavioural 
mechanism (strong) 
T2 Strong formal institutions 
- Changing national politics; 
- Changing national policy (increasing 
centralisation of cities – SOAs); 
- Lack of national agency involvement 
(e.g. Scottish Enterprise).  
Strong formal institutions: 
- Resources; 
- Two strategies; 
- Confused delivery and strategic 
focus; 
- Lack of skills; 
- Weak leadership from chair 
- Hidden leadership of Scottish 
government; 
- Fluctuating membership. 
Strong informal institutions  
- Lack of trust; 
- Membership inequality; 
- Lack of commitment;  
- Hidden agendas; 
- Network tensions. 
• Formal contextual 
mechanism (strong) 
• Formal functional 
mechanism (strong) 
• Informal behavioural 
mechanism (strong) 
T3 Strong formal institutions  
- Increased national recognition and input 
from other national agencies (Scottish 
futures trust; European funding)’ 
- Changing national and local politics; 
- Changing national policy context 
(English core city deals). 
Strong formal institutions 
- Improved leadership and position of 
chair 
- Increasing resources/national 
membership involvement; 
- Clear structures to serve cities 
expectations; 
- Development of informal structures 
to counteract presence of strong 
weak formal institutions. 
Weak informal institutions: 
- Strengthening city-city network ties; 
- Improving membership trust; 
- Network tensions with Scottish 
Government remains 
- Influencing role of larger cities 
agenda. 
 
• Formal contextual 
mechanism (strong) 
• Formal functional 
mechanism (Strong) 
• Informal behavioural 
mechanism (weak) 
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7.5.1 The role of institutions: 
By ‘telling a story’ (Smith, 2004: 68) about the role of institutions in the SCA case study it is 
possible to understand how they shape the PV of ULAC relative to the networks functional 
character, in terms of: purpose, configuration and management as an ‘input, process, output’ 
(Crosby et al. 2014: 449) pathway.  Closer examination of network members’ perceptions of 
institutions reveals their relative strength for constraining the PV.  Importantly, the research 
findings identify the role of different types of institutional mechanisms and different combinations 
(Table A10) cumulating and interacting across the network over time.  In particular, the findings 
demonstrate how path dependant institutions in one stage, shape and influence those in the 
following stages of the network to produce an overall cumulative, aggregate network effect at the 
end of the observed network process (the growth stage). 
Interaction of formal and informal institutions across the whole network: 
Consistent with Miller-Stevens and Morris (2015), the role of institutions can be seen to affect how 
well the network functions, in terms of: communication; consensus; decision-making; stakeholder 
diversity; goals; leadership; shared resources; culture, trust. 
The presence of both strong contextual mechanisms at each stage of the network suggests ‘history 
matters’ (Martin 2012: 399) for shaping the networks PV in a path dependent way: as contextual 
mechanisms are perceived as being carried forward from one stage to the next.  For example, the 
presence of strong formal historical institutions of falling resources and increasing centralization of 
local government is a key contextual mechanism persisting throughout all stages of the networks 
development.  Given the changing nature and strength of functional mechanisms at each stage of 
the network and their interaction with persistently strong formal contextual institutions, the strength 
of informal behavioural mechanisms (e.g. competitive culture of large cities) can be seen to 
weaken over time in subsequent stages of the networks development.  In particular, the 
constraining role of strong informal institutions of cities (loose ties and competitive culture 
between large cities) are seen to weaken across the network over time.   
The overall network effect of the role of institutions results in a cities-led outcome at the growth 
stage, perceived by cities representing a positive outcome.  It is reasonable to suggest therefore, 
that historical contextual mechanisms will continue to shape the future behavioural and functional 
mechanisms throughout the SCA.  The presence of strong national formal contextual mechanisms 
at the start of the network process, strongly influence the impact and role of additional formal and 
informal social-cultural behavioural mechanisms at the subnational level and across subsequent 
stages of the network.  
Institutional effects over time (2010 – mid-2016): 
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• The presence of strong formal functional constraints (e.g. lack of network value, leadership 
or clarity of purpose) reducing over time at the subnational level, in the presence of 
persistently strong formal contextual mechanisms (increasing centralization of 
government) and weakening informal behavioural constraints (e.g. strengthening city-city 
network ties; trust), increases the likelihood of cities positive perception of the networks 
PV at the growth stage;  
• The presence of strong formal contextual mechanisms (e.g. increasing centralization of 
government), persisting over time at the national level, in the presence of weakening 
formal functional constraints (e.g. duel structures) and weakening informal behavioural 
constraints (e.g. strengthening city-city network ties; trust), increases the likelihood of 
cities positive perception of the networks PV at the growth stage;  
• The presence of weakening informal behavioural constraints (e.g. strengthening city-city 
network ties; trust), reducing over time at the subnational level, in the presence of 
persistently strong formal contextual constraints (e.g. increasing centralization of 
government), increases the likelihood of cities positive perception of the networks PV at 
the growth stage. 
 
Therefore, the continuous presence of formal historical, economic and policy institutions at the 
national level, interacting with behavioural and functional mechanisms at the subnational level, 
create a cumulative whole network effect at the end of the observed network process.  The PV of 
ULAC at a particular stage of the network will be affected by the changing nature and direction 
(either strong or weak) of different mechanisms within the process, interacting with mechanisms in 
the following stages.  In this sense, the overall role of institutions will depend on the different 
combinations of intuitional effects, relative to their combined constraint role (i.e. as weak or 
strong) (Figure 26).   
 
Figure 26: Combination of institutional mechanisms relative to their strength of constraint on 
the PV of ULAC  
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Strong) 
 
NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Weak) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism 
(Strong) 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Weak)  
 
NETWORK GROWTH 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Weak) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Weak) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism 
(Strong) 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Weak) 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Weak) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Weak) 
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The classification system for the constraining role of different intuitional mechanisms ‘does not 
predict or imply anything specific about the resulting effects…or the frequency, use, or effectiveness 
of the institution’ (Williamson, 2009: 373), nor does it ‘essentialize any one scale but views 
economic development as an open-ended and contested process operating across different 
geographical scales’ Cumbers et al. (2003: 326).  The identification and classification of different 
combinations of institutions merely provides a framework for grouping the different combination of 
institutions that is used to help analyze their impact in Chapter Eight.  
Therefore, relative to the institutional characteristics identified in Chapter Four (i.e. Part B of the 
conceptual framework, see Figure 9 in section 4.2.2), Table 24 below provides the second set of 
conceptual results that identify the role of institutional characteristics for the PV of the SCA:  
 
Table 24: Concetpualising Matrix (PART B): Path Dependent Institutional Dimensions of the 
SCA 
NETWORK PHASE NODE: URBAN LOCAL AUTHORITY  
FUNCTION: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
T1 • Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
• Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
• Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Strong) 
T2 • Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
• Formal Functional Mechanism (Weak) 
• Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Strong) 
T3 • Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
• Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
• Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Weak) 
 
Therefore, having identified ‘what’ ULAC looks like in (Chapter Six) and ‘how’ different 
combinations of institutions play a role in the process (Chapter Seven), it is important to further 
consider ‘why’ institutions matter for ‘getting the institutions right’ (Williamson, 2009: 271).  The 
combined results from Chapter Six and Seven are therefore discussed in the content of theoretical 
observations from the literature review (Chapter Two, Three and Four), as a causal explanation of 
‘why institutions matter’ relative to different institutional combinations to provide an overall 
conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC in Scotland in Chapter Eight.   
  
Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Weak) 
 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism 
(Weak) 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Strong) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Weak) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism (Strong)  
 
NETWORK IDENTIFICATION 
Formal Contextual Mechanism (Weak) 
Formal Functional Mechanism (Strong) 
Informal Behavioural Mechanism 
(Weak) 
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Chapter Eight: ‘Why’ institutions matter for the Public Value (PV) of 
ULAC: theoretical domains explaining the impact of institutional 
mechanisms?   
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
Having identified what ULAC looks like (Chapter Six) and how it creates public value (PV), 
Chapter eight discusses the combined research findings to explain the impact of institutions on the 
PV of ULAC according to the causal impact of institutional characteristics identified in chapter six 
and seven.  Gaining insight from institutional theory (i.e. spatial, economic and governance 
networks), the chapter aims to explain ‘why’ institutions matter for understanding the PV of ULAC 
as economic development policy.   
 
The chapter provides a theoretical explanation of the impact of institutional mechanisms for 
shaping and contextualising network events, to help answer the third and final research question of 
the thesis:    
 
Why does economic, spatial and governance institutional insights help to explain the 
PV of ULAC? 
 
Chapter eight concludes the analysis of the SCA case study findings, providing an interpretive 
critical realist explanation of the PV of ULAC as economic development policy, before finally 
considering wider implications for economic development policy and urban local government in 
Scotland in chapter nine. 
 
Section 8.2 provides a brief summary of the theoretical dimensions for explaining the impact of 
institutions on the PV of ULAC.  8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 summarises the research findings relative to the 
key stages of the ULAC process: Network Identification; Network Implementation and Network 
Growth, to explain the impact of causal mechanisms relative to three theoretical domains.  
 
In line with the stated aim and methodological approach of the research, and based on the empirical 
findings in earlier chapters, Section 8.6 subsequently presents a discussion of the interpretive 
critical realist conceptualisation model of the PV of ULAC.  The key features of the PV of ULAC 
are discussed relative to theoretical insights, identifying a number of cross-cutting themes that 
highlight the overall impact of contextual causal mechanisms on the process of ULAC. Summary 
sense-making statements are also provided to support and explicate elements of the causal 
explanation process, to highlighting causal mechanisms and contextual factors on the process of 
network development. 
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8.2 A theoretical explanation of the impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC  
 
Table 2 in Chapter Three of the literature review identifies the key theoretical dimensions relative 
to each of the three theoretical domains.  From an institutional perspective, the PV of ULAC 
depends on the ‘density or thickness’, quality, and mix of both formal and informal institutions in 
the process (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013: 1039).   
 
The previous chapter helped to identify the role of institutions, using Williamson’s (2009) simple 
classification process of weak or strong formal and informal institutional arrangements.  
Williamson’s (2000) approach ‘does not predict or imply anything specific about the resulting 
effects of these institutional arrangements’ (p373).  Indeed, previous research has attempted, with 
limited success, to develop models illustrating the political, economic, and demographic factors 
affecting levels of collaboration between different local governments (LeRoux, 2006; Krueger, 
2005; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Wood, 2004; Zeemering, 2007).   
 
Therefore, the final part of the research provides an institutional analysis to complete the final stage 
of the conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC according to three main research questions: a) the 
interaction between the Functional Domains (i.e. What the network looks like) and b) the role of 
institutional mechanisms (i.e. How the network creates public value), to help explain c) the 
resultant impact of institutions according to three theoretical domains: spatial, economic, and 
governance dimensions (see Table 25). 
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Table 25: Theoretical Conceptualising Matrix 
THEORETICAL 
DIMENSIONS 
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS (What ULAC looks like)  IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS 
(Functional; Contextual; Behavioural) 
Purpose Configuration Management PUBLIC VALUE (PV) 
Spatial Theory To achieve 
functional and 
complimentary 
coherence  
Configured as a single, 
coherent, polycentric unit 
 
Managed in a coherent way to 
improve spatial synergy by 
improving: uneven spatial 
development, functional 
Coherence and 
Complementarity.  
Spatial Synergy: 
functional and complimentary 
coherence across the network 
Economic Theory To achieve 
transaction cost 
efficiency, 
opportunity cost and 
incentive alignment 
from the network 
Configuring networked 
activities to create: 
knowledge sharing; 
innovation clusters; 
agglomeration economies;  
infrastructure 
improvements. 
Managed to create efficient 
institutional economies, 
including: stronger ties; 
technical or productive 
efficiency: obtaining the 
greatest output for a fixed 
amount of resources, or by 
getting a given amount of 
output for a minimal amount of 
inputs);  
allocative efficiency: when 
output is allocated to where is 
most efficient.   
Economic Efficiency: 
transaction cost efficiency, 
opportunity cost and incentive 
alignment from the network 
Governance Theory To achieve shared 
meaning, 
commitment and 
trust   
Configured as formal or 
informal structure of 
different types (i.e. non-
market/hierarchical 
structure).  
Managed to create network 
synergy by improving: 
leadership; trust; 
communication, political 
conflict.  
Network Embeddedness: 
shared meaning, commitment and trust 
across the network 
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The table is used to provide to an interpretive critical realist causal explanation of the PV of ULAC 
through the theoretical analysis of the role and impact of institutions relative to three PV effects: 
economic efficiency; spatial synergy and network embedding: 
 
• Economic efficiency: transaction cost efficiency, opportunity cost, and incentive alignment from 
the network  
• Spatial synergy: functional and complementary coherence across the network 
• Network embedding: shared meaning and commitment across the network 
Economic efficiency: 
 
Much of existing research agrees on the importance of regional governance for solving collective 
problems (albeit disagree on the form that governance should take), for two types of efficiency: 
technical efficiency (or productive) and allocative efficiency. Economic institutions from a New 
Institutional Economic (NIE) perspective, recognises the role of both formal and informal 
institutions of the institutional environment and the institutions of governance, for achieving 
economic efficiency. According to Williamson (2000), the extent to which economic institutions 
affect networked policy, depends on the capacity for achieving efficiency gains (i.e. resource 
sharing, additional funding, reduced transaction costs), across four main effects: social 
embeddedness (norms, customs, traditions); the institutional environment (rules of the game); the 
governance (i.e. market versus hierarchy) structures (how to play the game); and production 
efficiency (incentive alignment) (Williamson, 2000).   
 
Therefore, the importance of NIE for understanding the impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC 
concerns the extent to which environmental institutions ‘elicit shifts in the comparative costs of 
governance’ (Williamson, 2016: 287).  The capacity for efficiency gains from reducing 
transactions costs (i.e. costs for running the network according to different governance structures, 
and incentivised behaviour (Blakey and Leigh, 2010) of a network, will therefore vary with 
structure (Williamson, 2016).  
 
Spatial Synergy: 
 
An institutional economic geography perspective provides a relational conception that recognises 
the more complex context of networked interaction, asa situation where ‘economic agents are 
thought to act according to economic and non-economic goals and strategies’ (Bathelt and 
Gluckler, 2013: 343).   The importance of understanding the role of network synergy for the PV of 
ULAC, relates to the synergies and flows resulting from the structures and nature of institutional 
collaboration (Dühr, 2005: 235-236) defining the  network.  Both formal and informal spatial 
institutions defining ULAC can help to explain spatial synergies, through a greater appreciation of 
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the role of institutions in ‘geographers traditional spatial and network-based analysis’ (Farole et al, 
2011: 64).  For example, spatial proximity and networked relationships are throught to potentially 
provide a ‘functional equivalent in economic coordination’ (p64).  An institutional spatial 
perspective concerns the role of ‘untraded interdependencies and relational assets’ and their 
‘potential to add valuable insights into processes of economic adaptation, path dependence and 
cumulative causation (p64).  Therefore, an institutional economic geography perspective considers 
the role of spatial institutions for the achievement of functional coherence and complementarities 
between the participating cities of the ULAC network, towards what could be defined a 
apolycentric urban region (PUR) (Meijers, 2005).  PURs have the potential to generate 
agglomeration advantages (Turok, 2009; Paddison, 1983) and avoid duplication of services across 
different areas.  For example, increasing complementarity within a network of cities as a result of 
increasing the range of services offered by a region, would require the development of network 
policies focussed on  promoting a more balanced spatial distribution of economic activity and 
interaction between different cities (Burger et al. 2013).   
 
Albeit the achievement of a PUR is not stated as a distinct objective of the ULAC in Scotland (as 
per section 6.3.1), the chapter considers how a spatial institutional perspective of ULAC can help 
explain any potential improvements in spatial synergy across the cities.  The importance of an 
institutional economic geography perspective for understanding the impact of institutions on the 
PV of ULAC, thus concerns the extent to which the dynamic processes of economic, social, and 
cultural institutions provide the potential for ‘a creative field that stimulates entrepreneurship, 
learning, and innovation, [that] leads to positive spatial externalities, if concentrated in physical 
spaces such as regional agglomerations’ but also, ‘creativity and innovation may also emerge from 
non-localized institutions… not bound to territorial scales’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 343).  
Therefore, the overall impact of institutions in this context will depend on the networks capacity 
for improving spatial synergy and strengthened city network ties across Scotland cities, for the 
whole system (i.e. the network effect) of cities within Scotland (Meijers, 2006a). 
 
Network Embeddedness: 
 
Urban regime theory involving ‘elected local government officials, that seek to coordinate 
resources and generate governing capacity’ (McCarthy, 2007: 20), provides insight into the 
difficulties for policy relating to the presence of both political and public interest, according to 
economic and political context.  Network governance (i.e. as either markets or hierarchies) 
provides structural embeddedness (i.e. a networks level of centrality) relative to the networks 
trustworthiness, reputation, and influence over time, where the function and structure of 
governance supports the overall isomorphic effect for achieving efficiency and functional 
sustainability. 
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Therefore, the overall impact of governance institutions on the PV of ULAC will depend on their 
capacity for achieving network synergy and embeddedness and the level of direct and indirect 
involvement and commitment of members within the network. 
 
The following sub sections discuss the three theoretical dimensions across the three network stages, 
explaining the impact of institutional mechanisms on the PV of ULAC in Scotland.  The sub 
sections refer to the summary tables presented in Chapter Six and Seven. 
 
8.3 Network Identification: the impact of institutions 
Chapter six provides an indication of what ULAC looked like at the identification stage of the SCA 
in terms of: 
 
- purpose of the network: political lobbying (e.g. stronger links with the Scottish Government) 
and strategic planning (e.g. knowledge/skills/resource sharing; to develop a cities strategy).   
- structure of the network is relatively small: neutral facilitation; city-centric. 
- managed of the network is: informal planning structures; passive leadership and lack of 
governance.   
 
Chapter seven describes the role of institutions for creating value from the network, in terms of:  
 
- strong formal institutions (contextual mechanism): the weak role of COSLA as a national 
institution; the impact on national policy (e.g. reduced public funding; role of cities); the 
negative implication of urban economic diversity between cities; 
- weak formal institutions (functional mechanism): no governance; unfocussed strategy and a 
cities partnership; poor communication and no distinct budget; 
- Strong informal institutions (behavioural) mechanism: cities competitive culture; lack of trust 
and weak ties. 
The theoretical impact of the functional and institutional dimensions are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
8.3.1 Economic efficiencies: 
The economic efficiency impact of institutional mechanisms for the PV of the SCA at the 
identification stage, relates to the potential value from changing the rules of the game (i.e. SCDI 
being used to strengthen cities relationship with the Scottish Government, as opposed to using 
COSLA), within an external context of falling local government resources and lack of recognition 
of cities by national institutions.  
 
There is ‘relatively robust’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013: 1038) research evidence suggesting the absence 
of ‘basic formal institutions have a detrimental effect on economic development’ (p1038).  The 
perceived inefficient role of the strong formal contextual institutions (i.e. COSLAs weak role) is 
replaced by SCDI in the shape of an informal network to help coordinate the cities, initially 
perceived as incurring low transaction costs (i.e. working with SCDI to coordinate the cities 
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network, without a budget or major resource input from cities), with the perceived potential to 
produce an economically efficient outcome for city members (e.g. leveraging resources with other 
cities, from the SCDI and the Scottish Government).  
 
However, the resulting network efficiency relative to low transaction costs and leveraged 
resources, depends on the extent to which these gains can outweigh any resultant opportunity costs 
from replacing perceived inefficient external formal institutions with informal institutions; 
especially given that the impact of ‘informal institutions on economic activity and welfare [are 
believed] to be negligible’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013: 1038).  The combination of weak formal 
functional mechanisms (SCDI’s weak facilitation) and strong informal behavioural mechanisms 
(loose network ties, low trust), can be seen to contribute towards a growing perception among the 
city network members that the collaboration process lacks productive efficiency (i.e. a lack of 
incentive alignment from SCDIs weak governance).  As a result, the cities network has the 
potential to produce high opportunity costs during this stage in the networks development.   
 
Furthermore, the presence of already ‘loose ties’ between the cities (Orton, 1990) (i.e. strong 
informal institutions) are unlikely to strengthen without the presence of sufficiently strong 
functional mechanisms (e.g. leadership, accountability, transparency, good governance, resource 
incentives) to support network embedding or incentive alignment.  In particular, the historical 
context and culture of conflict between the larger cities within the network (i.e. strong formal 
institutions), as well as a weakening perception of the SCDI’s hidden agenda (i.e. strong informal 
behavioural institutions), has the potential for reducing incentive alignment and productive 
efficiency of the network.  The informal ‘voluntary’ nature of the cities network structure (and its 
weak formal institutions) thus has the potential to collapse over the longer term, particularly when 
having to ‘make difficult decisions’ (Begg and Docherty, 2002: 13).   
 
Therefore, the economic implications of the nature of institutions during the identification stage of 
the network, is economically inefficient for the PV of ULAC, consistent with the view that:  
 
‘informal institutions are second best to or incomplete substitutes for formal institutions and 
can only prove useful for economic development in either cases of a serious absence of or in 
the presence of inadequate formal institutions’  
Rodríguez-Pose (2013: 1038) 
8.3.2 Spatial synergies: 
The spatial synergies relating to formal and informal institutional mechanisms for the PV of the 
SCA at the identification stage relates to the key role that the cities network has to play for 
achieving spatial synergy and capacity for effective governance across Scotland’s LAs, for the 
achievement of functional and complimentary coherence, regardless of LA spatial boundaries.  The 
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existence of strong external environmental institutions in Scotland in terms of ‘strong natural, 
social and economic interdependencies’ (Hulst and van Montfort, 2012: 128) between Scotland’s 
cities was highlighted by various network members, as context to the rationale for ULAC.  
Interdependencies between Scotland’s cities implies that ‘local policy decisions have an impact 
beyond the local boundaries on the one hand and that [local authorities] depend on their neighbours 
to deal effectively with issues that manifest themselves within their jurisdiction on the other’ (Hulst 
and van Montfort, 2012: 128). 
 
The difficulties associated with governing different tiers of government in Scotland are well 
documented, particularly those relating to the metropolitan scale, where high population densities 
are assumed to result in ‘complex, boundary-crossing policy issues’ (Hulst and van Montfort, 
2012: 128).  Indeed, academics and policy-makers have long been concerned that ‘metropolitan 
regions are chaotic and ungovernable places’ (Storper, 2013: 1).  LA boundaries in Scotland are 
said not to reflect the reality at the system level, due to ‘a widely perceived disconnect between 
administrative boundaries and functional areas (i.e. weak formal external institutions) in Scotland 
(Second City Visions Leads meeting: 12 September 2014). 
 
Given strong informal external economic institutions shaping the interdependencies between 
Scotland’s ULA areas, the cities network in the form of a planning forum during the identification 
stage, potentially reflects cities recognition of the need for ‘regulation of the externalities of local 
policy decisions and for the distribution and redistribution of scarce resources on a supra-municipal 
level, where some form of regional co-ordination and planning is required’ (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2012: 128). 
 
SCDI’s informal governance remit has the potential to act as a mechanism that better recognises 
the functional role of Scotland’s cities, regardless of administrative boundaries, and to act as ‘a 
strategy to cope with the need for regional planning’ (Hulst and van Montfort, 2012: 128), 
reflecting a lack of a sufficient intermediate tier of government in Scotland.  
 
However, the network members’ perceptions of SCDI’s informal governance role suggests a weak 
informal institution, potentially ‘hampering the learning capacity and thus the potential for further 
agglomeration and clustering’ advantages (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013: 1039) that the ULAC has the 
potential to serve.  Indeed, SCDIs informal governance role has the potential to hinder the capacity 
for network members to share learning and knowledge on efficient infrastructure development, that 
could otherwise reduce a duplication of ULAs services or improve complimentary or functional 
coherence of future infrastructure investments across Scotland cities. 
 
Therefore, the spatial implications of weak informal internal institutions during the identification 
stage of the network are potentially inefficient for the PV of ULAC. 
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8.3.3 Network embedding:   
The network embedding effect of institutional mechanisms for the PV of the SCA at the 
identification stage relates to the SCDI’s weak governance remit in the absence of a strong 
intermediate tier of national governance (strong formal contextual institution), for maximizing 
cities economic development capacity (Hulst and van Monfort, 2012).  The fact that Scotland’s six 
cities first identified the city collaboration opportunity without government mandate or resources, 
suggests ULAs ambitions and agendas at a particular point in time are key to understanding the 
social value of different tiers and structures of governance institutions.  Consistent with Kay 
(2009), the SCDI’s role potentially reflects the perception that ‘sub-national regions or cities in 
Scotland are natural units within which to analyse socioeconomic development and the policies to 
promote it’ (Wilson, 2016: 11).  In other words, Scotland’s cities establishment of a cities network 
reflects the view that ‘government competences should adapt to the scale that best suits specific 
policy challenges’ (p11), and are reacting to the negative role of strong national contextual 
institutions.  However, by attempting to replace strong contextual institutions with weak formal 
mechanisms (i.e. SCDI’s informal facilitation) reflects poor leadership, lack of communication or 
clear network management.   
 
The combination of weak internal network ties (strong behavioural institutional mechanism) 
between cities, weak formal functional institutions; strong formal national institutions in Scotland, 
and an increasing perception that the performance management of local government (strong formal 
contextual mechanism), suggests the weak functional governance structure of the network at 
identification stage was initially a reflection cities preference for ‘maintaining autonomy and 
avoiding political conflict from complex formal processes’ (Lee, 2016: 173):  
 
• physical, political, socio-economic and geographical similarities play crucial roles when 
local jurisdictions select their partners who can minimise costs and maximise benefit from 
collective action 
• actors who share similar characteristics are more likely to have similar preferences, and 
these preferences make the actors more inclined to work together 
• structural and resource based aspects encourage cities t o align incentives, but also, cultural 
and contextual aspect of social interaction thus social-organisational structure in which 
participating individuals are embedded. 
However, the context of strong external economic interdependency across Scotland’s cities (strong 
formal contextual mechanism) and the presence of ‘loosely clustered network structures’ (Feiock 
and Turnbull, 2012: 11), suggests a lack of monitoring potentially hinders the ‘mutual reciprocity, 
trust, and conformance to the rules of the game’ (p11), and overall network embedding. 
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Finally, successful collaboration is reliant on good communication on the behalf of the network 
manager for ‘boundary spanning’, in terms of improving the connectivity between members 
(Tushman and Scanlan 1981).  SCDI’s facilitation role was described as lacking good 
communication, as such, it follows that SCDI’s facilitation is having a negative effect on network 
embedding. 
 
Given the apparent existence of weak ties between the cities at the start of the network process (and 
their culture of competiveness), it raises the question as to whether network members considered 
the implications of both having to compete, as well as collaborate, and whether they can clearly 
delineate those activities where they will collaborate, and those where they will compete.  Cities 
commonly collaborate on activities that require a joined up approach, for example, joint 
procurement activities, or national bidding for cultural events.  However, the lack of a clear 
strategic focus at this stage of the network suggest a lack of clarity around such important issues, 
thus negatively affecting the network embedding as such boundaries are somewhat unclear. 
 
Table 26: Theoretical Explanation: The role and impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC 
during ‘Network Identification’ (T1) 
 
PROCESS TRACING: 
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS 
(WHAT) 
SENSEMAKING:  
ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
(HOW) 
THEORETICAL 
EXPLANATION:  
CAUSAL IMPACT OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
(WHY) 
Purpose:  
• Political Lobbying 
• Strategic Planning 
 
Configuration 
• City-centric membership 
• Neutral Facilitation 
 
Management:  
• Informal Planning Structure 
• Informal 
Leadership/Governance 
• Formal Contextual 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
• Formal Functional 
Mechanism (Weak) 
 
• Informal Behavioural 
Mechanism (Strong)  
 
Economic efficiency:  
• Low transaction costs 
• Low productive efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• No learning clusters 
• Reduced capacity for 
functional and complimentary 
coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• Low trust 
• No incentive alignment 
 
8.4 Network Implementation: the impact of institutions 
Chapter six provides an indication of what ULAC looked like at the implementation stage of the 
SCA: 
 
- The purpose of the network: allocate new resources (i.e. Cities Investment Fund) across 
national strategic planning objectives (i.e. in line with the Agenda for Cities).   
- The structure of the network: expanding/mixed membership (i.e. Scottish Government 
Ministers; Chief Executive Groups; Delivery Groups;); 
- The management of the network: a quasi-regional structure comprised of formal leadership and 
cnetralised governance structures; duel strategies.   
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Chapter seven describes the role of institutions for creating value from the network implementation 
stage in terms of:  
 
- Strong formal institutions (contextual mechanism): Changing national politics; Changing 
national policy (increasing centralisation of cities); lack of national agency involvement (e.g. 
Scottish Enterprise); 
- Strong formal institutions (functional): increased resources; two strategies; confused delivery 
and strategic focus; lack of skills; weak leadership from chair; hidden leadership of Scottish 
Government; fluctuating membership; 
- Strong informal institutions (behavioural): Lack of trust; Membership inequality; Lack of 
commitment; Hidden agendas; loose network tensions. 
 
The theoretical impact of the functional and institutional dimensions are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
8.4.1 Economic efficiencies: 
The value and impact of economic institutional mechanisms for the PV of ULAC at the 
implementation stage relates to the implications from the formalization of the network and the 
ability of the network to internalize any associated increase in transactions costs from working 
within a more centralized governing network.  The impact of formal governance mechanisms 
‘depends upon the transaction costs faced by local authorities pursuing joint collective outcomes’. 
(Feiock, 2014: 9). Transaction costs are assumed to be high when formal institutions are present 
(e.g. having to record processes and deal with issues more transparently, by managing conflict 
etc.), although potentially offset by any observed improvement in allocative or productive 
efficiency.   
 
The presence of strong functional mechanisms are perceived as having a negative impact on the 
network mainly due to a lack of strategic clarity, lack of skills from the facilitators and weak 
leadership role of the formal facilitation for allocating task and strategic projects effectively.  For 
example, although the introduction of resources from the formalization process has the potential for 
improve incentive alignment, the lack of strategic clarity and the allocation of projects being 
undertaken in a relatively haphazard and unstrategic way, poses a risk for allocative efficiency, 
potentially outweighing any benefits to be had from stronger functional (i.e. formal structures, 
resources, governance) mechanisms.  The mixture of both a ‘Six Cities Partnership’ and ‘Agenda 
for Cities’ means that there are potentially conflicting objective within the network.  It isn’t also 
clear what strategic areas the cities should collaborate on, or where should compete.   Indeed, the 
competitive culture of cities is still very much a strong informal mechanisms at this stage.  As a 
result of a lack of clarity regarding where to compete, and where to collaborate, the potential for 
allocative efficiency towards the most efficient projects and outcomes, is a high risk.   
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Furthermore, Feiock (2001) suggests:  ‘decentralized systems of governments enhances allocative 
efficiency if it produces a match between community preferences for quantities and qualities…and 
actual service choices and resource allocations’ (p303). The centralization of the network towards a 
realignment of evolving projects towards national priorities (as a post-hoc exercise), is perceived 
by cities as risking the ability to allocate projects and resources effectively given that they are 
perceived as being steered away from those cities thought to provide the largest gain. 
 
The overall combined effect of stronger formal functional mechanisms (perceived negatively 
among network members) and strong informal behavioural mechanisms (i.e. already loose network 
ties, increasing levels of mistrust), can be seen to contribute towards a network tension between the 
cities and national agencies within the network, hence further reducing incentive alignment. 
 
8.4.2 Spatial synergies: 
During the network implementation stage, the network membership expanded to include both the 
Scottish Government and Perth, to include all seven of Scotland’s cities; all of varying structure 
and size. Feiock (2007) warn that network stability can be ‘undermined by heterogeneity among 
local governments’.  Given the diverse and increasing nature of the membership of the SCA, the 
positive impact of any spatial institutions is their potential to help address any scale or equity issues 
relating to the heterogeneous nature of Scotland’s cities.  The impact of spatial institutions on the 
PV of ULAC thus relates to the potential value from polycentric network synergies across ‘three 
synergy releasing mechanisms (i.e. co-operation, complementarity or externality)’ (Meijers, 2005: 
767).   
 
During the network implementation stage, a key strategic focus of the SCA was to achieve national 
economic growth via the potential for smaller cities to be included in the SCA (i.e. Perth was 
added), by exploiting any already well-established economic linkages.  For example, to help 
achieve greater scale by ‘working more closely with cities in close proximity to help provide a 
greater critical mass of assets beyond administrative boundaries to improve economic diversity’ 
(Wight, 2005).  Various network members referred to the size of their city and the gains from 
working with the larger cities in the SCA, referring in particular to knowledge sharing between the 
mid-sized cities (i.e. Glasgow, Edinburgh) and the smaller cities (Stirling and Perth) on 
infrastructure funding models (i.e. ‘city-deals’).   Knowledge sharing relative to infrastructure 
investment models has the potential to improve structural, functional and complimentary 
investment decisions and thus, spatial synergy between Scotland’s cities. 
 
Furthermore, the formalisation of the network at implementation stage involved a process of 
strategic clarification and realignment of the networks activity.  However, at the same time, 
informal network connections and strategic discussions were strengthening between city-city 
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members within the network, resulting in shared learning on emerging infrastructure funding 
models across a number of Scotland’s cities (i.e. city-deals) during this time.  The shared learning 
on ‘city-deals’ between city members of the SCA and the potential impact of spatial institutions, 
suggests a potential causal mechanism resulting in an increase in the number of ‘city-deal’ funding 
models across Scotland, with future potential for: reducing the uneven character of development 
across Scotland; improving business connections; providing functional integration; improving 
complementarity (i.e. reduce uneven city characteristics).  The strengthening of informal structures 
between the city members of the SCA and their facilitating of new and emerging models of 
infrastructure funding across Scotland, suggests potential improvements for functional integration 
and cohesions across Scotland’s cities.  However, any benefits from improving functional 
integration will depend on the nature of any counteractive spatial imbalances.  Indeed, an added 
complexity from SCA being urban-centric is the potential for widening spatial imbalances between 
local and urban scales of government in Scotland.   
 
8.4.3 Network embedding: 
Provan and Kenis (2008) refer to the critical role of network governance for its ability to respond to 
three basic tensions: efficiency vs. inclusiveness, internal vs. external legitimacy, and flexibility vs. 
stability.  The trade-off between these effects depends on the nature of governing, for example, in 
this instance, brokered by an external neutral agency (SCDI).  The formal appointment of SCDI as 
the broker organisation and chair of the SCA is described as a Network Administrative 
Organisation (NAO) (Provan and Kenis, 2008), believed to enhance ‘network legitimacy, dealing 
with unique and complex network-level problems and issues, and reducing the complexity of 
shared governance’ (p236).  However, such quasi-regional structures are thought 
‘atypical…seldom arising spontaneously’ (p127) between local governments. 
 
The impact of governance institutions relative to the structure of the SCA, the more formal 
facilitation role of the network manager (i.e. SCDI CEO) at the early stages of implementation, 
meant having to deal with an increasing number and range of tensions during implementation, and 
attempt to include all parties in joint decision making to ensure inclusiveness for efficiency.  The 
increase in the size of the SCA network during this stage potentially explains its perceived lack of 
efficiency by many of the network members, as more participants being involved, especially 
Scottish Government members, led to observed increases in the timing and efficiency of the SCA’s 
decision-making processes. 
 
The structure of governance institutions typically depends on the function they are required to 
serve.  The structure of the governance institutions during network implementation was largely 
voluntary, based on: financial incentives, resource and information sharing, and governments role 
in establishing a quasi-regional government form due to a missing tier of intermediate regional 
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government linking cities and national government effectively. Ansell and Gash (2007) suggest 
collaboration is likely to produce ‘intermediate process outcomes…when small wins are 
possible…particularly when prior antagonism is high and a long-term commitment to trust building 
is necessary’ (p561).  Local government is largely ‘without general powers of competence and 
restricted in what they can do by Parliament…principally within a framework constructed by 
central government’s policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the current 
governing political party’ (Kelly, 2007: 195).  Given the political and administrative context 
shaping the power relationship between local and central government in Scotland, a network 
member tension was highlighted by several network members.  Thus, the development of a cities 
development fund of £7 million to accompany the SCA had the potential to act as a compensation 
incentive to encourage cities to be involved in the SCA during the implementation stage. 
 
The value and impact of governance institutions on the PV of ULAC at the implementation stage 
relates to the network’s capacity for integrating decision making between the network members.  
Indeed, ‘diverse values and perceptions about other jurisdictions shape behaviors and 
configuration’ (Feiock and Trunbull, 2012: 13).  The nature of the SCA governance mechanism 
(i.e. centralized authority) will potentially, impact the overall network embeddedness and 
sustainability of the governance structure as a whole.  The structural embeddedness in the network 
will also be affected by the level of centrality within the network, in terms of the networks capacity 
for generating ‘trustworthiness, reputation, and influence, as rated by other network members’ 
(Provan, et al. 2009: 873).   
 
Given that increasing levels of mistrust were observed between the city and national government 
members during this stage, the sustainability of formal governance structures are causally related to 
the apparent lack of network embedding, increasing levels of political conflict and mistrust. 
 
Therefore, although inter-governmental collaboration is understood to be typically supported by 
‘centralizing authority…as inter-governmental fragmentation makes voluntary self-organizing 
solutions infeasible’ (Feiock and Turnbull 2012: 5), the desire for alternative, less centralised 
governance arrangements within the SCA were apparent.  The lack of value of a centralising 
governance structure at this stage may well negatively impact on the network’s embededeness. 
 
The climate of trust is also weak, which is commonly associated with informal planning forums, 
typically reflecting ‘a zero-sum game or at best a mixed motive game, where the interests of the 
actors involve conflict’ (Hulst van Monfort, 2012: 131).  Indeed, the potential to restrict the policy 
options of individual ULAs given the desire for formal collaboration arrangements ‘can result in an 
uneven distribution of resources and benefit’ (Hulst van Monfort, 2012: 131), in turn, affecting 
network members commitment for collaboration and ‘unwillingness not very willing to establish 
joint authorities with formal decision-making powers to co-ordinate local policies.  
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Davies (2003) describes the formal structures introduced into the SCA during its implementation 
stage as typical of a ‘regeneration partnership’ reflecting ‘bureaucratic structures under strong 
central government control…where collaboration is thought necessary for the production of shared 
governing outcomes’ (p254).  Historically, regeneration partnerships in the UK are found not to 
have generated such shared governing outcomes (Davies 2003), which would depend upon:  
 
‘small-scale partnership initiatives focused on delivery rather than policy and strategy  are 
demonstrating a degree of collaborative synergy. In the long term these partnerships might 
be the basis for regime politics. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely in the context of a 
centralized UK government that they are the seed from which regime-like coalitions might 
grow’ 
Davies (2003: 254) 
 
Although the SCA might be said to potentially represent a structure similar to a small-scale 
regeneration partnership with the potential to create ‘collaborative synergy’ Davies (2003: 254), the 
apparent duel focus of the SCA on both strategic and delivery outcomes during its implementation 
stage, is likely to result in a lack of synergy and network embedding.   
 
Table 27: Theoretical explanation of the causal impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC 
during ‘Network Implementation’ (T2) 
 
INTEPRETATION: 
PROCESS TRACING 
(WHAT) 
SENSEMAKING: CAUSAL 
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
(HOW) 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATION: 
CAUSAL IMPACT OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
(WHY) 
Purpose:  
• Public Resource 
Allocation 
• Strategic Planning 
 
Configuration:  
• Mixed/expanding 
membership 
• National Agency-
led 
 
Management:  
• Formal Quasi-
Regional Structure 
• Formal 
Leadership/Govern
ance 
 
• Formal Contextual 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
• Formal Functional 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
 
• Informal Behavioural 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
Economic efficiency:  
• High transaction costs 
• Low allocative efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• Low learning clusters 
• Low capacity for functional and 
complimentary coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• Low trust  
• Low incentive alignment 
 
8.5 Network Growth: the impact of institutions  
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Chapter six provides an indication of what ULAC looked like at the implementation stage 
of the SCA: 
 
- The purpose of the network for: Public Resource Allocation; Operational and Project Delivery; 
Strategic Policy Making; Political Lobbying; 
- The structure of the network for: Mixed/expanding membership; Cities-led (Political); 
- The management of the network in terms of: Formal Quasi-Regional Structures; Informal 
Planning Structures; Formal Political Leadership; Formal Strategic Leadership. 
 
Chapter seven describes the role of institutions for creating value from the network implementation 
stage in terms of:  
 
- Strong formal institutions (contextual): Increased national recognition and input from other 
national agencies (Scottish Futures Trust; European funding); Changing national and local 
politics; Changing national policy context (English core city deals); 
- Strong formal institutions (functional): Improved leadership and position of chair; Increasing 
resources/national membership involvement; Clear structures to seven cities expectations; 
Development of informal structures to counteract presence of strong efficient formal 
institutions; 
- Weak informal institutions (behavioural): Strengthening city-city network ties; Improving 
membership trust; Network tensions with Scottish Government remains; Influencing role of 
larger cities agenda. 
The theoretical impact of the functional and institutional dimensions are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
8.5.1 Economic efficiencies:  
 
Inter-organizational networks underpinning the flow of knowledge within and across cities and 
regions are assumed key capital inputs within regional growth processes (Huggins and Thompson, 
2013).  In this sense, the longer organisations have to develop relationships, the more chances there 
are of positive collaborative economic outcomes (Bingham and O’Leary, 2007), and potential to 
contribute towards longer-term regional growth. From an institutional perspective, collaboration 
can contribute towards productive and allocative efficiency if ‘it corrects market failures…through 
innovation and incentives.’ (Feiock and Turnbull, 2012: 3), but also ‘be destructive if it produces 
negative spillovers that undercut regional gains’ (p3).  In other words, the role of institutions relate 
to the potential ‘mismatching’ of different combinations of institutions for economic development 
(Williamson, 2009: 379).    
 
Economic institutions can be inefficient if they are associated with ‘rigid conditions that limit the 
perceptions and opportunities of economic actors’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 343), to potentially 
influence network members reliance on ‘internal problem-solving and existing power hierarchies’ 
(p343).  For example, considering the impact of the role of increasing formal institutional 
mechanisms during the growth stage, including added complexity of duel structures and strategies, 
can be potentially destabilising and inefficient for the network, consistent with what Williamson 
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(2009) suggests as ‘formalization of institutions can actually hurt economic performance (p372).   
Furthermore, the duel structures can be seen as cities response to their dissatisfaction with strong 
formal governance, and indeed, a perception that there is a lack of cities focus from the evolving 
work of the SCA.  As a result, cities can be said to be ‘voting with their feet’ as they take greater 
control of the SCA to ensure it meets their expectations.  The economic idea behind ‘voting with 
their feet’ is that it was thought to lead to an economically efficient outcome.  However, this view 
of allocative efficiency is thought naïve and rarely efficient in practice (see Brueckner, 1982), as is 
potentially the case here.  
In the context of the SCA, the creation of the cities-only group during the growth stage can be seen 
to be a result of the increasing role of strong informal institutional mechanisms through the 
network process, potentially shaped by cities dislike of increasing formal institutions (governance 
structures including Scottish Government).  However, the potential economic inefficiency of the 
network relates to larger cities being perceived as steering the group towards the development of 
dual structures.  The cities-only group thus utilizes existing (and strengthening) informal power 
hierarchies between cities in Scotland, as larger cities are seen to steer the SCA towards the 
development of a cities group focused on ‘lobbying for devolution’. 
 
Institutional hysteresis24 is a risk at this stage, relating to the effect (or power) of institutions that 
persist to create potential problems over the long term for the economic efficiency of the SCA.  
Although not a lot is known about ‘how hysteresis manifests at the institutional level’ (Gherhes, 
2017: 2), a key risk within the SCA is the potential ‘persistence of inefficient institutions in 
supporting practices that are suboptimal, disruptive, or unsustainable’ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 
348).  The cities-only group in the SCA has the potential for influencing a disruptive sub-optimal 
economic situation, as institutional hysteresis risks larger cities continuing to steer the group 
towards a sub-optimal outcome over the longer term an inequitable distribution of power across the 
network.  The inefficient outcome relates mainly to the fact that larger urban local authorities are 
steering urban policy, without the full inclusion of the wider local government sector within those 
discussions (a potentially high opportunity cost).  
Therefore, the economic implication of the nature of institutions during the networks growth stage, 
is potentially economically inefficient for the PV of ULAC, consistent with the view that:  
 
‘Institutions are dangerous when we have strong formal and weak informal institutions’  
Williamson (2009: 379) 
8.5.2 Spatial synergies: 
                                                 
24 “Institutions play a critical role in economic interaction because they establish the basic conditions for information and knowledge 
exchange. Institutions can become a burden, however, if they are associated with rigid conditions that limit the perceptions and 
opportunities of economic actors” (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2013: 348) 
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A key change in the management of the SCA relates to the creation of a cities-only group to pursue 
aspirations for greater devolution of powers to urban local government in Scotland.  The research 
findings suggest that Scotland’s new city-only collaboration configuration is not serving to replace 
the SCA, but emerged alongside it to form a distinct ‘urban-only’ perspective.  The structure is 
potentially morphological (Parente, and Pessoa, 2009), given the varying-sized cities and focus on 
functional activities, with weak formal governance due to the exclusion of the government as a 
member.   
 
The literature suggests that ‘city governments that are responsible for populations of similar size 
are more likely to share similar development needs and economic interests, which could ultimately 
decrease the transaction costs involved in collaborative economic development’ Lee (2016: 174).  
Lee (2016) hypothesizes that ‘local governments with similar population size are more likely to 
create network ties for collaborative economic development’ (p174). Similarly, cities that are 
‘geographically close to each other and densely located with each other’ (p176) tend to increase 
their level of interaction.   
 
Indeed, previous research by Bailey and Turok (2001) raised some doubts as to whether links 
between two of Scotland’s largest cities (Edinburgh and Glasgow) make up a polycentric system. 
However, the shifting motivations of city-members and strengthening relationships between the 
cities of the SCA during the growth stages, has the potential to influence the continued 
involvement of cities within the SCA, regardless of their varying size and geographical dispersion 
across Scotland.  In other words, the perceived impact of the SCA for: leveraged funding, 
knowledge sharing; lobbying potential; sharing ideas on city deals, are all identified as contextual 
mechanisms maintaining the interest of all of Scotland’s cities in the SCA.  The extent to which the 
wider agenda and strategic focus of the SCA during the growth stages is being steered in the 
interests mainly of larger cities, is also plausible and potentially destabilising over the longer term. 
 
Regardless, by implication, the efficient and effective delivery of the SCA during the growth stage, 
relates to its potential impact on the spatial allocation of policy focus and responsibility across 
different tiers of local government.  First, given the wider context of increasing constitutional 
change in Scotland, a key challenge facing local government in Scotland will be ‘their ability to 
show leadership within new systems of governance, without any formal authority to do so’ and in 
such a way as ‘to get others to cooperate out of self-interest, by encouraging coordination at the 
geographical scale that makes more economic sense than local authority boundaries’ (Stewart and 
Stoker, 1995: 182).  
 
The city-only SCA governance group shows potential for facilitating a new and emerging spatially 
devolved model of political–economic governance in Scotland, regardless of city boundaries, albeit 
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‘relatively ad hoc and piece-meal reform’ (Martin et al. 2015: 348), highly uneven, unequal, and 
potentially destabilising for promoting further spatial imbalances in Scotland.  
 
Second, the SCA can be seen to have promoted the first set of ‘City Deals’ in Scotland.  The SCA, 
with small catalytic funding, on the one hand, has emphasised the strategic priority of promoting 
connections and commonalities between the major urban areas in Scotland as well as the need to 
improve the competitiveness of their individual economic bases. The SCA can be seen to actively 
support City Deal initiatives across the seven cities.  City Deals in Scotland potentially reflect a 
‘spatial rebalancing’ of power between national and local government (Martin et al. 2015).  Indeed, 
City Deals have the virtue of promoting change at the city-region or metropolitan scale.  
 
The city region approach of city-deals is one that would have resonance for Scotland, given the role 
of the cities in Scotland’s economy (Glasgow alone contributes 32% of Scottish economic output, 
35% of jobs and 36% of exports); however it cannot be the sole answer given the geographic 
distribution of Scotland’s population into smaller urban centres.  The wider impact of spatial 
institutions during the growth stage of the SCA, is potentially increasing unequal spatial 
imbalances across Scotland’s local government sector, highlighting a lack of appropriately 
resourced, inclusive governance structures that equitably represents all tiers of local government in 
Scotland.  For example, it is potentially an anomaly that a LA area like Falkirk (with a similar 
population to that of Perth and Inverness) is not represented within the SCA.  Therefore, 
definitional ambiguities relating to cities and their functional boundaries (see chapter two for fuller 
discussion), and the fine line between definitional differences between small cities and large towns 
in Scotland, highlights a key contextual mechanism affecting the SCA’s potential for inclusive and 
efficient spatial synergetic effects.  
 
8.5.3 Network embedding:  
 
Strategic approaches to local government collaboration in empirical research in recent years 
highlights ‘difficulties for achieving political consensus’ resulting in ‘functional design being 
primarily aimed at service delivery as opposed to strategy development’ (OECD, 2015: 41).  This 
potentially explains why the two key structures of the SCA demonstrate distinctly different focus: 
the wider-SCA group including Scottish Government was perceived by its members as ‘delivery 
focussed…to help smaller cities (RI7)’.   
 
The cities-only group on the other hand appears more strategically focussed to include ambitions for 
lobbying the Scottish Government, consistent with the view that ULAC focussed on strategy 
development are typically used for  ‘lobbying and advocacy’ providing ‘a context for leaders with 
broader vision to emerge’ (OECD, 2015:41).  Within any nation state or devolved administration, 
the ability to tax, spend and regulate are distributed across different spatial levels. Therefore, the 
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lobbying for greater devolution of powers to cities or city regions has the potential to strengthen the 
choices for individual city policy.    
 
Within the context of greater collaboration and devolution for English local authorities as ‘a 
restatement of the new public management’ (Loudes and Garner, 2016: 9), the Scottish 
Government’s continued participation in the SCA and gradual support for City Region Deals in 
Scotland, reflects a ‘holding onto political power, whilst decentralising operational responsibilities’ 
(Loudes and Garner, 2016: 12), with ‘limited gains for local democracy’ (p 12) from an apparent 
piecemeal approach to cities policy and urban local government reform. Consistent with existing 
empirical insights that suggest governments don’t typically ‘devolve substantial power to 
governance networks’ (Davies, 2011: 60), this explains why ‘informal, pluralistic decision making 
structures’ (Griﬃn, 2012: 210) evolved during the growth stage of the network, as cities pursue 
aspirations for greater devolution of decision making powers across urban local government in 
Scotland.   The impact of strong formal governance institutions and the ‘increasing political nature’ 
(Peters and Pierre, 2000) of the SCA as a cities policy network, also explains cities creation of 
plural structures and lack of value for formal SCA governance institutions.  
 
Provan and Milward (2001) suggest that a networks effectiveness over time (i.e. network 
legitimacy by satisfying the needs of clients and other community-interest) can also be determined 
through: the ebb and flow of agencies to and from the network; the strength of the relationships 
between and among network members; widening the web of network ties (2001: 418).  The nature 
of network ties during growth stage strengthened between the city-city members, but weakened 
between cities and Scottish Government (weak in terms of the strength of a positive relationship).  
Furthermore, the networks members referred to a growing range of projects involving a number of 
additional external national agencies (e.g. Scottish Futures Trust, European Funding).      
 
An apparent weakness of ‘loose ties’ (Orton, 1990) between cities and Scottish Government during 
identification stage was also identified, that can be partly explained by the SCA’s attempt at 
formalisation from the Scottish Government’s response to fixing the ‘fragmentation of the external 
environment’ (p207).  Weak ties can also be a result of ‘incompatible expectations’ (Orton, 1990: 
207), consistent with that observed during the growth stages of the SCA network, typically 
requiring ‘strong leadership’ or ‘compensation’ (p207) to resolve.  In terms of leadership.  Folke et 
al. (2005: 28) argue that co-operation requires leadership by ‘building trust, making sense, 
managing conflict, linking actors, initiating partnerships among actor groups, compiling and 
generating knowledge and mobilizing broad support for change’.  The development of plural 
structures can thus be explained by weak ‘brokerage’ and leadership of the SCA during previous 
stages, reflected by the cities lack of value in the formalised SCA structures: possibly due to a lack 
of sufficient compensation within the SCA, as perceived resource gains from strengthening city-
city relationships outwith the formal SCA structures, potentially hold greater value for cities 
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compared with formal ties between cities and government.  Given the presence of political tensions 
within the network, ‘informal, cooperative or partnership arrangements are understood to be better 
for regional decision-making, due mainly to their ability to overcome political barriers’ (Wolfson 
and Frisken, 2000, p365).   
 
By implication, the impact of governance institutions characterised by a lack of strong leadership 
or sufficient compensation, potentially explains the development of plural structures during the 
network growth stage.  Consistent with Giest and Howlett (2014):  
 
‘in order to create trust and reciprocity within a community, there needs to be a network 
leader, who operates within the system and complements it through directed management 
activities aimed at its membership. Such a leader enables communication among 
heterogeneous actors for building social capital and exchanging knowledge…. network 
leadership is different from direct government involvement or networking on the ground. 
Instead, it is an additional layer in the middle of a polycentric system, balancing hierarchical 
and horizontal dynamics requires a neutral leader in overcoming networking obstacles’ 
Giest and Howlett (2014: 38) 
 
The nature of the management of the SCA changed from being chaired and brokered by a NAO 
(i.e. a Network Administrative Organisation – the SCA – hosted within SCDIs organisation) 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008), to one still broker by a NAO (i.e. the SCA), but chaired by a 
‘participant’: first, by the Leader of Stirling City Council, then later chaired by Edinburgh City 
Council.  The idea that a separate administrative entity to govern the network, the role of the 
network broker is a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network. The NAO in this case not 
chaired by another member organization but by the members themselves (i.e. City Political 
Leader).  Provan and Kenis (2008) suggest ‘shared network governance’ (p241) is potentially an 
effective governance structure for providing network-level effectiveness, for producing widely 
shared trust and consensus among participants. 
 
The overall impact of governance institutions from SCDI’s weak neutral management of the SCA 
can be seen as a key causal mechanism explaining evolving plural SCA structures, alongside 
underlying contextual mechanisms and behavioural mechanisms.  The result is the potential for the 
SCA to create unstable spatial imbalances across Scotland’s local government sector, due the 
emergence of a new spatially devolved model of political–economic governance of urban local 
government in Scotland. 
 
Although local economic development is not a statutory responsibility of local government in 
Scotland, the findings are also consistent with shifting focus in recent years (albeit potentially 
inconsistent and uneven) towards a model of greater sub-regional autonomy (Lowndes and 
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Gardner, 2016), accelerated by the SCAs strategic focus on greater autonomy and shared learning 
around evolving City Deals across Scotland.  The collective lobbying of the seven ULAs for city 
deals through the SCA also raises important questions about the definition of ULAC within the 
context of the SCA, as excluding other levels of local government (i.e. local authorities across 
other scales), and the implications this may present from the collective lobbying from ULAs on 
behalf of all local authorities in Scotland, in terms of an equitable distribution of power across 
Scotland’s local government more generally. 
 
The ICA framework suggests an actors’ strategic action in a collaborative context depends on the 
extent of ‘preference integration among actors in the composite network, with capacity for conflict 
when preferences diverge’ (i.e. principal-agent problem) (Feiock, 2009: 358). 
 
‘Academics and policy-makers have long been concerned that ‘metropolitan regions are 
chaotic and ungovernable places’  
Storper (2013: 1)  
 
There is therefore a tendency for city local authorities to compete for funding, rather than 
collaborate with neighbouring local authorities, due mainly to discrepancies in functional and legal 
boundary responsibilities and funding. 
 
A recent Scottish Parliament ‘Local Government and Regeneration Committee’ inquiry into the 
Flexibility and Autonomy of Local Government (2014), suggest a key obstacle facing further 
decentralisation of local government in Scotland relates to the restrictions of LAs ‘internal culture’.   
The apparent competitive culture between cities during the network growth stages appears to have 
struck a better balance.  The growth stage of the network can be seen to make clearer delineation 
between the work elements that would require cities to collaborate on (e.g. jointly bidding for 
national inward investment opportunities).  Therefore, the growth stage of the network can be seen 
to potentially clarify and eliminate those areas where collaboration is required, leading to 
strengthening network ties.  However, the culture of conflict and difficult relationship with national 
agencies are still clearly apparent as a key institutional mechanism.   
 
The key challenge for local government going forward will be their ability to continue to encourage 
better cooperation between cities within the new SCA arrangements and their ability to respond to 
new and evolving national policy institutions (e.g. new taxation measures from the impending 
Scottish Government elections). Questions will remain over devolved powers to Scotland’s LAs 
and the adequacy of existing Scotland-wide governance and financing arrangements. 
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Table 28: Theoretical explanation of the causal impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC 
during ‘Network Growth’ (T3) 
INTEPRETATION: 
PROCESS TRACING 
(WHAT) 
SENSEMAKING: CAUSAL 
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
(HOW) 
THEORETICAL 
EXPLANATION: CAUSAL 
IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS 
(WHY) 
Purpose:  
• Public Resource 
Allocation 
• Operational and Project 
Delivery 
• Strategic Policy Making 
• Political Lobbying 
 
Configuration: 
•  Mixed/expanding 
membership 
• City-led (Political)  
 
Management:  
• Formal Quasi-Regional 
Structures  
• Informal Planning 
Structures 
• Formal Political 
Leadership 
• Formal Strategic 
Leadership 
• Formal Contextual 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
• Formal Functional 
Mechanism (Strong) 
 
• Informal Behavioural 
Mechanism (Weak) 
 
Economic efficiency: 
• High transaction costs 
• Low allocative efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• High learning clusters 
• Higher capacity for functional 
and complimentary coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• High trust 
• High incentive alignment 
 
The conceptual framework of ULAC during the growth stage can be compared with Hulst and Van 
Montfort (2007) framework, where it is found that IMC in the UK is distinctly different in 
character when compared with the rest of Europe (where it is largely a non-mandated process 
established by municipalities themselves as circumstances require). Contemporary forms of IMC 
are thought less dependent on vertical arrangements (i.e. top-down direction from central 
government), and often replaced by horizontal modes (i.e. expansion of networks and partnership 
arrangements).  The findings here therefore suggest ULAC in Scotland can be described as a 
mandated form of IMC as a new form of urban policy in Scotland. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the Scottish Government continue to steer the ULAC (albeit in a 
hidden, way given that they do not chair the SCA in any transparent capacity), Therefore, 
according to Kelly (2007: 209): 
 
‘Only substantial decentralisation would create conditions for a shift from vertical 
cooperative arrangements to cooperation between local councils. But for substantial 
decentralisation to occur, a vital condition seems to be missing: confidence in the quality of 
local government’.   
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Therefore, it is questionable as to whether in the case of Scotland’s local government sector, that 
the shift from hierarchy to market is less differentiated, and transformation less complete in 
supporting an increasing localism agenda, than some literature suggests (Hulst and van Montfort, 
2007).  
 
8.6 Summary: Impact of Theoretical Dimensions on the PV of ULAC   
 
The theoretical analysis in sections 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 demonstrates the theoretical impact of 
institutions on the PV of ULAC in Scotland across three stages of the network: identification, 
implementation, and growth. Three theoretical dimensions help to explain the impact of 
behavioural, contextual and functional mechanisms, in the form of both formal and informal 
institutions, relative to the purpose, configuration and management of the network.   
 
At the identification stage, institutional heterogeneity between network members, weak informal 
ties, combined with the desire for economic efficiencies and resources, were key explanatory 
factors in relation to the PV of ULAC at network creation.  Initially, weak informal ties (between 
cities), formal institutional differences (between cities and government) and weak formal 
governance institutions (between cities, government, COSLA), limited cities capacity to connect 
with each other and the Scottish Government.  The resultant impact of the explanatory institutions 
on the PV of ULAC at this stage of the network revealed a preference for a voluntary network, 
brokered by a neutral external organisation through informal institutional arrangement, leading to 
stronger informal ties between Scotland’s cities.  
 
Although weak ties are found to be less time-consuming and intense than strong ties, the 
institutionalisation of weak ties (both formal and informal) during SCA network implementation, 
presented key challenges for the networks governance and embeddedness.  The centralizing 
process of the SCA, differences in formal institutions between cities and the Scottish Government, 
and the institutional environment, resulted in the network being compromised to reveal a lack of 
perceived economic efficiency, spatial synergy, and network embedding.    
During the growth stages, the strengthening of informal institutions from behavioural mechanisms 
influencing network embedding between the city cluster of the SCA network - as opposed to 
formal institutions from centralising governance – proved to be the most influential for maintaining 
the cities interest and participation in the SCA network over time.  
8.7 Causal Explanation of the PV of ULAC and the Impact of Institutions 
The chapter summarises the process of ULAC and its PV according to the role and impact of 
institutions on the process.  The network process is explained according to the three stages of the 
ULAC process: network implementation, network creation and network growth.  The ULAC 
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process is further explained relative to three main institutional mechanism (formal and informal): 
contextual, functional and behavioural mechanisms, and their causal impact explained relative to 
theoretical insights.   
 
The findings identify the role and impact of different combinations of institutions across different 
stages of the network, although it is apparent that following the formalisation process of the SCA, 
‘the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes becomes much more complex, fuzzy 
and difficult to isolate’ (Rodrieguez-pose, 2013: 1038).  Indeed, throughout the network 
development analysis, but particularly during the growth stages, is the apparent role and impact of 
social mechanisms on the network embedding, in terms of diverging ambitions, political tensions 
and emerging agendas.  The size and balance of efficiency gains from improved city-city network 
ties, in relation to increasing tensions with the Scottish Government (as well as any opportunity 
costs from larger cities steering of the network), will ultimately determine the overall network 
effect and outcome over the longer –term.   
 
The integrative conceptual framework for each stage of the network (Table 29), provides a causal 
explanation of the role and impact of different institutions for the PV of the SCA as economic 
development policy, bringing together all the different elements of the research from chapter six: 
functional dimensions of ULAC (Part A); Chapter seven: the role of institutional mechanisms (Part 
B), and chapter eight: the theoretical impact of institutional mechanisms explaining the PV of 
ULAC (Part C). 
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Table 29: Integrative Conceptualisation Framework: Causal Explanation of the impact of Institutions on the PV of the SCA as Economic Development Policy 
 
 
  
NETWORK 
STAGES  
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS (PART A) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS (PART B) INSTIUTIONAL 
IMPACTS (PART C): 
Purpose Configuration Management Functional; Contextual; Behavioural  Economic; Spatial; 
Governance  
T1 • Political 
Lobbying 
• Strategic 
Planning 
 
• City-centric 
membership 
• Neutral 
Facilitation 
• Informal Planning 
Structure 
• Informal 
Leadership/Governance 
Strong formal institutions (Contextual) 
- Weak role of COSLA; 
- Weak impact of national policy (reduced public 
funding; role of cities); 
- The negative implication of urban economic 
diversity between cities; 
Culture of city competitiveness. 
Economic efficiency:  
• Low transaction costs 
• Low productive 
efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• No learning clusters 
• Reduced capacity for 
functional and 
complimentary 
coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• Low trust 
• No incentive alignment 
Weak formal institutions (functional): 
- No governance; 
- Unfocussed strategy; 
- Poor communication; 
- No resources. 
 
Strong informal institutions (behavioural): 
- Cities competitive culture; 
- Weak ties; 
- Lack of Trust. 
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NETWORK 
STAGES  
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS (PART A) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS (PART B) INSTIUTIONAL 
IMPACTS (PART C): 
Purpose Configuration Management Functional; Contextual; Behavioural  Economic; Spatial; 
Governance  
T2 • Public 
Resource 
Allocation 
• Strategic 
Planning 
• Mixed/expandin
g membership 
• National 
Agency-led 
 
• Formal Quasi-Regional 
Structure 
• Formal 
Leadership/Governance 
Strong formal institutions (contextual): 
- Changing national politics; 
- Changing national policy (increasing centralisation of 
cities – SOAs); 
Lack of national agency involvement (e.g. Scottish 
Enterprise). 
Economic efficiency:  
• High transaction costs 
• Low allocative 
efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• Low learning clusters 
• Low capacity for 
functional and 
complimentary 
coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• Low trust  
• Low incentive 
alignment 
Strong formal institutions (functional): 
- Resources; 
- Two strategies; 
- Confused delivery and strategic focus; 
- Lack of skills; 
- Weak leadership from chair; 
- Hidden leadership of Scottish Government; 
- Fluctuating membership. 
Strong informal institutions (behavioural): 
- Lack of trust; 
- Membership inequality; 
- Lack of commitment;  
- Hidden agendas; 
- Network tensions. 
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NETWORK 
STAGES  
FUNCTIONAL DOMAINS (PART A) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS (PART B) INSTIUTIONAL 
IMPACTS (PART C): 
Purpose Configuration Management Functional; Contextual; Behavioural  Economic; Spatial; 
Governance  
T3 • Public 
Resource 
Allocation 
• Operationa
l and 
Project 
Delivery 
• Strategic 
Policy 
Making 
• Political 
Lobbying 
• Mixed/expandin
g membership 
• Cities-led 
(Political)  
 
• Formal Quasi-Regional 
Structures  
• Informal Planning 
Structures 
• Formal Political 
Leadership 
• Formal Strategic 
Leadership 
Strong formal institutions (contextual):  
- Increased national recognition and input from other 
national agencies (Scottish Futures Trust; European 
funding)’ 
- Changing national and local politics; 
Changing national policy context (English core city 
deals). 
Economic efficiency: 
• High transaction costs 
• Low allocative 
efficiency 
 
Spatial synergy: 
• High learning clusters 
• Higher capacity for 
functional and 
complimentary 
coherence 
  
Network embedding: 
• High trust 
• High incentive 
alignment 
Strong formal institutions (functional): 
- Improved leadership and position of chair 
- Increasing resources/national membership involvement; 
- Clear structures to seven cities expectations; 
- Development of informal structures to counteract 
presence of strong weak formal institutions. 
Weak informal institutions (behavioural): 
- Strengthening city-city network ties; 
- Improving membership trust; 
- Network tensions with Scottish Government remains 
- Influencing role of larger cities agenda. 
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Causal explanation model: 
 
There is currently a lack of evidence demonstrating a positive link between informal institutions 
and economic development, due mainly to: a lack of ‘proxies for different types of institutions’; 
different institutional arrangements in different geographical contexts demonstrating similar 
outcomes; or that ‘beyond a certain threshold of formal institutions, the role of institutions may be 
relatively limited’ (Rodrieguez-pose, 2013: 1038).  In the context of current empirical weaknesses, 
the value and contribution of the integrative conceptual framework (Table 29) presented here, is 
through the causal explanation of the role and impact of different institutions for the PV of the SCA 
as economic development policy.  In particular, the role of informal behaviour mechanisms (and 
more generally, strengthening informal ties within the network) at different stages of the network.   
The framework therefore demonstrates an important causal link between different combinations of 
institutional mechanisms for the PV of ULAC as economic development policy relative to:  
 
- The identification and role and impact of different types of institutional mechanisms (and the 
various combinations possible across the network), over time; 
- A description of how different institutional mechanisms in a specific contextual geographical 
context, may produce similar (or different) outcomes in different settings, due to the important 
distinction required between network stages, to help clarify the important role of institutions 
for economic development policy; 
- An analysis and explanation of why different institutional mechanisms matter relative to 
context, in that their effect will differ according to the theoretical dimensions, and how they 
interact across the networks contextual functional characteristics over time 
The causal explanation model underlines the important role of different institutional 
mechanisms (i.e. of which, there are estimated to be eight possible different combinations 
at any given stage of the network) for the PV of ULAC relative to: different stages of the 
network, different institutional mechanisms; different theoretical impacts.  
 
Explanation statements (Table 30) of the theoretical and functional domains are provided, 
to help understand the causal explanation process model presented in Table (25). 
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Table 30: Explanation Statements Supporting the Causal Explanation Model of the PV of the 
SCA 
 
 
The research findings demonstrate the important role that both formal and informal institutions 
play in the ULAC process, and in particular, the role that informal institutions (i.e. culture of urban 
local government) in the context of the SCA.  The direction of the SCA during the latter stages of 
the identification phase through to the growth stage was steered strongly in the direction of ULAs 
ambitions, regardless of formal governance institutions being in place. The ULAC process is thus 
dynamic over time, to reveal an on going cumulative effect from the role of institutional 
mechanisms in one stage, shaping and conditioning of the resultant institutions in the further 
stages. 
 
Key to the conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC is therefore understanding the role of formal and 
informal institutions and how they differ at different stages and levels of the policy network 
process, and how they interact in a non-linear way.  For example, as indicated by the arrows on 
Table 30, the interaction of institutions act to contextualise subsequent network stages and the 
nature of institutional mechanisms, to create a dynamic, cumulative effect from stages 1 of the 
network to stages 5, up to a possible n times. Hence, the non-linear nature of the process also 
relates to the feedback effect from institutional mechanisms also.  Therefore, the growth of the 
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SCA reflect over three stages reflects the observation period, and is possible that further 
observations over time would reflect additional contextual mechanisms and different types of 
stages (e.g. collapse; stagnation).  The research provides an analysis of the role of different types 
(i.e. formal and informal) and different combinations of institutions over three distinct network 
stages of the SCA process over time.  It is apparent that key to understanding the role of these 
institutions is the ability to assess and measure their economic role, the role of geography, and 
institutional governance structures over time.   
 
Furthermore, the findings make clear that identifying the right mix; density (or thickness), and 
quality of institutions is key also to understanding their role in the policy development process for 
achieving PV for economic development.  However, transforming institutional insights from the 
empirical research, into clear policy guidelines is complex, due to the difficulties inherent in 
isolating and measuring the specific magnitude and relative importance of different formal and 
informal institutions, in terms of their operationalization (see Rodríguez-Pose, 2013, Williamson, 
2009), summarised as follows: 
 
• Economic efficiency and institutions: the absence or presence of efficient institutions is 
difficult to isolate and measure, especially in terms of the overall size and effect.  The 
conceptual framework provides an analytical framework that helps to map the process towards 
identifying the role and impact of different types of institutional mechanisms.  Therefore, 
having identified the role of different types of institutions, in order to improve those that are 
potentially inefficient remains challenging. 
 
• Governance and institutions: formal institutional governance structures are seen to present 
key challenges for creating network value through the generation of network capital, 
particularly in the presence of inefficient strong formal governance that is being replaced by 
inefficient strong informal institutions.   
 
• Geography and institutions: informal institutions are context and geography specific. 
Geography exerts a significant effect on the type and quality of institutions. Moderate changes 
in [region- and] country-specific circumstances (policies and institutional arrangements), often 
interacting with the external environment, can produce discontinuous changes in economic 
performances, which in turn set off virtuous or vicious cycles.  
 
• Time and institutions: key to the conceptual framework is the recognition that institutions 
change over time and what are good institutions in one stage of the network, may no longer 
have the same effect in a different stage of the network (due to the dynamic interaction process 
and contextualising process at each stage). Future research would benefit from testing different 
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combinations of networks in different settings, to better understand the role that time plays on 
supporting or hinder the networks sustainability. 
The analysis of the impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC as economic development suggest 
their important role ‘in ensuring the efficient functioning of markets… and presence of solid and 
efficient institutions has become a must, a prerequisite for those dealing with economic growth and 
development’ (Rodriguez-pose, 2013: 1036).  Therefore, consistent with North (2009), the role and 
impact of institutions on the PV of ULAC according to this thesis, relates to their important role as 
an: 
  
‘underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies’  
North (2009: 107) 
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Chapter Nine: Thesis Conclusions, Contributions, and 
Limitations 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis aims to understand and explain the PV of ULAC through an interpretive (Stake, 2005) 
explanation of the role of institutional and theoretical dimensions on the network process.  While 
qualitative research can be guided by pre-set conceptual frameworks and existing extant academic 
knowledge, emerging themes associated with the inductive approach taken to the research, helped 
to reveal additional insights into the role and impact of formal and informal institutions on the PV 
of ULAC.  
 
The final chapter concludes the thesis by bringing together both the research gaps identified from 
the earlier literature review (Chapter two, three and four) alongside the research findings (Chapter 
six, seven and eight), highlighting the thesis contribution. Implications for academic research and 
public policy practice and are also discussed, along with the limitations of the current research 
approach, suggesting implications for future research. 
 
9.2 Empirical Findings: Contribution to Theory the PV of ULAC as economic development 
policy 
 
The case study findings on the role of institutions on the PV of ULAC relative to the SCA context, 
demonstrates how they interact within the policy process in a convoluted and complex way.  The 
assessment of ULAC and its PV is revealed according to the networks functional dimensions, in 
terms of: their purpose; management and configuration (What); the role of institutions (How), and 
the impact of institutions as an explanation of the networks PV (Why), according to economic, 
political and geographical institutional perspectives. 
 
The research findings demonstrate ‘how’ and ‘why’ institutions matter for the PV of ULAC as 
economic development policy, highlighting the particular multi-scalar role of institutions (relative 
to inter-organisational working involving both national and urban organisations) and the 
cumulative, dynamic effect of different types of institutional mechanisms (i.e. contextual, function, 
behavioural mechanisms), across various stages of the network process. 
9.2.1 Conceptual and theoretical contribution:  
 
The thesis research question was to: Conceptualise the public value (PV) of urban local authority 
collaboration (ULAC) through the role of institutions.  The thesis integrates an understanding and 
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description of ULAC with institutional theory to demonstrate, through interpretive particularisation 
(Stake, 2005), the role and impact of institutions for the PV of collaboration in situations of 
constant change over time.  Given the interpretive ontological nature of the research approach, the 
research objectives were broad and initially organised around the exploration of three separate 
aspects in order to conceptualize the PV of ULUC in a particular geographical setting, to help:  
 
• describe the functional nature of ULAC according to its: purpose, configuration and 
management; 
• analyse the multi-dimensional nature of the role and impact of different institutional 
mechanisms from a multi-disciplinary theoretical perspective in terms of: economic, spatial 
and governance effects; 
• conceptualise the PV of ULAC from an interpretive critical realist perspective to provide a 
causal explanation of the impact of institutions on economic development policy. 
 
Figure 27 provides an overview of the key research gaps.   
 
Figure 27: Contribution to research gaps on the PV of ULAC  
 
 
 
To research gaps were filled according to the three main research questions as follows: 
 
What does Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) look like? 
 
RESEARCH 
CONTRIBUTION 
WHAT does Urban Local 
Authority Collaboration 
(ULAC) look like?
ULAC has three phases (Identification; 
Implementation; Growth) with different 
functional characteristics: Purpose; 
Configuration and Management 
HOW does ULAC function to 
create PV?
The role of institutions (internal and 
external) on how ULAC functions, 
depends on: strength/nature of 
formal/informal institutions relative to 
three mechanisms: contextual; functional; 
relationship mechanisms   
WHY does institutional context 
explain the PV of  ULAC
The impact of institutional mechanisms 
on the PV of ULAC, can be explained by 
three theoretical dimensions: economic 
efficency; spatial synergy; network 
embeddeness
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ULAC was analysed relative to three stages of the network (these are not exhaustive) in terms of 
(Identification; Implementation; Growth) according to a description of their different functional 
characteristics: Purpose; Configuration and Management.  Process tracing and sense-making 
identified a set of strategic events describing the evolving functional nature of ULAC across three 
network stages. 
 
How does ULAC function to create PV? 
 
The role of institutions (internal and external) on how ULAC functions, depends on the strength 
and nature of both formal/informal institutions via three institutional mechanisms: contextual; 
functional; behavioural mechanisms, to reveal substantial differences in the typology of, 
positioning and power of key actors within the policy network, highlight the key role of 
institutions, and more particularly institutional differences between network members and at 
different stages of the networks development.   Network Identification was focused on building 
recognition of the need for a coordinated cities policy in Scotland, to reveal a missing tier of 
governance between cities, and between cities and the Scottish Government.  Network 
Implementation highlights the implications of creating and implementing formal governance 
structures through a nationally recognised city collaboration structure in Scotland, to reveal an 
underlying complexity of institutional distance across both national and subnational tiers of 
Government.   
 
Why does institutional context explain the PV of  ULAC? 
 
An interpretive critical realist causal explanation of the PV of ULAC is provided through a 
theoretical analysis of the role and impact of institutions relative to three PV effects: economic 
efficiency; spatial synergy and network embedding. 
 
The integrative conceptual framework (Table 29) set out in chapter eight provides a causal 
explanation of the role and impact of different institutions for the PV of the SCA as economic 
development policy, bringing together all the different elements of the research: 
 
- chapter six helps to identify what the functional dimensions of ULAC are (Part A of the 
conceptual framework);  
- chapter seven helps to identify the role of institutional mechanisms for creating PV from 
ULAC (Part B of the conceptual framework), and finally; 
- chapter eight integrates the findings to provide a theoretical explanation of the impact of 
institutional mechanisms on the PV of ULAC (Part C of the conceptual framework).  
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Therefore, the thesis contributes towards an understanding of: what constitutes urban collaboration 
and its relationship with policy outcomes, through the development of a conceptual understanding 
of the PV of ULAC as economic development policy, relative to three theoretical domains in the 
literature: economic collaboration; spatial collaboration and governance collaboration.  
Theoretically, the institutions matter for the conceptualisation of the PV of ULAC a distinct 
conceptual dimension connecting the theoretical literature, helping to bridge scholarly boundaries 
across compatible ontological insights (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003; and Hay, 2011).  Therefore, an 
explication of the empirical findings relative to the research questions and objectives are further 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
9.2.2 Empirical findings on the delivery of local government in Scotland:  
 
Given the lack of empirical studies on the role of scale (i.e. in terms of urban scale of local 
government) as a key institutional characteristic of the network actor, and its role in affecting 
collaboration outcomes (Ha et al. 2016), the role of both the ‘urban’ and ‘national’ context of the 
SCA are found to be key institutional characteristics affecting the overall PV of ULAC in Scotland.   
 
The governance and development of urban economic development policy at the city and regional 
scale is critical to the overall nature and achievement of policy outcomes.  The background of 
increasing academic focus and policy rhetoric, concerning the perceived benefits from partnership 
working and collaboration across the public sector, have focused attention on urban local authority 
collaboration (ULAC) as a new form of urban policy and delivery mechanism in Scotland. The 
context of austerity government and constitutional flux in Scotland have reinforced the Scottish 
Government’s rationale for greater collaborative working, to maximise resource sharing, reduce 
duplication, and maintain an element of national government policy control and oversight.  City 
authorities and local agencies embraced the opportunity to work together, supporting an evolving 
range of strategies with an infrastructure focus, including new infrastructure funding mechanisms 
alongside new institutional and governance arrangements.  
 
The research analyses the urban policy context, emergent ULAC strategies, policy outcomes and 
practices, to reveal the PV of the ULAC network. The experience of the SCA raises critical 
questions about the emergent relationships, leadership and governance across the cities and the 
nature of national-urban relationships in the austerity state.  In particular, the case study research 
demonstrate how urban local government context and the role of both formal and informal 
institutions, are key characteristics influencing the overall purpose, structure, management and PV 
of ULAC for economic development in Scotland:  
 
The PV of ULAC in Scotland was found to be largely shaped by: 
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- the structure and nature of effective management of policy network governance; 
- the nature of power and informal institutional relationships between national and sub-national 
urban government, and between urban local government; 
- the policy networks capacity for meeting the diverse needs of its members shaped by 
conflicting and often, diverging, institutional agendas, hindering the networks ability to create 
value;  
- the importance role of formal contextual mechanisms and the shifting nature of devolved 
power emerging across Scotland’s local government. 
 
The research evidence illustrates how the governance and management of urban local authority 
collaboration (ULAC) for economic development in Scotland, has been largely shaped by the 
shifting nature of national government’s relationship with local authorities and the desire for 
greater devolution of power from national government, shaping the overall nature of the policy 
network and outcome processes, to reveal a new form of urban policy in Scotland. 
 
Therefore, the implications of the PV of ULAC for local government in Scotland relate mainly to 
the following: 
 
• Increasing localism: the SCAs cities-only group focus on lobbying for greater devolution of 
powers to LAs, has the potential for bringing decision-making closer to where decisions take 
effect (i.e. localism), and for improving the responsiveness of decision making to local 
circumstances.  Few would argue against the principle of localism, although, there are key 
questions in terms of the adequacy of local capacity and resource to deliver increased devolution 
of powers to local government in Scotland. 
 
• Geographic redistribution of power: ULAs push for greater autonomy through the SCA raises 
questions about the equitable nature of a redistribution of powers across different tiers of local 
government in Scotland. The current centralised system of transfer payments from central to 
local government is aimed at reducing potential geographic inequalities resulting from the 
economic diversity and tax raising capacity of different local authority areas.  Cities of 
different size and structure have vital economic roles to play in supporting the economy, for 
example, through supply chains, commuting, migration, and cultural or environmental 
importance.  The shifting balance of a redistribution of financial power from central to local 
government raises key questions about the equitability of changing central government’s 
redistribution role. Furthermore, given that city local authorities represent the SCA only, this 
raises key questions with regards to wider implications on the governance, structure and future 
direction of all tiers of local government in Scotland.  An apparent shifting balance of devolved 
power between urban and central government also raises questions concerning the democratic 
accountability of existing governance arrangements for local government in Scotland.   
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• Geographic scale of governance: cities are not self-contained economies, drawing on wide 
regional hinterlands for suppliers, commuters, migrants and consumers, raising key questions 
concerning the appropriate level of governance of urban LAs.  They have many connections 
further afield, both domestically and internationally (as, indeed, do many rural areas).  Is it 
necessary or acceptable for cities or city-regions to have more autonomy than other areas?  One 
rationale might be that city-regions form relatively self-contained functional economic systems 
that therefore make sense to manage at city-regional level. Another might be that the scale of 
city-regions is such that the financial risks of fiscal autonomy are ameliorated. Sub-national 
devolution needs to be looked at in the context of the local history, culture, tradition and political 
structure, all of which vary between LA areas.  Therefore, the SCAs development of a level of 
governance across urban LAs in Scotland raises key questions concerning the most effective and 
efficient scale of governance systems for the future delivery of economic development policy in 
Scotland. 
Overall, the research findings support the development of the theoretical model conceptualizing the 
PV of ULAC from an institutional critical realist perspective, further explained in section 9.3 
 
9.3 Methodological contributions: Theory, Practice and Public Policy  
 
The research draws upon the findings and initial analysis of Scotland’s SCA programme. 23 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with senior national and local officials who were responsible 
for negotiating and implementing the SCA, supplemented by analysis of relevant government and 
other policy documents.  
 
The research describes how the Scottish Government invited the seven cities to participate in the 
SCA, leading to increasing tensions between national and urban government. Within the Scottish 
context of partnership policy emphasis and aspirational devolution, there are signs of national 
government’s disagreement with some aspects of the ULAC networks aspirations for greater 
devolved powers to urban local authorities.  The research reveals a growing power tension between 
urban and national government, largely predicated on the Scottish Government’s desire for 
maintaining some level of centralised control and involvement in urban economic development 
policy. 
 
9.3.1 Implications for practice and policy 
 
Given the above conceptualisation, and in line with that suggested in a recent KPMG report (2015), 
the evidence here suggests the SCA as urban policy may be changing the relationships between 
spatial and investment planning in cities.  Since 2011, the SCA can be seen as providing informed 
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impetus to the growth in infrastructure investment and enhance the connections between them. The 
research supports the argument that Scotland may now be on the edge of a new, very different 
period for city economic policies, by beginning to see a shift in nationally (UK and Scottish) 
determined ‘Cities Policy’, and a new era of more autonomous locally-driven City Policy.  
 
However, a key policy implication is the need for the Scottish Government to reconsider the SCA 
and its role on influencing city deals in Scotland.  In particular, there is a need to better include the 
role of major towns at much the same scale as the smaller cities, if to ensure a single coherent 
approach to urban politic through the SCA. 
 
Besides the need for greater spatial economic balance within the policy machinery of Scottish 
government, there appears scope for further decentralizing of certain functions from Scottish 
Government to local government. and need for a transparent and coherent assess of the 
implications of increasing decentralization of powers across local government in Scotland.  
Moreover, the democratic and political accountability of emergent governance arrangements 
remains underdeveloped, suggesting ‘little seems to have been learned from the public rejection of 
the elected regional assemblies with their limited powers and resources’. (Ron Martin et al. 2015: 
350). 
 
Political ambitions and constitutional reform for local government: 
 
The empirical evidence on the SCA raises important questions about the impact of political 
ambitions on the implicit role of the SCA as a Scotland-wide policy mechanism, that can both: 
coordinate public policy and investment decisions on behalf of cities, as well as activate and 
control these decisions at a regional level.   
 
If the Scottish Government’s ambition is to use the SCA to act as a vehicle for urban decision-
making at the national level – through a dominant cities agenda – and shown to influence the 
overall policy outcomes of the SCA, urban regime theory would steer towards caution in 
acknowledging the potential dis-equilibrating effects of the political agenda of larger cities 
potentially generating coalitions of interest that can dominate the overall political agenda and 
priorities, by persuading other elected members to act mainly in the interest of larger cities (Stoker, 
1995).  An important point here is to understand to what extent the SCA agenda has been 
dominated by the larger city local authorities’ political ambitions, and by implication, questioning 
whether this is representative of the whole SCA network and all of Scotland’s local authorities.  In 
this regard, the overall configuration and structure of the SCA will require further scrutiny in years 
to come.  
 
Institutional dimensions/characteristics/PV: 
 257 
 
The country studies undertaken by Hulst and van Monfort (2012) suggest that specific features of 
the national institutional context may service the establishment of collaboration due to specific 
external factors: the presence of strong natural, social and economic interdependencies in a region 
and the absence of a strong intermediate tier of government that can fulfil planning functions.   
 
The findings in the thesis demonstrate how: a) the basic mechanisms and possible patterns of path-
dependent institutional change in a formal institutional governance arrangement is comprised of 
both formal and informal network effects; b) specifying how these mechanisms and patterns vary 
according to the different types of institutions, conditioned by differences in the institutional 
environment (in particular with regard to government structure at the national level, and structures 
at the subnational level). 
The role institutions are found mainly to be as follows: 
• Informal institutional characteristics are found to play a key role in the SCA’s development, in 
terms of trust that developed between ULA’s resulting in a significant shift in the networks 
value during the growth stage, and for meeting the networks original objectives. This is 
contrary to much of existing economic research on informal institutions and their impact 
thought largely negligible (see Rodrigues, 2013: 1038). There is also lack of evidence on a 
positive link between informal institutions and economic development outcomes.  Therefore, in 
the context of ULAC, informal institutions have played a key and important role in influencing 
the perceived value of ULAC network; 
• Despite the absence of solid evidence linking informal institutions in the literature to regional 
economic development, there is a firm belief by institutionalists that informal institutions (e.g. 
such as culture, history, religion or identity), are indeed important, on the potential for 
economic activity (Rodrigues, 2013: 1038), including: ‘smoothing the process of knowledge 
and innovation transfer’ (North, 1990, 1995; V Ázquez-Barquero, 2002), and establishing an 
adequate balance between coordination and competition as a key condition for  the  
institutional development  process; 
The conceptual framework and methodology across three levels of What, How and Why ULAC 
has PV for economic development, was used to provide a deep contextual insight of Scotland’s 
ULAC experience.  Scotland’s establishment of ULAC as an economic development policy largely 
reflects the cities ambitions for greater devolution of power from the centre in Scotland, and 
reflective of a missing tier of government between national and subnational tiers of government in 
Scotland.  The findings support the view that the PV of ULAC in Scotland for economic 
development, is largely reflective of (1) different priorities and inconsistency in the ambitions and 
strategic direction of local government in Scotland, (2) changing governance arrangements within 
the policy network over time (3) the nature of formal institutions of national government structure 
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in Scotland and lack of trust and tensions between network members within the network (4) the 
strength of weak, informal institutions and ties within the network between members from similar 
institutional contexts. 
 
9.2.2 Implications for Theory 
 
While there exist a range of policy network studies of local government collaboration from an 
institutional perspective (Ha et al. 2016; Hulst and Montfort, 2012), few provide a multi-
disciplinary focus on the role of scale (e.g. urban scale of local government) as a key institutional 
characteristic affecting collaboration outcomes.   
 
Although theoretical ideas about the collaboration policy-outcome relationship are vast, much of 
that work is ambiguous in character and unsystematic in sketching causal links between 
collaboration and performance.  Bingham et al.  (2003), for example, suggests evaluation of 
collaborative should be seen ‘as part of an extended, systematic, learning process’ that considers 
looking for patterns of outcomes across different situations over time. Therefore, the particular 
operationalization of the process–outcome relationship presented in this thesis is a contribution 
toward this learning process. Hence, it is unlikely we will ever arrive at a single approach to assess 
collaboration outcomes 
 
 In an effort to contribute to a multi-disciplinary perspective, an inductively developed model of the 
collaboration-outcome relationship is presented – a model constructed from the review of 
theoretical literature on collaboration ‘functional characteristics’ and consolidated through the 
findings of the interpretive particularization of case study findings according to the ULAC setting.   
 
Consistent with a wider perspective of institutions according to Evenhues (2017) relative to path 
dependency, the findings here support the idea of a multi-scalar view of institutions, but also, that 
both formal and informal institutions across different scale are important in economic development 
networks, summarised as follows: 
• The SCA can be regarded as a formal institutional network (i.e. formalized institution for the 
steering and coordination of initiatives pertaining to economic development in Scotland) 
comprised of both national and subnational (urban agencies);   
• Institutional change at the subnational level (e.g. differing political views on city powers) is 
shown to be conditioned by structures at different levels of scale (i.e. particular the urban local 
scale), and how various local agents (i.e. those larger in size and with greater political influence 
and connections – Edinburgh and Glasgow) can be seen to drive institutional nature of the 
overall network, and hence, its PV;  
• The regional institutional context can be seen to influence both the overall networks formal 
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instituted context, but importantly, the informal institutions within the network between 
national and local agencies, and contributed towards the whole network effect of going in a 
slightly different direction to that originally anticipated by the national government’s 
intentions.  Demonstrating the importance of informal institutions within the network at a 
subnational level, and their impact overall on the PV of ULAC 
• A multi-scalar view of institutions can be seen to create a dynamic effect on the PV of ULAC 
due to both formal institutions at the national level, and informal institutions at the subnational 
level; 
• To operate effectively, network members must act as a network, which means incurring 
organizing and transaction costs.  However, the overall impact of increasing transactions costs 
on the networks value will depend on the balance of opportunity costs for network embedding 
and spatial efficiencies; 
• There is the need for increasing recognition of the region as a cultural and political 
construction, as a prelude to institution building.  Regional institutions ‘come to exist and take 
on significance only in the context of their wider political and institutional settings’ (Agnew, 
2013: 12) and the outcome of territorially based politics. 
 
The contribution of the thesis is demonstrating the value of institutional theory for understanding 
the value of networked policy at a subnational level for economic development, through its 
explanatory power of the contribution of the role of informal institutions for economic 
development and growth, reflecting the path dependent nature of subnational forms of networked 
policy.   
The research observations of the lack of steering capacity of Scottish Government in the ULAC 
network, resonates with others (see: Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997; Rhodes, 1997), and 
underlines the point that ‘complex social interventions act on complex social systems (Pawson et 
al. 2006: 21). Hence, underlining the thesis argument that policy needs to be viewed as the outcome 
of non-rational decision-making, by taking into account multi-actor and multi-level approaches in 
policy formulation (i.e. realism – See Pawson, 2006).   Therefore, assessing policy processes from 
an institutional perspective recognises the need to consider the lack of steering capacity by 
government in the policy-making and implementation process, and government’s inability to deal 
with societal problems in their original institutional context (see: Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 
1997; Rhodes 1997). 
 
9.4 Limitations and Future research  
 
A major weakness of the research is the potential limited explanatory power of an ethnographic 
style single case study approach.  Indeed, the conclusions concerning the links between different 
institutional mechanisms (i.e. functional, behavioural and contextual) can only be viewed as 
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indicative given the different combinations of mechanisms that are possible (as identified in Figure 
26).  Therefore, further research in different institutional settings and involving different types of 
actors, will inevitably change the pattern and hence, interaction of different mechanisms given that 
they are heavily context dependant.   
 
A further limitation of the research relates to the public value approach adopted and the 
identification of the counterfactual from ULAC.  The thesis assumes that measuring the 
counterfactual is a challenging measurement process, requiring a similar complex ontological 
approach to that adopted in establishing an approach to PV estimation of collaboration.  For 
example, ‘whether counterfactual assessment should be considered a valid method of testing causal 
hypotheses is not clear’ (Fearon, 1996: 39).  Therefore, measuring the counterfactual of the PV of 
ULAC is important for clarifying the  value added from ULAC as an economic development 
policy. 
 
Empirically, there is also a lack of evidence comparing whole network effects and counterfactual 
effects (i.e. particularly comparing the effectiveness of policy outcomes of individual network sub-
actors).  Indeed, if ULAC in Scotland is to continue, a clear understanding of its added value 
should become clearer over the longer term (i.e. to identify further stages in the network, a 
potential collapse).  The conceptual framework here assumes that PV can be best understood as a 
product of both agency and structure, contextualised subject to the role of institutional mechanisms.  
The conceptual framework does however, demonstrate how the PV of ULAC can be achieved, 
therefore, a further counterfactual analysis would help to extend the conceptual model by 
measuring the extent to which the efficiency mechanisms identified (e.g. strengthening network 
ties; Scotland-wide city deal models etc) would otherwise be achieved if local authorities acted 
individually.  An important question relates to findings linking the SCA to the evolution of 
Scotland-wide city-region models for infrastructure (city deals).  Therefore, would these have 
happened without the SCA? The findings here suggest that the SCA has had a significant role in 
steering other cities interests in development city deal models from Glasgow’s first mover 
advantage.  The findings suggest at a minimum, that informal network ties are improving between 
Scotland’s cities, and indeed, having a key role in influencing new emerging infrastructure 
planning models in Scotland. 
 
Given the contextual single case study nature of the research as a potential limitation, their is also 
value from recognising the different stages of the network, and understanding how the role of 
institutions are cumulative, conditioned by institutions in earlier network stages, to reveal an on-
going dynamic policy process over time.  Further empirical research in other country contexts 
adopting ULAC would prove valuable for validating and refining the conceptual characteristics, 
and hence their theoretical value, as well as opportunities for more in depth investigation of the 
different types of institutions. 
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The approach taken here is also empirically valuable, as it relates to the need for understanding the 
Scottish case, rather than serving only to solve a conceptual problem from a single research case 
study design: where previous failed ULAC attempts between Edinburgh and Glasgow justified the 
single country case study selection. The fact that Scotland had previously failed in its attempts at 
ULAC between two of its LAs, called for a ‘privileged perspective’ (Huby, Harries, and Grant 
2011) an immersion into a single case study of a generic type, to observe and unravel variables 
potentially overlooked or underestimated by previous research, particularly a multi-disciplinarily 
perspective of the impact of institutions. 
 
There remains a challenge however, in gathering and analysing data from multiple sources, where 
the findings cannot be readily generalized to all types of collaboration policies, or indeed, public 
sector collaboration; however, it may be conceptually useful to the studied ‘type’, in terms of 
collaboration relating to network policies involving urban local authorities only.  Therefore, 
systematic data would help to make the conceptual framework more accurate by gathering 
comparable evidence about other ULAC settings, rather than just the ones observed in Scotland.   
 
Finally, a limitation of the interpretive critical realist ontology is based on people’s own perception 
and subjective understanding of events rather than an objective reality of the process of ULAC, 
thus dependant on an interpretive approach by both the researcher, and research participants.  
However, the conceptual strength of the framework’s findings acts to contribute towards a fuller, 
more holistic understanding of the PV of ULAC to help improve the validity and reliability of the 
research approach taken.  
 
Areas for future research: 
 
Areas for future research would include testing the functional domains in other ULAC contexts, to 
check the limits of their generalizability and ‘general applicability’, in order to provide invaluable 
insights around alternative functional components that might help better understand or strengthen 
ULAC policies and practice, possible through further research methods using more deductive 
research approaches to further ‘test’ the functional relationship with outcomes over a longer time 
period. 
 
In terms of the strengthening of informal ties between the city members of the SCA and their 
facilitating of new and emerging models of infrastructure funding across Scotland, this suggests a 
new spatial planning model across is evolving across Scotland.  The extent to which the new 
models of infrastructure planning across Scotland has the potential to improve functional 
integration and cohesion across Scotland’s cities, is a key area for future research.  In particular, 
any benefits from improving functional integration will depend on the nature of any counteractive 
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spatial imbalances.  Indeed, an added complexity from SCA being urban-centric is the potential for 
widening spatial imbalances between local and urban scales of government in Scotland.   
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Appendix 1: Policy Network Definitions  
An overview of the range of multi-disciplinary terms and their definitions are provided, mainly: ‘collaboration’; ‘policy network’;  ‘network governance’; and 
‘collaborative public management’. The table highlights a lack of agreement and consistency of terminology as well as confusion not only about what collaboration is, 
but also, what is its objective and purpose.   
 
AUTHOR(S) TITLE (YR) CONCEPT DEFINITIONS 
Rhodes Policy Network Analysis (2008) Policy Network Policy networks are sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between 
governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated 
beliefs and interests in public policy making and implementation. (p.426) 
Mossberger, and 
Stoker 
 
Urban Affairs Review The Challenge of 
Conceptualization (2001) 
Policy network The concept of policy networks is so broad as to include almost any type of cross-
institutional collaboration (p.821) 
Kickert, Klijn, 
Franciscus, 
Koppenjan 
 
Managing Complex Networks: Strategies 
for the Public Sector (1997) 
Policy networks More or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, 
which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes (p.6). 
Isett, Ines, Mergel, 
LeRoux, Mischen, 
and Rethemeyer. 
Networks in Public Administration 
Scholarship: Understanding Where We 
Are and Where We Need to Go (2011) 
 
Policy network A set of public agencies, legislative offices, and private sector organizations 
(including interest groups, corporations, non-profits, etc.) that have an interest in 
public decisions within a particular area of policy because they are interdependent 
but have a shared fate (p.158)…The original conceptualization of policy networks 
concerned decision making about public resource allocation (p.158). 
Isett, Ines, Mergel, 
LeRoux, Mischen, 
and Rethemeyer 
Networks in Public Administration 
Scholarship: Understanding Where We 
Are and Where We Need to Go (2011) 
 
Collaborative 
networks 
Collections of government agencies, non-profits, and for-profits that work together 
to provide a public good, service, or ‘‘value’’ when a single public agency is 
unable to create the good or service on its own and/or the private sector is unable 
or unwilling to provide the goods or services in the desired quantities. 
Collaborative networks carry out activities on behalf of the public. They may be 
formal and orchestrated by a public manager or they may be emergent, self-
organizing, and ad hoc, with many variants in between. (p.158) 
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Isett, Ines, Mergel, 
LeRoux, Mischen, 
and Rethemeyer. 
Networks in Public Administration 
Scholarship: Understanding Where We 
Are and Where We Need to Go (2011) 
Governance 
networks 
 
Entities that fuse collaborative public goods and service provision with collective 
policymaking—for instance, business improvement districts or some 
environmental mitigation efforts (p.158) 
Huxham Creating collaborative advantage (1996) Collaboration Working in association with others for some form of mutual benefit (p.1). 
Bardach Getting agencies to work together (1998) Collaboration Any joint activity by two or more agencies working together that is intended to 
increase public value by their working together rather than separately (p.8). 
Burger,  
van der Knaap, and 
Wall 
Polycentricity and the Multiplexity of 
Urban Networks (2013) 
 
Urban network A multiplex phenomena to allow polycentricity and interdependencies to be 
studied by evaluating different types of functional linkage between cities and 
regions, for example, commuter trips (p.3) 
Liu, X and 
Derudder, B. 
Analysing urban networks through the 
lens of corporate networks (2013) 
Urban networks An organizing paradigm…from roughly the early 1990s onwards, we see a rising 
interest in describing urban systems through the analytical lens of flows between 
cities… emphasizing the bearing of external relations of cities … (p. 430). 
Rhodes and Marsh  New directions in the study of policy 
networks (1992) 
Interurban 
networks 
A new set of horizontal intergovernmental relations, where participants manoeuvre 
for advantage deploying their constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, 
political and informational resources to maximise their influence over outcomes 
(p.182). 
Ansell and Gash Collaborative Governance in Theory and 
Practice. (2008) 
Collaborative 
governance 
A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, 
consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public 
policy or manage public programs or assets (p.544) 
Agranoff and 
McGuire  
Collaborative public management: New 
strategies for local governments (2003) 
Collaborative 
public 
management 
To co-labour, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in 
multi-sector and multi-actor relationships…based on the value of reciprocity and 
can include the public (p...)  
O’Leary and 
Bingham,  
Conclusion: Conflict and Collaboration in 
Networks: Missing Questions, Missing 
Connections.  
Collaborative 
public 
management 
A concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-
organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily 
solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co- labour, to co-operate to 
achieve common goals, working across boundaries in multi-sector relationships. 
Cooperation is based on the value of reciprocity (p.7) 
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Appendix 2: Scottish Settlements (Travel-to-Work-Areas) (2004-2014) 
Travel to Work Area 
Population 
2004 
Population 
2014 
Mean Annual 
Growth 2004-
14  
Population 
Share 2014 
Glasgow 1,128,397 1,169,659 0.4% 21.9% 
Edinburgh 610,228 671,149 1.0% 12.6% 
Lanarkshire 483,297 498,599 0.3% 9.3% 
Aberdeen 359,913 403,379 1.2% 7.5% 
Ayr and Kilmarnock 228,388 231,230 0.1% 4.3% 
Dundee 210,464 220,155 0.5% 4.1% 
Falkirk 161,878 171,428 0.6% 3.2% 
Livingston and Bathgate 155,271 168,787 0.9% 3.2% 
Kirkcaldy and Glenrothes 160,265 165,137 0.3% 3.1% 
Dunfermline 131,589 140,153 0.7% 2.6% 
Stirling and Alloa 132,426 139,510 0.5% 2.6% 
Irvine and Arran 137,412 137,103 0.0% 2.6% 
Perth and Blairgowrie 122,902 133,869 0.9% 2.5% 
Inverness and Dingwall 104,820 119,061 1.4% 2.2% 
Moray 89,380 94,750 0.6% 1.8% 
Dumfries and Annan 85,530 87,573 0.2% 1.6% 
Greenock 84,777 82,049 -0.3% 1.5% 
Dumbarton 73,753 72,164 -0.2% 1.3% 
Forfar and Montrose 57,313 59,957 0.5% 1.1% 
Galashiels and Peebles 54,221 57,631 0.6% 1.1% 
St Andrews and Cupar 48,702 49,551 0.2% 0.9% 
Peterhead 34,373 36,231 0.5% 0.7% 
Berwick 28,856 30,931 0.7% 0.6% 
Western Isles 26,650 27,250 0.2% 0.5% 
Banff 26,425 27,065 0.2% 0.5% 
Kirkcudbright 23,419 23,408 0.0% 0.4% 
Shetland Islands 22,090 23,230 0.5% 0.4% 
Fraserburgh 21,799 22,815 0.5% 0.4% 
Invergordon 21,170 22,203 0.5% 0.4% 
Orkney Islands 19,830 21,590 0.9% 0.4% 
Dunoon and Bute 22,430 20,674 -0.8% 0.4% 
Lochaber 19,043 19,763 0.4% 0.4% 
Hawick 18,981 18,557 -0.2% 0.3% 
Stranraer 18,317 17,833 -0.3% 0.3% 
Oban 16,125 16,894 0.5% 0.3% 
Kelso and Jedburgh 14,577 15,419 0.6% 0.3% 
Thurso 15,192 15,315 0.1% 0.3% 
Badenoch 12,225 13,672 1.2% 0.3% 
Skye and Lochalsh 12,417 13,076 0.5% 0.2% 
Pitlochry 12,210 12,542 0.3% 0.2% 
Wick 11,794 11,936 0.1% 0.2% 
Newton Stewart and Wigtown 11,641 11,413 -0.2% 0.2% 
Carlisle 10,446 10,301 -0.1% 0.2% 
Dornoch and Lairg 9,507 9,781 0.3% 0.2% 
Lochgilphead 9,694 9,408 -0.3% 0.2% 
Ullapool and Gairloch 8,392 8,293 -0.1% 0.2% 
Campbeltown 8,286 7,749 -0.6% 0.1% 
Mull and Islay 7,485 7,357 -0.2% 0.1% 
 2,669,150 2,856,782 0.7% 53% 
 5,084,300 5,347,600 0.5% 100% 
Mid-Year Population Estimates, NRS 
Source: Scottish Government Statistics:http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/Publications/7Cities 
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Appendix 3: Scotland’s Cities: Key Facts 
 
Scottish Cities Key Facts  
Aberdeen 
 
• Europe’s energy capital and one of top 5 
energy cities in the world  
• 2nd highest business birth rate in UK  
• 2 world renowned universities  
• Home to 33 of Scotland’s top 100 
companies  
• Has over 1,000 businesses within the 
energy sector  
• 3.5m passengers through Aberdeen 
International Airport (14% of all passengers 
in Scottish airports)  
Dundee 
 
• Highest student population ratio in Scotland  
• Selected as one of the 7 most intelligent 
communities in the world by the Intelligent 
Community Forum   
• UK’s first and only UNESCO City of 
Design  
• Home to the only VandA Museum outside 
London   
• Birthplace of Scotland’s computer games 
industry and home to the world’s first 
computer games degree  
• Scotland’s sunniest city  
Stirling 
 
• Ranked best place in Scotland to start a 
business and 8th in the UK  
• The University of Stirling is one of the 
UK’s top research universities and is 7th in 
the UK for graduate employability.  
• Highest % of employees who are managers, 
directors or senior officials in Scotland 
(13.4%)  
• Scotland’s most entrepreneurial city with 
100 more businesses per 1,000 population 
than the UK average.  
• Stirling is an international centre of 
excellence for Aquaculture, Dementia Care 
and Sport.   
• 33% of our workforce is educated to degree 
level or above.   
Perth 
 
• Projected population growth of 25% over 
next 20 years  
• More places to eat and drink per head of 
population than any other Scottish city.   
• Largest concentration of food and drink 
businesses in Scotland worth £310m 
annually 
• 61.5% of residents qualified to graduate 
level  
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• One of UK’s leading cities for digital 
connectivity (almost 100% of premises 
having access to superfast broadband and 
89% to ultrafast broadband)  
• Home to largest University of Highlands 
and Islands Campus with over 9,000 
students  
Inverness 
 
 
• Fastest growing city in Scotland   
• One of the best UK retail investment 
locations  
• Home to the UK’s newest university  
• Home to Scotland’s largest life science 
company – Lifescan Scotland  
• Largest multi-purpose arts venue in 
Scotland  
• Home to one of world’s finest golf courses  
• Largest national park in UK - Cairngorms  
Glasgow 
 
• Scotland’s largest city, population of 
600,000  
• Scotland’s economic powerhouse  
• Home to 130,000 students from more than 
135 countries   
• One of National Geographic’s top 20 
locations for 2016   
• 2nd largest shopping location in UK, 
£2.55bn spent each year   
• Rough Guide’s Friendliest city in the world  
Edinburgh 
 
• Home to the world’s largest Arts Festival  
(The Edinburgh Festival Fringe), a world 
Heritage Site and UNESCO’s first City of 
Literature, and the city is 2nd most popular 
tourist destination in UK, over 4m visitors 
each year.   
• "Best Mid-Sized European City for 
Business Friendliness 2016/17”   
• More people with degree/degree equivalent 
qualifications than any UK city outside 
London (46% of working age residents )  
• Hotel occupancy rates amongst the highest 
in Europe  
• UK’s largest tech hub out of London  and 
home to 2 of the world’s 152 unicorn start 
ups  
• Four Michelin starred restaurants, more 
than any UK city outside London  
Source: Data sources for City Information take from Scotland’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ 2016: 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/03/3178/3 
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Appendix 4: Interviewee Characteristics 
 
INTERVIEWE
E CODE 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
REPRESENTATIO
N 
1. NATIONAL (N) 
2. URBAN (U)  
GENDER: 
1. MALE (M) 
2. FEMALE 
(F) 
PERSPECTIVE:  
1. POLITICAL 
(P) 
2. OFFICER (O) 
INTERVIEW 
LENGTH 
(minutes) 
I1 U F O 31 
I2 U F O 32 
I3 U F O 42 
I4 U F P 35 
I5 U M O 42 
I6 U M O 53 
I7 U M O 45 
I8 U M O 48 
I9 U M O 40 
I10 U M O 62 
I11 U M O 53 
I12 U M P 42 
I13 U M O 45 
I14 U M P 38 
I15 U F O 54 
I16 N F O 34 
I17 N F O 63 
I18 N F O 38 
I19 N F O 62 
I20 N M O 70 
I21 N M O 63 
I22 N M O 53 
I23 N M O 58 
 293 
Appendix 5: Research Questions 
 
Background information on your area of expertise and organisation 
1. Name of organisation 
2. Job title (optional) of person completing this survey  
3. What is your role or primary responsibility in your organisation? 
4. Your (interviewee) background and relationship and role with the ULAC in general. 
CASE STUDY OF A URBAN LOCAL AUTHORITY COLLABORATION (ULAC):  
 
THEME A: PURPOSE OF ULAC 
 
1. How has your relationship with the ULAC developed since your involvement? 
 
2. What do you perceive has been the key milestones (i.e. objectives) in the development of the 
ULAC initiative to date?  
 
3. Do you think there have been any perceived unintended outcomes from the SCA network to 
date?  
 
4. Do you think there have been any constraints surrounding the achievement of current ULAC 
milestones/objectives?  
 
5. Can you say anything about ULAC contribution towards the achievement of: 
• pooled resources; 
• shared agendas; 
• leadership; 
• community engagement; 
• mutual learning; 
• accountability; 
• trusting relationships. 
 
THEME B: MANAGEMENT OF ULAC 
 
1. What do you perceive as the key successes of the ULAC to date? 
2. Based on your involvement with the ULAC, what would you say are the key advantages 
(disadvantages) of being involved in the ULAC? 
3. Are there any barriers (disadvantages) or facilitators (advantages) towards the achievement of 
successful economic development policy outcomes from being involved in a ULAC?  
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4. Is there anything you think the ULAC could do to be more effective for the achievement of 
economic development objectives?  
5. Can you tell me more about how the ULAC is governed and managed? 
6. What do you regard as the important aspects of the ULAC governance for urban collaboration? 
7. What do you regard as the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the ULAC governance for 
urban collaboration? 
8. Can you say anything about the effective (or ineffective) ways in which the ULAC governance 
functions? 
9. What, in your opinion, are the key challenges faced by the ULAC? 
 
THEME C:  THE CONFIGURATION/STRUCTURE OF ULAC 
 
1. Who are the key partners/agencies involved in the ULAC network and what is their respective 
role with the ULAC? 
2. In your opinion, what is the role of individual cities within the ULAC – are there key members 
(or non-key members) of the ULAC network, who might they be and why?  
 
3. Has your working relationship with the agencies currently involved in the ULAC changed due 
to your involvement with the ULAC, and if so, how has it changed? 
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Appendix 6: Non-participant Observation Proforma 
 
 
NON-PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION:  
 
Observations will be based around: 
 
• The dynamics taking place within the case study/group being observed; 
• Relationship between members; 
• Decision-making processes, governance considerations, meeting standards, regulations, 
processes. 
OBSERVATION AREAS: 
 
A What is happening? 
1. Setting: 
- describe the space;  
- who is involved; 
- what objects are involved/what are they doing/listening to presentations etc/making 
decision etc; 
- what are the goals/objectives of the event; 
- what is the mood of the event; 
- who was the chair etc; 
- using a chart to map who is involved/who they are etc; 
2. Description of the event/what kind of event is it; 
3. Ethnographic mapping (e.g. decision making). 
 
B  Why it is happening: 
 
- looking for events that influence the groups behaviour; 
- looking for patterns of behaviour; 
- the typology of the event/classify the people involved: decision makers; participants; 
observers; leaders etc; 
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Appendix 7: Plain Language Statement 
 
 
Plain Language Statement 
 
1. Study title and Researcher Details 
 
University:  University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, Management 
Research Title: Urban Collaboration for Economic Development: a critical assessment of the 
relationship between Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) and policy in practice 
 
Names of Researcher(s): Linda Christie, Doctoral Researcher 
 
2. Invitation paragraph  
 
You are being invited to take part in a doctoral research study. Before you decide to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  
 
Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Thank you in advance for reading this statement. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The aim of this research is to clarify the conceptual understanding and importance of collaborative 
working for urban economic development, through an analysis of the nature of the relationship between 
Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC) and policy outcomes. Urban Local Authority 
Collaboration (ULAC) in this research is used as an umbrella term to refer to economic development 
policy networks that involve collaborative working at the scale of the city, using the Scottish Cities 
Alliance (SCA) as a case study.  The nature of inter-urban collaboration within the SCA is being studied 
via policy network analysis, by describing the SCA policy process to provide insight on the nature of the 
urban networked relationships for policy outcomes.   
 
An exploration of the SCA will offer fresh insight on the collaborative relationship between Scotland’s 
cities by expanding the empirical knowledge base.  Research such as this is concerned with assessing the 
nature of collaborative policy-making within different institutional settings of urban governance, with a 
focus on the relative impact on the delivery of policy outcomes.  The research also aims to validate 
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apparent criticisms of the role of governance in Urban Local Authority Collaboration (ULAC), by 
considering whether inter-urban collaboration does in fact, provide an effective economic development 
policy solution. 
 
The data collection for this research is estimated to take approximately 6 months. 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen based on your involvement with the SCA and or related work experience and 
involvement in economic development policy of Scotland’s cities.  
5. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. If you refuse to participate in the research, this will have no effect on your 
employment.  
In addition, if you have decided to participate, all the data and information gathered from you will not be 
disclosed to your superiors and subordinates in order ensure the protection and anonymity of participation. 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be involved in the data gathering process through interviews. Interviews will be conducted for 
approximately 30-40 minutes and data will be recorded, with your permission using audio recording.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Information, which is collected about you during the course of the research, will be kept strictly confidential 
such as name, background etc. The organisation’s name and role (position) of the participant within the 
organisation may be disclosed with permission only. If you do not like to disclose your role (position) of the 
organization, your information will be kept anonymous throughout the research. You will be identified under 
a fictitious name, and any information about you will have your name and address removed so that you cannot 
be recognised from it.  
 
Data will be gathered in the form of field notes (during interviews) using real names and during writing up of 
the formal notes (second stage) you will be identified under a fictitious name. Data will be stored in the personal 
laptop or computers with access to be available by password only and field notes will be stored securely in 
personal locked filed cabinet during the data gathering period.  
 
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will be published in the form of a PhD thesis, and possibly, contribute towards the 
production of conference papers, journal articles and/or book chapters.  You can obtain a copy of the published 
results from the researcher if you request it. 
 
9. Who is organising and funding the research?  
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Scottish Government are funding the PhD as part of 
a PhD scholarship with the Scottish Cities Knowledge Centre of the University of Glasgow.   
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10. Who has reviewed the study? 
Project has been reviewed by the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. 
 
11. Contact for Further Information  
LINDA CHRISTIE 
PhD Researcher (Scottish Cities Knowledge Centre) 
University of Glasgow 
12 Southpark Terrace 
Glasgow G12 8LG 
Tel: 0141 330 2014 (direct) 
Mobile: +44 (0)7772767751 
Email: l.christie.2@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project, you can contact the College Ethics 
Officer by contacting: Dr Muir Houston, (email muir.houston@glasgow.ac.uk). 
 
If you consent to being interviewed and understand the Plain Language Statement (PLS), please print and sign 
your name, and date the form, in the spaces provided, confirming that: 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any 
reason. 
• I understand that my interview will be audio-recorded and that copies of transcripts will be returned for 
participant verification.  All information recorded will thereafter be transcribed (and the recordings 
destroyed) and participants to be referred to by pseudonym and identified by a pseudonym in all publications 
arising from the research. 
• I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
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Appendix 8: Consent for the Use of Data 
 
DATA USE AND MANAGEMENT PLAN - CONSENT TO THE USE OF DATA 
 
University of Glasgow, College of Social Science Research Ethics Committee 
 
Title of Project: Public Value of Urban Local Authority Collaboration 
 
 
I understand that          Linda Christie     is collecting data in the form of interviews for use in an 
academic research project at the University of Glasgow.  
 
This research is funded entirely by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
 
 
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
 
• All names and other material likely to identify individuals (or locations) will be anonymised (see 
Appendix 1 for illustrative purposes). 
• Participants have the right to withdraw at any time. 
• Data collected may be processed manually and with the aid of computer software. 
• The material will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times. 
• When all research outputs are complete, the material will be destroyed in accordance with the 
University of Glasgow’s Data Protection Policy.  
• A copy of your interview transcript will be provided, free of charge, on request. 
• In line with ESRC data sharing rules, the interview data will be deposited (and anonymised) to the 
UK Data Service's ReShare data repository within three months of the end of the grant period (i.e. 
January 2017). 
 
In order to comply with the ESRC’s Data Sharing requirements please indicate, by ticking ONE of the 
boxes below, how you prefer selected texts to be quoted directly, in reports and publications arising 
from this research:  
 
□ I/my employer (delete which is not applicable) may be identified in reports made available outside 
the research teams and the ESRC, and in publications. 
 
□ Neither I, nor my employer, may be identified in reports made available outside the research teams 
and the ESRC, nor in any publications. My words may be quoted provided that they are anonymised. 
 
□ Neither I, nor my employer, may be identified in reports made available outside the research teams 
and the ESRC, nor in any publications. My words may not be quoted. 
 
 
If you consent to the data gathered being processed as outlined below, please print and sign your 
name, and date the form, in the spaces provided: 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understand the Data Management Plan and Consent Form for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
• I agree to take part in the above study. 
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Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
 
Researcher’s name and email contact: Linda Christie 
 
Supervisor’s name and email contact:  
Professor Iain Docherty: iain.docherty@glasgow.ac.uk,  
 
Department address: Adam Smith Business School, Main Building, and University of Glasgow, 
G12 8QQ 
 
 Example anonymisation log 
 
Interview and page 
number 
Original Changed to 
Int1 
p1 Age 27 Age range 20-30 
p1 Glasgow City 
p3 Glasgow City Council  Urban Local Authority (ULA) 
p2 20th June June 
p2 Amy (real name) RI1…RIx (pseudonym) 
Int2 
p1 Francis my colleague  
p10 
Head of Economic Development, 
Edinburgh 
Senior Executive with a Scottish 
Local Authority 
 
Transcript anonymisation example 
In an interview transcript a person's name is replaced with a pseudonym or with a tag that typifies 
the person [i.e. council employee].  
This is also done when reference is made to other identifiable people.  
An exact geographical location may be replaced with a meaningful descriptive term that typifies 
the location [southern part of town, near the local river, a moorland farm, his native village]. 
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Appendix 9: Network Timeline (January 2010 – June 2016) 
 
 
 
NETWORK	IDENTIFICATION	
(T1)	
• Ci es	Lobbying	Events	(e.g.	
‘League	of	Sco sh	ci es’	event)	
(2010)		
• SCDI	Appoint	SCA	Programme	
Manager	(January,	2011)	
• City	Leader’s	Summit	(February,	
2011)		
• Signing	of	‘Six	Ci es	Shared	Vision	
for	Success’	(May	2011)	
• Sco sh	Government	‘Ci es	Team’	
Created	(July	2011)		
• Sco sh	Government	SCA	
Announcement:	‘Delivering	for	
Scotland’s	Ci es’	(December	2011)	
NETWORK	IMPLEMENTATION	
(T2)	
• First	mee ng	of	the	City	
Leadership	Group	(March	2012)	
• SCDI	Creates	SCA	Team:	SCA	
Programme	Director	Appointed	
(June,	2012)		
• SCDI	CEO	Resigns:	Remains	as	SCA	
Chair	(June,	2013)		
• Leadership	Group	Mee ng:	Ci es	
Policy	Reform	(September,	2013)		
• SCDI	Appoints	New	CEO	
(November,	2013)	
• Leadership	Group	Mee ng:	SCDI	
CEO	Resigns	as	Chair	(December,	
2013)	
NETWORK	GROWTH	(T3)	
• New	SCA	Strategic	Director	
Appointed	(January,	2014)	
• Private	City	Leaders	Mee ngs	
Commence	(Summer,	2014)		
• Leadership	Group	Mee ng:	Review	
of	SCA	Governance	(December,	
2014)	
• Private	City	Leaders	Mee ng:	
‘Review	of	City	Networks’	Report	
(January,	2015)	
• New	Chair	of	Leadership	Group:	
Poli cal	Leader	of	Edinburgh	City	
Council	(March,	2015)	
• Chief	Execu ve	Mee ng:	Agreed	
Areas	of	Responsibility	(April,	
2015)	
• SCA	Governance	Review:	CEO/City	
Leadership	Groups	Created	(May,	
2015)	
• Refreshed:	‘Seven	Ci es	Shared	
Vision’	(May,	2015)	
• Sco sh	Government:	‘Ci es	
Conven on	(November,	2015)	
• Refreshed	Sco sh	Government:	
‘Agenda	for	Ci es’	(March,	2016)	
• City	Leaders	Group:	‘Empowering	
Scotland’s	Ci es’	Report	(May,	
2016)	
JANUARY	2010	–	DECEMBER	2011	
OBSERVATION PERIOD WITHIN SCDI
 (January 2015 – January  2016)
JANUARY	2012–	DECEMBER	2014	 JANUARY	2015	–	JUNE	2016	
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Appendix 10: The role of institutional mechanisms on the PV of ULAC at each stage of the network (key quotes taken from 
interview transcripts during analysis) 
 
Table A: Sense-making: Network Identification (T1) 
 
INTERPRETATION OF 
THE NETWORK 
PROCESS:  
CONTEXTUAL MECHANISM: 
 
FUNCTIONAL MECHANISM: 
 
BEHAVIOURAL MECHANISM: 
Purpose: Increase national 
profile of cities; Build a link 
with Scottish Government; 
Provide 
governance/coordination of 
cities in Scotland 
 
Configuration: Six Cities; 
SCDI as Chair 
 
Management: Passive 
facilitation; Lack of strategic 
focus; Informal/Voluntary 
coordination 
Economic: ‘Local Government is very 
hard to get ideas…we are really a 
hundred miles away from the nearest 
comparable local authority’ (RI10) 
‘as a small city…we don't have the 
capacity to do it all ourselves’ (RI11) 
 ‘Scotland’s cities are…economically 
diverse, geographically 
diverse…Probably a sense that Glasgow 
and Edinburgh have something in 
common. Dundee and Aberdeen at a 
push. The rest of them quite different.’ 
(RI8)  
‘The initial concept of the city-region 
was the start, and a carefully constructed 
narrative around the travel to work area’ 
(RI23)  
 
Political: ‘COSLA considers that all 
councils are treated equally, when that’s 
incorrect’ (RI22).  
‘the different political parties put things 
in their manifestos around cities at the 
last election [2011]…SNP committed 
Impact: ‘it takes a lot of resources and 
energy to liaise with all the cities 
without a core team’ (RI17) 
‘going back to the politics of it…it's 
like herding cats…what happened was 
nothing got done’ (RI9). 
 
Clarity of Purpose: ‘Well it wasn’t 
clear. I mean, I think it just seemed 
like different organisations, you know, 
doing their own things…the cities 
themselves were trying to understand 
how they could work, because they 
hadn't worked together before’ (RI14) 
 
Communication:‘communication 
wasn’t the strong point at the start, it 
was felt that that would all be done by 
the existing city PR people’ (RI10) 
 
 
 
 
  
Conflict/tension: ‘We had an away day with 
only the cities, and the Scottish Government 
weren’t involved, and that rankled the Scottish 
Government.’ (RI20) 
‘We wanted to cities to run it without 
government, but much to our annoyance the 
government created the combination at the 
heart of the SCA organisation’ (RI23) 
‘the relationship between Glasgow and 
Edinburgh wasn’t collaborative, it was quite 
competitive’ (RI12) 
 
Commitment: ‘there was no particular problem 
bringing the cities round that table for early 
discussions.’ (RI1). 
‘there was a bit of small p political tension just 
in terms of a sense of, we’re Glasgow, why do 
we need this? …what are we doing in a room 
with these much smaller places? (RI18) 
‘I think the scope and pressures Glasgow is 
facing are of a different to some other 
cities.’(RI2) 
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that they would appoint a cities minister’ 
(RI22) 
‘the aim was to create a coalition of 
cities that lobbied the government before 
the [2011] elections and for urban policy 
to be put into the manifestos of 
Scotland’s political parties’  
Respondent: (I18) 
 
‘the notion of what was going to be 
called the 'league of Scottish cities' based 
on the California league…then 
government in the run up to the 2011 
elections, saw a political opportunity, 
and decided they would be part of 
it…made it SCA, and gave it to SCDI 
and funded it with a deal done with the 
leader of SCDI (RI23) 
 
Historical: ‘Edinburgh was really 
instrumental in lobbying...around 2010, 
and came out of the Glasgow-Edinburgh 
Collaboration Initiative’ (RI1) 
‘it’s been a big step forward in my 
experience, since the Glasgow 
Edinburgh Collaboration’ (RI12) 
‘it all started in 2010 with two events 
with the six cities, and telling them about 
city-regions (RI23) 
 
Financial: ‘the political agenda in 
Scotland was about nation building and 
that the shift in where money was spent, 
 
 
Strength of ties: ‘this was the first time ever 
that only the city leaders had got in a room 
together’(RI22) 
‘cities had never actually been directly 
involved in [joint projects] with each other 
before’ (RI21). 
‘the degree to which cities felt a common bond, 
I think, was also a lot less than say, a [English] 
Core Cities model’ (RI13) 
‘Scotland’s cities are all politically diverse in 
their administrations…not really familiar with 
each other.’ (RI8)  
 
Equality: ‘If you’re the same colour as Scottish 
government I think you would feel that you’re 
in a better position’ (RI6) 
‘it’s not really apparent sometimes to see how 
working with the smaller cities is to the larger 
cities’ advantage, purely on a scale basis, so I 
was probably a little bit sceptical at the 
beginning’ (RI12) 
Agendas: ‘SCDI had its own agenda in relation 
to the Cities Alliance…working for their own 
interests…not in the interest of the Alliance’ 
(RI14) 
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Table B: Sense-making: Network Implementation (T2) 
 
what it was spent on, was away from 
cities and into either key rural areas or 
into sectoral interests that were not those 
of cities’ (RI18)   
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE 
NETWORK PROCESS:  
CONTEXTUAL MECHANISM: 
 
FUNCTIONAL MECHANISM: 
 
BEHAVIOURAL MECHANISM: 
Purpose:  Support cities 
contribution towards national 
economic  growth; National 
focus on inclusive growth; 
- Configuration: Increasing 
membership; All seven cities 
membership; membership 
flux/change 
- Management: Passive 
leadership; Lack of strategic 
clarity; Formalising/aligning 
governance 
 
Politics: ‘Nicola Sturgeon was quite 
heavily involved at the beginning. She 
didn’t chair the leadership group but she 
participated in it’ (RI10); 
‘Glasgow was the only city leader who 
spanned the 2011-2012 SCA…it 
changed dynamics, not just potentially 
politically, but in terms of personalities, 
totally transformed.’(RI12) 
‘there was a negotiation to be had in 
terms of short term political aims of 
collectively, the SCA, and what i would 
see as the longer term stability of the 
SCA (RI23) 
‘I guess the battle between labour who 
see the Scottish cities as more 
autonomous and then SNP who trying to 
build a country to appear unified under 
one central area.’(RI7) 
 
‘The big P politics of it…quite quickly 
the events of 2011 and 12, the 
emergency coalition...a very different 
Influence/Impact: ‘by using the SCA 
to lobby the Scottish Government for 
more resource, I think you’ve got to be 
careful how you do that and it’s better 
to do that with them round the 
table’(RI10) 
 
‘the SCA didn't have legal status in 
2013, it was a programme within 
SCDI’ (RI23) 
‘its not impartial enough…we had to 
have a debate about the role of SCDI 
within the structure’ (RI13) 
‘It helps us to open doors in 
government that perhaps we wouldn’t 
manage to open on our own. Having 
Scottish government colleagues meet 
with us on a regular basis just’ (RI1). 
‘externally it’s didn’t have much of a 
profile… people were saying “well 
what does the SCA really do?”’(RI10) 
 
 
Tensions: 
[Nicola Sturgeon] is a very astute politician 
who was good at understanding the different 
dynamics in the group between the more SNP 
led councils and the labour led councils (RI10) 
‘there is also some recognition of real Galieths 
in the SCA membership’ (RI17) 
‘Perth and Stirling, they do provide a number 
of commuters and supply chain to the larger 
cities so they have a rightful place [in the 
SCA], but it did cause a little tension with the 
bigger cites (RI7) 
‘there was a tension between the cities wanting 
to take on more as a group of cities, and on the 
other hand, the government trying to figure out 
what that means to them’ (RI13) 
‘it would be crazy to say there haven’t been 
difficulties, not least…when you come from a 
big city…pretty well resourced, it’s easier…to 
take forward some of the work than it is for 
some of the smaller cities’(RI1)  
 
Commitment/motivation: 
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political environment…and various 
other things (RI18) 
 
‘ Gordon [Leader of GCC]was the only 
one who was there from the start.’ 
(RI12) 
 
‘I don’t understand what their [cities] 
objective being part of the SCA is at the 
moment.(Ri18) 
 
Power: ‘The Scottish Government had 
the resources; they were a helpful 
resource, because we didn't have the 
resource ourselves. (RI14) 
‘the alliance…so having the Depute 
First Minister at the table I think was 
valuable because we could bring to the 
table different things that we [cities] 
were doing and got noticed’ (RI10);   
 
 
Transparency: ‘there were discussions 
that took place…that didn't come down 
to the core team, and we didn't have an 
understanding of things (RI14) 
 
Accountability: ‘there was all this sort 
of stuff, that just went on, that we were 
told, we just had to do, without there 
being an assessment of whether it was 
in the interests of the Alliance’ (RI14) 
 
Clarity of Purpose: 
‘I think if we had been slightly more 
focused on doing one or two things 
really, really well rather than opening 
up a number of fronts, I think we 
would potentially have been more 
successful’(RI22) 
‘there was a bit too much jumping in 
too quick. I think, too much change in 
the lead up to the publication of the 
Agenda for Cities (RI21) 
‘whatever progress, or lack of it, was 
being made, some of the cities were 
talking that something had to change’ 
(RI20) 
‘I think it would have been better to 
approach things differently, looking 
back…we took a while to establish 
how we worked into the Agenda for 
Cities. And I think that's representative 
of the number of different strategies 
and plans we've had. I think a lot of 
‘some of the civil servants involved lacked 
imagination. I think they were pursuing a fairly 
narrow agenda without much ambition. It was 
almost like something that had to be 
done.’(RI8) 
 ‘i think the key thing is to get buy in and i 
worry perhaps where we are going with it. we 
have taken on a lot of people in the centre of 
the SCA…i think we might lose something 
from the cities themselves and buy-in from 
each city’(RI7)  
‘Glasgow still has no big political buy in. It’s a 
side show. It doesn’t really matter 
politically….the leader is exposed to what is 
going on and isn’t particularly enamoured by 
it. So it’s more on his radar than it was before, 
but not in a good way necessarily’ (RI18) 
‘So I had to ask them, ‘you need to decide 
where the SCA fits’. There was always an 
undercurrent of at least two of the cities 
(Edinburgh and Glasgow) who were on the 
verge of leaving.’(RI13) 
‘Scottish Enterprise having to be brought to the 
table kicking and screaming, and then actually 
trying to undermine us. They didn’t recognise 
cities.’(RI20) 
‘the delivery group attendance started to fall’ 
(RI20) 
 
 
Consensus: 
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time has been taken in revising a lot of 
strategies and plans’ (RI21) 
 
Impact: 
‘there were other people to share with 
and a professional network which 
existed and allowed the sharing and 
exchange of ideas on other things, and 
there was cost savings to that’(I21) 
‘The SCA has been a collaborative bed 
for securing European Structural 
funds. Although it’s led, by Glasgow 
City Council, all the cities benefit from 
it. And it's access to a pot of money, a 
substantial pot of money, that they 
wouldn't have got on their own.’ 
(RI21) 
‘the smaller cities have come up with 
some of the most interesting 
innovations for developing cities. For 
example, Perth was on the only city 
who had a strategic investment fund. 
So there has been room to learn what 
each other was doing’ (RI7) 
 
Accountabiity: ‘we were required to 
put in a much more formalised 
governance structure to make sure that 
we were accountable.’ (RI18) 
 
Stability: 
‘it was the equivalent of the note left in 
the treasury…mandated by the city 
‘cities need to be able to advocate their own 
city positions individually of government’ 
(I23). 
‘there were definitely constraints.  The civil 
servants came at it with an apparently fixed 
view of what the problem was’ (RI18) 
 
Agendas: 
‘the cities were gonna work together anyway.  
The Scottish Government wanted to be at the 
table, they put money on the table to bring 
them to the table. And that's where the Agenda 
for Cities came from’ (RI21) 
 
Equality: 
‘As a large city, I suppose on balance giving it, 
but not getting much back’ (RI8) 
‘As a large city, knowledge sharing hasn’t 
changed - No, I wouldn't say yet’ (RI2) 
‘although there are some real wins for smaller 
cities, like Perth, Stirling, Inverness by there 
very nature have more to gain than Glasgow 
Edinburgh Aberdeen or Edinburgh’ (RI17) 
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Table C: Sense-making Table: Network Growth (T3) 
leadership. This wasn't a stable basis to 
start from’ (RI23) 
‘it’s been a kind of nebulous concept 
to be honest with you, and frankly, I 
didn’t really think the whole 
organisation was really going 
anywhere’ (RI14) 
‘it's been over admin heavy. But I 
think that's gonna change (RI21) 
‘don’t think the cities themselves ever 
stopped to take a breath and reflect on 
where things were going. It was 
moving at a pace and in a direction 
that, you know, wasn’t really thought 
through. There wasn’t an opportunity 
for the cities to get together and think 
it through.’(RI8) 
NETWORK PROCESS:  CONTEXTUAL MECHANISM: 
 
FUNCTIONAL MECHANISM: 
 
BEHAVIOURAL MECHANISM: 
Purpose: Devolution for Urban 
Local Government in Scotland 
(cities gain); Scottish 
Government’s Agenda for National 
Inclusive Growth (National Gain)  
 
Configuration: informal cities-only 
Group; formal SCA group 
Economic:  
‘the smaller cities are facing a sub set 
of the issues that we’re facing.’(RI8) 
‘Glasgow is also a member of the 
Core Cities…that can be 
helpful…and ensure that is translated 
into the Scottish dimension’(RI2) 
Political: 
Influence: 
‘I can see the benefits of a collective lobbying 
power, the seven of us are working 
together…pushing the government for 
something’ (RI12) 
the doors have opened slightly because of the 7 
cities working together. The relationships with: 
UKTI; Scottish Development international; 
Commitment: 
‘trying to move the Alliance more towards 
being cities led…it’s been quite a journey 
to getting the government on board’ 
(RI12) 
‘there is a strong political steer that 
Glasgow is committed [to the SCA] going 
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including all cities and Scottish 
Government 
 
Management: Clarity of purpose; 
stronger strategic 
leadership/direction;  
‘I think it’s quite hard to show the 
impact. One of the questions is, well 
so why are working with all these 
other people what’s the impact? Well 
politicians want to see impact’ 
(RI10) 
‘I think there’s an increasing 
willingness from central Scottish 
Government to let go of the levers of 
control, but it’s a slow process, and if 
that process reverses or doesn’t keep 
going after May 2016, I think that’ll 
be a major barrier (RI12) 
a few of the cities were still SNP led, 
four Labour led, so there’s still a 
cross-party mix. And everybody was 
in agreement that we should try and 
move it towards being more cities 
led.(RI12) 
Historical: 
Following the referendum, the SCA 
could have either imploded or gained 
momentum, and i think it gained 
momentum in the safe space, and 
could have fallen apart if the 
outcome of the referendum had been 
different’ (RI17) 
Power: 
‘the cabinet minister needs to let the 
SCA deliver and not be overly 
concerned with the governance at 
that group and they should be 
Scottish Enterprise…so the national agency 
conversation has become much easier, 
particularly for smaller cities’ (RI3) 
‘you can’t underestimate the access to senior 
ministers that that SCA provides (RI10) 
 
Clarity of purpose: 
‘the political lobbying, the pressing for 
governmental input both politically and 
financially, and I think that’s improved with 
the change to the structure and focus on 
[council] leaders meetings’(I12) 
‘there is better governance rigour’(RI11) 
‘I think there’s been some move towards trying 
to tailor things towards the government’s 
agenda. I’m not sure it’s quite there yet’(RI14) 
Impact: 
‘There needs to be tangible, you know, 
evidence of things we’ve actually achieved. 
And I don’t think there is at the moment, you 
know’ (I14) 
‘a significant amount of institutional learning 
which is intangible and difficult to measure, 
…cities relationships. In particular the smaller 
cities have been getting investment and 
promotional experience from the larger 
cities’(RI15) 
 ‘City Deal’ work has massively enhanced 
learning and good practice amongst all the 
authorities…across and between the other 
cities as well.’ (RI12). 
forward and that it is aligned with their 
role in the core cities’(RI2) 
‘Glasgow was in a much better place…the 
fact that City Deals then came out at a 
national level, I think Glasgow was in a 
much stronger position to have learned 
some lessons…in terms of how you would 
construct those relationships that were 
maybe different from the way we’d 
approached it in the Alliance.(RI20) 
‘the executive leads for regeneration or 
development started regularly attending 
and sitting together talking about a 
common agenda.’ (RI20) 
Tension:  
‘there’s definitely a tension there, there’s 
no question about it…there’s quite a 
reluctance with a small r on behalf of the 
Scottish Government, to go down the 
route of a political chair and a division 
away from all six meetings being with the 
minister to just three of them, and three 
being leaders only…there is a very broad 
level of support both amongst the seven 
leaders and the seven chief execs for the 
direction of travel. The slight resistance 
has not been from those quarters, it’s 
more been from central government, from 
Scottish Government’ (RI12) 
Agendas: 
‘I think there are stresses there that, you 
know, are…frankly all tied up in the 
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focusing on the strategic 
elements,’(RI13) 
 
 
 
 
‘Dundee particularly might not be recognised 
as an investment opportunity on its own.’ 
(RI14) 
‘most of the cities are taking forward city deals 
now, and they're trying to understand how they 
go through the process, because it's not, like, 
there's a set process for this’ (RI21) 
‘looking at city deal models for cities was quite 
useful in exposing us to how other cities were 
looking strategically at city development and 
investment’ (RI13) 
‘the SCA has a much higher profile now than it 
did a year ago and now quoted as being 
influential’(RI13) 
Communication: 
‘we’ve put more resource into that, more 
resource into communication and I think that’s 
starting to make a bit of difference and raised 
the profile outside.’ (RI10) 
Stability: 
‘I think the inevitable political changes in May 
2017, will be a bit of a barrier because given 
the nature of local political system… we’re 
almost certain to see quite a tumble in terms of 
the membership in terms of leaders.’(RI12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ambitions of certain council leaders.’ 
(RI14) 
‘I think the alternative [to the Scottish 
Governments’ funding support of the 
SCA] is money from the cities.  But that’s 
easy for me to say coming from a large 
city’ (RI12) 
‘we are pushing quite strongly and 
politically to get a city region deal for 
[our] city’(RI10) 
‘Glasgow and the Clyde Valley City Deal 
was driven very much by Glasgow and 
the Clyde Valley.  But I think the Cities 
Alliance is now supportive of the other 
local authorities pushing for City Deals’ 
(RI12) 
‘cities are more confident now that there 
are certain things that can be delivered 
from within the local authority other than 
a central position, for example Scottish 
Enterprise, Scottish International 
Development, International Visit 
Scotland, Skills Development 
Scotland…that might be better delivered 
for local people in a slightly different way 
rather than it being national’ (RI3) 
Strength of ties: 
‘opportunities, from the inward 
investment side of things...the cities, on 
their own, are not big enough…so they're 
pairing up’(RI21) 
 ‘Now, I wouldn’t hesitate to pick up the 
phone to any of them’(RI12)  
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‘if there are issues, I can pick up the 
phone and just speak directly, you know, 
which wouldn’t have happened before’ 
(RI14) 
‘relationships within and between cities 
has changed for the better’ (RI10) 
 ‘I think the Scottish Government will 
eventually step away and it will become a 
truly cities led-alliance’ (RI10) 
‘it’s moved quite considerably since the 
2012 elections…there are quarterly catch-
ups between Edinburgh and Glasgow 
chief execs management teams have 
quarterly catch-ups as well…there’s still a 
little bit of competition between us, but 
that’s a good thing.’(RI12) 
the leaders met before the Scottish 
government came in to discuss about what 
sort of approach they would want to take 
(RI10) 
Trust: 
‘a sea change in the willingness of people 
to share information, even confidential 
information with other cities’(RI13) 
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Appendix 11: Membership of the Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA)25 
 
The Scottish Government 
 
The Scottish Government is Scotland's devolved government established in 1999 as the Scottish 
Executive under section 44(1) of the Scotland Act 1998, which created a devolved administration 
for Scotland in line with the result of the 1997 referendum on Scottish devolution.  It was formally 
renamed in 2012 to the Scottish Government by section 12(1) of the Scotland Act 2012.   
 
The Scottish Government 
Established 1 July 1999; 18 years ago 
Polity Scotland 
Leader First Minister 
Appointed by First Minister approved by parliament and 
ceremonially appointed by the monarch. 
Main organ Scottish Cabinet 
Responsible 
to 
Parliament 
Annual 
budget 
£37.2 billion (2016–17) 
Headquarters St Andrew's House 
Edinburgh 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 The Information was taken mainly from: wikipedia.org: https://www.wikipedia.org/ (and accurate as at November 2017); The Scottish 
Cities Alliance website: https://www.scottishcities.org.uk/ and The Adenda for Cities (2016):  
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The Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI) 
 
The Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI) was founded in 1931 as a non-
governmental, membership organisation.  The SCDI’s aim is to: strengthen Scotland’s economic 
competitiveness through influencing government and key stakeholders to create sustainable 
economic prosperity for Scotland.  SCDI has approximately 1,200 members primarily made up of 
Scotland’s private, public and social economy sectors. 
 
Abbreviation SCDI 
Formation 1931 
Legal status Non-profit organisation 
Purpose Scottish Economic Development 
Location Glasgow (headquarters) 
Aberdeen 
Inverness 
Region served Scotland 
Membership 1,200 organisations 
President 
Chairman 
Chief Executive 
Lady Susan Rice 
Brendan Dick 
Mark Bevan 
Main organ SCDI Board and Policy Committee 
 
 
Scotland’s Urban Local Authorities 
 
There are currently 32 unitary authorities in Scotland.  Each council elects a Convener and Depute 
Convener to chair meetings of the Council.  In four city councils in Scotland - Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee - the Convener is called a Lord Provost, whilst in other councils 
the council may choose the title given to the Convener.  Most councils use the term 'Provost'.  The 
office of Provost or Convener’s traditional roles are ceremonial, although may have the additional 
duty of acting as Lord Lieutenant for their respective city. 
 
The Leader of the Council is elected as the leader of the largest political grouping of councillors. 
The Leader of the Council has no executive or administrative powers designated by statute, but the 
position is salaried.  There is also a Depute Leader of the Council. 
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Each political group within the council typically appoints a leader, with the largest grouping's 
leader becoming 'Leader of the Council', and being the central figure of de facto political authority. 
 
There are currently seven Urban Local Authorities (ULAs) (i.e. City Council’s) in Scotland, each 
members of the Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA), including: 
 
• Glasgow City Council 
• Edinburgh Council 
• Dundee City Council 
• Aberdeen Council 
• Inverness Council 
• Stirling Council 
• Perth and Kinross Council 
